Analysis on the German Far Right Party
June 28, 2024 in Uncategorized
The Allianz für Deutschland (AfD) is a right-wing German political party which has been hit with numerous serious accusations and scandals over the last few months in the run up to the German general elections. These scandals have included accusations of one of the party’s members conducting espionage for the Chinese intelligence services, the AfD having pro-Russian ties and that the party is a suspected extremist group. Yet despite all these scandals and accusations, shockingly, the AfD has done surprisingly well in the election polls this year. As of June 2024, the party beat Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats party, placing the AfD second in the polls with 15.9% of the vote and securing 96 seats in Parliament. The conservative alliance of the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian won the elections in Germany, winning with 30% of the vote. How has the AfD managed to perform so well in the elections despite facing serious allegations and accusations? How concerning is this situation for German Intelligence and just how much of a security risk is the AfD? This analytical paper seeks analyse these questions and also seeks to explore the major scandals which have occurred against the AfD in the run up to the elections.
Since 2021, the BnV has labelled the AfD as a “suspected” extremist right wing group, with individual state associations and the party’s youth organisation designated as confirmed right wing extremist by the BNV. The BnV stated that the party had become a “case of interest” due to the AfD becoming increasingly radicalised in its views since its founding in 2013, specifically advocating anti-immigration and anti-Islam viewpoints. In 2017, AfD co-leader Alexander Gauland stated that after winning its first parliamentary seats, the AfD “vowed to fight an invasion of foreigners” after Germany accepted tens of thousands of migrants into the country. The AfD’s far right extremist views can also be exemplified by the fact that the party’s leader in the eastern state of Thuringia, Björn Höcke once described Berlin’s Holocaust memorial as a “monument of shame” and also called for a “180-degree turnaround” in Germany’s handling of is Nazi past. One of the party’s former leaders, Frauke Petry also commented that German police should “if necessary” shoot at migrants seeking to enter the country illegally. All these statements collectively show that the party has deeply rooted far right extremist views and rightfully justifies the BnV’s decision to classify the party as a suspected extremist group and put the party under surveillance. In 2022, the AfD was described as “suspected threat to democracy” after judges in Cologne stated that the party had not distanced itself from its most extreme members who are a part of the AfD’s hardline ‘Wing” faction led by Björn Höcke. The court ruled that that these members within the AfD still had “significant influence” in the party as they believed that the “German people should be kept ethnically intact and ‘outsiders’ should be excluded as far as possible”. The court ruled that these beliefs went against the basic law in Germany’s constitution.
The BnV sees far right extremist political parties as a threat to Germany due to the fact that they have “set themselves the goal of securing votes in local, state, federal and European elections… to gain influence in parliaments”. The AfD has certainly met this criteria as its goal is to promote its far right views and gain as much parliamentary seats and influence as possible. The fact that a suspected extremist party is looking to gain as much political influence as possible in the country firmly highlights that the AfD is a security risk for Germany and her intelligence agencies. In its run up to the elections, the AfD was hit by numerous scandals. One of the biggest occurred in November 2022 when the AfD had a secret meeting with Austrian right-wing extremists in which they discussed plans to deport millions of immigrants from Germany if the AfD were to be elected. During the meeting, the discussion centred around the far right concept remigration, with an Austrian right wing extremist suggesting that people should be deported an area of North Africa, to a “model state” that could accommodate up to two million people. News of the meeting broke out to the German press, inciting 200,000 people across the country to conduct mass protests against the AfD. The leak of the meeting also generated discussions which discussed the potential banning of the AfD. Other scandals occurred in the run up to the elections as well. For example, in April 2024, Jain G, an assistant to Maximilian Krah, who was the AFD’s top candidate at the time in the European elections was arrested on the suspicion of being an “employee of a Chinese secret service” and passing on information about the European Parliament to Chinese intelligence. Jain G was also accused of spying on Chinese opposition figures in Germany. On top of these damaging espionage allegations, Petr Bystron a top AfD candidate for the elections also faced accusations that he had received payments from Artem Marchevsky, who ran now debunked online Russian disinformation network portal known as the ‘Voice of Europe’ in return for spreading Russian propaganda. According to the Czech Security and Information Service (BIS), Mr Bystron met with Artem Marchevsky at least three times and can be heard in BIS audio tapes to be rusting and counting €20,000 (£17,000) which was given to him by Marchevsky. Bystron vigorously denied these claims prompting an investigation.
