MS Risk Blog

Russian 2024 Spring Offensive

Key Judgements:

• The Russian Spring Offensive would likely be targeting Kharkiv.
• Russia is likely to be able to establish a buffer zone to stop Ukrainian strikes against the Belgorod region.
• It is unlikely that Russia would be able to take control of the whole Kharkiv region, including the city of Kharkiv.
• It is realistically possible that the Russian Spring offensive would increase sceptical public opinion in the West, affecting the upcoming election. It is unlikely that this would directly convert into stopping Ukraine support.

Throughout history, the conflict in Eastern Europe has aligned with the natural rhythm of the seasons. The period of cold weather and mud, known as ‘Rasputitsa,’ significantly impacts the region, particularly in Ukraine. Rasputitsa has served as a formidable obstacle, a ‘wall of nature,’ for both Nazi Germany and Napoleon’s Grand Army during their respective invasions of Russia. In an ironic twist, the Russian military has become the most recent casualty of Rasputitsa.

In 2024, the Ukraine conflict reached a stalemate as neither side achieved significant progress despite multiple offensives in Eastern Ukraine. The combat revolved around trenches and bunkers, with both parties relying heavily on artillery and drones. Furthermore, long-range missiles and drones targeted vital infrastructure of both nations. The Russian military focused on damaging Ukraine’s infrastructure, including power plants, railroads, and broadcasting systems, while Ukraine countered by conducting sabotage inside Russia and striking near border cities. Despite the lack of advancement on the front lines, Russia aimed to weaken Ukraine’s society and force them to surrender on Russian terms.

In the year 2024, Western support for Ukraine has been unwavering, despite the ongoing conflict and political instability in the region. In April, the US Congress and Senate passed a bill to provide aid to Ukraine, which could potentially empower its military and help it withstand the long-standing challenges faced in the region. However, despite the continued support, there are signs of waning public opinion and political will to continue supporting Ukraine. The general population in the West is experiencing a sense of fatigue and disillusionment after years of conflict and instability in the region. Moreover, with several significant elections looming in the European Parliament, the UK, and the US, the current policy towards Ukraine could significantly change. It is important to note that the former US President Donald Trump had a pro-Russian stance in his foreign policy, which could have a significant impact on the future of Ukraine and Russia. Therefore, 2024 could prove to be a critical turning point for both Ukraine and its Western allies.

It is likely that President Putin, having been re-elected in 2024, will view this as an opportunity to establish his exit strategy in the Ukraine war and demonstrate to the Russian public that NATO has been defeated. Due to natural constraints, large-scale military operations are only feasible during the Spring, which has led Ukrainian and Western experts to anticipate an impending Russian offensive. Considering these circumstances, this forthcoming offensive is of critical importance to both Russia and Ukraine.

It appears that the current offensive in the north is directed towards Kharkiv City, which happens to be Ukraine’s second largest city. Over the past few months, the city has been subjected to drone and missile attacks that have primarily targeted its infrastructure. Recently, the Russian MOD announced that Moscow’s troops had taken control of several villages including Pletenivka, Ohirtseve, and Borysivka. It seems that the Russian forces are trying to establish a buffer zone that would prevent Ukrainian strikes into the Russian region that borders northern Ukraine. Belgorod, a Russian city, has been a major target of Ukrainian sabotage and bombing for months. In March, President Putin alluded to the possibility of creating a “sanitary zone” in Ukrainian territory that adjoins Belgorod. If the buffer zone is established, Russian forces would be able to target Kharkiv with their vast artillery capability. The current offensive in Northern Ukraine suggests that Russia has chosen to advance in a region that is less fortified than Eastern Ukraine.

According to several reports, it appears that the Russian forces stationed in northern Ukraine are facing challenges in terms of both quality and quantity. It is estimated that there are around 50,000 to 70,000 Russian personnel in the area, but a Russian opposition outlet reported in March that an additional 300,000 personnel would be required to encircle Kharkiv. Given that the total number of Russian forces in Ukraine is roughly 510,000, it seems unlikely that they could fully encircle Kharkiv without either utilizing forces from the Eastern Front or compromising their efforts. Additionally, the Russian forces stationed in the north have suffered significant losses over the past three years of war, and this trend is continuing.

