Somali piracy amid Houthi disruption

Key Judgments:

1. We assess that Somali pirates pose a heightened threat to commercial ships. The rise in Somali piracy in this region is seen as an opportunistic approach to their activities, rather than a strategic approach, and is due to the disruptions that have been caused by Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. (High Confidence).
2. Somali pirates are almost certainly not collaborating with the Houthis. We assess that their recent resurgence is out of opportunism, not support for the Houthis. (High Confidence).

Hamas attacked Israel on October 7^th of 2023, which since has resulted in a regional escalation of conflict. Since November 2023, the Houthi’s have been attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in order to damage Israeli trade, as well as gain support from the Yemeni population under the guise of a ‘Just War’. In reality, the Houthi’s attacks on commercial shipping have been indiscriminate, resulting in massive changes to global supply chains. In an effort to avoid the potential for attack in the Red Sea, commercial ships have opted to instead travel south and go around the African continent via the Cape of Good Hope route. Due to the deterioration of maritime security in the southern Red  Sea and Gulf of Aden region, Somali pirates have increased their operations in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the wider Indian Ocean area, adding another threat to vessels transiting this region. This report aims to assess the likely involvement of Iran and/or the Houthis in Somali activities, and the threat posed to commercial ships by Somali pirates.

In the first quarter of 2024, there have been 33 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery against commercial ships globally, which is up from 27 in the same period in 2023, according to the International Maritime Bureau. Of these 33 incidents, 5 have been attributed to Somali pirates and include activities such as hijackings, approaching and firing upon a vessel, and taking the crew hostage of a Bangladeshi flagged bulk carrier in March of 2024. The bulk carrier was hijacked by around 20 Somali pirates approximately 550 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia, demonstrating their ability to operate far off the coast, as well as their mounting capabilities from skiffs onto larger vessels. Despite this, however, it must be noted that while 5 events attributed to Somali pirates have occurred in Q1 of 2024, 358 events of attempted and successful piracy occurred from 2010 to 2015. This is important to contextualise the scale of current attacks, being nowhere near the level that it was between 2010-2017. This suggests that while there is cause for concern in the rise of Somali piracy, it is also not a strategic resurgence of piracy. Rather, it is an opportunistic moment for the pirates to take advantage of the disruption caused by the Houthi’s in Yemen, and the increase in vessel traffic within their vicinity. As a result, we assess that Somali pirates pose a heightened threat to commercial ships. Vessels transiting the Indian Ocean and near waters off Somalia are advised to remain vigilant and on high alert. (High Confidence).

The timing of the resurgence of piracy has led to questions being asked as to whether the Somali pirates and the Houthi’s are collaborating in their effort to disrupt commercial shipping in the region. This is plausible as Iran has established links with the jihadist group Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Iran uses these links to smuggle Iranian oil into Somalia and then sell it at cheap prices in Africa to avoid U.S. sanctions and to supply arms to Houthi rebels in Yemen. Iran is also said to have provided Al-Shabaab with financial and material support and may have paid rewards to militants to attack US and international forces in Somalia and the region. For example, on January 5, 2020, two days after the former head of the Quds Force Qassem Soleimani was killed in a US airstrike in Baghdad, Al-Shabab launched an attack on a military base used by US and Kenyan forces in coastal Lamu, Kenya. Al-Shabab did not say its attack was linked to Soleimani’s killing, but the timing of the attack and al-Shabab’s “history of opportunistic strikes” suggests that the two events may have been linked. This analysis ties Iran and Al-Shabab together through trade and financial support, however this does not necessarily spill over to Somali pirates and the Houthis. Whilst indirect ties via Iran and Al-Shabab may imply some sort of connection, we have assessed that this is very unlikely. The limited scale of attacks from Somali pirates, as well as the lack of coordination between targets, leads us to assess that Somali pirates are almost certainly not collaborating with the Houthis. We assess that their recent resurgence is out of opportunism, not support for the Houthis. (High Confidence).