MS Risk Blog

Implications of the of the 2025 German Election on defence and security policy

Key Judgements

• Friedrich Merz is likely to become the new German Chancellor after the election
• Defence spending is highly likely to increase to strengthen independent European security
• The major political parties disagree on policies around defence and security
• The makeup of the new coalition will impact the effectiveness of the new government’s defence spending

Context: Why is Germany important to European defence? 

Germany is preparing for a national election on the 23^rd of February 2025 after the collation under Olaf Scholz collapsed. The current frontrunner is the conservative candidate Friedrich Merz who must create a new coalition amongst Germany’s political parties.

The War in Ukraine has brought military issues back to the centre of attention for German politics, forcing political parties to rethink their positions on national security. Another reason for the shift, is the threat of dis-engagement under the new Trump administration and the request for a 5% share of GDP. Security decisions will likely need to be made more quickly, and more money will have to be spent due to the potential US economic and security pressures. All the major parties, the CDU & CSU (the Union), SPD, Greens and FDP, agree on the need to strengthen the German armed forces and have committed to allocating a higher share of GDP to defence.

Differences between the political parties 

There are still divisions over how to finance military spending. The Greens are considering an increase in public debt to support the modernisation of the armed forces. The Union have stated they will not increase German spending of GDP to 5% saying the US doesn’t spend this amount. Additionally, there is debate around the re-introduction of military service. The SPD and the Greens propose a voluntary but structured system adhering to the needs of the troops. Whereas the FDP insists on only pure volunteers. Alternatively, the Union proposes the return of compulsory military service or “compulsory social year” for young Germans.

The War in Ukraine also represents an area of differing strategic views. While all parties agree on the need to support Kyiv to ensure it has a strong negotiating position there are major differences in the tools being used. The FDP support the Taurus cruise missile whereas SPD reject it. The current Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, has refused to supply Taurus missiles on the basis that Ukraine could use them to hit Russian targets making Germany a part of the war. The Bavarian State Premiere, Markus Soder, used a similar argument as part of the CSU. This is despite the fact the US, the UK and France have all supplied similar long-range weapons to Ukraine. The CDU’s candidate, Friedrich Merz, has declared his willingness to supply the missile but only after consulting with European NATO partners. Currently, the CDU and CSU “Union” have not clear positions in their manifesto. This has been highlighted by the conservative press in Germany who criticise the Union’s positions on defence and security arguing they lack concrete commitments around the Taurus missile and plans to strengthen the German armed force.

The SPD and the Union support the presence of American weapons systems within Germany, whereas the AfD and BSW oppose it. Additionally, the Union are hinting at the possibility of Germany participating in negotiations towards  Ukraine including the deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers to keep the peace. On the other hand, the AfD supports more radical policies that risk isolating Germany, including theories around Putin’s victory up to the refusal of rearmament. These positions find a consensus amongst the electorate especially in eastern Germany where there is more respect for Russia policies due to the pre-existing energy relationship. Additionally, immigration and the economy are marked out as the two biggest problems in Germany by voters, only 8% view domestic security as a pressing issue.

What happens next? 

The most likely outcome is for Germany’s next chancellor to be Friedrich Merz and the conservatives. The various parties that will make up the future coalition are still up for debate and depend heavily on how many seats each party gains during the election.

If the outcome is a coalition between the Union and the SPD there is concern that security policy will proceed slowly. The SPD would likely continue their “peace populism” policy while distancing themselves from their coalition partner. This would cause Merz to face criticism from both the SPD and the Union.

Alternatively, a coalition between the Union and the Greens could push Germany security policy forward as the junior partners in the coalition have shifted from being a party with many pacifists to being one of the biggest supports of military aid to Ukraine including the delivery of weapons systems. There is greater alignment between the two parties allowing security policy to flow more smoothly.

