MS Risk Blog

Review of Situation in Eastern Europe

Belarus

As one of the remaining allay of Russia in European region, Belarus has been in the unique position of representing Russian interest. This has been continued for the last 1 month. Russia has completed shipments of short-range, tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, which raised strong concerns of neighbouring countries.

Diplomatic position of the country has been closer to Russa and China, which was represented with Lukashenko’s visit to Beijing in 4th December. Diplomatic isolations was seen after Global Red Cross suspended Belarus chapter after the chief Dzmitry Shautsou was related to mass Ukraine children abduction from Russian-controlled areas. It is known that more than 2,400 Ukrainian children was taken to Belarus.

Lukashenko is also tightening internal control. Human rights activists and formal political prisoner Leonid Sudalenka accused that he faced abuse in his three years of imprisonment. He submitted to UN Human Rights Committee, which Lukashenko refused to discuss. This is one of the continuing political oppression in the country.

Russian military presence in Belarus has been increasing. Wagner Group personnels continued to train Belarusian forces as of January. Five million rounds of ammunition was delivered to Belarus in December 2023. However, in the last few months decrease of equipment of Wagner Group in Belarus has been decrease, which could have taken back to Russa or transferred to Russian military.

Migration crisis on Belarus-Poland border is continuing since November 2022. It is known as part of hybrid warfare of Kremlin. Polish government constructed 5.5 meters high and stretching for 186km border barrier, stopping migrants and creating humanitarian crisis on border.

MOLDOVA

Vadim Krasnoselsky, the president of Republic of Transnistria claimed on 9th January that Moldova’s militarization is threatening Transnistria. This pro-Russian separatist leader is against Moldova’s pro-western policies, which is Kremlin controlled narrative that gives opportunities of future campaigns within Moldova. Long history of separatism and Russian speaking population of Moldova is facing possible treat from Moscow.

POLAND

13^th December, Donald Tusk became Prime Minister of Poland in the aftermath of the October parliamentary election. It was followed in 19^th December, Polish public media crisis which dismissed directors and supervisory boards of public broadcaster TVP. This was criticized by the Law and Justice (PiS) party, which lost election.

Poland is facing political unrest after 2 politicians was affected in the presidential palace at 9^th January. Former interior minister Mariusz Kaminski and former deputy interior minister Maciej Wasik was convicted and sentenced for abuse of power was given refuge in presidential palace. This shows political turmoil between the Law and Justice (PiS) party, and newly elected pro-EU administration. This was followed by the protest of several hundred PiS supporters at the police headquarter which where two former MPs were taken into custody after the arrest.

Current pro-EU party has majority in the parliament, but for month the country has suffered turmoil between current government and PiS. Current government is pushing for reform of country both domestic and foreign, which indicates turmoil within the new government.

20th December, Poland Internal Security Agency arrested suspected Belarusian woman of spying and providing information about diaspora in Poland to Belarusian security services. She was charged with espionage in 9^th of January. It was announced that Daira Ostapenko, who was model on Only fans which is a paid online service for pornography and prostitute was recruited few years ago. She was arrested after she disclosed to her friends that she was working for Belarusian security services.

Migration crisis on the Belarusian border is still continuing, but there were no significant development in the past month.

RUSSIA

As of February 2024, Russian invasion on Ukraine marks it’s 3^rd year. Despite continuing long war and staggering casualties on the frontline, Russia has not made any significant advance for month. Ukraine war has become stalemate in both military sense and political sense. Both Putin and Zelensky’s political position makes peace negotiation impossible. Without hope of ending the war near future, Kremlin faces presidential election on March 2024 which gives pressure to Putin for a result in this war.

However, there is no evidence that national difficulties are presenting Putin serious near future threat. Despite long war with Ukraine, President Putin is maintaining strong domestic support with 67% approve of   Putin’s foreign policy and 58% on domestic policy. 66% is planning to vote for Putin in the upcoming March Presidential Election of Russia. Also, with long history of rigged election current regime is expected to be on power without difficulties.

Russia’s main war effort is focused on Eastern Ukraine, mainly on Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast. Until 9th January, there were no meaningful changes on frontline. Positional fighting without significant development has been continuing in Eastern Ukraine.

Although the invasion was made by the Russia, effect of the war is not isolated on Ukraine soil. 2th of January city of Belgorod, which is located near Russian-Ukraine border was strike by Ukrainian forces. 5 was wounded by this attack. 9^th of January nearly 100 children was evacuated n Belgorod because of the repeated Ukraine attacks. Belgorod is the first Russian city that was attacked by the Ukraine and been suffering since. Currently there is no visible Ukraine forces on the area.

