Analysis on Situations in Syria and Lebanon

 Key Judgements

• Syria’s interim government faces a critical December 31, 2025, deadline to integrate Kurdish SDF forces, threatening the fragile one-year-old political transition if negotiations fail.

• Lebanon’s inability to disarm Hezbollah by the US-imposed December 31 deadline risks triggering renewed military conflict, with Israel conducting 5,350 ceasefire violations since November 2024.

• The parallel December deadlines in Syria and Lebanon create compounding regional instability, while Iraq’sUNAMI withdrawal and continued Houthi Red Sea attacks further strain security coordination across the MENA region.

Objective

This report examines how Syria’s political transition and Lebanon’s Hezbollah disarmament crisis, both facing end-of-year deadlines, are creating a critical juncture for regional stability, with spillover effects across Iraq, Yemen, and Red Sea security.

Context

December 8, 2025, marked one year since Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell, when Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led forces seized Damascus, and Assad fled to Russia. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government has since restructured governance, consolidated armed forces, and pursued international reintegration.However, critical challenges remain: integrating the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) by year-end per a March 10 agreement, managing ethnic tensions, and rebuilding after 13 years of civil war.

Simultaneously, Lebanon faces intense pressure to disarm Hezbollah by December 31 under a US-brokered 2024 ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire has proven one-sided; Hezbollah is prohibited from firing “even a single bullet” while Israel conducts preemptive strikes at will. Lebanese authorities report 5,350 violations since the November 27, 2024, ceasefire began, including 2,983 airstrikes, resulting in 331 deaths and 945 injuries. Israel launched intense airstrikes across southern and northeastern Lebanon on December 18 as the deadline approached.

Timeline

• December 8, 2024: Assad regime falls; HTS assumes power in Damascus
• November 27, 2024: US-brokered Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire takes effect
• March 10, 2025: Syria-SDF integration agreement signed with a December 2025 deadline
• November 26, 2025: US sets December 31 deadline for Hezbollah disarmament
• December 8, 2025: Syria celebrates first anniversary of Assad’s fall
• December 18, 2025: Israeli airstrikes intensify across Lebanon; Syria-SDF negotiations continue
• December 31, 2025: Dual deadlines; SDF integration and Hezbollah disarmament; UNAMI exits Iraq

Analysis

 Regional Security Implications

Syria’s transition faces its most critical test as SDF integration negotiations race against the December 31 deadline.Despite Commander Mazloum Abdi’s November 11 commitment to “accelerate integration,” deadly clashes continued in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates through late November. Failure to integrate the SDF, a key US partner controlling Syria’s autonomous northeast, risks fracturing Syria’s territorial integrity and complicating counter-ISIS operations along the Syrian-Iraqi border.

The Lebanon crisis presents even greater escalation risks. Hezbollah lawmaker Ali Ammar explicitly rejected disarmament, stating the group’s arsenal “will remain” until Israel withdraws from border positions and releases Lebanese detainees. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned military action may be the “only remaining option,” acknowledgingdiplomatic channels have stalled with “no real indication” of compliance. This creates immediate potential for renewed conflict that could destabilize Lebanon’s newly formed government under Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun.

Broader Regional Patterns

These crises unfold amid a deteriorating regional security architecture. Iraq’s security landscape remains volatile as UNAMI concludes its drawdown by December 31, removing international monitoring capacity precisely when regional tensions peak. ISIS continues exploiting Syria’s transition, focusing on rebuilding networks along the Syrian-Iraqi border and the Badia region.

Meanwhile, Houthi forces maintain pressure on Red Sea commercial shipping, launching missiles and drones at vessels as recently as December 5.

The convergence of these developments threatens coordinated counterterrorism efforts across the region. Syria’s potential fragmentation, Lebanon’s instability, Iraq’s reduced international presence, and continued Houthi operations create opportunities for ISIS and other extremist groups to exploit governance vacuums.

Outlook and Risks

The next two weeks are critical. If Syria’s SDF integration fails, ethnic violence could erupt in northeastern Syria, complicating reconstruction and refugee return. Missing the Hezbollah

deadline risks triggering what Washington warns could be a “new military conflict” with Lebanon bearing “fullresponsibility”. Such escalation would likely draw in regional actors and further destabilize an already fragile transition period across multiple MENA states.

