Revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: what will happen if diplomatic talks fail?
January 31, 2022 in Uncategorized
This report aims to talk about some potential consequences if diplomatic talks to reinstate the Iran Nuclear deal fail and how this could affect relationships between other global powers, mainly the United State and Iran, and the impact behind the likelihood of imposed sanctions upon Iran should talks collapse. Negotiations remain at a stalemate with neither side willing to compromise their national interests, despite countries maintaining that this deal is the best framework to address this situation.
In accordance with the JCPOA, signed by Iran and the P5 + 1, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to lift crippling economic sanctions if Iran agreed to limiting its nuclear activities and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unrestricted access to its factories with regular inspection. It also aimed at reducing much of Iran’s regional influence and moreover, relieve regional tensions between fellow rivals Israel and Saudi Arabia.
In 2018, under the then-Trump administration, the United States had abandoned the deal and reinstated economic sanctions, claiming the deal failed in its aims and so initiated a pressure campaign hoping that Iran would negotiate a deal that would further limit their ballistic capabilities. Following the re-imposition of sanctions Iran has begun stockpiling uranium beyond the levels agreed in the deal, while also developing centrifuges, increasing its acceleration of uranium enrichment.
President Biden expressed his desire to re-join the deal last year; but the US and Iran have since remained in indirect negotiations to revive the JCPOA with talks repeatedly faltering. Tehran remains sceptical of the US’ ability to provide sanctions that would be of viable economic benefit and want a binding treaty, which realistically cannot be guaranteed for the following future administrations nor would be passed in Senate. On the other hand, Washington is questioning whether they can secure the deal’s previous non-proliferation demands, following Iran’s significant nuclear development. Talks are rapidly reaching a decision point as Iran’s continued HEU growth will eventually become unattainable under the JCPOA.
There is a consensus that this deal presents the ideal framework to tackle this issue, but allied countries have since been thinking of alternate plans should talks fail, such as full implementation of sanctions to military operations, which would impair Iran’s nuclear program. These all present drawbacks that are otherwise unfavourable in the long term.
If talks were to fail, it is very likely that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will receive full support to reimplement full sanctions against Iran, despite the US having already done so without UNSC backing. However, the impact of this is arguable as Iran has since continued trading with other countries, such as China and Russia, regardless of the imposed sanctions. China and Iran have also signed an agreement bolstering economic ties between them. The sanctions therefore may not be as effective if such a trade continues. It is not within China and Russia’s interests to have a power with unchecked nuclear capability nor is it clear how willing the countries are to risk their own global trade to ally themselves with Iran. Consequently, relations are being strained over this potentiality.
Regardless of sanctions, it is also unlikely that Iran will be hindered from continuing with their nuclear programs. They have repeatedly insisted that their program is not for weapons applications, but this is impossible to confirm as with the end of the deal, Iran would likely never allow the IAEA to inspect their facilities, thereby providing them the opportunity of plausible deniability. However, it is unlikely that the US or other countries would dismiss the potentiality of Iran gaining a nuclear weapon and is likely to take military action to prevent this.
Regionally, Israel has mentioned and is gearing for a possible military confrontation if talks are unsuccessful. Iran and Israel have maintained a tenuous relationship and remains on shaky ground amidst the possible negotiations; Israel has remained uncompromising in its position that the JCPOA is too lenient and has tried to push away from negotiations, claiming them as fruitless. Tensions continue to rise with military exercises taking place in Iran in a blatant intimidation in response to talks between the US and Israel defence chiefs concerning possible military exercises in a worst-case scenario. Thus, it is likely that there will be an escalation of conflict, which will result in the rest of region being embroiled in conflict.
An ideal outcome for the west would be a return to the JCPOA but this seems unlikely given the harsh sanctions already implemented by the United States; they will not remove them unless Iran concedes. A compromise with both moderate sanction relief and moderate nuclear compromise, otherwise known as a ‘less-for-less’ deal, is the approach that Iran hopes for, but this would receive heavy criticism from the west.