Another AfD scandal occurred when Maximilian Krah, was questioned by the FBI in March 2024 over suspicions of taking money from Kremlin agent to which he denied. The combination of the Chinese espionage scandal and the investigations of Krah and Bystron highlights that the AfD on top of being a suspected extremist political party also has alleged ties to both Russia and China, thus making the party an ever worrying security threat and concern for German Intelligence officials. Despite all these scandals that have cropped up for the AfD they have come second in the election polls. This should be concerning for German intelligence officials as the party will no doubt continue to rally for support and influence promoting its radical and extremist views in the near future. The scandals that have surrounded the AfD show that the party continues to be a grave security risk to Germany because they harbour extreme right wing views, have done unexpectedly well in the elections and have alleged ties to Russia and China. German Intelligence must continue to monitor the party even more closely both now and in the future in light of the numerous serious accusations that have reared their ugly head for the party.
Whilst the scandals against the AfD were seen by many at the time as very damaging to the party, the AfD has managed to use these scandals to gather more support in areas in which the party is the strongest in Germany, which is why they have done surprisingly well in the polls. The AfD’s performance in Germany’s elections shows that no matter the scale of the allegations and scandals, they can be spun around and vigorously denied and defended to secure as many votes as possible from those who find themselves the most aligned with the AfD’s policies. Scandals can make or break a party and for the AfD, the scandals have worked in their favour as evidenced by their second place position in the German election results.
Islamic State’s threat in Iraq
June 25, 2024 in UncategorizedIslamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a Sunni Islamic jihadist group, rose from the ashes of Al-Qaeda in 2014, establishing a ‘caliphate’ in northern Iraq and Syria. In 2017, a US-led anti-terrorism coalition declared victory over ISIS, expelling them from their lands in northern Iraq. Following the withdrawal of US troops from the region in 2021, and even more since the escalation of conflict between Israel and Hamas in 2023, however, ISIS have been conducting an increasing number of attacks throughout the region, leading to more destabilised security conditions. This paper aims to analyse ISIS activities in 2024 to assess the likely threat they pose in the region over the next several months, as well as Iraq’s decision making in this regard.
The month of March 2024 saw ISIS’ most active month in terms of quantity of attacks since 2017 levels, conducting at least 69 attacks in central Syria in just that month. These attacks have resulted in the deaths of at least 84 Syrian soldiers and 44 civilians, which is more than double the confirmed operations ISIS have conducted in 2024. As well as these attacks in Syria, ISIS have been conducting operations in Iraq, with a recent attack on May 13th, 2024, in the Salahuddin province resulting in the death of one Iraqi officer and four soldiers. These increasing levels of attacks in the last 6 months, as well as severity of the attacks, as demonstrated by ISIS-K in the Moscow concert hall shooting on March 22nd, 2024, which saw the death of 145 civilians and at least 500 more injured, as well as the bombing in Iran on January 3rd, 2024, which resulted in the deaths of 103 people and injured 284 others, indicate the increasingly severe threat posed by Islamic State.