There was visible civil unrest, protest of families of Russian conscripts and activists being charge by the government indicates that Russian society is suffering from long war. But there is no visible political protest that could threaten regime or presidential election of 2024. One of the few remaining political adversary of Putin is Alexei Navalny, who is currently serving 19-years prison sentence was transferred to a IK-3 penal colony located in Yamalo-Nenets region. It is one of the Soviet-era Gulags, which is located at 1,900km northeast of Moscow. It is assumed this action is to deter Navalny’s public activities before presidential election.

Economical ties between Russia and the West have been damaged severely. And this is being replaced by China. Trade between China and Russia has reached a record of $240 billion in 2023, which is grown 26.3% comparing with 2022. Both countries has pledged to boost bilateral trade, and it is expected to grow in the near future because of deteriorated relation with the West. In 2023, half of Russia’s oil and petroleum was received by China, making Russia more dependent on Chinse relations.

UKRAINE

Ukraine is suffering long war, but Ukrainian public is still having positive attitudes toward the Ukrain government. Survey published on 18th December 2023 shows that 99% trust Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and 66% trust President Zelensky. However, it is noticeable that comparing to 2022, trust in President Zelensky has been declined from 84%.

Conflict with Russia is mainly focused on Eastern Ukraine, countering Russian effort to strengthen control of Eastern part of the country. Each side is positional fighting without significant changes on the frontline. Currently, Ukraine is building further barricades near Kupiansk, which is the northeastern city of Ukraine. This indicates that soon Ukraine is not planning counter offensive. Such defensive position of Ukraine would lead to a long stalemate. Current weather condition in Ukraine is extremely cold, and temperature is not forecasted to rise over the next week, which would complicate both side’s operations.

However, Ukraine is suffering from Russian missiles strikes. In 8^th January Russia have stroked with nearly 60 missiles nationwide. Most of the major Eastern cities such as Zaporizhzhia, Pokrovsk and Kharkiv was stroked, but some of the attacks was targeted on the other side of the country. Kharkiv region suffered again by Russian strike on 11^th January.

In 3^rd January, more than 200 soldiers was returned by the largest prisoner exchange. It was mediated by the UAE, and the location of the exchange was not announced by both governments. This was the 49^th prisoner exchange during the war, and Ukraine announced among the returned 230 Ukrainian prisoners were veterans from milestone battles.

Ukraine defence audit found $262m worth of financial violations over the last four month. Corruption issue is especially sensitive issue in Ukraine currently. Because of unstable public opinion of Ukraine support in West, and application to join EU, Ukraine government is tackling corruption.

Review of Current Situation in the Middle East

LEBANON

Tensions along the Lebanon-Israel border have risen in recent months, raising broad concerns about regional stability and security. The increase in tension began on October 7th and has been defined by a succession of important events since then. On December 4^th Hamas reportedly established a new movement in Lebanon named Al-Aqsa in order to attack Israel by recruiting young people from camps. Three days following the statement, Hamas began distributing flysheets urging Palestinian youngsters in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camps near Sidon to come together. In response to Hamas’ ‘Al Aqsa flood’ operation, Lebanon has launched a national emergency plan to confront the rising issue. The strategy is intended to shield the Lebanese people against future Israeli occupation forces assault by providing protective measures such as secure refuges and vital goods during times of crisis.

 In the midst of regional developments, the first batch of the 22nd Chinese peacekeeping forces arrived, with the following unit consisting of a multi-role engineering company, a construction engineering company, and a level 1+ medical detachment, reaffirming China’s commitment to UNIFIL’s mission in Lebanon.

Souheil Abboud, the president of Lebanon’s Higher Judicial Council, gave an urgent warning about the oncoming collapse of the country’s judicial system against the backdrop of the country’s rising crises and widespread corruption. Abboud emphasised the negative impact of political intervention on judicial efficiency, noting several empty judge seats and widespread obstruction of justice.

Furthermore, according to Lieutenant Colonel Avichay Adraee, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) spokesperson in Arabic, around one-fifth of the rockets fired by Hezbollah against Israel have landed in Lebanon since the conflict began. In response to Hezbollah’s strikes, Israel has launched many missiles into Lebanon, primarily in the south. This led in the injuries of Hezbollah members, innocent people, and even the mayors of Taybeh on the 11^th of December.