Ethiopia Situation update (27 Jan 2022)
January 31, 2022 in UncategorizedDespite security issues in East Africa centring around common themes and issues, by far the biggest threat to regional peace and stability remains in Ethiopia. This remains true for the end of 2021. There have however been several important shifts in the power dynamic in the ongoing war which has been fought for well over a year.
It is our judgement that several major identifiable factors have contributed to a recent shift in momentum, favouring the Ethiopian National army of the Abiy Ahmed regime (ENDF) in their war with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
Abstract
By mid-November 2021, through a combination of protracted bush fighting and guerrilla tactics, the TPLF had taken (amongst others) two key strategic cities in Afar and Amhara regions. Tactically this this likely provided the TPLF with capability to launch an attack on Addis Ababa. The towns of Dessie and Kombolcha sat either side of the A2 highway. The A2 is the main arterial route between north and south Ethiopia and links Ethiopia with Eritrea and Djibouti. It is and remains vital for fuel, food aid and any movement of troops. Whilst in control of these positions, the TPLF refused to return over two hundred food aid trucks which would have been suitable for troop transport. It is our assessment that these factors increased the threat of the Tigrayan leadership mobilising their forces on Addis Ababa. Until early December the ENDF showed no demonstrable indication they were able to provide effective opposition.
The Current situation
On the 5th of December, both Ethiopian news sources and trusted 3rd party outlets reported that ENDF had successfully retaken Dessie and Kombolcha from the TPLF. This was later confirmed by the official communication channels of the TPLF, referring to a “strategic repositioning”. In the TPLF retreat several UN food aid depots, local business, dry docks and homes were raided and emptied. These were coupled with widely reported cases of extreme sexual violence and non-judicial executions. After losing these positions, The TPLF were pushed back further into northern territories before losing another key position, the city of Lalibela. The loss of the three positions represented a huge reduction in any pre-established capability of the TPLF following through on their initial plans to capture Adidis Ababa and remove Abiy Ahmed.
As of late January, the TPLF have gone into full retreat and no longer occupy Amhara or Affar regions, with all troops now back inside Tigrayan state borders. The ENDF have been ordered to halt any counter operations and have stopped at the Tigrayan border. It is our best judgement that this provides the first and most significant opportunity for peace talks in a country with millions of people in desperate need of food assistance. Tigrayan Leader Debretsion Gebremicahel has stated his intention to use the change in the power dynamic as a catalyst for diplomatic talks.
Contributing Factors and Key Assessments
Ethiopia has been highly closed off to reporting during the past 14 months, it is however possible to make some assessment as to the nature of the TPLF retreat and defeat. Open Source satellite imagery analysis first reported by Al Jazeera and confirmed by the US state department has shown an airbridge of private charter flights originating in the UAE performing frequent weapons deliveries to Addis Ababa. The jets, which are chartered privately through 3rdparty nations have been confirmed to be carrying Chinese, Iranian and Turkish UAV equipment and weapons. We judge that the timing of these deliveries in relation to the resurgence of the ENDF is likely too significant to ignore.
Further assessment of the nature of the two belligerents likely indicates the lack in TPLF ability to conduct conventional warfare against a standing state force. With years of guerrilla and bush war experience, their capture of the towns pointed to success in rural conflict zones, but an in ability to hold strategic cities so far from their central command and control structure.
As of the ICOD, neither side has commenced meaningful talks, but hostilities on the ground appear to have cooled off. It should be noted that Tigrayan state media and government communications is still reporting daily government drone activity in Tigray. But at this time, it is not possible to fully confirm the validity of these claims.
Burkina Faso Coup
January 26, 2022 in UncategorizedDuring the afternoon hours on Monday 24 January, Burkina Faso’s army ended growing speculation about the events of the previous 24 hours and announced that it had ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. The army also announced that the country’s constitution had been suspended, that the government was dissolved, that national air and land borders were closed and that a curfew (2100 – 0500) will be in place until a new order. The announcement followed hours of confusion after gunfire erupted at army camps on Sunday night. The former president has not been seen since Sunday and his whereabouts currently remain unknown.
