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Regional Spillover of the US-Israel War on Iran: Implications for MENA Security

Key Judgements

• The US-Israeli campaign against Iran, launched on 28 February 2026, has triggered multi-front escalation across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and the Red Sea corridor, fundamentally reshaping the MENA security environment.
• Iran’s proxy network has been operationalised for retaliatory strikes, but internal fractures and declining public support will likely erode cohesion; Hezbollah’s entry into the war has probably constituted its most damaging strategic miscalculation in decades.
• The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the probable resumption of Houthi Red Sea attacks will almost certainly compound a global energy crisis, with oil prices likely to remain elevated for 60 to 90 days even under a ceasefire scenario.

Objective

This report examines how the US-Israeli war on Iran (Operation Epic Fury) has cascaded across the MENA region in its first twelve days. It assesses the activation of Iran’s proxy network in Iraq and Lebanon, the fracturing of the Lebanese state’s relationship with Hezbollah, the risk of Houthi re-engagement, and the spillover into Syria’s post-Assad order.

Context

On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes against Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei alongside Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, IRGC commander Mohammad Pakpour, and Defence Council secretary Ali Shamkhani. The campaign followed the collapse of Omani-mediated nuclear talks in Geneva on 26 February and came amid the largest anti-government protests in Iran since 1979, which had drawn a violent crackdown killing thousands across over 100 cities. Iran retaliated with over 500 ballistic missiles and nearly 2,000 drones aimed at Israel, US bases in Iraq, and facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. As of 11 March, over 1,300 civilians have been killed in Iran, 634 in Lebanon, 13 in Israel, and eight US service members. The IRGC attempted to mine the Strait of Hormuz before the US Navy destroyed 16 minelayers. Mojtaba Khamenei was elected Supreme Leader on 8 March, signalling hardliner continuity.

Timeline

28 Feb:  US-Israel launch strikes. Khamenei killed in Tehran. Kataib Hezbollah base at Jurf al-Sakhar (Babil province) struck. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz begins to be severely disrupted.

1 Mar:  Iran confirms Khamenei’s death. Islamic Resistance in Iraq claims 21 drone operations against US bases in Erbil. Hezbollah vows retaliation.

2 Mar:  Hezbollah fires rockets at Israel for first time since the November 2024 ceasefire. Israel responds with 250+ strikes across Lebanon. Lebanese PM Salam bans all Hezbollah military activities.

4–5 Mar:  Israel issues evacuation orders south of the Litani River. IDF enters Kfar Kila, Houla, Yaroun, and Khiam. Lebanon orders arrest and repatriation of IRGC Quds Force personnel. US strike kills Kataib Hezbollah commander Abu Hassan al-Fariji in Babil.

7–8 Mar:  Rocket attack on the US embassy in Baghdad. Mojtaba Khamenei elected Supreme Leader. IDF abducts four Syrian children from Quneitra.

10–11 Mar:  Over 760,000 displaced in Lebanon. Iran and Hezbollah conduct joint five-hour attack on 50+ Israeli targets. WHO warns of toxic “black rain.”

Analysis

Iraq as the unwilling frontline. The IRI has claimed over 200 attacks against US positions since 28 February, concentrated on the Kurdistan Region where remaining US forces are based. Unclaimed airstrikes, almost certainly by US or Israeli forces, have hit PMF facilities across Babil, Nineveh, Kirkuk, and Mosul. PM al-Sudani condemned the embassy attacks as “terrorist acts” but lacks the political capital to confront Iran-backed factions embedded in Iraq’s security architecture. If US strikes intensify, al-Sudani will likely face pressure to expel US forces from Kurdistan. If he fails to restrain the militias, Washington will probably expand its target set to PMF leadership, destabilising Iraq’s governing coalition.

Hezbollah’s isolation deepens. The Lebanese government’s ban on Hezbollah’s military activities and expulsion of IRGC advisers is unprecedented. Even Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri was reportedly furious, revealing that the group’s political wing had no control over its military wing and that the IRGC held decisive influence. Israel has exploited the escalation, issuing evacuation orders affecting 800,000+ people and expanding ground operations south of the Litani. The LAF has refused to deploy against Hezbollah while fighting continues, reflecting the risk of a sectarian fracture within its ranks. Lebanon has sought direct talks with Israel via US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack, but Washington has shown no interest in mediating. If the war continues, a full-scale Israeli ground invasion remains the most dangerous near-term scenario.