With the humanitarian disaster emerging in the region, the European Union announced a 12 million euros initiative in collaboration with the Expertise France to improve the integrity, transparency, and accountability of Lebanon’s public administration. The initiative is intended to last four years and conforms to reform possibilities indicated by the IMF Staff-Level Agreement, as well as modern public administration principles. This programme supplements current activities under the Lebanon Financing Facility for Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction. The initiative aims to increase public trust in the government’s ability to serve citizens’ interests by supporting oversight organisations critical to combatting corruption and wrongdoing in the public sector. French diplomatic efforts have also been critical, with French Foreign Minister Mme Catherine Colonna visiting Lebanon on December 13th and 14th. In addition, on the 28th, David Cameron visited Lebanon, encouraging caution amid border tensions with Israel. Moreover, late this month Hezbollah accused Israel of hacking on CCTV cameras in southern Lebanon, heightening concerns amongst the Lebanese people.

SYRIA

In December 2023, Syria saw a series of security crises that highlighted the region’s geopolitical complexity. Tensions erupted near the Syria-Lebanon border on December 6th, when Lebanese authorities opened fire on a vehicle, killing a young man. Meanwhile, dispute erupted in northern Deir Ezzor’s Abo Al-Naital Village, when a local shooters group engaged in violent confrontations with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), resulting in the death of the local shooter.

The regional dynamics were heightened further on December 7th, with a significant increase in Israeli military strikes. There have been reports of Israeli missile assaults on Hezbollah positions near Qalamoun, northwest of Damascus. These bombings were part of a larger pattern that included Hezbollah and Iranian militia locations near Sayyeda Zainab and Hujira, south of Damascus. At the same time, Israeli planes began airstrikes in response to a missile launched from Syrian territory into the Golan Heights. Following strikes near Damascus International Airport aggravated the situation, leading in deaths and the loss of crucial infrastructure.

As the Israeli strikes progressed, ISIS increased their activity in several locations of Syria. Notably, two non-Syrian leaders of Iranian militias were killed in Al-Bokamal, Deir Ezzor. The capacity of ISIS to carry out strikes in Al-Jama’iya Checkpoint, Al-Rusafah desert, and Al-Tabqah city, with losses recorded among both government troops and members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), added to the complexity of the fight.

The U.S. military remained heavily involved, carrying out attacks in Syria against Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps targets and targeting suspected terrorists. These operations, together with the continuous insurgency against U.S. forces, created a complicated security environment in which regional conflicts intermingled. Additonally, explosions heard on December 11^th at the U.S.’ Al-Shaddadi facility in Hasakah, assumed to be an attack by the Iraqi resistance. Meanwhile, in the Hasakah countryside, Syrian Arab Army soldiers evicted a mixed convoy of U.S. and Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters.

Concerns turned to humanitarian and environmental issues as the month continued. The link of combat and public health was emphasised by a hepatitis outbreak in Daraa governorate, which was fuelled by contaminated drinking water and worsened by state neglect. Furthermore, the cut-off of water to Hasakah city, which has been under Turkish-backed control since October, has added to the hardships of a besieged populace. In the middle of these security concerns, the Orontes River was confronted with a new hazard in the shape of an invasive Nile flower, which had a negative impact on the local livelihoods.

Taiwan made an important diplomatic move on the 13^th by signing an aid arrangement with the U.S. to promote development initiatives in north-eastern Syria. The aid, focused at Hasakah and Deir Ezzor, aims to promote public health, improve quality of life, and educate first responders, all while helping to the rebirth of civil society.

Further, on the 15^th, Russian air forces intervened, initiating airstrikes on terrorist hideouts in the White Desert to disrupt planned acts of sabotage targeting oil and gas installations, highways and government military positions.

The return of Syrian government second-in-command Maher al-Assad coincided with the approval of a legislation authorising the regime to oversee and invest in confiscated assets. This contentious measure, which went into force retroactively, tightened the regime’s control even more and prompted fears about state-sanctioned asset confiscation, replicating Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Turkish security forces killed PKK/YPG terrorists in northern Syria on the 20^th, underlining Turkey’s continuous military actions in the region. Simultaneously, an ISIS-planted landmine killed seven members of Syria’s security forces, highlighting the country’s ongoing threat from terrorist elements. Landmines exploded in Homs in western Syria and the capital of the Homs Governorate where pro-Iran militants attacked American positions in eastern Syria.  On the 23^rd, ISIS carried out three strikes in regions held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), resulting in a few casualties. While on the 19^th, Jordan carried airstrikes on farms and a military base near Al-Suwaidaa resulted in casualties. During an attempted smuggling across the Syrian Jordanian border, Syria seized a number of Captagon tablets and narcotic hashish packets. On the 29^th, Israel escalated its military efforts by carrying out an aircraft attack against a critical Syrian air defence installation in southern Syria.  Simultaneously, in a dramatic escalation, as eleven Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders were killed in an attack on Damascus International Airport.

