MS Risk Blog

Romanian Presidential Election

Romania’s presidential elections will be held again on 4 and 18 May 2025. The Constitutional Court annulled the original vote of November 2024 on 6 December, citing foreign interference and irregularities. Independent candidate Călin Georgescu, a nationalist and EU and NATO sceptic, had won a relative majority in the first round. On 9 March 2025, Georgescu was barred from running in the new elections by the Central Election Commission. A new ruling cited his inability to uphold democratic values, referring to previous rulings by the Constitutional Court. This sparked national protests and demonstrations and attracted international attention. Supporters view it as a triumph of militant democracy, while critics accuse the institutions of electoral manipulation.

Following the commission’s decision clashes between his supporters and police broke out. The decision was later upheld by the Constitutional Court. Virtually unknown before the election, Georgescu was a former senior civil servant. He rose to prominence through a coordinated social media strategy and illegal and undeclared payments to social media influencers. In the days leading up to the vote, approximately 25,000 previously inactive TikTok accounts began amplifying his content, helping it go viral. According to the Romanian intelligence service, the election was also targeted by roughly 85,000 cyberattacks on the country’s electoral IT infrastructure, with Russia allegedly responsible. The Kremlin denies these allegations, although Georgescu’s positions are clearly in line with Russian strategic interests. He is known for his far-right nationalist views, his opposition to continued aid to Ukraine and his advocacy of distancing Romania from Western alliances. These positions made him a highly polarizing figure both domestically and internationally. After the annulment, he received vocal support from prominent U.S. figures including Vice President J.D. Vance and businessman Elon Musk. Georgescu was able to appeal to rural areas, foreign Romanians and those disillusioned with politics. He was successful in exploiting the broad social divide between the urban and the rural, the educated and the marginalised, modern values and traditional identity. This divide will continue to shape the dynamics of the election.

George Simion, the leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), has emerged as Georgescus successor, seeking to inherit his electoral base. Simion, a 38-year-old nationalist and outspoken critic of the political establishment, shares Georgescu’s anti-system rhetoric and nationalist positions. Despite the similarities, he lacks the media reach and momentum of his predecessor. While polls suggest he could lead in the first round, analysts question whether his support is broad or mobilizable enough to ensure a second round victory. Meanwhile, Bucharest mayor Nicușor Dan has emerged as the leading reformist candidate, running as an independent and attracting support from the centre-right, including former PNL and USR voters. Known for his technocratic style and focus on anti-corruption and urban governance, Dan benefits from a reputation as a political outsider. Crin Antonescu, the candidate of the ruling coalition (PSD, PNL, UDMR), relies on party infrastructure but faces internal resistance and lacks public enthusiasm. Recent polls suggest that Dan would defeat both Simion and Antonescu in a run-off, making him the current frontrunner in a polarised political climate.

Beyond the candidates, the state of democratic institutions in Romania remains the other key issue. Trust in the state, its institutions and the political system has declined in recent years. This is due to repeated government changes, persistent instability and the absence of meaningful reform. In addition, many voters believe that corruption, nepotism and abuse of power are widespread. Although the Constitutional Court justified Georgescu’s exclusion on the grounds of protecting constitutional values, critics argue that it introduced a new and controversial interpretation of the Romanian constitution. Under the new ruling, candidates were judged on their “democratic commitment”. This broke with long-standing legal precedent. Although intelligence reports cited Russian influence in the annulment, no hard evidence was made public. This has led to accusations that the court acted in the interests of certain political forces, particularly the ruling coalition. As a result, some see the decision not as a defence of democracy, but as a strategic use of legal mechanisms to engineer a preferred election outcome. This perception reinforces conspiracy thinking, deepens institutional distrust and fuels the belief that the state protects the elite from the people rather than representing them.

In democratic systems, unlike authoritarian regimes, even extreme or system-critical candidates must be tolerated, making them more vulnerable to internal and external manipulation. Georgescu benefited from this openness. While the cancellation of the election and his exclusion were legally justified, they moved within a legally and politically ambiguous space—and are perceived by parts of the population as politically motivated. This perception reinforces conspiracy narratives, deepens distrust in state institutions, and intensifies social polarisation. Romania faces the challenge of defending democratic principles without further eroding public trust. To do so, it must strengthen transparency and define clear standards for political candidacy. Investments in cybersecurity are needed to protect elections from digital interference. Combating disinformation requires greater efforts in media literacy and civic education. At the same time, reforms in the judiciary and public administration remain essential. Romania is not alone in facing such hybrid threats. In the long run, only strong and resilient democracies can serve as reliable partners within Europe.

