The Greenland Crisis

Key Judgements

• U.S. pressure to take control over Greenland triggered a major NATO internal conflict, prompting Operation Arctic Endurance, a coordinated NATO military exercise deployment to Greenland to deter escalation and signal alliance resolve.
• Washington frames its Greenland strategy around the $175 billion Golden Dome and Arctic defence, but the primary objective is likely to be securing rare earth access to counter China’s 90% dominance of global supply chains.
• The Davos Framework has eased tensions temporarily with a negotiation period focused on expanding NATO Arctic operations but suspended U.S. tariffs are set to rise to 25% and tensions resume if no agreement reached by 1 June 2026.

Objective

This report assesses the strategic, economic and alliance risks arising from the Greenland sovereignty crisis. It examines U.S. interest in Greenland’s potential role in strengthening Western rare earth supply chain resilience, explores the impact of U.S. trade and security leverage on NATO and EU cohesion, and  evaluates the Davos Framework as a temporary de-escalation mechanism.

Context

The U.S. move on Greenland created serious tensions within NATO and on transatlantic relations. While the U.S. remains a central security partner, its approach has raised concerns among European allies about respect for sovereignty, alliance norms, and collective decision-making. The situation is shaped by two parallel pressures: U.S. strategic priorities in Arctic defence linked to the Golden Dome missile programme, and intensifying competition over rare earth supply chains, which remain heavily dominated by China. Following a temporary U.S.–China agreement in November 2025 that eased rare earth export restrictions, China’s current licensing regime is due to expire on 10 November 2026, creating uncertainty over future supply. This has increased U.S. interest in alternative sources, bringing Greenland’s mineral potential into sharper strategic focus.

Analysis

Alliance Shock: Western Europe and the NATO Stress Test

The diplomatic crisis between the United States and Denmark raised widespread European concern, and President Trump’s 11 January 2026 statement that he would act on Greenland ‘one way or another’ suggested coercion against a fellow NATO member.  Just a few days later on 15 January,  Operation Arctic Endurance, a Danish-led military deployment supported by seven allies was deployed to Greenland, formally framed as an exercise to counter potential Russian activity but understood to signal deterrence and allied solidarity in response to the perceived U.S. threat. The episode exposed European vulnerability to U.S. unilateralism and raised broader concerns about alliance cohesion, sovereignty norms, and the predictability of U.S. leadership within NATO.

National Security Framing: Executive Leverage and European Risk

The strategic value of Greenland exists due to its missile warning capabilities and for North Atlantic security, and a national security narrative serves as political cover for Washington to achieve its wider strategic goals without appearing to engage in a territorial land grab. Positioning Greenland as a national security priority, anchored in the $175 billion Golden Dome missile-defence program, also enables expansion of presidential legal powers such as use of the Defence Production Act, with reduced Congressional and allied oversight. For European allies, this situation creates a precedent risk, signalling a willingness by the U.S. to prioritise executive power of alliance consensus, which has implications for trade, defence and security.

Core Strategic Driver: Rare Earths, China, and Supply Chain Leverage

The primary driver behind U.S. interest in Greenland is likely rare earth access, aimed at weakening China’s 90% dominance of the market. Greenland holds an estimated 36.1 million metric tonnes of rare earth reserves, positioning it among the world’s most significant untapped sources. Against this backdrop, Trump’s strategy is likely shaped by a desire to approach the November 2026 expiry of China’s rare-earth export controls with greater leverage and contingency options, reducing U.S. exposure to Chinese economic pressure.

Greenland’s resources are not as inaccessible as often assumed, with several major deposits located in ice-free coastal regions that are increasingly viable for extraction. Although infrastructure investment remains substantial, commercial momentum is growing. Energy Transition Minerals has committed $150 million to Greenlandic rare earth development, though the project is currently stalled due to ongoing legal and regulatory disputes, while the Tanbreez project has secured approximately $120million in government-backed financing to support a Western-aligned supply chain.  These developments suggest Greenland’s rare earth sector is commercially viable, strategically significant and financially attractive, with clear implications for long-term industrial resilience.