MPSR & Damiba
The military takeover statement was made in the name of a previously unknown entity, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR). On Monday, it announced that the “MPSR, which includes all sections of the army, has decided to end President Kaboré’s post today.” It cited the deterioration of the security situation in the country and what it described as Kaboré’s inability to unite the nation and ineffective response to the challenges it faces.
Meanwhile a lieutenant appointed to oversee security in Ouagadougou has emerged as the leader of the military coup. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba was presented as the president of the MPSR. The 41-year-old Damiba had been promoted in December 2021 by ousted leader Kaboré to commander of Burkina Faso’s third military region in what some viewed as an effort by the president to shore up support within the army. The appointment to the strategic position came in the wake of the November attack on a gendarmerie post in the northern town of Inata, which killed 49 military officers and four civilians. Reports that troops had gone without food rations for two weeks had sparked anti-government protests and calls for Kaboré to step down. In his new post, Damiba proceeded to reorganize the military ranks, appointing new officers to key roles with the declared intent of battling the uprising. While Kaboré has been faulted by the army for the rising rebel violence, Damiba has sought to present himself as an expert in countering terrorism. He studied at a military academy in Paris, France, and obtained a Master’s degree in criminal sciences from the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers. In June, he published a book titled West African Armies and Terrorism: Uncertain Responses? in which he analysed anti-terrorism strategies in the Sahel region and their limits. Between 1987 – 2011, Damiba had been part of the Regiment of Presidential Security (RPS) of former president Blaise Compaore. Once Compaore was overthrown in 2014, after hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in protest at plans to extend his rule, the unit was dissolved by the transitional government, in a move that caused resentment amongst some officers. Reports indicate that Damiba resigned from the RPS in 2011 following a wave of protests and a violent army mutiny. He was later posted to the north-eastern town of Dori as Commander of the 11th Infantry Commando Regiment (RIC) and to the northern town of Ouahigouya as Commander of the 12th RIC. In 2015, he and other officers took part in an attempted coup that briefly deposed the transitional government. Burkinabé media indicate that Damiba later testified in the trial of conspirators behind the coup. Following the coup in 2015, Damiba left the country to pursue further military studies, though details of his time abroad remain limited. Upon his return, he took the leadership of the 30th RCAS, a regiment tasked with supporting Burkina Faso’s’ counter-terrorism strategy. On 3 December, ousted president Kaboré entrusted Damiba with protecting Ouagadougou from the threats posed by a religious rebellion. There are reports that Monday’s coup began as a mutiny at a military base hosting a prison where some of the key military figures that were involved in the 2015 coup attempt are imprisoned.
Regional & International Reactions
In the wake of this past weekend’s events, the African Union and the West African bloc ECOWAS earlier on Monday both condemned what they called an attempted coup. The United States and the European Union have also called for Kaboré’s “immediate release.” He is currently being held at an army base. On the ground however, more than 1,000 people gathered in the main square (Place de la Nation) in Ouagadougou on Monday to celebrate the coup, with some burning the French flag while others dancing as live music played. The burning of the French flag is the latest sign of the growing frustration about the former colonial power’s military role in the region.
As of Tuesday 25 January, French President Emmanuel Macron has disclosed that the situation in Burkina Faso appears to be calm as he condemned the coup, and said that ousted President Kaboré was in good health and not being threatened. The governing party in Burkina Faso meanwhile has reported that what began as an army mutiny is rapidly evolving into a coup. In a statement on Monday, the People’s Movement for Progress disclosed that President Kaboré and a government minister had survived assassination attempts.
While in its announcement on Monday, the army indicated that a return to democracy would be swift, it remains to be seen in the coming days and weeks what the transitional period will look like. For the moment, ECOWAS has not made any announcements on possible repercussions that those behind the coup could face. However, given the fact that it imposed economic sanctions on Mali and Guinea in the wake of those respective coups, it is likely that similar moves will be made in the coming days.