This increase in attacks occurs as the Iraqi and US political leadership are discussing the withdrawal of US military personnel and the end of the international coalition which resulted in the defeat of ISIS in 2017. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s office stated in January of 2024 that “Military experts will oversee ending the military mission of the Global Coalition against Daesh [ISIL], a decade after its initiation and after its successful achievement of its mission in partnership with Iraqi security and military forces”. There are two crucial reasons behind this decision, the first being the increasing capabilities of the Iraqi military and security forces since 2017. Iraq has been prioritising the strengthening of its defence capabilities, primarily through the means of acquiring modernised aircraft for air superiority. In 2023, Iraq finalised a $3.2 billion contract with Dassault Aviation to purchase 14 Rafale aircraft, a French, twin-jet combat aircraft with both long- and short-range capabilities, high-accuracy strikes, and reconnaissance. This modernisation of the Iraqi forces comes as a direct result of the possible resurgence of ISIS in Iraq, and thus the talks to end the coalition indicate Iraq’s preparedness for military dominance over ISIS. There are currently 2,500 US troops present in Iraq as part of the coalition against ISIS. If these troops are to leave, there is a worrying potential for a similar power vacuum left in Afghanistan in 2021, providing ISIS with the opportunity to regain territory.
The second crucial reason is due to the activity in Iraq as a result of the Israel-Hamas conflict. Since October of 2023, Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have targeted US troops over 170 times. The 2,500 troops have been targeted at Al-Asad air base numerous times, as well as in Jordan, where an attack in February of 2024 resulted in the death of three American soldiers. The US retaliation for the attack in Jordan was a series of strikes on over 85 targets throughout Iraq and Syria, resulting in the deaths of 16 people, including civilians, and over 25 injured. Even in 2020, US forces conducted an air strike outside Baghdad airport which killed the Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani, as well as Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Iraq has complained that these US attacks violate Iraq’s sovereignty, and thus is a further reason for the discussions of the removal of US troops. ISIS, however, have taken credit for the decision to begin the removal of US troops as a consequence of their force, and have promised to continue its attacks.
ISIS in 2024 has demonstrated its capabilities to execute complex attacks on an international scale, and therefore almost certainly poses a significant threat to regional security in Iraq in the short-term future. This is compounded with the intention to withdraw US forces from the region, leaving behind a significant power vacuum in Iraq’s security apparatus, providing ISIS with opportunity to engage with their intentions of re-establishing power. We assess with high confidence that ISIS will continue to attack US and Iraqi forces at a high rate over the next 6 months.
Iraq, however, has been investing in the modernisation of its equipment, with a priority on aircraft, and as such is certain to have military dominance over ISIS, in contrast to in 2014 when Iraq’s security structure was highly ineffective. We therefore assess with moderate confidence that Iraq has the capabilities, the training, and the experience, to effectively combat ISIS’ attempts to regain land in Iraq. This was recently demonstrated on the 22nd of June 2024, by an announcement by the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) regarding a successful joint operation with the Iraqi National Intelligence Service against an ISIS cell in the city of Tuz Khurmato in northern Iraq. The operation resulted in the death of at least 7 militants, including the leader of the cell. The ISOF stated that F-16 aircraft carried out strikes that destroyed tunnel systems and hideouts, resulting in the death of all the cell’s militants.
Analysing if France should deploy French troops into Ukraine and what ramifications it could have on Western and Southern Europe
June 17, 2024 in UncategorizedFrench President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly voiced that he is not opposed to sending French troops to Ukraine. Given the ever-deterioratingrelationship between Russia and the West and the persistent activities of Russian intelligence services meddling in the affairs of countries in Western and Southern Europe, one must ask the question ‘Should France and perhaps other European countries send troops to Ukraine and is it a sensible idea given the increasing amount of Russian backed espionage that has persisted to target the region? This analytical report seeks to explore and answer this pressing question.
Over the duration of May 2024, Emmanuel Macron reinstated his opinion that France could not rule out the possibility of sending troops into Ukraine to train the Ukrainian army. Macron has been adamant that such a decision is needed, stating that “at some point, the Europeans should be ready to stop Russia from moving further forward in Ukraine”. Macron also highlighted that he sincerely hoped that other European countries wouldn’t have to get further directly involved in the conflict by sending troops into Ukraine. However, he said that “if we leave everything as it is in Ukraine, then the right of the strongest will win. And we can’t be safe because it’s happening 1,500 kilometres away… So, our future and our security are at stake in Ukraine”. Dmitry Peskov a spokesperson for the Kremlin responded to Macron’s comments, calling them a “a very dangerous trend”, and accusing Macron of continuously raising the prospect of “direct involvement on the ground in the conflict around Ukraine”. In a more recent statement in June 2024, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov highlighted that such a move by France would make any French military instructors sent to Ukraine for the purposes of training the Ukrainian armed forces “Regardless of their status, military officials or mercenaries repent a legitimate target” for Russian armed forces.