The Davos Framework: A Six-Month Strategic Pause

The Davos Framework brokered on 21 January 2026 saw the United States pause threats of force and suspend 10% punitive tariffs while Denmark and its allies pursue negotiations on the proposed NATO-led ‘Arctic Sentry’ mission. This mission allows for an expansion of U.S. operations in the Arctic region without a formal transfer of sovereignty. President Trump later revealed there was also discussion regarding Greenlandic mineral rights which suggests that access to natural resources is an implicit condition of the agreement so far as the U.S. is concerned.  Failure to reach an agreement by 1 June 2026  risks renewed trade escalation and further alliance strain. As such, the Davos Framework currently functions as a temporary truce rather than a durable resolution, leaving the underlying drivers of the crisis unresolved.

China-Philippines Territorial Dispute in the South China Sea

Key Judgements

Tensions continue to rise in the South China Sea as China and the Philippines remain entangled in a maritime dispute amid legal standoff. The turn of the new year saw Filipino Coast Guard assets facing off a Chinese research vessel off the coast of northern Cagayan province, with China most recently driving away a Philippine aircraft over the disputed Scarborough Shoal. As the Philippines adopts an increasingly defensive posture towards China, continued incursions into contested waters risk escalation, almost ten years after the Permanent Court of Arbitration dismissed China’s territorial claims in the region.

Objective

This report addresses recent evolutions in maritime contestation between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, seeking to understand the progression of hostile interceptions and legal challenges against a backdrop of shifting regional postures in foreign policy.

Context

China and the Philippines have been locked in a dispute over maritime boundaries for some time, with China claiming long-standing access to waters outlined within its 1947 formulation of what would become the “Nine-Dash Line,” whilst the Philippines argues adherence to an international consensus of Exclusive Economic Zone sovereignty. Philippine claims rest on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) framework – stating a nation retains sovereign access to waters within 200 nautical miles of their land. The resource-dense area has since experienced clashes amongst fishing vessels and coast guard ships of both nations, with the emergence of artificial islands representing the most recent escalation of posturing in the region. China has rejected the Hague’s 2016 Court of Arbitration ruling dismissing its territorial claims in the area, favouring informal historical narratives in support of its strategic ambitions. The region continues to garner international attention as US military bases in the Philippines represent a critical superpower stronghold in a period of great power competition across the Pacific.

Timeline

• 20^th January – China reports that it intercepted and escorted a Philippine aircraft away from the Scarborough Shoal area.
• 19^th January – Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. announces that the Philippines has made its first gas discovery in more than a decade approximately 50 miles northwest of Palawan province.
• 15^th January – The Philippines and Japan sign two defence pacts, incorporating shared supplies and services as well as funds to support the building of facilities to house naval vessels donated by Japan.
• 30^th December – A Chinese research ship is challenged by the Philippine Coast Guard around 19 nautical miles off the coast of northern Cagayan province, home to one of the nine military bases open to US forces.

Analysis

As the Philippines officially assumed chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in late 2025, the position offers President Marcos Jr. with the opportunity to concentrate international attention on the dispute and bolster its own support. As Japan and South Korea step up resistance operations to Chinese incursions, the strengthening of bilateral agreements such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement with Japan serve to present a united front against China. The Philippines will seek to advance its legal argument as it prepares a second legal case against Beijing for environmental damage in the West Philippine Sea. Both Chinese ambassador to the Philippines Jing Quan and Filipino Foreign Minister Ma. Theresa Lazaro have expressed willingness to resolve the dispute by the close of 2026, as the negotiations for a “road map” scheduled for the first quarter of the year nears. China will be intent on refusing to cede its claims as other South-East Asian nations monitor the situation closely in light of their own maritime disputes with China. The issue provides the Philippines with increased opportunity to gain strategic alliances in the region and leverage US political muscle as tensions in Taiwan continue, all whilst drawing itself closer to confrontation with its biggest trading partner. Should the Philippines continue to refuse acceptance of China’s overseas ambitions, the US-led bloc will find opportunity in reinforcing its economic and military posture in the region.