Although there is a possibility that Russia may deploy additional units to aid the Kharkiv offensive in Ukraine, it is unlikely for several reasons. Over the course of three years of war, Russia has resorted to conscripting from its own population, including prisoners and foreign mercenaries, resulting in a significant number of Russian citizens fleeing to neighbouring countries and heightened public resistance. Putin has responded with severe political violence, including the death of Alexei Navalny and the detainment of journalists and activists labelled as “extremists.” In March, President Putin signed a degree for the routine spring conscription campaign, calling for 150,000 citizens to serve in the military. While it is realistically possible that Russia could conscript additional troops for this offensive, it remains doubtful that these forces would be able to be deployed to northern Ukraine, even if a surprise conscription were conducted.

Even in the best-case scenario for Russian forces, it would be impossible for them to achieve victory through force against Ukraine. As a result, Russia has shifted its focus towards persuading both Ukraine and the Western world to cease providing aid to Ukraine, and ultimately accept a peace deal in Russia’s favour. While a victory in northern Ukraine could potentially influence public opinion in the West, it is unlikely that Putin’s desired outcome would come to fruition. The Russian threat is increasingly concerning, particularly for Eastern European countries such as Poland, Moldova, and the Baltic nations. With an aggressive stance towards the West and a growing number of Russian espionage incidents, most European countries, with the exception of Hungary, maintain their stance against Russia. The majority of EU countries still view supporting Ukraine as a top priority for the newly elected European parliament, even though losing belief of Ukraine’s total victory. It is possible that the successful Russian offensive could align with Trump’s goal of improving the US-Russia relationship. President Trump has expressed his belief that US-Russian policy is unreasonable and has publicly stated that he would end the ongoing Ukraine conflict during his second term in office. However, even if President Trump were to get re-elected in November 2024, his term would not start until January 2025, and balanced House and Senate would not be able to expedite Trump’s drastic foreign policy that would demolish US led world alliance.

In conclusion, Russia’s spring offensive is one of the best exit strategies for Russia, and for President Putin. Replacing defence minister Sergei Shoigu on 12 May could be one of indicator that Putin has high hope for 2024. However, it seems unlikely that Putin’s high hope in this offensive would become reality. Without dramatic development in the frontline or Western countries, it is likely that Russia would still remain in self-made dilemma in Ukraine.

The Clash of Longstanding Rivals: A Turning Point in the Middle East?

This paper delves into the recent escalation between Iran and Israel, focusing on the aerial assault targeting the Iranian consulate in Damascus at the beginning of the month and Iran’s response through a missile operation directed at Israel on April 14th. It evaluates the scale of the attacks, their impact on regional stability, and the diplomatic consequences. The analysis further assesses the risk of additional escalation and the difficulties faced by international efforts aimed at decreasing tensions in the Middle East.

As a result of an aerial assault on April 1, that targeted the Iranian consulate in Damascus, thirteen people were killed including a senior commander in the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and his deputy General Mohammad Hadi Hajriahimi. Iran deemed this assault a violation of its sovereignty and issued a threat of retaliation. In response, Iran launched a missile operation targeting Israel on April 14th, hitting multiple targets simultaneously. This marked the initial frontal strike witnessed between the two adversaries after a significant period.

The Israeli military reported that Iran deployed over 300 drones and missiles against Israel. The assault consisted of a total of 170 drones and 30 guided missiles, along with a minimum of 110 long-range ballistic missiles.

Four missiles struck the Israeli airbase, aimed at the Nevatim air base located in the Negev desert in Southern Israel, base is to the country’s F-35 fighter jets. Although the Iranian army said that their blitz “successfully accomplished all its goals,” the actual impact was limited. Only minor damage occurred at the Nevatim Air Base in the southern region, and a 7-year-old child sustained injuries from fragments of an intercepted missile.  During the assault, sounds of explosives were detected in various locations, including Tel Aviv. As Israeli forces attempted to intercept the projectiles, air raid alarms were activated in over 720 locations and the detonations were also detected in Jerusalem.