Current Situation
On Tuesday 25 January, celebratory gatherings occurred in Ouagadougou, with participants gathering in support of the military takeover made on behalf of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguarding and Restoration (MPSR). Despite the latest turmoil, life in Ouagadougou seemed to continue as normal on Tuesday, with the city’s main market, shops and petrol station open. The troop presence appears to be mainly army, with the gendarmerie being less visible. While initially, the ruling military had closed Burkina Faso’s air and land borders, on Tuesday, it announced the resumption of air traffic while reopening land borders for vehicles carrying humanitarian, military and essential goods. As of Tuesday morning, mobile internet appears to have been restored, a move that has been welcomed by the populace. The 2100 – 0500 curfew remains in place until further notice.
Advisory
An increased security presence is likely in the coming hours and days across the country, notably in the capital Ouagadougou. Associated localized transport, commercial and telecommunications disruptions are also likely to persist. Further flight disruptions are likely and officials may suspend international travel and or close borders in response to the latest developments. Checkpoints across Ouagadougou may also be set up. Protests either in support or in opposition to the recent developments could also occur in major cities nationwide. Anyone planning to travel to Burkina Faso is advised to avoid all non-essential travel until the situation stabilizes. In the event that travel is necessary, reconfirm transport services, including flights, before departure. Persons currently in the country are advised to shelter in place and to maintain close contact with their diplomatic representation. Individuals should ensure that they have enough supplies for the next several days and should limit travel both within Ouagadougou and outside of the capital. Avoid government buildings, security installations, large concentrations of police and soldiers, or any protests that may materialize. Heed all instructions by the local authorities – remain courteous and cooperative if approached and questioned by security personnel.
With much of the focus now concentrating on the political situation in Burkina Faso, jihadists groups operating in the country may use this period to launch attacks both in major cities across the country and rural areas as a mechanism to instil further fear amongst the local populations. Attacks could be indiscriminate and could affect Burkinabé security forces, religious sites, restaurants, schools, markets and places frequented by foreigners. Anyone currently in Burkina Faso is advised to maintain heightened vigilance at all times.
Burkina Faso Mutiny (24 Jan 2022)
January 24, 2022 in UncategorizedFour security sources and a West African diplomat reported on Monday 24 January 2022 that Burkina Faso President Roch Kaboré has been detained at a military camp by mutinying soldiers. The security situation in Burkina Faso currently remains fluid with reports that the Burkinabé military will make a statement on the current situation later on Monday. While for the moment, Burkina Faso’s borders remain open, a number of international air lines have cancelled flights for today.
Monday’s events follow heavy gunfire that was reported around the president’s residence on Sunday night in the capital city, Ouagadougou. Sustained gunfire also rang out from military camps across the country, including in Ouagadougou, Kaya and Ouahigouya, throughout Sunday, as soldiers demanded more support for their fight against Islamist militants. While on Sunday, the country’s Minister of Defence denied that the army had seized power, as of Monday afternoon, President Kaboré’s whereabouts remain unclear, with reports indicating that he has been detained and arrested by the mutinying soldiers. Several rumoured vehicles of the presidential fleet, riddled with bullets, could be seen near the president’s residence, with one being spattered with blood. Residents of the neighbourhood have reported that heavy gunfire was heard overnight. Sources report that state television in Burkina Faso is under military control, with soldiers reported to have surrounded the television station in the capital. There has been no live programming as of Monday morning, though it remains on air.
