MS Risk Blog

Mali Confirms New Ebola Case

Mali has confirmed a new Ebola case, which is separate from its only other case that was detected last month.

Medical sources disclosed late Tuesday that a nurse who had treated a patient from Guinea has died. According to the head of the Pasteur Clinic in Bamako, one of the capital city’s top medical centres, “the nurse who had been in contact with a Guinean national who died of the illness, died in turn,” adding that tests had confirmed the Ebola virus. A doctor at Pasteur Clinic is also suspected of having contracted the virus.

On Wednesday, authorities in Mali quarantined dozens of people at the home of the 25-year-old nurse and at the clinic where he had treated an imam from Guinea who died with Ebola-like symptoms. The imam, who comes from the border town of Kouremale, died on 27 October and was never tested for EVD. Strict burial procedures implemented for the burial of Ebola patients were not imposed during his burial. Concerns are now growing over the time it took between the imam’s passing and the implementation of steps needed in order to contain the disease.

A government statement released Wednesday confirmed that the nurse had tested positive for EVD and that he died late Tuesday. The statement further disclosed that all necessary steps to identify people who had come into contact with the nurse had been taken. According to Ousmane Doumbia, secretary general of the health ministry, 70 people have been quarantined and the Pasteur Clinic has been locked down by police.

Mali is the sixth West African nation to record Ebola. Officials will now be required to trace a new group of contacts, a similar procedure that was taken last month after a two-year-old girl died of the disease in western Mali.

ISIS leader believed injured, is there ISIS after Baghdadi?

11 November– Last week, airstrikes conducted by the anti-ISIS coalition targeted an assembly of the group’s leaders in Mosul. Reports have emerged that the head of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was among those in attendance. Iraq’s defence ministry reported that Baghdadi had been injured in the strike, and that his deputy, Abu-Muslim al-Turkmani, was killed. Rumours have circulated that the ISIS “caliph” was either grievously injured or killed. ISIS has not refuted the claim; while copycat ISIS sites claim that Baghdadi was not present, there has been no word from official ISIS channels as to the whereabouts or health of Baghdadi.

Baghdadi oversaw operations that gained ISIS a large swath of territory in Iraq and Syria earlier this year. In June, the leader declared the newly controlled land a Sunni Islamic caliphate, and declared himself the caliph. Baghdadi has scholarly knowledge of Islam, and claims he has ascendency from the Prophet Muhammed.

This self-declaration, particularly based on a bloodline, is in conflict with the premise of Sunni Islam. At the time of Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 AD, many followers believed that his successor should be determined by a community of Muslims. However, a small faction believed that the successor should be a member of his family, favouring Ali, the prophet’s son-in-law. To this day, Sunnis favour consensus appointment of leaders, and Shia’s familial ascendency.

In claiming his right to become caliph based on his bloodline, Baghdadi has dismissed an important tenet of Sunni beliefs, compensating for this only by agreeing that his successor would be appointed. Further, it is unknown whether his claim to the bloodline is real; in the Arab world, it is not uncommon for documents to be falsified to suggest that a family is descended from Prophet Mohammed; it is considered a point of pride among many.

Those joining ISIS blindly follow Baghdadi despite the conflicting nature of his actions. He is perceived as charismatic and convincing, with credentials both academic and relational. Baghdadi has become a symbolic figure as much as a leader, tying together both the actions and ideologies of his followers.

In the event of Baghdadi’s death, the question arises as to what would become of ISIS. Analysts do not believe that a sufficient replacement exists among the group’s ranks. It is unknown whether Baghdadi has selected a successor from among his high-ranking leaders. Among the likely successors is Omar Shishani, a former sergeant for the Georgian army who is now a commander for ISIS. It is widely believed that Shishani is responsible for planning the military operations which led to the rapid gain of territory in Iraq over the summer.  Another prosepect is believed to be Shaker Abu Waheeb, who escaped from an Iraqi prison in Tikrit in 2012, and is now an ISIS field commander in the Anbar province.

While both candidates have worked toward seeing Baghdadi’s mission to fruition, neither have the same scholarly credentials, charisma, or bloodline as Baghdadi. It is expected that under their leadership, ISIS would be unlikely to continue with the same momentum or devotion. Further, as Baghdadi’s successor will be determined by consensus, the group could break into factions, weakening the entire entity.

It is suspected that successful targeting of ISIS leadership and controlled resources, including oil refineries, will result in the eventual dissolution of the caliphate. As ISIS weakens, so too could its hold on the territory it currently controls, allowing government forces and opposition fighters an opportunity to retake confiscated lands. In this event, fewer domestic and foreign fighters will seek to join the ranks, and existing membership will either return to their native nations or attempt to join other organisations.

Dozens Dead in Suicide Bombing in Northeastern Nigeria

On Monday, a suicide bomber killed nearly fifty students in a school in northeastern Nigeria. The attack, which has been blamed on Boko Haram, is the latest in a series of atrocities against schoolchildren in the state of Yobe and is one of the deadliest attacks against schools teaching a so-called Western curriculum.