Israel said that almost 99% of the incoming barrage was successfully intercepted, either before it entered Israeli territory or while it was over the nation. Israel, together with the US, UK, France, and Jordan, successfully intercepted drones and cruise missiles. Jordan has acknowledged that it shot down Iranian drones to defend national sovereignty. Jordan also granted Israeli airplanes limited access to its airspace. In addition, the Saudis are said to have shared intelligence with the US and monitored potential risks posed by Iranian-supported militant factions in Yemen.

In response, Israel retaliated by targeting Isfahan, a city of strategic significance that has several crucial facilities, such as military research and development centers and bases. In addition, Iran’s nuclear enrichment plant is situated in the neighbouring city of Natanz. The strike was more limited than anticipated, indicating a deliberate effort to discourage Iran without escalating the situation.

Israel was warned by Iran against launching a response. Major General Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, claimed on state television that Iran’s retaliatory measures would be “significantly more extensive” than the assault if Israel retaliates. Washington was also cautioned by Iran that support for Israeli retaliation could result in the targeting of American bases.

As the likelihood of a spillover conflict in the Middle East grows, an increasing number of Western and Middle Eastern nations are concerned about what’s to come. Another conflict in the Middle East is something that ‘we cannot afford’ as UN Security Council Secretary Antonio Guterres stated.

The escalation between Iran and Israel poses a regional threat of destabilisation to an already unstable area. Israel is currently dealing with the violence emerging from Iran-backed militia groups along its border, including Hezbollah; therefore, an actual confrontation would be a very challenging conflict to manage.

The escalation between Iran and Israel presents also diplomatic challenges that have the potential to disrupt regional stability and international relations. The participation of nations including France, Jordan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia adds a layer of complexity to the attempts aimed at mitigating tensions and achieving a peaceful resolution.

To sum up, further escalation of the tensions between the two states and the failure of diplomatic negotiations to defuse it could have additional repercussions for regional security. Amidst the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, the Middle East is already affected by serious unrest, including attacks and counterattacks in Iraq involving the US, and confrontations in Syria and Lebanon.

Somali piracy amid Houthi disruption

Key Judgments:

1. We assess that Somali pirates pose a heightened threat to commercial ships. The rise in Somali piracy in this region is seen as an opportunistic approach to their activities, rather than a strategic approach, and is due to the disruptions that have been caused by Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. (High Confidence).
2. Somali pirates are almost certainly not collaborating with the Houthis. We assess that their recent resurgence is out of opportunism, not support for the Houthis. (High Confidence).

Hamas attacked Israel on October 7^th of 2023, which since has resulted in a regional escalation of conflict. Since November 2023, the Houthi’s have been attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in order to damage Israeli trade, as well as gain support from the Yemeni population under the guise of a ‘Just War’. In reality, the Houthi’s attacks on commercial shipping have been indiscriminate, resulting in massive changes to global supply chains. In an effort to avoid the potential for attack in the Red Sea, commercial ships have opted to instead travel south and go around the African continent via the Cape of Good Hope route. Due to the deterioration of maritime security in the southern Red  Sea and Gulf of Aden region, Somali pirates have increased their operations in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the wider Indian Ocean area, adding another threat to vessels transiting this region. This report aims to assess the likely involvement of Iran and/or the Houthis in Somali activities, and the threat posed to commercial ships by Somali pirates.

In the first quarter of 2024, there have been 33 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery against commercial ships globally, which is up from 27 in the same period in 2023, according to the International Maritime Bureau. Of these 33 incidents, 5 have been attributed to Somali pirates and include activities such as hijackings, approaching and firing upon a vessel, and taking the crew hostage of a Bangladeshi flagged bulk carrier in March of 2024. The bulk carrier was hijacked by around 20 Somali pirates approximately 550 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia, demonstrating their ability to operate far off the coast, as well as their mounting capabilities from skiffs onto larger vessels. Despite this, however, it must be noted that while 5 events attributed to Somali pirates have occurred in Q1 of 2024, 358 events of attempted and successful piracy occurred from 2010 to 2015. This is important to contextualise the scale of current attacks, being nowhere near the level that it was between 2010-2017. This suggests that while there is cause for concern in the rise of Somali piracy, it is also not a strategic resurgence of piracy. Rather, it is an opportunistic moment for the pirates to take advantage of the disruption caused by the Houthi’s in Yemen, and the increase in vessel traffic within their vicinity. As a result, we assess that Somali pirates pose a heightened threat to commercial ships. Vessels transiting the Indian Ocean and near waters off Somalia are advised to remain vigilant and on high alert. (High Confidence).