Implications of the Italian Spyware Scandal

Key Judgements

• Allegations that the Italian government used its technology to hack into the phones of criticis, using technology from the Israeli Spyware maker, Paragon Solutions
• Most of the individuals targeted have expressed criticism of the Melloni Italian administration
• The Paragon case has raised questions by opposition parties about citizens’ democratic rights and laws surrounding wiretapping in Italy
• The Meloni government continue to deny any involvement with the hacking operation but suspended its contract with Paragon Solutions

Context

Paragon Solutions, an Israeli spyware company, has a flagship product known as “Graphite”, which can be used to gain complete access to a target’s phone. Paragon claims to sell its technology exclusively to “a select group of global democracies, primarily the United States and its allies.”  The company is a competitor to NSO group, which manufactures a similar spyware product called “Pegasus”.

Timeline

During a meeting on the week of the 3^rd of February with Copasir, the parliamentary committee for the intelligence services, Giovanni Caravelli, Aise’s chief, admitted the agency had used the Paragon spyware but not to monitor journalists or activists.

The Italian government confirmed in a statement on the 5^th of February 2025 that 7 mobile phone users in the country had been hacked, calling the incident “particularly serious”, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s office denied any involvement and asked Italy’s National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN) to investigate it.

On the 6^th of February, Fanpage director Francesco Cancellato, Mediterranea Saving Humans mission chief Luca Casarini, David Yambio, spokesperson for Refugees in Libya and Husam El Gomati, a  Sweden-based Libyan activist all received warnings from Meta that their devices had been “compromised by a high-level spyware operation using one of the most sophisticated surveillance tools available.” Meta’s WhatsApp chat service alleged that spyware was used to target 90 WhatsApp users in two dozen countries. The Italian government said they were told by WhatsApp that those targeted had phone numbers with prefixes from countries including Spain, Portugal, Greece, Sweden, Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Targeted individuals were sent a “zero-click hack”, a malicious document that required no user interaction to compromise the device.

The Italian government issued a statement saying a total of 90 individuals across 14 EU countries have been targeted in violation of established engagement rules and 7 cases have been confirmed in Italy so far. Additionally, the European Commission spokesperson Markus Lammert said national authorities would be responsible for probing these allegations, not the EU executive. She did note that in general, “any attempt to illegally access the data of citizens, including journalists and political opponents, is unacceptable if proven.” On the same day, Paragon Solutions terminated its relationship with clients in Italy including an intelligence agency and law enforcement agency, “out of an abundance of caution” following initial allegations of potential misuse. The contract did not allow for journalists or members of civil society to be targeted.

On the 7^th of February, the Italian intelligence agency, Asie revealed it had suspended its contract with Paragon pending investigations. The former Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, said those responsible must be held to account.

On the 12^th of February, the Ministry for Parliamentary Relations Luca Ciriani refuted the claims of the government spying on journalists and said the government would take legal action against any accusers. On the same day, Undersecretary to the Prime Minister, Alfreado Mantovano stated if there had been any misuse it fell under judicial authorities, and they were awaiting the outcome of investigations by the parliamentary intelligence oversight committee and the National Cybersecurity Agency (Agnenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale).

On the 18^th of February Sandro Rutolo, a Democratic Party MEP, said “This is one of the most serious attacks on the rule of law in Europe” adding “We want to know which countries have illegally spied on their citizens, why, and how we can protect European citizens”. He sent a letter signed by opposition forces in Italy to the European Parliament President, requesting an inquiry committee.  He also raised the issue at a hearing in the European Parliament’s civil liberties committee, noted in attendance was European Commissioner of Technological Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen. On the same day, the president of the Italian parliament signed a document involving a rule allowing the government to refrain from responding to questions related to the scandal, claiming that “all unclassified information has already been shared” and any other details were under secrecy rules.

On the 19^th of February, Italy’s national union for journalists (FNSI) a criminal complaint in response to this decision.  The secretary general, Alessandra Costante said  “We want clarity, we want journalists to be able to do their job without the risk of being intercepted. We’re dealing with facts that not only violate the criminal code but the constitution itself. It is also extremely serious that the government has decided not to report to parliament.” The Order of Journalists and the FNSI also announced legal action, calling on the Italian public prosecutor’s office in Rome to seek clarification about the wiretapping of an Italian journalist.