Georgian elections: Authoritarian tendencies and geopolitical tensions

The recent parliamentary elections in Georgia highlight the ongoing geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West. Despite clear evidence of widespread irregularities, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party won a 54% majority in the 26 October vote. This outcome has raised serious concerns in Western capitals that Georgia’s increasing alignment with Russia could undermine the country’s democratic institutions and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The election results signal a potential shift away from EU integration, long a cornerstone of Georgian policy and enshrined in its constitution, and towards closer ties with the Kremlin and Eurasian powers. This shift is particularly striking given that a significant majority of Georgians—with polls showing over 80% support—continue to favor EU accession, while further alignment with Russia remains deeply unpopular. The elections were widely regarded as a referendum on Georgia’s geopolitical orientation, and the growing disconnect between government actions and public opinion underscores the high stakes for Georgia’s domestic stability and regional influence.

The opposition and former president Salome Zourabichvili are contesting the official results. Post-election protests erupted on 28 October and have continued since, met with intense police violence and pressure from the authorities. More than 500 people have been detained and dozens injured by riot police using water cannon and tear gas. The demonstrations began following the disputed election results and the announcement that Georgia’s EU accession negotiations had been suspended by the new government until the end of 2028. This decision followed the EU’s earlier move to freeze negotiations in June 2024, citing concerns about authoritarianism after the GD passed laws requiring organizations receiving foreign funding to register as foreign agents and an anti-LGBTQ+ law, both modelled on Russian legislation. These laws had sparked heavy protests throughout Georgia in 2023 and 2024. The United States reacted by freezing bilateral aid, NATO partners canceled military support, and the United Kingdom paused its joint security dialogue. Although the election was rigged, the GD was expected to secure twice as many votes as any opposition party. Western governments criticized the election but refrained from rejecting the results outright.

The GD party had previously won the 2016 and 2020 elections as well as the controversial 2024 parliamentary elections, with results not legally challenged domestically due to the GD’s control over the courts. With the inauguration of new President Mikheil Kavelashvili, a former professional footballer, on 29 December 2024, the only significant institutional opposition, former President Salome Zourabichvili, was removed from office. This marked another milestone in the dominance of the GD party, founded in 2012 by billionaire oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, widely regarded as Georgia’s de facto ruler despite serving as prime minister for only 13 months. Ivanishvili, Georgia’s richest man, made his fortune in Russia during the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving Russia in 2002 when Vladimir Putin became president but maintaining close ties to Russian business and politics. His political views mix anti-Western sentiment, social conservatism, and populist rhetoric aimed at consolidating power and discrediting opponents. This entrenched dominance reflects the challenges faced by opposition forces, highlighting the fragility of democratic institutions under prolonged one-party rule.

Georgia’s geopolitical significance lies in its strategic location in the South Caucasus, serving as a critical bottleneck for Eurasian energy transit, economic integration, and trade routes. Positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia with access to the sea, the country plays a pivotal role in connecting these regions, making developments within Georgia highly relevant for regional stability and global interests. Historically, Georgia has had complicated ties to Russia, as its predecessors controlled the country for much of the last few centuries, and it remains economically dependent on its northern neighbor. The Kremlin still controls Georgian separatist territories Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the invasion of Georgia in 2008. Meanwhile, the Georgian government does not participate in sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine and has been accused of helping to evade Russian sanctions, while also serving as a destination for political refugees from Russia. This duality underscores Georgia’s complex balancing act, navigating historical and economic ties to Russia while seeking to align with Western democratic principles.

In conclusion, Georgia stands at a crossroads where its domestic political trajectory and geopolitical orientation hold profound implications not only for its own citizens but for the broader regional balance of power. The disputed elections and their aftermath underline the fragile state of democracy in a nation critical to both Russian and Western interests. Georgia’s location as a bridge between Europe and Asia, coupled with its potential as a model for democratic resilience, makes it a focal point in the struggle between authoritarian and democratic forces. Allowing Georgia to drift further into authoritarianism would undermine the democratic aspirations of its people and signal that authoritarian regimes can consolidate power without consequence. For Western allies, supporting democratic governance and addressing the increasing authoritarian tendencies in Georgia is not merely an ethical imperative but a strategic necessity to ensure stability in the region and counterbalance Russian influence.