The timing of the resurgence of piracy has led to questions being asked as to whether the Somali pirates and the Houthi’s are collaborating in their effort to disrupt commercial shipping in the region. This is plausible as Iran has established links with the jihadist group Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Iran uses these links to smuggle Iranian oil into Somalia and then sell it at cheap prices in Africa to avoid U.S. sanctions and to supply arms to Houthi rebels in Yemen. Iran is also said to have provided Al-Shabaab with financial and material support and may have paid rewards to militants to attack US and international forces in Somalia and the region. For example, on January 5, 2020, two days after the former head of the Quds Force Qassem Soleimani was killed in a US airstrike in Baghdad, Al-Shabab launched an attack on a military base used by US and Kenyan forces in coastal Lamu, Kenya. Al-Shabab did not say its attack was linked to Soleimani’s killing, but the timing of the attack and al-Shabab’s “history of opportunistic strikes” suggests that the two events may have been linked. This analysis ties Iran and Al-Shabab together through trade and financial support, however this does not necessarily spill over to Somali pirates and the Houthis. Whilst indirect ties via Iran and Al-Shabab may imply some sort of connection, we have assessed that this is very unlikely. The limited scale of attacks from Somali pirates, as well as the lack of coordination between targets, leads us to assess that Somali pirates are almost certainly not collaborating with the Houthis. We assess that their recent resurgence is out of opportunism, not support for the Houthis. (High Confidence).

Assessing Israel’s Operation at Al-Shifa Hospital: Justifiable Defence or Violation?    

This paper provides an analysis of the Israeli Defence Forces’ (IDF) operations at Al-Shifa Hospital on March 18th. It evaluates the claims regarding the presence of Hamas members, the civilian casualties, and the ethical considerations involved in striking medical facilities. The assessment evaluates the IDF’s compliance with international law and suggests different approaches to the conflict’s settlement in response to the growing concerns.

On March 18^th the IDF conducted an operation at Al-Shifa Hospital in northern Gaza which stood among the “most significant and successful” efforts throughout the intensely disputed six-month conflict with Hamas according to the IDF. They alleged that the facility and many other medical centres served as a hub for Hamas terrorists to carry out operations and conceal their weapons. The Israeli military claimed to have found a tunnel entrance and a vehicle carrying weapons at Al-Shifa hospital complex. Both Hamas and medical administrators strongly denied the accusation that the hospital served as a command centre, and the health ministry in Gaza stated that no weapons were found in the hospital. A British doctor working at Shifa dismissed the allegation as an “outlandish excuse.”

The raid allegedly was designed to eliminate senior Hamas terrorists who were present at the hospital. However, the hospital is estimated to have been sheltering 3,000 civilians as per the Palestinian health officials and IDF.  According to the official media office in Gaza, during the raid, the Israeli attack on the facility resulted in over 250 Palestinians being killed and more others injured.

Israel said that they arrested around 800 individuals, with 480 of them identified as members of Hamas or the Islamic Jihad. The IDF began the interrogation of individuals by specialised intelligence units, and those found to be innocent were eventually released. Israeli military spokespersons, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari and Lt Col Jonathan Conricus attempted to justify their actions by providing the media with only a small amount of evidence. Hagari presented a few Kalashnikovs and a motorcycle at al-Rantisi Children’s Hospital, while Conricus presented AK assault weapons without ammunition magazines, a laptop, and cans of WD40 in al-Shifa. Nevertheless, their efforts to support their assertions were regarded with doubt since the evidence provided was insufficient and inconclusive.

Unidentified sources in Gaza for safety concerns, confirm that there is a belief that multiple members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, including certain high-ranking commanders, have once again gathered at the hospital. This assumption is mainly based on the assumption that Israel has completed its operations in northern Gaza.

US President Joe Biden has expressed support for Israel’s position about the destructive explosion at a Gaza hospital during his brief discussion about Israel. The White House asserted that it possessed independent evidence indicating that Hamas was utilising Al-Shifa, for conducting military operations and perhaps storing weapons.