Analysis

Most of the individuals in Italy who were involved were linked by criticism towards the current administration and Prime Minister Meloni. Cancellato’s outlet had published two major investigations into Giorgia Meloni’s party over the past year including a high-profile investigation that exposed young fascists within Meloni’s party. Casarini engaged in sea rescue operations for migrants through a non-government organisation. He was critical of Italy’s alleged complicity in abuses suffered by migrants in Libya. The Meloni government has vowed to cut arrivals to Italy’s shores. El Gomati had been critical of the Italian and Libyan governments’ activities against immigrants in the Mediterranean Sea.

The Italian government denied any suspicion of Paragon and then suspended their contract the next day, this raises questions about their involvement in the hacking operation. Additionally, the refusal to answer questions in parliament makes them appear afraid of revealing information.

If the Italian government were involved in the Paragon case it raises questions about the rights of their citizens and the rule of law within Italy as it would represent a severe constitutional breach of democratic rights.

What happens next?

According to Italian law preventive wiretaps may be conducted by intelligence agencies or the police but only if the targeted individuals are a serious danger to the national and economic security of the nation. These measures can be used before a crime has been committed.  This authorisation rests with the prime minister, interior minister or justice minister. In the aftermath of the Paragon case, this legal framework will likely be changed due to pressure from opposition political parties. Members of the Five Star Movement (M5S) have already raised concerns about this case and the protection of privacy and the freedom of the press.

Transnistria Energy Crisis

On 31 December 2024, Moldova and its Moscow-backed breakaway region of Transnistria stopped receiving natural gas from Russia via Ukraine after a five-year gas transit contract expired. Since then, both Moldova and Transnistria have been grappling with an energy crisis. The region’s electricity grid relied on an outdated Soviet system and a large power station in Transnistria, which had been receiving free natural gas from Russia’s Gazprom. With no willingness to consider alternative supply routes, Russia’s goal appears to be influencing the upcoming parliamentary elections in Eastern Europe, as Moldova’s pro-European President Maia Sandu, elected in 2024, continues pushing for closer ties with Europe.

The crisis was triggered when Ukraine halted the transit of Russian gas through its territory, despite warning several months in advance. Russia, in response, refused to use alternative routes such as TurkStream or the Trans-Balkan pipeline. Gazprom justified its stance by citing alleged unpaid gas debts of €675 million. Until December 2024, Moldova had received 70-80% of its electricity from a Transnistrian power plant at below-market prices. Moldova disputes this debt, pointing to an international audit that estimates it at €8.2 million—excluding Transnistria’s payment claims, as the region had been supplied with free gas since 2005. This subsidy allowed Transnistria to fund pensions and soldiers’ salaries through energy sales to the EU market, which accounted for 80% of its exports. With free gas supplies cut off, the 360,000 residents of Transnistria were left without heating, hot water, and much of their electricity, bringing public life to a standstill. Meanwhile, Moldova’s capital, Chisinau, also faced political instability, forcing it to import electricity from Romania. This led to soaring prices, daily blackouts, and electricity rationing.

In the lead-up to Moldova’s elections, Russia predictably blamed the pro-European authorities and Ukraine for the crisis, accusing Kyiv of blocking transit to inflict hardship during the winter. Using disinformation campaigns and fake news, Moscow is feeding the narrative that Moldova’s future depends on a close, subordinate partnership with Russia. These efforts play on fears of war and public distrust of state institutions, while shifting responsibility for the crisis to Chisinau. Moldova, which considers Transnistria’s population as its own, offered to buy gas for the region – an offer initially rejected by Transnistria’s capital, Tiraspol. On 31 January, the EU Commission approved €64 million in grant aid to Moldova, including €20 million to alleviate the energy crisis in Transnistria. Without immediate assistance from Moscow, Chisinau began importing 3 million cubic metres of gas per day for Transnistria, restoring heating and allowing a return to gas-fired electricity generation. The EU also proposed €61 million in long-term funding for Tiraspol in exchange for commitments on fundamental freedoms and human rights. However, under pressure from Russia, this offer was rejected. Instead, Transnistria will receive gas through a Swiss-based Hungarian subsidiary, financed by a Russian loan.

This crisis is an opportunity for Moldova and the EU to improve Moldova’s energy security and further reduce Russia’s influence. To this end, the EU has already provided immediate financial assistance to cover gas costs for Moldova and Transnistria. In addition, the EU has already provided Chisinau with €142 million in grants and €220 million in loans between 2021 and 2024, as well as €240 million in direct budget support for its energy system. Although Moldova and Ukraine have been connected to the European electricity grid since March 2022, the infrastructure still faces major challenges. The high-voltage transmission line from Romania, which is essential to improve energy supply, is under construction but won’t be operational until the end of 2025. In the next few years, the EU should encourage Moldova to continue to transform its energy market to reduce dependence on Russian gas. This means investing in sustainable energy and local power plants and increasing electrification. Opening the energy market to foreign investors could improve access to energy and overall security. Equally important is countering Russia’s disinformation efforts, particularly in Transnistria. It’s crucial to show people that Moldova and the EU have viable alternatives, and that Russia caused the current crisis.