Finally, Razi Mousavi, a long-time advisor to Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guard, was assassinated by an Israeli attack in the Sayida Zeinab, Syria on the 25^th. The incident heightened existing tensions, with Iran threatening Israel with retaliation.

ISRAEL

The month of December saw major escalation in the Israel-Hamas conflict, with a number of incidents ranging from difficult political conversations to increased military actions. The conflict between Palestinian militias and Israeli soldiers in Khan Younis laid the ground for a fresh round of violence. The al Qassem Brigades’ claim of responsibility for an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) strike that killed Israeli soldiers. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) responded quickly, releasing details on the December 10^th operations in the Shujaiya neighbourhood. The 282nd Fire Brigade carried out strikes on over 20 targets, including weapons storage facilities and booby-trapped residences, highlighting the conflict’s urban warfare issues. Additionally, the al Quds Brigades claimed responsibility for the explosion of a house in Shujaiya that contained 13 Israeli soldiers looking for a tunnel access.

In mid-December, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken supported the emergency delivery of roughly 14,000 rounds of tank ammunition to Israel, citing Israel’s ongoing conflict with Hamas as justification.

With Hezbollah’s involvement, the conflict’s regional implications became increasingly obvious. Hezbollah targeted three Israeli military outposts near the Lebanese border: Ramim, Metulla, and the Birket Rishe. The tension reached a breaking point with a Hezbollah missile attack on Kiryat Shmona, demonstrating the group’s willingness to strike against perceived Israeli offences. Meanwhile, the Yemeni Houthis’ warning that ships avoid sailing towards Israel underlined the possibility of regional spillover and the junction of many geopolitical fault points.

Further, on December 23^rd, Israeli forces made significant advances into the West Bank. Tulkarem and Bethlehem became the flashpoints for violence between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian people. On December 27^th, a viable avenue for humanitarian help arose amid the growing fighting. Israel agreed to a proposal for a humanitarian sea corridor into Gaza, which has the backing of Cyprus and the United Kingdom. Moreover, internal Israeli unrest reached a boiling point on December 30^th, when hundreds of protesters filled the streets of Tel Aviv. The protestors were demanding a cease-fire, the release of Israeli detainees, and the cessation of civilian fatalities in Gaza.

JORDAN

Jordan has recently found itself at the crossroads of several difficulties, demonstrating the region’s complexity and dynamism. In the face of global developments, the Kingdom has been actively involved in resolving both internal and foreign challenges.

The continued dispute in Gaza has drawn international attention, and Jordan, led by King Abdullah II, has played a critical role in diplomatic attempts to settle the problem. King Abdullah’s constantly appeals for a quick cease-fire along with Egypt and raises his concerns about the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Jordan’s aggressive commitment in seeking solutions to the Israel-Hamas conflict is shown by the recent meeting between King Abdullah II and French President Emmanuel Macron in Aqaba on the 21^st of December. The King emphasised the need of international cooperation in facilitating the supply of humanitarian supplies to Gaza, alluding to the potential consequences of continued Israeli assault.

Jordan has experienced internal issues, particularly in the area of human rights. On the 7^th of December Human Rights Watch reports have highlighted concerns about Jordan’s security forces’ systematic targeting of LGBTQ+ people. Jordanian police have been accused of assaulting the LGBTQ+ community by forcing individuals to reveal their sexual orientation to their conservative families and shutting down LGBTQ+ organisations. Human rights organisations claim abductions, harassment, and monitoring of activists, with current targeting growing.

Jordan’s army launched a raid on drug traffickers near the Syrian border on the 12th, resulting in the deaths of many individuals involved in the trafficking of the drug Captagon. This amphetamine-like stimulant, which is commonly made in Syria, is transported through Jordan into the Gulf nations, providing significant funding to Syria’s government and Iran-aligned militias who control areas of southern Syria. Despite the operation, several smugglers were able to return to Syria, taking advantage of the two nations’ large and partly desert 370km (230-mile) border. On the same day, Jordan signed a deal with the United States to receive a grant of 845.1 million US dollars. This award, which is part of Jordan’s yearly U.S. financial aid, is meant to promote the execution of different development projects and economic reforms in areas such as public finance, water, energy, education, health, and housing. Zeina Toukan, Jordan’s Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, emphasised that the award will help to reduce Jordan’s state budget deficit, giving critical assistance for the country’s economic growth.