Renewed Thailand-Cambodia hostilities  

On 7th December the ceasefire deal between Thailand and Cambodia collapsed as heavy fighting broke out along the 817km border. This most recent and deadly phase of the conflict has resulted in at least 60 people killed and numerous more injured and displaced, with Thailand taking the upper hand through its aerial dominance. Despite calls from the US and China, Thailand has shown no intent to restrain hostilities in what it claims are a reaction to repeated Cambodian violations of the previous ceasefire agreement brokered by the US and Malaysia in July.

Spike in cross-border smuggling networks between Belarus, Poland and Lithuania

Key Judgements

• Large-scale increases in low-cost aerial smuggling methods over the Polish, Belarusian and Lithuanian border area, centred around commercially available drones and weather balloons, highlight he ‘hybrid’ nature of threats in the area.
• Recent balloon incursions have caused widespread disruption and temporary closures of airports and border crossings, highlighting the high-impact nature of this issue
• Smuggling activity is likely to continue at this point in time, with a sustained disruption risk to regional logistics and aviation.

Objective

To assess the recent spike in air-borne smuggling activity from Belarus into Lithuania and Poland to consider its wider implications on regional tensions.

Context

It is no secret that Belarus has been the key supplier of illegal Tobacco products into the EU in recent times. Even beyond today’s tobacco issue, Belarus has long been a key transit state for illegal fuel, alcohol and other illicit goods, an issue which has intensified alongside rapidly souring border tensions since 2022, almost entirely tied with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent scrutiny from within the EU. Belarusian disregard for EU opinions is the best evidence of its ever-increasing Russian influence. Belarusian dependence on the Kremlin and the poor relationships with border nations are interlinked and mutually reinforcing at this time.

With an increased flow of migrants and contraband, it is easy to understand the reasoning behind enhanced border controls. As a result, truck-based smuggling took a hit; however, the same cannot be said for aerial methods, which are now widely preferred.

The National Library of Medicine estimated that just under 30% of discarded cigarette packets were illicit; of that percentage, 90% originated in Belarus. The study concludes that the trade of illicit cigarettes in Lithuania is more concerning than first thought.

The trade closed Vilnius airport and caused Lithuania to close its remaining land border with Belarus. Poland remains a secondary victim in the case of illicit tobacco but is actively managing sustained Belarusian-backed migrant-smuggling networks.

Timeline

2023-2024: Growing detection of balloon-based drops, a secondary issue behind migration smuggling networks

2025: Lithuania begins ICJ proceedings accusing Belarus of facilitating migrant flows, providing the backdrop for increased border scrutiny

Oct – Nov 2025: Surge in balloon incursions closes airports and renews border shutdown in Lithuania.

Analysis

Smuggling networks have certainly adapted to stronger border controls by switching to airborne distribution methods, which are more accessible and cause a disproportionate disruption to aviation safety and border control.

Poland is certainly less concerned by cigarettes in comparison to migrant smuggling pressures, but Lithuania has to treat repeated operational delays with a higher degree of seriousness, largely to avoid reputational consequences and economic knock-on, especially given Lithuania’s lack of comprehensive airspace denial capability, which has failed to stem the level of balloon traffic. Current measures are best described as reactive rather than preventative, regulatory responses seem to be focused on a general increase in the rigidity of controls surrounding supply chains and minor sanctions to Belarusian entities linked to the illegal trade.

The pattern and timing of spikes in smuggling are consistent with the view that, at the very least, Belarus is tolerating these activities, potentially even leveraging them as a tool within a broader campaign.

Smuggling will likely remain a persistent threat and will probably prompt a further EU regulatory response. However, the issue is highly unlikely to reach a top priority status in the region, given the wider circumstances. Relations with the Belarusian state are also unlikely to improve at this moment in time, meaning the tolerance of smuggling activity is also likely to continue. It is highly unlikely that this issue will become a core concern in the area at this moment in time due to the focus of all nations involved being firmly fixed on the Russian – Ukraine conflict. The smuggling of migrants presents a greater threat at this point in time within the region. therefore Tabacco will continue to be seen as a secondary issue at worst.