Iran’s Mass Crackdown on Nationwide Protests: Regional Implications and Escalation Risks

Key Judgements

• Iran’s security forces have killed at least 2,500-3,400 protesters during a violent crackdown on nationwide demonstrations that began in late December 2025, representing one of the deadliest protest suppressions in modern Iranian history and potentially precipitating a broader regional crisis.
• The crisis has prompted U.S. military repositioning and threats of intervention from President Trump, raising the immediate risk of a U.S.-Iran military confrontation while potentially destabilizing the broader regional security architecture.

Objective

This report examines the ongoing Iranian government crackdown on nationwide anti-regime protests, assessing the scale of violence, the regime’s strategic response, international reactions, and the potential for regional military escalation.

Context

Protests erupted across Iran beginning December 28, 2025, triggered by severe economic hardship, including sharp inflation, currency devaluation, and persistent electricity and gas shortages. What began as demonstrations over economic conditions rapidly evolved into broader anti-regime protests, with demonstrators calling for an end to Iran’s theocratic government. By January 1, 2026, security forces were firing live ammunition at protesters across multiple cities.

On January 8, Iranian authorities implemented a comprehensive internet blackout while dramatically escalating violence. Security forces used rifles, heavy machine guns, and coordinated sniper fire from elevated positions. Medical workers reported morgues overflowing with bodies, with 150 deceased protesters brought to a single Mashhad hospital on January 9 alone. More than 18,400 people have been arrested, with Iran’s judiciary calling for swift executions. The Prosecutor General declared all protesters “mohareb” (enemies of God), a charge carrying the death penalty.

Timeline

December 28, 2025 – Protests begin across Iran over economic hardship

January 1, 2026 – Security forces begin using live ammunition; at least 28 killed in the first four days

January 8, 2026 – Near-total internet blackout implemented; 217 killed in Tehran alone this day

January 8-10, 2026 – Peak crackdown period; leaked documents suggest up to 12,000 killed during 48 hours

January 12, 2026 – First execution sentence handed down to 26-year-old protester Erfan Soltani

January 13-14, 2026 – U.S. begins withdrawing personnel from Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar; Trump administration considers military options

January 15, 2026 – Death toll reaches at least 2,637 according to U.S.-based rights groups

Analysis

Regional Security Implications

This crisis emerges at a particularly volatile moment. Iran’s “axis of resistance” has been significantly weakened following Israeli and U.S. strikes on its nuclear and missile programs, while Hezbollah has been decapitated and Hamas hollowed out militarily. The Islamic Republic, facing an internal legitimacy crisis and external military pressure, appears to have calculated that only overwhelming force can prevent regime change.

The U.S. military response, repositioning forces away from exposed bases while President Trump weighs military options, signals genuine concern about escalation. Iran’s parliament speaker has explicitly threatened U.S. bases and Israel if Washington backs strikes against Tehran, establishing red lines that increase miscalculation risks. Any U.S. military action would likely draw regional partners into wider conflict, potentially undoing fragile diplomatic progress, including Israeli-Arab normalization efforts.

International Response and Intervention Risk

The G7 has warned of additional sanctions, while the U.S. has imposed measures on Iranian officials, though these traditional tools appear inadequate to the crisis’s scale. President Trump’s oscillating statements reflect Washington’s uncertain calculus between supporting protesters and risking direct military confrontation. Beyond the immediate death toll, mass arrests exceeding 18,400 people combined with threats of swift trials and executions suggest additional casualties may occur through judicial killings.

Outlook and Scenarios

Near-term (1-4 weeks): Protests appear increasingly suppressed under a heavy security presence. The regime will likely proceed with show trials and selective executions to deter future unrest. However, the massive death toll has created thousands of grieving families with direct motivation for continued resistance.

Medium-term (1-3 months): Three scenarios appear most probable: (1) Successful suppression through sustained security presence but at enormous legitimacy cost, with unresolved economic conditions; (2) Evolution into periodic violent resistance creating persistent low-level conflict; or (3) International intervention triggered by executions or Iranian threats against regional assets, potentially escalating into broader regional conflict.