Jordan effectively prevented repeated efforts by Syrian groups to smuggle weapons and drugs into its borders on the 21st. These group, allegedly run by Syrian security forces, Hezbollah, and Iran, were designed to feed Palestinian groups in the West Bank. Notably, on December 18, 2023, the Jordanian army revealed the foiled of a large-scale smuggling operation including narcotics, machine guns, and, crucially, rockets—a major increase in smuggled armament. The operation came during a time of heightened smuggling attempts, and on that day, severe confrontations erupted on the Syrian border between Jordanian border guards and armed groups attempting to smuggle in contraband, injuring Jordanian soldiers. In response to the danger, Jordan launched numerous airstrikes in southern Syria, targeting smugglers’ operations near the border. According to government spokesperson Muhannad Mubaidin, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi talked with his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and stressed that smuggling attempts by Iran-affiliated militias in Syria must stop.

Israeli settlers attacked Palestinian shepherds east of Khalat Makhol in the northern Jordan Valley on the 27^th.  The attackers apparently targeted the shepherds when they were seeking to reach pastures east of Khalat Makhol, impeding their entry to the region. At the same time, Israeli authorities apprehended two shepherd children, Hussein Yousef Bisharat, 16, and Mohammad Yousef Bisharat, 13.

Libya’s Perpetual Instability: Domestic Drivers and Foreign Involvement

Violent clashes that took place in Libya during August made apparent the country’s chronic instability. With the internationally backed stabilization and unification process deadlocked, a multitude of armed militias are competing for influence throughout the country, making such violence inevitable. Meanwhile, due to their conflicting interests, the main foreign actors involved in the conflict have been unable to establish a unified approach toward Libya and pressure their local partners into making compromises.

On the night of 14 August, clashes broke out in the southern suburbs of Libya’s capital Tripoli between two influential rival militias, the 444 Brigade and the Al-Radaa, or Special Deterrence Force (SDF). The fighting was reportedly triggered by the detention of 444 Brigade commander Mahmud Hamza by the SDF as he tried to travel from the city’s Mitiga airport, which is controlled by the latter. The clashes raged until late 15 August when the social council of the southeastern suburb of Soug gel-Joumaa, assisted by Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah, brokered a ceasefire according to which Hamza would be released and handed over to a “neutral party”. Soon after the announcement, the fighting abated. In total, 55 people were killed and 146 were wounded, while 234 families had to be evacuated.

The violence was yet another manifestation of the instability and political dysfunction that has been plaguing Libya since the fall of longtime ruler Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 and its descent into civil war. The country remains divided between two rival administrations, the Dbeibah-led internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the House of Representatives (HoR) in the eastern city of Tobruk, supported by Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) militia. After the United Nations (UN) brokered a ceasefire in October 2020 that put an end to the fighting, elections for forming a unified government that would lead the country back to stability were supposed to be held in December 2021, under a UN-backed process. But they were eventually canceled, as the various players were unable to agree on how they would be conducted or who would be eligible to run for office. Libya has since been locked in a stalemate, with neither side able to defeat the other and impose its rule over the entire country, although the ceasefire has so far held.

In this situation, numerous militias that emerged during the uprising against Gaddafi’s regime exercise powerful influence throughout the country. In the west, those militias are affiliated with various parts of the GNU, while in the east, Haftar has centralized control over local militias and integrated them into the LAAF. Due to the lack of a unified state structure that enjoys a monopoly on violence, these militias operate largely autonomously, particularly those aligned with the GNU. They exert control over different parts of the country, provide security services that fulfill the void left by the lack of proper security agencies, and promote their own allies for positions within state institutions. They also compete for government funding through the country’s immense oil wealth, while also profiting from criminal activities that Libya has emerged as a hub for, such as drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. Those militias and figures associated with them are among the main beneficiaries of the country’s current state, which enables them to amass political power and wealth.

Within this context, the recent clashes in Tripoli were probably more about competition between local militias than the country’s east-west split. The 444 and the SDF constitute two of the most powerful militias in Tripoli, both supporting the GNU. The former is affiliated with the defense ministry and controls the city’s southern suburbs, while the latter is more loosely linked with the interior ministry and controls east and central Tripoli, the Mitiga air base and civilian airport, and a prison. Competition between them has intensified, as the 444 has grown more militarily structured and organized, also including elements of the former Gaddafi regime, and its popularity has grown due to a reputation for discipline and effectively dealing with crime, while the ultra-conservative religious SDF has been losing influence. Control over the Mitiga airport, where Hamza was initially detained, was a central focus of the fighting, as both groups seek to bolster their influence in the capital by seizing control of strategic assets. Instability and lack of state control lead to frequent re-occurring of such violence, as different militias seek to consolidate and expand their influence in areas where they operate.