Parliamentary Elections in Moldova 2025: Between Europe and Russia

Summary

On 28 September 2025, the Republic of Moldova will elect a new parliament. The vote is considered decisive for the country’s geopolitical direction. It could either confirm the pro-European course with the goal of EU integration by 2028 or initiate a return to neutrality and closer ties with Russia. For many voters, everyday issues such as the economy, energy prices and corruption are the main concerns. But for the European Union, the election is highly relevant in terms of security policy, not least because of Moldova’s location between Ukraine, Romania and the Black Sea region. Moscow, for its part, regards the Republic of Moldova, including the breakaway region of Transnistria, as a strategic sphere of influence. Massive Russian influence through disinformation, vote buying and support for opposition parties and electoral blocs is therefore to be expected.

Key Takeaways

• The election on 28 September is a decision between EU integration by 2028 and closer ties with Russia.
• External influence is shaping the election campaign: the EU is supporting the government with massive financial and political aid, while Russia is relying on hybrid tactics such as disinformation and vote buying.
• Regional fracture lines (pro-Russian north/south vs. pro-European centre and diaspora) make the election result difficult to predict; an unstable coalition is considered likely.

Context

Moldova is a parliamentary republic with 101 seats. Since 2021, President Maia Sandu’s pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) has governed with an absolute majority (63 out of 101 seats). A renewed absolute majority for the PAS is considered unlikely.

PAS (Party of Action and Solidarity): ruling pro-European party of President Maia Sandu.

Patriotic Bloc: alliance around the Socialists (Igor Dodon) with other pro-Russian forces; calls for neutrality and closer relations with Moscow.

Block Alternativa: led by Ion Ceban, officially pro-European, but focused on ‘neutrality’ and pragmatism, partly close to Moscow.

Our Party (Renato Usatîi): populist, heterogeneous, considered a potential ‘kingmaker’.

Small parties and independents: many new parties, little chance of success, but could fragment coalitions.

Analysis

Three factors determine the outcome of the election: external influence, the government’s domestic political weaknesses and regional fault lines within the country.

The European Union is providing massive support to the ruling PAS. Around €1.9 billion has been pledged for energy, infrastructure and modernisation until 2027, of which around €385 million is in grants and the rest in low-interest loans. Together, this amounts to around 11 per cent of Moldova’s GDP. This is supplemented by high-level visits and information campaigns to reach sceptical groups. The aim is to consolidate the pro-European course and secure EU integration by 2028.

Moscow sees this as interference and thus legitimises its own hybrid tactics: disinformation campaigns on social media, vote buying, financing protests and supporting pro-Russian parties and oligarch networks. The aim is to undermine the pro-European course, divide society and weaken confidence in democratic processes. In the 2024 EU accession referendum, approximately 130,000 voters were paid via Russian channels, with a volume of 35–40 million euros, and something similar is to be expected this year. In addition, the separatist region of Transnistria remains a lever of Russian influence and a permanent factor of instability within Moldova.

Domestic policy is dominated by energy prices, inflation and the fight against corruption. The energy crisis in early 2025 revealed dependencies and a lack of preparation on the part of the government. Progress in the fight against corruption remains limited; by summer 2025, there had been no major convictions against oligarchs or corrupt networks, even though this was a key election promise of the PAS. At the same time, opposition parties accuse the PAS of concentrating power and nepotism. The party also lacks new leaders.

There are clear dividing lines between regions. Pro-Russian parties traditionally dominate in the north and south. In regions such as Gagauzia and Taraclia, pro-Russian oligarch networks rely on local structures to buy votes and thus secure their influence. In Gagauzia, trials against regional leaders led to protests that deepened mistrust of the capital. In the centre around Chişinău, the PAS can rely on its stronghold but is dependent on a high voter turnout. Moldovans living abroad also have a decisive influence, regularly accounting for 10 to 20 per cent of the vote and having voted predominantly pro-European in the past.

Conclusion

The election result will have a decisive impact on Moldova’s foreign policy direction. A renewed majority for the PAS would stabilise the EU integration process, even if economic problems and institutional weaknesses make the course difficult. However, a fragmented coalition is more likely, which would delay reforms and promote instability. A strengthening of pro-Russian forces would fundamentally change the foreign policy course and pose considerable security risks for Ukraine, Romania and the entire Black Sea region. Ultimately, the election will show whether Moldovans remain committed to the European path or turn back towards neutrality and closer ties with Russia.

Ukraine–Russia Peace Negotiations: Status and Outlook

Context

Since mid-July, Washington under President Donald Trump has been pursuing new diplomatic initiatives to achieve a ceasefire in the Ukraine war. An announced ultimatum to Russia threatening harsh punitive tariffs was replaced by a summit between Trump and Putin in Alaska on 15 August.