The crisis has exposed the fragility of Transnistria and its economy. For too long, both have relied on the Kremlin’s goodwill for free Russian gas. This dependence is not a long-term strategy, as Russia’s use of energy as leverage is a central part of its broader strategy of hybrid warfare. Over the past year, Russia has used this strategy to destabilise Moldova and influence its political landscape, including extensive disinformation campaigns, interference in Moldova’s presidential elections, and attempts to undermine Moldova’s pro-European government. While modernising its energy sector, Moldova needs to rethink its approach to Transnistria by focusing on an energy policy that integrates the region. Chisinau itself can now utilise energy, to gradually reduce Russian influence while working towards a reintegration process of Transnistria. The key steps in shaping Moldova’s geopolitical future are to transform its energy landscape to ensure energy security, while aligning with European standards and deepening regional cooperation.

Implications of the of the 2025 German Election on defence and security policy

Key Judgements

• Friedrich Merz is likely to become the new German Chancellor after the election
• Defence spending is highly likely to increase to strengthen independent European security
• The major political parties disagree on policies around defence and security
• The makeup of the new coalition will impact the effectiveness of the new government’s defence spending

Context: Why is Germany important to European defence? 

Germany is preparing for a national election on the 23^rd of February 2025 after the collation under Olaf Scholz collapsed. The current frontrunner is the conservative candidate Friedrich Merz who must create a new coalition amongst Germany’s political parties.

The War in Ukraine has brought military issues back to the centre of attention for German politics, forcing political parties to rethink their positions on national security. Another reason for the shift, is the threat of dis-engagement under the new Trump administration and the request for a 5% share of GDP. Security decisions will likely need to be made more quickly, and more money will have to be spent due to the potential US economic and security pressures. All the major parties, the CDU & CSU (the Union), SPD, Greens and FDP, agree on the need to strengthen the German armed forces and have committed to allocating a higher share of GDP to defence.

Differences between the political parties 

There are still divisions over how to finance military spending. The Greens are considering an increase in public debt to support the modernisation of the armed forces. The Union have stated they will not increase German spending of GDP to 5% saying the US doesn’t spend this amount. Additionally, there is debate around the re-introduction of military service. The SPD and the Greens propose a voluntary but structured system adhering to the needs of the troops. Whereas the FDP insists on only pure volunteers. Alternatively, the Union proposes the return of compulsory military service or “compulsory social year” for young Germans.

The War in Ukraine also represents an area of differing strategic views. While all parties agree on the need to support Kyiv to ensure it has a strong negotiating position there are major differences in the tools being used. The FDP support the Taurus cruise missile whereas SPD reject it. The current Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, has refused to supply Taurus missiles on the basis that Ukraine could use them to hit Russian targets making Germany a part of the war. The Bavarian State Premiere, Markus Soder, used a similar argument as part of the CSU. This is despite the fact the US, the UK and France have all supplied similar long-range weapons to Ukraine. The CDU’s candidate, Friedrich Merz, has declared his willingness to supply the missile but only after consulting with European NATO partners. Currently, the CDU and CSU “Union” have not clear positions in their manifesto. This has been highlighted by the conservative press in Germany who criticise the Union’s positions on defence and security arguing they lack concrete commitments around the Taurus missile and plans to strengthen the German armed force.

The SPD and the Union support the presence of American weapons systems within Germany, whereas the AfD and BSW oppose it. Additionally, the Union are hinting at the possibility of Germany participating in negotiations towards  Ukraine including the deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers to keep the peace. On the other hand, the AfD supports more radical policies that risk isolating Germany, including theories around Putin’s victory up to the refusal of rearmament. These positions find a consensus amongst the electorate especially in eastern Germany where there is more respect for Russia policies due to the pre-existing energy relationship. Additionally, immigration and the economy are marked out as the two biggest problems in Germany by voters, only 8% view domestic security as a pressing issue.

What happens next? 

The most likely outcome is for Germany’s next chancellor to be Friedrich Merz and the conservatives. The various parties that will make up the future coalition are still up for debate and depend heavily on how many seats each party gains during the election.

If the outcome is a coalition between the Union and the SPD there is concern that security policy will proceed slowly. The SPD would likely continue their “peace populism” policy while distancing themselves from their coalition partner. This would cause Merz to face criticism from both the SPD and the Union.