The activities carried out by the IDF at Al-Shifa Hospital give rise to significant questions regarding ethical standards and compliance with international humanitarian law (Geneva Convention IV). Targeting health institutions and units, such as hospitals, is against the law as these places are designated as protected zones for providing medical care to the wounded. The IDF’s military actions resulted in injuries and harm among civilians and healthcare workers, suggesting a possible failure to uphold these legal responsibilities. These actions could have legal repercussions, especially in light of recent developments such as South Africa’s initiative to bring Israel before international courts for alleged war crimes.

The IDF must urgently revaluate its strategy in this conflict. Rather than resorting to direct raids on hospitals based on intelligence about potential Hamas presence, a more nuanced approach could be adopted. This might involve closely monitoring suspected militants’ movements and preventing attacks on Israel through proactive measures. So far, the IDF’s tactics seem reactive rather than preventative, highlighting the need for a shift in approach to better comply with legal and ethical standards while ensuring the protection of civilians.

By following the approach of monitoring the group as many governments have conducted in previous operations including operations Barkhane, an African military initiative initiated in 2014 under the leadership of France, which aimed to counteract terrorism and instability in the Sahel region. The operation utilised air support, combat forces, and intelligence gathering to target associates of al-Qaeda and ISIS, among other terrorist organisations. With the assistance of international support and contributions from partner nations, the primary objectives were to neutralise militants, destroy their networks, and provide support to local security forces. Despite ongoing threats and challenges, the operation emphasised on minimising civilian casualties through precise targeting and thorough preparation to promote stability and security in the region.

To summarise, Israel’s Operation at Al-Shifa Hospital highlights the complex balance between the need for defence and the standards of humanitarianism. The operation’s impact on non-combatant casualties and moral challenges needs a revaluation of military tactics, highlighting the significance of following legal and ethical norms while safeguarding innocent lives which Israel has been dismissing so far.

Moldova’s Pivot to the West

Key Judgements:

It is highly likely that President Sandu will be re-elected in upcoming presidential election of 2024. (High confidence)

It is Almost certain that re-elected President Sandu would attempt to join EU, aiming to become a member state within the next 10 years. (High confidence)

It is unlikely Moldova will attempt to join NATO in the next 18 months (Medium confidence)

It is highly likely that Moldova will suffer more intense Russian led hybrid warfare, concerning Transnistria in the next 18 months. (High confidence)

It is realistically possible that direct military confrontation between Moldova and separatist could happen in the next 18 months.

Moldova, a small post-Soviet state, finds itself at a pivotal juncture in its history, grappling with threats from Russia. Moldova has historically maintained a cultural divergence from Russian civilization, showing a closer affinity with Romania. This distinction became blurred with the 18th-century expansion of the Russian Empire, which subsumed the territory of contemporary Moldova, a condition that lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The demographic landscape of Moldova, characterized by substantial Russian and Ukrainian populations, remained unaltered post-independence.

The political environment bequeathed to Moldova was fraught with challenges, especially from pro-Russian elements, leading to the emergence of Transnistria and Gagauzia. These entities have persistently pursued independence, echoing the turmoil in eastern Ukraine and complicating Moldova’s endeavours to align with NATO and the EU.

Moldova, as one of Europe’s least affluent countries, was profoundly reliant on Russia economically, a dependence that exacerbated its economic downturn post-2014 when relations with Russia soured. The advent of COVID-19 in 2020 and the Ukraine conflict in 2022 further debilitated GDP growth, diminished foreign investment, and spurred inflation, which surged to 34% in October 2022, marking one of the highest rates in Europe.

In this context, Moldova has striven to maintain a delicate balance between the West and Russia. Despite Russian machinations aimed at derailing pro-EU policies and the presence of pro-Russian separatists, efforts to enhance ties with the West have been stymied. However, President Maia Sandu, who took office in December 2020, with a robust economic background and substantial connections with the US, has ardently championed pro-EU policies and domestic reforms. The Ukraine crisis in 2022 propelled her to file an application for EU membership a month post-invasion, delineating a definitive stance against Russian encroachments.