A subsequent meeting between EU heads of state and government and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Washington fueled hopes for progress and a united transatlantic position. Despite these diplomatic moves, no substantial rapprochement between Russia, Ukraine and its Western partners is foreseeable.

Key judgements

• Russia remains steadfast in its maximalist demands. Diplomatic initiatives to date have not changed this. A change of course would only be conceivable under changed military or economic conditions.
• Territorial issues (especially the Donbas) are currently secondary to Russia’s strategic goal of undermining Ukrainian statehood and reshaping European security.
• The US position is inconsistent: President Trump has distanced himself from earlier demands for an immediate ceasefire and tougher sanctions. This is causing uncertainty about the reliability of Western security commitments.
• Without coordinated security guarantees and additional economic pressure on Russia, substantial progress in the negotiations is not currently foreseeable.

Timeline (14 July – 24 August 2025)

14 July 2025 – Washington’s first ultimatum

President Trump threatens Russia with harsh punitive tariffs and, above all, secondary tariffs against trading partners if Moscow does not take serious steps towards a ceasefire within 50 days. At the same time, he announces new US arms deliveries to Ukraine.

28 July 2025 – Shortening of the deadline

Trump reduces the originally scheduled 50-day deadline to 10–12 days. He signals that he wants to isolate Russia economically if no movement is apparent (secondary sanctions).

8 August 2025 – Ultimatum expires

Russia does not respond to the demands. Instead of sanctions, Washington announces a summit meeting with President Putin.

15 August 2025 – Alaska summit Trump-Putin

President Trump receives Putin in Anchorage in a high-profile setting. Result: no agreement on a ceasefire or peace process; Russia insists on maximalist demands.

18 August 2025 – Washington meeting

Meeting between Trump, President Zelensky and leading EU heads of state and government (including Merz, Macron, von der Leyen, Meloni, Starmer). Topics: security guarantees and transatlantic unity. No tangible results were achieved.

21–22 August 2025

Russia intensifies air and drone strikes, including a targeted attack on a US company in western Ukraine. Foreign Minister Lavrov calls for lengthy preliminary negotiations and blocks direct summit meetings between Putin and Zelensky.

24 August 2025

Putin’s demand for complete control over Donbas moves to the centre of the talks. Zelensky strictly rejects this: constitutionally, it is not possible to cede territory without a referendum. Polls show that a majority of the population rejects the land swap. This exacerbates the tension between domestic political constraints and international pressure.

Analysis

In recent weeks, Putin has made it clear that he is not interested in a diplomatic solution that does not meet his maximalist demands: complete control of Donbas, recognition of Crimea and the annexed territories, and influence over Ukrainian statehood. At the same time, President Trump has not clearly pursued decisive means of pressure (ceasefire demand, tough sanctions and secondary tariffs). As a result, the US line appears inconsistent and shifting during this administration.

The EU states are presenting a united front, despite individual deviations (Hungary and Slovakia). They are pledging further support to Ukraine, including possible security guarantees.

The central element is the attempt to cautiously influence President Trump in a pro-Ukrainian direction. Without the US, however, the EU lacks the power to enforce this line on its own. Economically, Moscow continues to rely on its revenues from energy exports. China and India remain important buyers of Russian oil, providing Russia with stable revenues.

The US has now decided on secondary tariffs against India, which are to take effect at the end of August. No such measures have been implemented against China to date, although they are considered the most effective lever. On the European side, due to its high dependence on natural gas, the EU has not yet imposed comprehensive sanctions on this energy source, but has only sanctioned oil and coal and partially reduced gas imports (including via Nord Stream).

Outlook

In the short term, no substantial progress in the negotiations is expected. Russia is sticking to its maximalist demands, while the US government has so far refrained from using tough economic leverage.

In the medium-term, further summit meetings could follow, but these are likely to be mainly symbolic. Real momentum would only emerge if the EU enforces its demand for tougher sanctions or the US government is prepared to increase economic pressure. Without such measures, the basis for negotiation will remain unchanged, while Russia will try to gain time with continued attacks and delaying tactics.

In the long term, a possible rapprochement depends crucially on changes in the balance of power. If Russia comes under greater economic pressure or reaches its military limits, negotiations would be more realistic. As long as these factors are absent, the peace process is likely to remain deadlocked, prolonging the uncertainty for Ukraine and its Western partners.