Alternatively, a coalition between the Union and the Greens could push Germany security policy forward as the junior partners in the coalition have shifted from being a party with many pacifists to being one of the biggest supports of military aid to Ukraine including the delivery of weapons systems. There is greater alignment between the two parties allowing security policy to flow more smoothly.

Georgian elections: Authoritarian tendencies and geopolitical tensions

The recent parliamentary elections in Georgia highlight the ongoing geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West. Despite clear evidence of widespread irregularities, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party won a 54% majority in the 26 October vote. This outcome has raised serious concerns in Western capitals that Georgia’s increasing alignment with Russia could undermine the country’s democratic institutions and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The election results signal a potential shift away from EU integration, long a cornerstone of Georgian policy and enshrined in its constitution, and towards closer ties with the Kremlin and Eurasian powers. This shift is particularly striking given that a significant majority of Georgians—with polls showing over 80% support—continue to favor EU accession, while further alignment with Russia remains deeply unpopular. The elections were widely regarded as a referendum on Georgia’s geopolitical orientation, and the growing disconnect between government actions and public opinion underscores the high stakes for Georgia’s domestic stability and regional influence.

The opposition and former president Salome Zourabichvili are contesting the official results. Post-election protests erupted on 28 October and have continued since, met with intense police violence and pressure from the authorities. More than 500 people have been detained and dozens injured by riot police using water cannon and tear gas. The demonstrations began following the disputed election results and the announcement that Georgia’s EU accession negotiations had been suspended by the new government until the end of 2028. This decision followed the EU’s earlier move to freeze negotiations in June 2024, citing concerns about authoritarianism after the GD passed laws requiring organizations receiving foreign funding to register as foreign agents and an anti-LGBTQ+ law, both modelled on Russian legislation. These laws had sparked heavy protests throughout Georgia in 2023 and 2024. The United States reacted by freezing bilateral aid, NATO partners canceled military support, and the United Kingdom paused its joint security dialogue. Although the election was rigged, the GD was expected to secure twice as many votes as any opposition party. Western governments criticized the election but refrained from rejecting the results outright.

The GD party had previously won the 2016 and 2020 elections as well as the controversial 2024 parliamentary elections, with results not legally challenged domestically due to the GD’s control over the courts. With the inauguration of new President Mikheil Kavelashvili, a former professional footballer, on 29 December 2024, the only significant institutional opposition, former President Salome Zourabichvili, was removed from office. This marked another milestone in the dominance of the GD party, founded in 2012 by billionaire oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, widely regarded as Georgia’s de facto ruler despite serving as prime minister for only 13 months. Ivanishvili, Georgia’s richest man, made his fortune in Russia during the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving Russia in 2002 when Vladimir Putin became president but maintaining close ties to Russian business and politics. His political views mix anti-Western sentiment, social conservatism, and populist rhetoric aimed at consolidating power and discrediting opponents. This entrenched dominance reflects the challenges faced by opposition forces, highlighting the fragility of democratic institutions under prolonged one-party rule.

Georgia’s geopolitical significance lies in its strategic location in the South Caucasus, serving as a critical bottleneck for Eurasian energy transit, economic integration, and trade routes. Positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia with access to the sea, the country plays a pivotal role in connecting these regions, making developments within Georgia highly relevant for regional stability and global interests. Historically, Georgia has had complicated ties to Russia, as its predecessors controlled the country for much of the last few centuries, and it remains economically dependent on its northern neighbor. The Kremlin still controls Georgian separatist territories Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the invasion of Georgia in 2008. Meanwhile, the Georgian government does not participate in sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine and has been accused of helping to evade Russian sanctions, while also serving as a destination for political refugees from Russia. This duality underscores Georgia’s complex balancing act, navigating historical and economic ties to Russia while seeking to align with Western democratic principles.

In conclusion, Georgia stands at a crossroads where its domestic political trajectory and geopolitical orientation hold profound implications not only for its own citizens but for the broader regional balance of power. The disputed elections and their aftermath underline the fragile state of democracy in a nation critical to both Russian and Western interests. Georgia’s location as a bridge between Europe and Asia, coupled with its potential as a model for democratic resilience, makes it a focal point in the struggle between authoritarian and democratic forces. Allowing Georgia to drift further into authoritarianism would undermine the democratic aspirations of its people and signal that authoritarian regimes can consolidate power without consequence. For Western allies, supporting democratic governance and addressing the increasing authoritarian tendencies in Georgia is not merely an ethical imperative but a strategic necessity to ensure stability in the region and counterbalance Russian influence.