The involvement of multiple foreign actors, pursuing competing strategic and economic interests, in Libya’s affairs has contributed to this instability. Until the 2020 ceasefire, the Tripoli-based western factions were supported mainly by Turkey, Qatar, and Italy, while the main backers of HoR and Haftar were Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, France, and Russia. When Haftar launched an offensive during 2019-2020 to seize Tripoli, assisted by Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group, Turkey directly intervened by deploying military forces that pushed his forces back and froze the frontlines, leading to the current stalemate. Ankara’s move, supported by Doha, was part of its policy of countering its then regional adversaries UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, as well as strengthening its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, while Moscow has also been seeking to gain a foothold in the region in the context of its confrontation with the US and NATO.

Conciliatory shifts in this web of alignments and rivalries, of which Libya became a battleground, have been taking place since 2021. Turkey and Qatar have patched up their relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while Ankara has also made great progress in repairing its strained ties with Egypt. These developments have raised hopes that the rapprochement between some of the main foreign players will also trigger positive momentum in negotiations between the factions they support in Libya. Still, it seems that despite their involvement in Libya’s conflicts, these countries’ capability to pressure their local partners into compromises is limited. The latter have their own domestic bases of support, bolstered by oil revenues, and can hedge by seeking support from a wide array of foreign actors interested in Libya.

Meanwhile, Wagner mercenaries, aligned with Haftar, remain entrenched in several military bases and oil installations in east, central, and southern Libya. Concerned by Moscow’s foothold in a major oil-producing country with a strategic location in NATO’s southern flank, the US has intensified its efforts to dislodge Russia’s forces from Libya since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. But Washington so far has lacked the leverage and willingness to get more deeply involved in Libya, instead opting to rely on the powerful Turkish military presence in the west to contain Russian influence. The European Union (EU) has also shown increased interest in Libya’s oil and gas reserves since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. However, foreign policy disagreements between member states, as well as the complexities created by Turkish and Russian presence in the country, obstruct a coherent EU approach to the country.

In conclusion, Libya’s continued lack of a unified government and state control has solidified the strength and influence of militias, making competition between them a “natural” part of the country’s politics. As the militias compete for access to strategic assets and resources, violent clashes such as those that took place in Tripoli will almost certainly reoccur. Meanwhile, a breakthrough in the UN-backed process to unify and stabilize Libya is unlikely since the elites, particularly the militias, benefit from the current deadlock. Foreign actors are unlikely to be able to pressure their local partners into making compromises, considering the autonomy and agency of the latter as well as the conflicting regional and international interests in the country.

Guatemala: Between Political Instability and Hope

The 2023 presidential elections in Guatemala took place in a climate of mistrust of the elites due to numerous irregularities and several convincing cases of corruption, prompting voters to turn to a left-wing candidate with a progressive, anti-corruption programme: Bernardo Arévalo. Nevertheless, this victory did not instantly put an end to the corruption of the elites and certain state bodies, and the new president, who is due to take office on 14 January 2024, will undoubtedly face internal pressure and attempts to neutralise him. It is highly likely that Arévalo will have serious problems governing properly. His less security-conscious agenda than that of his opponent Sandra Torres also makes it unlikely that a strict state of emergency, such as that in Nicaragua, will be introduced during his term of office.

On 20 August, voters in Central America’s largest country went to the polls to elect the successor to Alejandro Giammattei, of the conservative Vamos party, who has been in power since 14 January 2020. Giammattei won the run-off election against Sandra Torres of the National Unity of Hope (UNE) party with 57.96% of the vote on 11 August 2019. The 2023 elections were no better for the former First Lady, as she lost to Bernardo Arévalo of the progressive Semilla party. Many predicted her victory, especially as the most popular candidate, Carlos Pineda, a member of Citizen Prosperity, who was expected to win 23% of the vote in the first round – compared with 20% for Sandra Torres – was disqualified on 26 May by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that he had not complied with electoral laws. Arévalo was given just 3% of the vote in the first round, but gradually gained votes by campaigning against corruption and for the underprivileged, reaching 12% in the first round.