Long-term implications: Regardless of the immediate outcome, the regime has demonstrated its survival strategy centers on violence rather than reform. This fundamentally alters Iran’s domestic trajectory and regional role. The massive casualties will shape Iranian society for decades, either through successful intimidation or by creating a generation committed to revolutionary change. For regional stability, a regime that has killed thousands of its own citizens while facing external military pressure represents an unpredictable actor capable of desperate escalation.

Russian control and messaging within Orthodox identity in Moldova.

Key Judgements

• Russian-linked Orthodox circles are being leveraged to disperse anti-European ideology within socially conservative areas.
• Religious legitimacy provides Russian-linked actors with a deniable influence mechanism
• Activity levels are directly correlated to key political events such as elections. Suggesting tolerance and potentially coordination from Russian-friendly actors
• Unlikely to cause immediate instability. However, sustained religious mobilisation will eventually risk a dip in the perception of state legitimacy.

Objective

To assess the growing use of religious identity as a tool for Russian influence in Moldova and assess its wider implications for regional security dynamics.

Context

In recent years, Moldova has experienced a significant shift in strategic orientation. A largely euro – positive messaging has become commonplace in most Moldovan regions. However, intensifying Russian friction has led to a willingness to deploy non-military tools to reestablish influence inside of what Russia would consider to be its ‘sphere of influence’

Religion plays a unique role within Moldovan society. Approximately 85–90% of the population identifies as Orthodox Christian, with varying degrees of depth. The Orthodox church remains one of the most trusted institutions and still carries favour in older and more socially conservative regions. The trust that certain demographics retain within the church often exceeds that of traditional politics.

Beyond that, Gagauzia represents a particularly acute vulnerability. The region is ethnically distinct, Russian-speaking, and economically dependent, with strong historical, cultural, and media ties to Moscow. Its Euroscepticism is rooted in fears that European integration threatens traditional social norms, particularly around family structures, religious authority, and gender norms, as well as concerns over economic marginalisation. These factors have made Gagauzia the epicentre for anti-EU messaging, where European values are frequently framed as morally corrosive and incompatible with Orthodox traditions.

Rather than relying solely on economic leverage or more obvious political pressure. Moscow seems to be more willing to infringe public sentiment and frame geopolitical choices in moral terms rather than strategic ones.

Timeline

Pre 2022

• Religious influence in Moldova is largely apolitical, although links to Russia largely persist

2022-2023

• Russia’s invasion of Ukraine heightens EU sentiment in Moldova; Russian actors frame it as “morally corrosive”

2024

• First accusations of Clergy – linked messaging against EU positions, typically through sermons, social media and religious networks

2025

• Activity spikes close to electoral milestones, with increasing religious and political overlap.

Analysis

The use of the Orthodox church as a tool offers several strategic advantages. It allows for influence to be exerted quietly and below political thresholds. It speaks to cultural and emotional values and is practically unaffected by counter messaging, as well as limiting attribution back to Russia.

Moldovan authorities are essentially powerless against the spread of anti-EU messaging within religious spaces; direct interference is likely to be met with backlash. The measures currently in place are more focused on monitoring rather than disrupting or slowing the spread.

The tactic is classically Russian. Similar tactics have been observed elsewhere, including the use of Orthodox institutions in Ukraine before 2022, Georgia, and parts of the Western Balkans. The exploitation of internal divisions, the effort to avoid direct escalation and prioritising the erosion of long-term stability rather than short term disruption all fit the classical mould of Russian interference too. The impact will likely never come to a visible head, but the cumulative effect may well cause complications within Moldova over time.

Therefore, the leveraging of religion within Moldova by Russian actors will remain a persistent, low-visibility risk. Increases in messaging are to be expected in key political periods, but it is highly unlikely it will displace any real regional security concerns at this time.

Analysis on Situations in Syria and Lebanon

 Key Judgements

• Syria’s interim government faces a critical December 31, 2025, deadline to integrate Kurdish SDF forces, threatening the fragile one-year-old political transition if negotiations fail.