Attack on German Christmas Market

Context: Why was Germany chosen as an attack location?

Terrorism attacks are not new to Germany as the history of the country shows, during the Weimar Republic elected officials were beaten and murdered, and in the 1960s the Red Army Faction, a far-left military group, conducted kidnappings and murders in opposition to the socioeconomic system of West Germany, capitalism combined with elements of social democracy. In recent times, there have been attacks from Islamic extremists along with left and right-wing extremists. One of the most prominent was on the 19th of December 2016 when a man killed 13 individuals after driving a truck into a crowd at a market in Berlin, afterward, ISIS claimed responsibility.

One of the explanations for the rise in terrorist attacks is Germany’s position as a centre for terrorist and Islamic extremists in Europe where the group has grown at a faster rate compared with other European nations. Many Turkish and Kurdish Islamic groups are active in Germany as their top leaders fled there in the 2000s.

Another explanation is the growing resentment towards the national government as economic growth has decreased and the political consensus of social democracy is becoming less popular. This is driving citizens to more extreme political ideologies on both the left and right.

Possible motives behind the Christmas market attack  

The suspect of the 20 December 2024 attack in Magdeburg, Taleb al-Abdulmohsen, was a 50-year-old Saudi citizen who arrived in Germany in 20006 and worked as a doctor. The suspected attacker has no known links to Islamist extremism, however, German authorities have so far treated the attack as a terrorist incident. Six people were killed in the attack and at least 299 were injured, according to the latest figures from the interior ministry of Saxony-Anhalt.

Prosecutor Horst Walter Noepns has suggested the reasoning behind the crime could be linked to the mistreatment of Saudi Arabia refugees by German officials. The suspect has been seen as an outspoken critic of Islam and of European immigration policy, particularly on social media. Reports in the German media have shown the suspect campaigned against Islam while in Saudi Arabia and showed anger at German governments for letting in large numbers of Muslim refugees. Additionally, there are reports of the suspect helping young Saudi women and critics of the government escape and seek asylum in Germany, describing an “Islamism of Europe”. The suspect’s posts on the X platform show a distrust of authorities in Germany along with a belief in conspiratorial stories including accusing police of stealing a USB stick from him and destroying a criminal complaint he had filed. Along with threats of violence against German citizens and politicians. All this points to a strong negative view of Islam and the regime in Saudi Arabia along with German authorities.

Additionally, the mental state of the suspect can also be observed as a factor. The suspect had been treated for mental illness in the past and tested positive for drug use on the night of his arrest. Interior Minister Nancy Faeser has said so far no motive has been established but “there are striking signs of a pathological psyche” in the suspect.

Furthermore, there is reason to believe the suspect was already a potential threat to the public. German police had contacted the suspect in September and October of 2024 and tried but failed to meet up with him in December. Additionally, the Saudi government sent four official notifications to the German authorities, three to intelligence and one to the foreign ministry, warning them about the “very extreme views” held by the suspect. All of these were ignored, according to sources close to the Saudi government. Although German Police say the accusations from the Saudi government were too vague.

What has resulted?

The Interior Minister of Germany has argued lessons have been learned from this attack, specifically on tracking potential attackers who don’t fit conventional threat categories or profiles, new indicators and action plans will need to be created. Security experts have criticised the security apparatus of the Magdeburg Christmas market in which organisers had left an escape route open, designed for emergency service vehicles which the suspect used to drive past all the blockades. Additionally, elements were missing from the security plan, a chain to block the gap between two concrete blocks, for instance. Criminal charges have been made against the city and local police which could lead to investigations around the security plan and implementation for the market.

The result amongst the public has been an increased opposition to Germany’s current immigration policy and a rise in support for right-wing political parties such as the AfD, who have called for major rallies to take place across the country. This will become significant as the country prepares for an election in early 2025.