The Houthis: a calculated pause. Despite mass demonstrations in Sanaa and threats to resume Red Sea operations, the Houthis have not launched new maritime attacks. This restraint likely reflects internal debate over the risk of renewed US strikes on infrastructure in Hodeida, Hajjah, Sa’adah, and al-Jawf. However, missile launchers and radar have been repositioned along the Red Sea coast. Given the group’s record of calibrating attacks to political timing, the pause is probably strategic, not structural. Re-engagement would compound the Hormuz closure, with major carriers already suspending Suez transits.

Syria under pressure. Israel has expanded incursions into Quneitra and Daraa provinces, establishing checkpoints and detaining civilians. An Islamic Resistance Front in Syria has reportedly begun forming military cells with likely Iranian backing. If Iraqi militias transit Syrian territory toward the Golan, it would probably provoke Israeli strikes on Syrian government positions, collapsing the January security understandings and jeopardising the landmark SDF integration agreement reached in February.

What to watch. The next 30 days will likely be decisive. Iran’s declining missile launch rate suggests stock depletion, which will probably push Tehran toward a ceasefire through intermediaries, potentially Russia. The Houthi decision on Red Sea re-engagement will likely come within two weeks; continued abstention would signal strategic decoupling from Iran. In Lebanon, the government’s viability hinges on whether the LAF can enforce the Hezbollah ban without fracturing along sectarian lines. The broader pattern is a stress test of Iran’s Axis of Resistance: Hezbollah is isolated, Iraqi militias are drawing retaliatory strikes, and the Houthis are hedging. Failure to mount a coordinated response would likely accelerate fragmentation of Iranian influence across the region.

Night Wolves mobilisation activity in Eastern Europe during February 2026

Key Judgements

• The Night Wolves motorcycle club sustained symbolic and network-building activity across parts of Eastern Europe in February 2026, reinforcing pro-Kremlin historical narratives under a cultural and patriotic banner.
• Public-facing events remain framed as commemorative or charitable in nature, providing a socially acceptable platform for soft-power projection and relationship cultivation.
• Activity levels appear calibrated rather than escalatory; mobilisation is symbolic and narrative-driven rather than operationally disruptive.
• Unlikely to generate immediate instability. However, cumulative presence contributes to long-term normalisation of Russian-aligned identity messaging within receptive communities.

Objective

To assess Night Wolves activity in Eastern Europe during February 2026 and evaluate its role in Russian-aligned identity projection and influence operations.

Context

The Night Wolves is a Russian ultra-nationalist motorcycle club with close ties to the Kremlin and longstanding public support for President Vladimir Putin. The group has historically combined biker subculture with patriotic spectacle, Orthodox symbolism, and World War II commemorative narratives.

Since 2014, the organisation has been associated with pro-Russian mobilisation in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, as well as high visibility “Victory Road” rides through Central and Eastern Europe. While several European states have restricted entry to key members, the broader network retains the ability to engage supporters, affiliates, and sympathetic civic groups.

In February, activity centred on smaller-scale commemorative gatherings, youth outreach, and cross-border coordination messaging on social platforms. Rather than mass convoy events, the focus appeared to be narrative continuity: reinforcing themes of Slavic unity, anti-fascism, and resistance to Western moral and political influence.

Timeline

Pre 2022                   Night Wolves conduct regular transnational rides marking Soviet WWII anniversaries, occasionally prompting diplomatic friction in Poland, the Baltics, and the Czech Republic.

2022-2024                 Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine increases scrutiny of pro-Kremlin civic networks. Several Eastern European governments tighten monitoring of affiliated organisations.

2025                           Reduced visibility of large convoys but sustained digital engagement and symbolic gatherings continue in sympathetic regions.

2026                           Smaller commemorative and identity-focused events take place across parts of Eastern Europe, emphasising historical memory and Orthodox-aligned cultural themes rather than overt geopolitical messaging.