This scenario mirrors Ukraine’s existential predicament, suggesting Moldova could be Russia’s next target. Despite the Russian military’s failure to advance in Odesa, a strategic entry point to Moldova, Russia persists in exerting non-military pressure on Moldova. In 2023, Moldovan intelligence disclosed Russia’s illicit funneling of over $55 million to sway local elections. Moreover, pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor has been implicated in orchestrating protests and election fraud.

Russian influence has deeply infiltrated Moldova’s political sphere, evident in the support that figures such as Ion Ceban, the capital’s mayor, have received from ex-FSB officers. The separatist movements in Transnistria and Gagauzia remain a significant concern, with Russia’s interest in these regions noticeably intensifying in recent months. In response, the Moldovan government and its Western allies have undertaken measures to counter these threats, including the suspension of the Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, removing military constraints. Also, flooding media reports that pictures President Sandu as the ideal figure for the EU suggest that the narrative to include Moldova as EU member is getting thrust within the EU decision makers.

Amid these challenges, the current administration has pursued pro-EU policies with unprecedented level backed by political victory. The Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), the governing party, garnered 52.80% in the 2021 parliamentary elections. President Sandu’s victory in the 2020 election by a 15% margin, alongside the PAS party’s continued popularity, as demonstrated in the 2023 local elections, underscores a significant political shift. The current administration’s biggest political baggage is economic situation, but the PAS party and President Sandu still maintain public support by driving EU agenda as a main policy.

The 2024 presidential election emerges as a critical moment for Moldova, President Sandu, Russia, and the West. President Sandu’s decision to coincide the EU membership referendum with the presidential election signifies the centrality of EU relations to the electoral discourse. Despite the complex public sentiment on security threats from Russia and the value of neutrality, the endorsement for EU membership is palpable, with 48% support for the referendum and a mere 27% favouring NATO membership, underscoring a widespread desire for economic and political stability amidst a 69% majority valuing neutrality as paramount for Moldova’s security. If President Sandu could maintain her highest approval rate until the presidential election in Fall, it would be possible for her to continue her administration with the support of dominance in the parliament.

Currently, Russia has a very small entry point to Moldovan politics. With more people seeing EU as a better economic partner than Russia, and the sanctions that targeted Russian foreign business, Russia is losing its economic influence within the country. This means Russia is losing its non-kinetic options against Moldova, which eventually lead to a more violent and drastic measure to keep Moldova in line. Russia’s foreign minister publicly announcing to protect separatist Russian in Moldova, and installation of polling station in Transnistria for the Russian presidential election is one of the indicators of Russian desperation.

Within these contexts, the President Sandu’s administration and separatist is in a zero-sum game. It is highly likely that actor would be a driving force of increasing domestic tension. Also, Russia with continuing embarrassment in Ukraine, increasing domestic nationalism and public scrutiny after the presidential election, the Kremlin simply cannot endure another ex-soviet nation to join the West.  In both practical sense and saving President Putin’s face.

Therefore, with the assumption that President Sandu would win in presidential election of 2024, Moldova is highly likely to desperately attempt to join the EU. However, it is unlikely that Moldova will attempt to join NATO simultaneously while pursuing EU membership. It is highly likely that Russian led hybrid warfare against Moldova will intensify to historical levels, but it is unlikely that President Sandu or the public opinion would change its course because of it.

It is realistically possible there would be a direct military confrontation between Moldova and the separatist government, and it is also realistically possible Russian proxy force would intervene in this scenario. However, this confrontation could create patriotic public opinion or demand of neutrality. The shift of public opinion would be dependent on the amount of threat by separatist, reaction of Moldova, Western support, US presidential election and ongoing Ukraine war. These variables would have a direct effect on the parliamentary election in 2025, that would decide the nation’s driving policy.

It is highly unlikely that direct Russian invasion would happen.

This detailed analysis highlights the intricate and dynamic political landscape of Moldova, marked by internal discord, external pressures, and the quest for a balanced and secure future. The impending electoral and referendum processes are pivotal in determining Moldova’s trajectory amid ongoing geopolitical tensions and domestic challenges.

Within this context, it is clear that both the separatist and Moldovian governments is in a zero-sum game. It is likely that the separatist governments of Transnistira and Gagaugia would demand Russian intervention for survival.