President Kaboré has faced waves of protests in recent months as frustrations amongst the local populations have grown over the frequent attacks and killings of civilians and soldiers by militants with ties to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) group. A militant attack in November 2021, which targeted a gendarmerie post in Inata, in the northern Soum region, killed 49 military police officers and four civilians. The attack also highlighted the conditions that most soldiers working in Burkina Faso face on a regular basis. Shortly after the attack, it emerged that the forces stationed at the post had run out of food and had been forced to hunt animals in the vicinity for two weeks. On numerous other occasions, soldiers have also complained of a lack of proper equipment and adequate training. In November, in the wake of the attack in Inata and a number of protests, President Kaboré pledged to end “dysfunction” in the army, stating at the time that an inquiry into the Inata attack would be followed by disciplinary measures and that he would launch an anti-corruption drive. On 9 December, he dismissed his prime minister, which by law triggered the resignation of the entire government. However protests continued, with unrest occurring on 22 January. Mutinying soldiers over this past weekend have highlighted their growing frustrations with the Burkinabé government in its failure to adequately equip them. On Saturday, major protests were held in Ouagadougou as the local populations are also increasingly growing frustrated with the ongoing insecurity in the country. On Sunday, protesters also came out to support the mutineers, with some ransacking the headquarters of the president’s political party in Ouagadougou. While the Burkinabé government has denied the military uprisings were part of a coup attempt, officials indicated on 11 January that they had arrested several army personnel, including Lieutenant-Colonel Emmanuel Zoungrana, on suspicion of plotting to destabilize the government.
The latest turmoil in Burkina Faso comes as the wider West African region has seen a string of successful military pushes in the last eighteen months. Coups have been held in Mali (August 2020 and May 2021), and more recently in Guinea, where the army removed President Alpha Condé last September. In Chad, the military also took over after the death of President Idris Déby, who died on the battlefield there. A transitional council continues to be in place in Chad. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has imposed sanctions on Mali over its failure to adhere to the electoral timeline and while it remains unclear what its response will be to the current developments in Burkina Faso, ECOWAS stated on Monday afternoon that it condemned the move and called on soldiers to return to their barracks. It further indicated that it was closely monitoring the situation.
Current Situation
On 24 January, the French Embassy in Burkina Faso issued a security advisory, advising French nationals to limit non-essential daytime travel and to avoid travelling at night across Ouagadougou amidst ongoing mutinies. The embassy further indicated that French schools in the capital will remain closed on 25 January. Additionally, French carrier Air France announced that it would suspend both of its flights scheduled from Paris (CDG) to Ouagadougou on 24 January. Turkish Airlines and Royal Air Maroc have also reportedly suspended their respective scheduled flights from Istanbul and Casablanca on 24 January.
As of Monday afternoon, mutinying soldiers remain stationed in front of the National TV building in Ouagadougou, where the military is expected to make a statement on the current situation in the coming hours. Gatherings have also been taking place at Place de la Nation in Ouagadougou as of Monday morning, with youths gathering to celebrate the mutinies. The rest of the city however has remained relatively quiet, with many services and shops closed for the day and minimal traffic circulating across Ouagadougou.
Gatherings are also reportedly occurring at Place de la Nation in Ouagadougou to celebrate the mutinies. On Monday afternoon, President Kaboré’s official Twitter account posted a statement, saying “our Nation is going through difficult times. At this precise moment, we must safeguard our democratic achievements. I invite those who have taken up arms to lay them down in the Higher Interests of the Nation. It is through dialogue and listening that we must resolve our contradictions. RK.” No further statements have been made by the president or the Burkinabé government. On 23 – 24 January, authorities initially implemented a nationwide 20:00 – 05:00 curfew in response to earlier unrest and mutinies at several military bases across the country. That curfew could be extended in the coming hours and days in response to the latest developments. Earlier on 23 January, authorities suspended mobile internet services. It currently remains unclear when they will be restored.
Advisory
An increased security presence is likely in the coming hours and days across the country, notably in the capital Ouagadougou. Associated localized transport, commercial and telecommunications disruptions are also likely to persist. Further flight disruptions are likely and officials may suspend international travel and or close borders in response to the latest developments. Checkpoints across Ouagadougou may also be set up. Protests either in support or in opposition to the recent developments could also occur in major cities nationwide. Anyone planning to travel to Burkina Faso is advised to avoid all non-essential travel until the situation stabilizes. In the event that travel is necessary, reconfirm transport services, including flights, before departure. Persons currently in the country are advised to shelter in place and to maintain close contact with their diplomatic representation. Individuals should ensure that they have enough supplies for the next several days and should limit travel both within Ouagadougou and outside of the capital. Avoid government buildings, security installations, large concentrations of police and soldiers, or any protests that may materialize. Heed all instructions by the local authorities – remain courteous and cooperative if approached and questioned by security personnel.