Analysis

The Night Wolves model blends spectacle with deniability. Publicly, events are framed as cultural, historical, or charitable. They reinforce narratives aligned with Kremlin strategic communication: the sanctity of Russian historical memory, moral conservatism, and scepticism toward Western institutions.

February’s activity suggests consolidation rather than expansion. There were no indicators of mass mobilisation or direct confrontation. Instead, the group-maintained relevance through continuity, ensuring that aligned communities remain socially connected and ideologically primed.

The strategic value lies in long-term narrative reinforcement. Identity movements of this nature lower the barrier between cultural affinity and political alignment. Over time, repeated symbolic engagement can entrench pro-Russian sentiment within specific demographic pockets, particularly among socially conservative or historically nostalgic audiences.

For Eastern European governments, the challenge remains proportionality. Heavy-handed responses risk amplifying the group’s victimhood narrative, while passive tolerance may enable gradual influence entrenchment. As observed in February, the Night Wolves are unlikely to destabilise states directly; however, their presence contributes incrementally to the broader contest over historical memory and political identity in the region.

Munich Security Conference 2026 – European Rearmament and Deterrence Recalibration

Key Judgements                   

• The 2026 Munich Security Conference signalled that the post-Cold War model of European security dependence is eroding, as allies prepare for a future in which a US security guarantee cannot be assumed to be stable or unconditional.
• Emerging consultations among France, the UK and Germany on strengthening European deterrence using existing French and British nuclear capabilities signal a profound recalibration in European strategic posture.
• As European governments expand defence spending and commit to sustained rearmament, the credibility of this strategic shift will depend on whether increased budgets translate into deployable military capability rather than remaining largely declaratory.

Objective

This report assesses how discussions at the Munich Security Conference (13–15 February) reflect a structural shift in Europe’s defence posture, focusing on the drivers of rearmament, the emerging rethink of nuclear deterrence, and the constraints that will shape Europe’s future security direction.

Context

The 2026 Munich Security Conference took place against the backdrop of continued war in Ukraine and sustained Russian hostility toward the European security order. Western European leaders, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, arrived amid growing concern over a widening deterrence gap. While Russia remains the most immediate threat, with the outcome of the Ukraine war described as an urgent and ‘existential’ situation for Europe, the 2026 Munich Security Report, titled ‘Under Destruction’, framed a deeper structural instability: an era of alliance politics characterised by unpredictable US signalling. What some officials described as a ‘wrecking ball’ dynamic has unsettled long-standing assumptions about the durability of the American security guarantee. As a result, the core question for Western European governments is no longer whether defence spending must increase, but how rapidly strategic dependency on Washington can be reduced.  Munich therefore became a forum not only for reaffirming NATO commitments, but for exploring greater European responsibility within the alliance. France, the UK and Germany emerged central to this discussion, including consultations on whether French and British nuclear capabilities could reinforce European deterrence. At the same time, persistent shortfalls in munitions, air defence and industrial output underscored the gap between political intent and operational readiness.

Timetable of events leading up to.

February 2022 – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine  – Fundamentally recalibrates European threat understanding and reveals capability cracks.

2023-24 – European defence budgets skyrocket – Production constraints restrain capability progression.

February 2025 – US Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech  – Signalled a more conditional approach to transatlantic support, exposing visible strains within the alliance.

June 2025 – NATO Summit, The Hague – New benchmark set: 3.5% of GDP core defence and 1.5% broader security resilience.

Late 2025 – US rhetoric about Greenland  – Creates diplomatic strain and highlights emerging fractures within the alliance.

February 2026 – Munich Security Conference (‘Under Destruction’) – European leaders frame rearmament as structural and publicly acknowledge discussions on supplementing the US nuclear umbrella with French and British capabilities.

Analysis

Moving Toward Strategic Sovereignty

The 2026 Munich Security Conference confirmed that the change in Europe’s defence posture is no longer reactive but structural. Since 2021, European NATO members have increased defence spending by roughly 30%, and the 2025 Hague target,  3.5% of GDP for core defence within a broader 5% ambition, indicates long-term intent rather than temporary adjustment. What has changed is not only the increased threat from Russia, but the degree of uncertainty surrounding US strategic continuity. As European leaders increasingly plan for a future in which US security guarantees are less predictable, higher defence spending is used to hedge against strategic uncertainty. This reflects a gradual shift toward greater European responsibility within the transatlantic framework. Whether that transition stabilises the alliance or produces further divergence will depend on how coherently Europe can sustain political and fiscal consensus.