Romanian Presidential Election and Russian Interference

On November 24, 2024, Romania held its presidential elections, which resulted in no candidate securing an absolute majority, prompting a second round scheduled for December 8. However, on December 6, the Constitutional Court annulled the initial results because of Russian interference. Călin Georgescu, an independent NATO and EU-skeptic nationalist, won a relative majority in the first round, while liberal Elena Lasconi finished second. Georgescu’s rise to prominence was largely attributed to Russian influence and the extensive use of non-traditional media, particularly TikTok, which significantly boosted his campaign. Key issues in the election included corruption, traditional Christian values, Romania’s stance on EU and NATO membership, and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War.

Following the election results, serious allegations of manipulation and foreign interference emerged. Opinion polls had initially shown Georgescu as a minor candidate, raising doubts about his unexpected success. These claims of fraud prompted the Constitutional Court to order a recount, which confirmed the results and validated the runoff. However, on December 4, declassified intelligence reports revealed unusual activities surrounding the election. Reports indicated coordinated misinformation campaigns on TikTok, aimed at influencing public opinion in favor of Georgescu, and cyberattacks on the official Romanian election website, both linked to Russian interference. Illegal campaign financing was also uncovered.

The court’s decision to annul the results ignited significant controversy, both domestically and internationally. The situation deepened existing skepticism toward the government and political parties. Georgescu, a former senior civil servant and agricultural engineer, is known for his far-right nationalist views, which include skepticism toward both the EU and NATO. His rejection of further support for Ukraine and his focus on national interests over Western alliances made him a controversial figure, attracting attention both in Romania and internationally. Russia’s interest in the Romanian election lies in its broader strategy of weakening the unity of the West and undermining the EU and NATO by exploiting the vulnerabilities of individual member states. Romania has significant geostrategic importance as a key NATO ally on the eastern flank, with critical military infrastructure and contributions to regional security, particularly in the Black Sea. During the war, Romania expanded maritime trade opportunities with Ukraine in Danube and Black Sea ports, helping to secure new trade corridors. A destabilization of Romania could complicate strategic logistics and trade partnerships with Ukraine. The risk of an alienated Romania, with a Eurosceptic and NATO-skeptic president, distancing itself from its Western allies could seriously undermine NATO’s cohesion and its ability to respond effectively to regional threats. Moreover, Romania’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian energy, particularly through the Neptun Deep gas project in the Black Sea, threaten Russia’s influence in the region.

Russia’s campaigns aim to exploit public dissatisfaction with domestic governments, weaken trust in institutions, and erode support for NATO and EU policies by amplifying sensitive issues like economic struggles, social inequalities, and controversial policies. One such narrative portrays foreign investments, particularly from the U.S., in Romania’s resources as a threat to national sovereignty. These narratives aim to foster resistance to Western economic involvement, especially regarding the Neptun Deep gas project. At the same time, Russia has backed campaigns appealing to Orthodox Christian nationalist sentiment, increasing tensions between Romania and its Western allies. In addition, Russia has used disinformation campaigns, often launched from Moldova, to undermine the Romanian public’s trust in the government and Western institutions, exploiting social and economic discontent and also weakening public support for Ukraine. Through these tactics, Russia seeks to weaken Romania’s commitment to the EU and NATO, destabilize its political landscape, and further its strategic interests in the region.

The interference in the Romanian elections is a demonstration of the hybrid tactics used in Russia’s geopolitical strategy to weaken Western unity. It is unique because it is the first time that Russian interference has led to the annulment of an election with credible evidence. Romania’s handling of foreign interference will be closely watched by other countries facing similar threats, particularly in terms of transparency and public accountability. If Romania can effectively demonstrate that it identified, addressed and neutralised the interference in a way that strengthens institutional credibility, it could provide a model for responding to hybrid warfare tactics aimed at undermining democratic systems.

Netherlands Joining European Long-range Missile Strike Approach

Key Judgements

The Netherlands is considering joining the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA)

The Dutch defence minister believes it is essential to increase capacity against further Russian aggression

What is the European Long-Range Missile Strike Approach? 