The elimination of Carlos Pineda, along with others, was just one of the cases that led observers to believe that there had been irregularities in the presidential campaign, and they feared for the proper democratic conduct of the country’s most important elections. According to the World Bank (WB), Guatemala’s poverty and inequality rates are among the highest in the Latin American and Caribbean region (LAC), driven by the existence of a large and underserved population, mostly rural and Indigenous and employed in the informal sector. Fifty-four percent of the country’s population lives below the poverty line. These two factors probably played in favour of left-wing candidate Semilla, against a backdrop of voter fatigue and disillusionment with their elites. Arévalo was finally elected on 20 August 2023 with 58% of the vote to his opponent’s 37%. He will officially take office in January 2024.

Despite this victory, international observers feared that the results would not be respected by Guatemala’s legal institutions, primarily the US, the EU, the Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) and the Organisation of American States (OAS). They called on Giammattei’s government to ensure that the results were respected, and that security measures were taken for Arévalo and his deputy Karin Herrera, believing that they were both at credible risk to their lives following death threats. Five days after the second round and the victory of the left-wing candidate, the government confirmed the implementation of specific security measures to avoid any incidents.

On 26 August, Torres decided to contest the election results, arguing that inconsistencies, data variations and a number of contradictions in the vote counts had been found. These statements fuelled further suspicion among some voters in an already turbulent election, which risked further damaging the credibility of the transition. Nevertheless, Guatemala’s Supreme Electoral Tribunal decided to disregard these concerns and definitively validated the results on 29 August. Unfortunately, the judicial authorities also decided to suspend the legal personality of the Semilla party, to which Arévalo and 23 other deputies belong. The left-wing party was accused of having committed alleged irregularities in collecting signatures for its formation, rendering its status illegal. This decision is a source of concern for observers and uncertainty about the country’s governance. It is certain that the next president will have to deal with hostile institutions and corruption among the elites. In other words, the social and economic problems will be compounded by problems of power to implement the policies for which he was elected.

The latest elections have highlighted the state of corruption in the country’s highest authorities, and it is certain that Bernardo Arévalo will have difficulty governing from January 2024. Against this tense and unstable backdrop, it is difficult to say with any certainty how power will be exercised, but it does augur well for improvements in people’s living conditions if the measures promised are implemented. Arévalo has also said that he is open to working with Mexico City and Washington to curb illegal migration to the US, and that structural social, economic and anti-corruption measures could help in this regard. It should be added that during the campaign, in an attempt to win over right-wing voters, Torres promised to implement stricter measures to combat crime, along the lines of those already in place in Nicaragua. The left-wing candidate was more sceptical. Barring a catastrophe, the spectre of a repressive state of emergency is receding and it is likely that the next government will adopt measures that are more social than security oriented.

Intra-Palestinian Clashes in Lebanon: Causes and Regional Implications

Violent clashes broke out in the Ain el-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon from late July until early August between Fatah and hardline Islamist factions. Although rooted in local struggles for control of the camp, the events could further weaken Fatah to the benefit of Iran, Hezbollah, and their Palestinian allies. In the context of Lebanon’s deteriorating political, economic, and security environment, this situation risks triggering major regional instability.

The violence at Ain el-Hilweh, near the southern city of Sidon, began on 29 July, when a Fatah member attacked Mahmoud Khalil, a militant of the al-Shabab al-Muslim faction, allegedly to avenge the murder of his brother by Islamists last March. Although Khalil survived, three of his companions were killed. In retaliation, Fatah commander Abu Ashraf al-Armoushi, who heads the Palestinian National Security Forces in the camp, and four of his aides were murdered the following day. The situation escalated, with militants engaging in gunbattles throughout the camp using heavy weapons such as assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. The main Islamist groups involved in the fighting against Fatah were al-Shabab and Jund al-Sham. Although a ceasefire was agreed on Monday, mediated with support from pro-Iranian Hezbollah, the clashes continued until the night of 2 August. Overall, at least 13 people were killed most of them militants, and 20,000 were displaced.

Ain el-Hilweh is the biggest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, among 12 in total, and hosts around 55,000 people. Fatah, the largest Palestinian group that dominates the Palestinian Authority (PA), is the most powerful faction in the camp, but other rival groups, such as Hamad and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), also have a presence. Fatah’s dominance over Ain el-Hilweh has been challenged by the more hardline Islamist factions and other criminal elements that have acquired influence in the camp for more than a decade, resulting in multiple instances of fighting like the most recent clashes. Previous rounds of fighting took place in 2015 and 2017. The official Lebanese army did not intervene, as it is prohibited from entering Palestinian refugee camps according to the 1969 Cairo Agreement, although caretaker Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati, in a phone call with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (from Fatah), warned that it may do so if the clashes continued.