Such a prospect has divided Europe, with countries such as Germany and the UK ruling out the possibility of sending troops to Ukraine. Such a move by France may be unwise given that other European countries in Western and Southern Europe are rigidly opposed to the idea. Moreover, if France sent troops to Ukraine, it could have the potential to further escalate tensions between Russia and the West in an already fragile geopolitical climate. A French intervention in the conflict could see Russia employ an ever more aggressive stance towards regions of Western and Southern Europe by conducting more espionage and disinformation operations against the West. Over the duration of May 2024, France and other countries in Western and Southern Europe saw the familiar and continued trend of Russian espionage backed operations targeting a variety of targets and regions respectively. For example, France summoned its Russian ambassador citing that French “diplomatic channels are once again being abused to manipulate information” by Russia, with the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs commenting that Russia is continuing to pursue “itsaggressive manoeuvres aimed at destabilizing European countries, notably through cyberattacks and hybrid actions”.
Across in Germany, towards the end of the month, a German military officer, identified as Thomas H, 54, was sentenced to three and a half years in prison for spying for Russia. He was originally arrested in Koblenz, Germany in August 2023 and was accused of sharing photographs of munitions training systems and aircraft technology with Russian Intelligence Services. He “approached the Russian embassy in Berlin and the consulate in Bonn unprompted” and “almost persistently offered himself to Russia” because he was concerned about the risk of nuclear war that is being driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Whist he did not reveal any classified information, it is important to note that he “had been influenced by a stream of pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation that he had been consuming on TikTok and Telegram”. This shows that Russian disinformation can weave itself into any western government organization, spending misinformation and swaying some people to engage in illegal acts that have the ability to compromise the security of Western and Southern Europe. If France or any other European country for that matter chose to further escalate the conflict by directly deploying troops to Ukraine, then we are almost certain to see a spike in continued Russian espionage backed operations and disinformation campaigns against the West. This would not only further endanger the security of the region, but could also simultaneously prolong the Russio-Ukraine war as France’s intervention could also be spun by the Kremlin as another justification for the continuation of its war in Ukraine, further adding to and bolstering the Kremlin’s propaganda system.
Given the repeated and consistent Russian espionage operations and disinformation campaigns, it would be unwise for France to send in troops to Ukraine. However, whilst it may be unwise decision, necessity is something that France must consider for its decision to deploy troops to Ukraine. On 30 May, 2024, diplomatic sources revealed that “France would initially send a limited number of personnel to assess the modalities of a mission before dispatching several hundred trainers…Training would centre around… keeping equipment operational and technical expertise for warplanes to be provided by the West”. France may deem this a necessary move for the purposes of supporting Ukraine’s and by proxy France’s own security, however, France and the regions within Western and Southern Europe should expect to face more aggressive Russian backed espionage and disinformation operations both now and in the near future as a result of France’s actions to send a small amount of French military personnel to Ukraine. France’s decision has certainly divided Europe however, sometimes necessity outweighs other options.
Polish Border Crisis
June 17, 2024 in UncategorizedKey Judgement:
- It is highly likely that Russia would attempt to destabilize Poland by weaponizing migrants (High confidence)
- It is highly likely that recent European Parliament election result would be supportive Poland’s extreme border control policy, and migrants flow would be helpful for right wing parties of Western Europe. (High confidence)
- It is unlikely that weaponizing migrants would led to stopping or deterring Ukraine aid in upcoming months. It is realistically possible if Trump win in upcoming US presidential election. (Medium confidence)
The border between Poland and Belarus has been a focal point of tension since the onset of the Ukraine war, primarily due to Belarus’s alignment with Russia. President Alexander Lukashenko, the long-standing dictator of Belarus, has ruled using tactics reminiscent of President Putin’s strategies. Since the 2020 Belarus crisis and subsequent Russian assistance in quelling political opposition, Lukashenko has closely aligned with Kremlin interests in Eastern Europe.