During the early morning hours, a suicide bomber targeted students at the Government Comprehensive Senior Science Secondary School in Potiskum. The attack occurred at 7:50 AM (0650 GMT) as students were waiting to hear the principal’s daily address. National police spokesman Emmanuel Ojukwu confirmed the incident, disclosing that at least 48 students, all believed to be in their teens, were killed while 79 others were injured. According to survivors, some 2,000 students had gathered for Monday morning’s weekly assembly. The suicide bomber was wearing a school uniform and entered the school unnoticed. Officials believe that the explosives were hidden in a type of rucksack that is popular with students. Although investigators have released minimal details about the bomber, months ago, Nigeria’s military reported finding a bomb factory in the northern city of Kano, where explosives were being sewn into rucksacks.  No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, however Boko Haram is believed responsible.

Frustration with the government has grown high in recent weeks, as Boko Haram has increased its tempo of attacks in the wake of an October 17 announcement by the government, which claimed to have brokered a cease-fire. Boko Haram’s leader has denied these negotiations, stating that no truce has been reached. On the ground sources reported Monday that angry locals had blocked access to the school and an adjoining hospital, preventing security forces from getting close to the site of the explosion. Family members of wounded students reported Monday that the school did not have proper security, with one local disclosing that three months ago, an anti-bomb squad was called in after officials discovered a bomb at the school. While the federal government of President Goodluck Jonathan, who recently announced that he will run for re-election in February 2015, has promised more security for schools located in northeastern Nigeria, Monday’s attack has shown that militants operating in the region continue to have relative easy access to schools in the area and are able to disguise themselves as students and enter schools without being approached by officials.

Monday’s attack came a day after the release of a new Boko Haram video, in which the group’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, again rejected the Nigerian government’s claims of a ceasefire and peace talks. It also comes a week after a suicide bomb attack in the same city killed thirty people a week ago when suspected Boko Haram fighters attacked a religious procession of moderate Muslims.

Since 2009, Boko Haram has carried out numerous attacks targeting schools that teach a so-called Western curriculum. In February, gunmen killed at least 40 students after throwing explosives into the dormitory of a government boarding school in Buni Yadi, also in Yobe state. In July 2013, 42 students were killed when Boko Haram stormed dormitories in a gun and bomb attack on a government boarding school in the village of Mamudo, near Potiskum.

Burkina Faso Leader Dismisses Two-Week Deadline

Despite agreeing to a one-year political transition, with presidential elections to be held in November 2015, Burkina Faso’s interim leader has dismissed the African Union’s (AU) imposition of a two-week deadline to hand power to civilians.

Following crisis talks on Wednesday, Burkina Faso’s army, politicians and society leaders agreed to a one-year political transition, with presidential elections to be held in November 2015. While the talks, which were mediated by three West African presidents and also attended by religious and tribal chiefs, failed to name a leader that will head the transitional government, a statement released late Wednesday indicated that all parties had agreed that an “eminent civilian personality” should take the job. Burkina Faso’s interim leader however announced late Thursday that he was not concerned by the AU’s two-week deadline, stating, “we are not afraid of sanctions, we care much more about stability.”

The talks on Wednesday had initially started off rocky, with opposition leaders storming out in protest over the possible involvement of loyalists of former president Blaise Compaore in any provisional government. The opposition’s main leader Zephirin Diabre had also objected to a proposal by the three West African leaders that each group submit three candidates for a transitional government. While security guards intervened, in a bid to prevent the talks from ending in violence, both the opposition and civil society representatives were later persuaded to return to negotiations with all sides, including the current interim leader Lt Col Isaac Zida, welcoming the final agreement. Speaking shortly after the meeting, Lt Col Zida disclosed that the talks “…went very well,” adding that he hoped the teams would be able to “find a solution in order to achieve a civilian transition.”

Despite the meeting ending without a decision on who might be the transitional leader, Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama indicated that he expected a transitional government to be installed in Burkina Faso in a matter of days. President Mahama and his Nigerian counterpart Goodluck Jonathan and Senegal’s President Macky Sall, who the West African regional body ECOWAS has appointed to lead mediation efforts, travelled to Ouagadougou early Wednesday to mediate the talks and to press for a swift handover of power back to civilians.

There has been mounting international pressure on Lt Col Zida and the military to return the country to civilian rule, with the AU threatening sanctions and Canada earlier this week withdrawing much-needed aid. Despite announcing Tuesday that he would restore civilian rule with two weeks, late Thursday, Lt Col Zida disclosed that he was not concerned by the AU’s deadline, stating “we have waited on the African Union in moments when it should have shown its fraternity and its friendship but instead was not there.” A failure to meet the AU’s deadline could have significant consequences for the West African country and may result in further protests. The AU’s sanctions could include suspension of Burkina Faso’s AU membership and travel ban on military officials. The AU’s Peace and Security Council is expected to meet later this month in order to discuss the crisis.