With much of the focus now concentrating on the political situation in Burkina Faso, jihadists groups operating in the country may use this period to launch attacks both in major cities across the country and rural areas as a mechanism to instil further fear amongst the local populations. Attacks could be indiscriminate and could affect Burkinabé security forces, religious sites, restaurants, schools, markets and places frequented by foreigners. Anyone currently in Burkina Faso is advised to maintain heightened vigilance at all times.
Chile Elects Gabriel Boric as its New President
January 20, 2022 in UncategorizedOn 19 December, Chile elected its youngest ever president, Gabriel Boric. It was a close contest between Boric and his far-right rival José Antonio Kast, who has been likened to Bolsonaro and openly admires Pinochet, but Boric was victorious with 56% of the vote. Turnout for the election was the highest since compulsory voting ended 9 years ago. Though the election rhetoric was extreme, it is likely that an attitude of cooperation with other parties will characterise Boric’s administration. His victory caps off the rise in support for Chile’s progressive left that has been gaining ground since the 2019 protests that left 30 people dead. It is a continuation of a region-wide trend to favour leftist candidates who aim to ease social inequality; a trend that has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In July, Peru elected Pedro Castillo. In April, Colombians began demonstrating for several months against tax reform and police brutality. In November, Honduras voted in Xiomara Castro.
Oliver Stuenkel, professor of international relations at Brazil’s Fundacao Getulio Vargas told Bloomberg that “Many point to a new ‘pink tide’ in Latin America after Boric’s victory […] But Chile’s president-elect has very little in common with Castillo in Peru and even less with Venezuela’s authoritarian regime. Boric is a progressive. Castillo and several other iconic left-wing leaders are social conservatives. That may allow Boric to become the face of Latin America’s new left, inspiring other candidates in the region.” There appears to be evidence of these progressive concerns within Gabriel Boric’s policies. He has proposed a green public investment program to target alternative energy and climate adaption, and is interested in improving social care provisions and in advancing feminist causes. Boric wrote in an open letter about the importance of “having a real social security system that doesn’t leave people behind, ending the hateful gap between healthcare for the rich and healthcare for the poor, advancing without hesitation in freedoms and rights for women.” He recognises LGBT rights and the rights of indigenous peoples. He had previously pledged to overhaul Chile’s “neoliberal” economic model but softened his stance on this in the weeks running up to the election in order to win over more centrist voters. This helped him on his way to victory, as he was more successful in winning over these voters who did not support either him or Kast. Supporting the re-write of Chile’s Pinochet-era constitution will also be a priority for Boric.
With the stark choice between left and right the election presented Chileans with, the collapse of centrist parties within the country, and the intense rhetoric that has characterised the campaign, there is concern that Chile’s society could become highly polarized and an environment of divisiveness could emerge. Yet, since Boric’s win, the atmosphere on both sides appears conciliatory and calm. Kast tweeted that he had called Boric to congratulate him on his “great triumph,” adding that “From today he is the elected President of Chile and deserves all our respect and constructive collaboration.” Outgoing President Sebastián Piñera said Chile was living in “an environment of excessive polarisation, confrontation [and] disputes,” and urged his successor to “be the president of all Chileans”.
It is likely that Gabriel Boric will continue with his strategy of pragmatism, looking to breach divides and find common ground on key issues like economic policy. For example, in the weeks leading up to the elections, Boric emphasized fiscal responsibility. He also supports the independence of the Central Bank. José Antonio Kast’s party still has a large presence in parliament and in the senate and so Boric will need to seek their cooperation in order to fulfil his programme. Looking at what Boric’s plans are for foreign policy, he has said he will “give priority to the Pacific Alliance in the future”. Yet, he stresses his immediate priorities are team building in Chile rather than international matters.Gabriel Boric will take office in March 2022, his term ending in 2026.