Poland, with its historical experiences of Russian occupation, maintains a cautious and adversarial stance toward Moscow. Since joining NATO and the EU, Poland has remained vigilant against Russian threats, unlike many Western European nations that have relaxed their defences since the Cold War. Poland’s significant military investments have positioned it as a leading NATO military power. Prior to the Ukraine war, Poland was among the few NATO countries already spending more than 2% of its GDP on defence. By 2024, military expenditures reached 3.9% of GDP, totalling $31.6 billion, making Poland the 14th largest military spender globally. The land forces plan to double in size to 300,000 troops, bolstered by substantial military imports from the US and South Korea, transforming Poland’s post-Soviet military into one of the most modern in the region. Additionally, Poland has transferred significant post-Soviet arms to Ukraine, including MiG-29 jets, modernized T-72 tanks, and Krab 155-mm howitzers. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy tracker, Poland has donated €3 billion to Ukraine, compared to France’s €544 million contribution.
The previous administration, led by the populist far-right PiS party, maintained a strong stance against Russia, actively supporting Ukraine and leveraging the Russian threat as a political advantage. This anti-Russian sentiment is one of the few issues with broad support within Polish society, and the current administration has not altered its stance on Russia, despite efforts to roll back many PiS policies. Discussions within the current administration about renegotiating military imports have not weakened Warsaw’s firm position against Moscow. The European Parliament election on June 9 saw the Civic Coalition triumph over the PiS party, likely enabling the continuation of current policies.
In light of the ongoing Ukraine war, Poland has emerged as a significant threat to Moscow’s ambitions to reestablish its influence in the region. Poland’s capability and willingness to deter Russian military activities make it a primary target for Russian intelligence operations. On May 14, Prime Minister Tusk announced increased investment in security agencies due to the growing threat from Russian and Belarusian intelligence services. While the Polish counterintelligence agency (BIRN) has not disclosed exact arrest figures related to Russian intelligence, it is known that since the Ukraine war began, 29 individuals have been arrested, and 19 charged with working for Russian intelligence. Notable incidents include the arrest of a Polish man collaborating with the GRU, providing information about Rzeszow-Jasionka Airport, the main hub for military aid to Ukraine, and involvement in an assassination attempt on the Ukrainian president. In January and May, networks attempting to sabotage strategic infrastructure were dismantled. Additionally, “Voice of Europe,” a propaganda network aimed at influencing European politics and public opinion, has targeted Poland, countered by Polish and other security agencies. The largest spy network scandal, involving 16 individuals conducting reconnaissance of key military facilities and critical infrastructure, was uncovered in November 2023.
Given these circumstances, it is highly likely that Russia will attempt to weaponize migrants against Poland using its border with Belarus. Weaponizing migrants has been a recurring Kremlin tactic against Europe to destabilize the region. Recent turmoil at the Finland-Russia border exemplifies this strategy. It is well-documented that Russia and the Assad regime in Syria have used migrant flows to Europe as an asymmetric warfare tool against the West. Russian mercenaries have also facilitated migrant entry from Libya to Europe, exacerbating the Mediterranean migrant crisis. With Russia’s dwindling options to pressure Poland, a large-scale migrant weaponization at the Poland-Belarus border is highly probable.
Tensions in this region have been escalating for years, with the border serving as a gateway for migrants entering the EU. The previous PiS administration publicly committed to defending the border at all costs, a stance that remains unchanged despite the regime change. Poland is currently fortifying its border with Belarus, and the recent tragic death of a Polish soldier, who was stabbed by migrants, has garnered public support for these measures.