• Lebanon’s inability to disarm Hezbollah by the US-imposed December 31 deadline risks triggering renewed military conflict, with Israel conducting 5,350 ceasefire violations since November 2024.

• The parallel December deadlines in Syria and Lebanon create compounding regional instability, while Iraq’sUNAMI withdrawal and continued Houthi Red Sea attacks further strain security coordination across the MENA region.

Objective

This report examines how Syria’s political transition and Lebanon’s Hezbollah disarmament crisis, both facing end-of-year deadlines, are creating a critical juncture for regional stability, with spillover effects across Iraq, Yemen, and Red Sea security.

Context

December 8, 2025, marked one year since Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell, when Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led forces seized Damascus, and Assad fled to Russia. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government has since restructured governance, consolidated armed forces, and pursued international reintegration.However, critical challenges remain: integrating the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) by year-end per a March 10 agreement, managing ethnic tensions, and rebuilding after 13 years of civil war.

Simultaneously, Lebanon faces intense pressure to disarm Hezbollah by December 31 under a US-brokered 2024 ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire has proven one-sided; Hezbollah is prohibited from firing “even a single bullet” while Israel conducts preemptive strikes at will. Lebanese authorities report 5,350 violations since the November 27, 2024, ceasefire began, including 2,983 airstrikes, resulting in 331 deaths and 945 injuries. Israel launched intense airstrikes across southern and northeastern Lebanon on December 18 as the deadline approached.

Timeline

• December 8, 2024: Assad regime falls; HTS assumes power in Damascus
• November 27, 2024: US-brokered Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire takes effect
• March 10, 2025: Syria-SDF integration agreement signed with a December 2025 deadline
• November 26, 2025: US sets December 31 deadline for Hezbollah disarmament
• December 8, 2025: Syria celebrates first anniversary of Assad’s fall
• December 18, 2025: Israeli airstrikes intensify across Lebanon; Syria-SDF negotiations continue
• December 31, 2025: Dual deadlines; SDF integration and Hezbollah disarmament; UNAMI exits Iraq

Analysis

 Regional Security Implications

Syria’s transition faces its most critical test as SDF integration negotiations race against the December 31 deadline.Despite Commander Mazloum Abdi’s November 11 commitment to “accelerate integration,” deadly clashes continued in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates through late November. Failure to integrate the SDF, a key US partner controlling Syria’s autonomous northeast, risks fracturing Syria’s territorial integrity and complicating counter-ISIS operations along the Syrian-Iraqi border.

The Lebanon crisis presents even greater escalation risks. Hezbollah lawmaker Ali Ammar explicitly rejected disarmament, stating the group’s arsenal “will remain” until Israel withdraws from border positions and releases Lebanese detainees. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned military action may be the “only remaining option,” acknowledgingdiplomatic channels have stalled with “no real indication” of compliance. This creates immediate potential for renewed conflict that could destabilize Lebanon’s newly formed government under Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun.

Broader Regional Patterns

These crises unfold amid a deteriorating regional security architecture. Iraq’s security landscape remains volatile as UNAMI concludes its drawdown by December 31, removing international monitoring capacity precisely when regional tensions peak. ISIS continues exploiting Syria’s transition, focusing on rebuilding networks along the Syrian-Iraqi border and the Badia region.

Meanwhile, Houthi forces maintain pressure on Red Sea commercial shipping, launching missiles and drones at vessels as recently as December 5.

The convergence of these developments threatens coordinated counterterrorism efforts across the region. Syria’s potential fragmentation, Lebanon’s instability, Iraq’s reduced international presence, and continued Houthi operations create opportunities for ISIS and other extremist groups to exploit governance vacuums.

Outlook and Risks

The next two weeks are critical. If Syria’s SDF integration fails, ethnic violence could erupt in northeastern Syria, complicating reconstruction and refugee return. Missing the Hezbollah

deadline risks triggering what Washington warns could be a “new military conflict” with Lebanon bearing “fullresponsibility”. Such escalation would likely draw in regional actors and further destabilize an already fragile transition period across multiple MENA states.