Lebanon’s battle with ISIS: a proxy war for Saudi Arabia and Iran

On Wednesday, Lebanon’s Parliament voted to extend their terms in office to 2017, arguing that the nation’s fragile security situation makes it too difficult to hold elections. The lawmakers, who were elected to four-year terms in 2009, voted last year to remain in office, citing the same security threats. The decision has been denounced by foreign diplomats and human rights organizations who feel that the vote undermines the democratic process. However to many Lebanese citizens, the decision does not come as a surprise.

Lebanon’s government has been paralysed by disagreements among powerful political blocs, and decisively split on the issue of Syria’s civil war. The Prime Minister appointed a new cabinet in February, but the group has been unable to achieve much. Nearly two decades after the end of their own civil war, policymakers have only agreed to prevent new battles from erupting within the nation.

Lebanon has been without a president since May. The Lebanese Parliament does not elect the president; rather the chosen leader is “rubber stamped” after a regional consensus is met. Currently, the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is forestalling that agreement, and Lebanon’s growing battle with ISIS has become a proxy battle between the two nations.

ISIS relies upon a strategy of destabilising a region and entrenching themselves, while avoiding local organised fighting forces until they are ready to engage. This strategy is currently being enacted on the Syrian border with Lebanon. Last week, the terror group killed 11 soldiers north of Tripoli, and ISIS leaders have threatened to plunge the country into another civil war.

Lebanon, a member of the US led coalition to combat ISIS, has received approximately $1 billion in training and equipment from the US since 2006. However the US has been constrained in providing further support as the threat of ISIS encroaches upon the Lebanese border. This is in part due to an American domestic law that guarantees that the US will provide Israel a “qualitative military edge” over its neighbours in the region.

In the absence of US support, Saudi Arabia and Iran have offered competing aid packages to Lebanon; the combined offers amount to billions of dollars in arms from the two opposing nations. However, the offers of assistance are being perceived as political one-upmanship between the foes. Lebanon’s acceptance of either aid package amounts to tacit approval of either the Shiite or Sunni dominated governments.

On Tuesday, France and Saudi Arabia signed a contract to give $3 billion worth of French-made weapons to Lebanon’s military. In August the kingdom provided a $1 billion grant for emergency aid to Lebanon’s military and intelligence agencies. The combined pledges are more than twice the Lebanese estimated annual military budget. The aid, which is set to arrive in the first quarter of 2015, will include training, as well as land, sea and air equipment, including armoured vehicles, heavy artillery, anti-tank missiles, mortars and assault weapons.

In September, Ali Shamkhani, secretary to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council offered a package consisting of antitank weapons, artillery and heavy machine guns. Lebanese Defense Minister Samir Moqbel’s delegation declined to formally respond to Iran’s offer, which could violate a 2007 U.N. Security Council resolution restricting Iranian arms trade.

The Saudi government believes that the Iranian weapons will be directed toward Hezbollah; a Shiite dominated political organization that is opposed by Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah supports President Assad, whose troops are battling Sunni opposition, which is backed by Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom believes that Iran is more interested in countering Saudi backing than assisting the Lebanese military.

The 65,000-strong Lebanese military (arguably the least sectarian organization in the country), is less effective than Hezbollah, whose armed wing is better equipped and organized, and battle hardened after wars with Israel. However as many Hezbollah fighters have deployed to the war in Syria, the group has become increasingly reliant on the Lebanese military. The Lebanese military has not prevented Shiite Hezbollah fighters from entering Syria to confront Sunni militants fighting against Assad, and they deploy to areas that Hezbollah has cleared and set up checkpoints.

Because of this relationship, Tehran now has a perceived interest in supporting the Lebanese military. However, this relationship has also led the Sunni Muslim community in Lebanon to believe that the army is now taking orders from Hezbollah.

As ISIS moves closer to Lebanon’s border, they benefit from the Lebanese military’s unwillingness to cooperate with Assad. Experts believe that Syria has the only Arab military currently capable of confronting ISIL. More worrisome, Hezbollah has shown a reluctance to battle ISIS, arguing that their involvement will enflame already strained sectarian tensions in Lebanon. It is this enticement that leads ISIS to believe they can ignite a second civil war. ISIS has expressed interest to create new supply routes between Lebanon and Syria as winter unfolds.

In recent weeks, the Lebanese army has suffered setbacks along its long border with Syria. Lebanon shares a short border and rocky relationship with Israel on its only other border. Israel is not a member of the ISIS coalition. The nearest ally, Jordan, does not have the capacity to confront ISIS in Lebanon and protect its own borders with Syria.

Meanwhile, in the absence of a president and a split parliament, the Lebanese policymakers are in gridlock, agreeing only to preserve civil peace and avoid civil or sectarian clashes. However in the face of a growing threat, it is likely that peace will become more difficult to maintain.  The nation is relying on a consensus between Saudi Arabia and Iran before it can put its government in working order, and it appears that consensus is not forthcoming.