Considering the above, what caused the most recent clashes, and what might the implications be for Palestinian politics and regional stability in general?

Regional observers have noted that the various groups in the camp are often motivated by purely local sentiments, seeking to wrest control of the camp’s neighborhoods, while Fatah strives to maintain its control over Ain el-Hilweh. Preserving its sway over the nearly 210,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is key to the group’s status and influence and Ain el-Hilweh, being the biggest refugee camp and strategically located in south Lebanon near the Israeli border, is of significant importance. But the group has not been able to impose a political monopoly on the camp’s population due to the presence of multiple rivals. Apart from violence in the camp itself, the hardline Islamist factions have also been involved in other terrorist attacks in Lebanon and have sent fighters to Syria. The Syrian conflict has also caused an influx of Palestinian refugees who settled in the camp, causing further friction. Tensions in Ain el-Hilweh are thus high, and although it is difficult to find out the exact timeline leading up to the most recent outbreak of violence, it is obvious that it could easily be triggered by a cycle of revenge attacks like those described above. According to some analysts, after the latest round of fighting Islamist factions have put large segments of the camp under their control.

But the timing of the clashes could suggest that there might be broader implications. They broke out while a meeting was taking place in Egypt between Abbas and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh aiming to reconcile the two major Palestinian factions, which have been locked in conflict since 2007. The Iran-backed PIJ did not participate, and questions have been raised about its possible involvement in triggering the fighting. The group would have a clear interest in sabotaging the talks and weakening Fatah’s control over Ain el-Hilweh and other Palestinian camps in Lebanon. This would enable the group and its allies, Iran and Hezbollah, to expand the front against Israel and “link” Lebanon’s camps with the militants fighting against Israeli forces in the West Bank, which has been witnessing record levels of Israeli-Palestinian violence this year. With Fatah’s popularity in its West Bank stronghold rapidly declining due to mismanagement, corruption, and deteriorating security conditions, its weakening in Lebanon would further bolster the influence of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. Interestingly, a week before the clashes, PA intelligence chief Majed Faraj visited Lebanon, where he reportedly urged political authorities to contain Hamas and other Islamist groups and pressure Hezbollah to cease aiding militants in the West Bank. This event demonstrates Fatah’s concerns over its position in Lebanon being undermined by Iran and its local allies.

On its part, Hamas did not get involved in the clashes, but it tried to exploit them to strengthen its own influence vis-à-vis Fatah. Haniyeh tried to assume a mediating role, urging Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri (a Hezbollah ally) to intervene for an end to the hostilities. By exploiting its partnership with fellow Iranian ally Hezbollah to establish a direct link with both Lebanese state institutions and Palestinian factions in the country, Hamas is likely seeking to further marginalize Fatah. Despite the disputes between PIJ, Hezbollah, and Hamas, Fatah’s decline serves the interests of all those groups and their Iranian patron and it serves their goal of establishing a powerful presence around Israel’s borders. Jihad Tahe, Hamas’ spokesman in Lebanon, pointedly declared that the group would work together with other “invested parties” to maintain security at Palestinian refugee camps and keep them “a bone in the throat of the United States and Israel”.

More generally, the clashes were another indication of Lebanon’s deteriorating political and security environment. The country has been mired in a dire economic crisis since 2019, with the local currency losing more than 98% of its value against the US dollar and citizens unable to afford food and fuel or access their bank deposits. Palestinian refugees, who face widespread discrimination in the country and are legally banned from a wide range of professions, are even more severely affected by poverty and hopelessness. Lebanese politics have also been locked in a stalemate, as political parties have been unable to agree on a new president since October 2022 and have been unwilling to undertake the major reforms needed to lift the country out of its predicament. The Lebanese army has also been almost paralyzed by the crisis, with soldiers reportedly being barely able to get by with their salaries. In these conditions, Hezbollah, Palestinian factions, and other armed groups continue to operate with impunity and resist calls to disarm, raising concerns about even more intense violence and a potential Israeli military reaction if Lebanon’s institutions continue to falter.

In conclusion, the clashes at Ain el-Hilweh are both another flare-up of a long-running struggle between local actors for control of the camp and part of broader regional geopolitics. Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and their Palestinian allies are likely seeking to capitalize on Fatah’s declining influence in both Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. The expansion of the pro-Iranian “Axis of Resistance” in Lebanon would pose a major threat to Israel’s security. The gradual collapse of the country’s state institutions could further bolster extremist armed groups and thus risk triggering a major regional crisis.