The recent European Parliament election saw right-wing parties in Western Europe gain seats, indicating a significant shift in migrant policy in Western Europe. Traditionally, Western European countries have supported pro-migrant policies, while Eastern Europe has opposed them due to bearing the brunt of incoming migrants. Although right-wing party’s lost seats in Eastern Europe, Western influence in Parliament is more substantial, and Eastern European left-wing parties do not align with the pro-migrant stance of their Western counterparts. Therefore, possible
Right-wing parties in Europe have historically been more pro-Russian, and Russia has supported them for years. In this political climate, a massive migrant influx could bolster public support for far-right parties in Europe, potentially influencing election outcomes and disrupting the ongoing Ukraine war. With intensifying Western support and weapons starting to strike targets inside Russian territory, Russia’s desperation is growing.
In conclusion, it is highly likely that weaponizing migrants in Poland will be observed in the next six months, given the current geopolitical dynamics. Russia would actively use migrants to cultivate chaos in Poland, and to support ongoing dominance of right-wing party that could possibly stop or deter support for Ukraine. However it is unlikely that right wing party dominance would led to stopping Ukraine aid in upcoming months. Actual possible difference would be possible after the biggest political event of 2024, which is the US election in November.
Gaza Escalation: Understanding Israel’s Rafah Operation and Its Broader Implications
June 7, 2024 in UncategorizedThis paper analyses Israel’s military operation in Rafah on May 6th, 2024, within the broader context of the Gaza Strip conflict. It explores the factors leading to the operation, its immediate consequences, and its regional and international implications, including diplomatic tensions and humanitarian concerns.
On May 6th, 2024, Israel launched an operation in and around Rafah as part of its invasion of the Gaza Strip, gaining control of a crucial border crossing and shutting off most supplies to the neighbourhood a day before indirect discussions on a ceasefire agreement were scheduled to commence. The Israeli operation began hours after Hamas officials said on Monday night that they would accept a recent ceasefire proposal presented by Qatari and Egyptian mediators. Israeli forces airdropped leaflets to Palestinians in east Rafah on Sunday night, telling them to flee to a safe zone; yet the operation began only hours later. The Israeli military seized control of the Gaza side of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt on Tuesday, after airstrikes on the southern Palestinian city on Monday.
Yoav Gallant, Israel’s defence minister, stated that the attack would continue until Hamas soldiers in Rafah “and the entire Gaza Strip” were “eliminated”, or the militant Islamist organization began to release captives.
According to the IDF, six rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip’s Rafah sector on May 7th towards Kerem Shalom and the Re’im region in southern Israel in retaliation to the Israeli operation.
The United States, Israel’s staunchest ally, has repeatedly urged Israel against launching a significant military assault in Rafah, where more than a million civilians evacuated from other parts of Gaza are seeking refuge. In addition, aid groups have forecast a major humanitarian disaster. On the other hand, President Netanyahu later reacted, stating that the civilian losses from Sunday’s strike on the Rafah camp were a ‘tragic error’.
This Israeli action has and will have far-reaching ramifications for regional stability. Neighbouring nations have already expressed their displeasure, with Egypt reportedly considering downgrading ties with Israel, perhaps ending the peace accords between the two countries. The operation would necessitate the relocation of Palestinians into Egyptincreasing tensions with Egypt since the arrival of so many displaced people would be difficult for Egypt as well and would impede the return of Palestinians to their land after the conflict. On Lebanon now, as the IDF makes its first steps on the southern Gaza city of Rafah, Hezbollah announces the use of new weaponry in strikes over the northern border, calls for further soldier mobilisation, and sends other signs of impending escalation. Whether their claims are legitimate or simply an effort to cause fear, the pressure on Israel is increasing.
The necessity for the international community to enhance diplomatic efforts and humanitarian help to solve the rising catastrophe in Gaza is growing significantly, and Netanyahu is under pressure from both the international community and his own administration.