France, Germany, Italy, and Poland launched the ELSA project in July 2024 to develop a ground-based missile for deep strikes against enemy positions. The United Kingdom and Sweden joined in October 2024. The programme aims to create a sovereign defence capability, strengthen the European defence industry and technology base and implement fairer sharing of the burden between Allies. The Ukraine War demonstrated the need for this approach as Russia used ballistic and cruise missiles to attack Ukrainian cities from a far distance.

Previously, during the Cold War, ground-launched missiles were prohibited from having a range of 1,000-2,000 kilometres under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. However, this agreement collapsed in 2019 after the US and Russia withdrew. This happened after the US accused Russia of violating the pact by building a new type of cruise missile.

The Dutch defence minister, Ruben Brekelmans, announced an interest in participating while in Paris on 27th November 2024. He highlighted how essential it is for European armies to increase their capacity to deter further aggression from Russia. The Ukraine War has demonstrated the need for ground-launched deep strike capability as Russian missiles have destroyed Ukrainian cities from far-off ranges. The decision to join by the Netherlands comes as Russia announces plans to place the latest intercontinental ballistic missile system  (RS-28 Sarmat) on combat duty. This has been made to help Russia modern its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile system with the capability to strike targets in Europe and the US.

Why is the Netherlands joining?

Brekelmans acknowledged the incoming US administration under Donald Trump, saying European capitals need to show America they are taking on more of the burden for defence within NATO. This also explains the development of the ELSA project as European powers feel it is better to develop their own independent system than purchase one from an outside power like the US. This feeds into an overall sense that Europe wants to become more reliant on itself for security rather than the US. Part of this decision comes from a fear of President Trump reducing US involvement in NATO, or pulling out altogether as he has threatened in the past.

European powers also want to fill a perceived capability gap between themselves and Russia. All the current ELSA participants already possess air and for some, sea-launched cruise missiles but they all have a smaller range of 500 kilometres. One of the advantages of cruise missiles is they fly lower than other projection weaponry like ballistic systems. Only Turkey possesses a ground-based system. The reason behind this capability gap is the significant drop in overall defence spending by NATO allies in Europe after the Cold War, falling by 20 per cent after 2008. In particular, high-intensity combat has been structurally underfunded. By closing this capability gap European powers aim to deter further aggression from Russia.

The Netherlands in particular has been looking for an increase in long-range strike capacity for some time, hence their decision in February of 2024 to purchase 120 air-launched cruise missiles from the US. The European power has made other investments in its military including a 4 billion Euro investment plan with a focus on its maritime domain with new Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, new frigates and new submarines. The reason behind these investments is mainly to help combat the growing security threat from Russian aggression and, like other European nations, to limit any dependency on outside powers for defence. However, it will likely still need support from overseas as many of the suppliers it has partnered with manufacture their products offshore, including in the US, Norway and Israel.

There has been a growing strategic closeness on defence issues between European nations. The Netherlands signed a contract in late September of this year to buy four Barracuda submarines from the French shipmaker Naval Group. Indeed, one of the objectives of the ELSA is to reduce the costs of the system by spreading them amongst the various nations. This aligns with the French president, Emmanuel Macron’s goal of creating a new European security framework

What happens next? 

It will take some time for this decision by the Dutch government to take full effect as the reality of ELSA is still a few years away. Additionally, the full cost of the system has not been announced and there is the possibility of citizens feeling less warm towards an expensive military project in a time of economic downturn.

While the stated goal of European defence officials is to create ground-launched capability it is important to note that this is not explicitly stated in any of the official statements or announcements surrounding the ELSA. In fact, the Swedish defence minister, Pal Jonson,  has said his country won’t prioritise ground-based strike options, instead focusing on naval and aerial domains, which are of greater national interest.

It is possible that if the ELSA initiative moves closer towards implementation, MBDA, a European defence firm, will be the one developing the technology. This gives further support that European powers are concentrating on building up their domestic industries. It also means the development of a cruise missile is more likely than a ballistic system as many of the European defence-industrial firms have greater experience and expertise in the former. However, there are also concerns as the implementation of new weapons systems takes a considerable chunk of time, take the Anglo-French Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon that is still under development and will not be ready before 2028 at the earliest despite being announced in 2017.