Breaking the Nuclear Taboo

Consultations among France, the UK and Germany regarding how French and British nuclear capabilities might reinforce European deterrence represent a deeper psychological shift. Germany is not seeking nuclear weapons, but its willingness to engage in deterrence architecture discussions marks a significant departure from its traditionally cautious posture. Once extended deterrence becomes a matter of active consideration rather than inherited assumption, it changes strategic signalling. Moscow must now account for a Europe more openly engaged in nuclear burden-sharing debates, while Washington faces a Europe preparing contingencies. Even absent institutional reform, the act of discussing nuclear integration reshapes expectations about Europe’s long-term strategic posture.

The Gap Between Intent and Capability

Ambitious spending commitments alone will not secure deterrence credibility. Throughout the Munich conference, warnings about ammunition shortages, air defence shortfalls and industrial bottlenecks revealed that financial pledges still outpace operational readiness. Initiatives such as the SAFE framework and closer UK/EU industrial coordination are designed to address financial and structural weaknesses, but industrial mobilisation requires time, skilled labour and sustained political will. If higher budgets fail to produce visible capability gains within the next several years, the strategic shift outlined at Munich 2026 risks being perceived as rhetorical rather than substantive and will not go unnoticed by Moscow. Conversely, if spending translates into scaled production and improved readiness, Europe will materially strengthen its deterrent posture and bargaining power within NATO.

The ‘Iron-clad’ Alliance – Philippines and US Expand Defence Commitment

Key Judgements

On Tuesday 17^th February, a joint-statement from the US and Philippines pledged additional deployments of missile and unmanned systems in the Philippines. The announcement, made following the annual US-Philippines Strategic Dialogue in Manila, reinforces the Philippine’s capacity to leverage distributed deterrence.

• As the Philippines deepens its international defence partnerships, the political weight and costs of Chinese aggression has further increased.
• The move is likely to escalate the build-up of military infrastructure and the frequency of confrontation as China seeks to undermine US regional influence.

Objective

This analysis intends to map the trajectory of Philippine defence strategy and alignment, seeking to determine how an evolution in threat perception shifts its role as an actor in broader regional dynamics.

Context

Tuesday’s announcement follows a pattern of increased defence commitments between the Philippines and its international partners relating to military infrastructure and cooperation. The move comes amidst ongoing territorial dispute with China, whose defence expenditure has more than doubled since 2013, including yearly increases of 6-8 percent. Following the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, the Philippine government embarked upon an ambitious 15-year military modernisation programme, set to continue through to 2027. This transition responds to a shift in security focus away from domestic insurgency towards prioritisation of external and maritime deterrence. The onset of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration in 2022 has paved the way for expanded defence cooperation with the Philippine’s partners, most recently including Japan, Australia, Italy and Canada. Manila’s current strategy is to leverage these international partnerships to reduce the asymmetry of unilateral military power, signifying intent to respond to China’s provocations through layered deterrence.

Timeline of US-Philippine bilateral defence cooperation

• 1951 – US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) – Establishment of a formal alliance in the event of an attack.
• 1998 – Visiting Forces Agreement – Legal foundation for the presence and jurisdiction of US military personnel across the Philippines.
• 2014 – Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) – Permits US forces rotational access to nine Philippine military bases as of 2023.
• 2024 – General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) – Facilitates the sharing of classified intelligence and defence technology between the respective states.
• 2025 – Acceleration of advanced capabilities, joint-operations and strengthened defense industrial cooperation.
• 2026 – Commitment of increased advanced missile deployment and unmanned systems.

Analysis

The latest agreement between the US and the Philippines marks a symbolic reaffirmation of the partnership on the 75^thanniversary of their alliance. This is especially significant for the US as the strategic positioning of the Philippines in relation to the Chinese mainland ensures that it features centrally in deterrence capability planning for Taiwan. Philippine ambassador to Washington Jose Manuel, who took part in Monday’s talks, said that discussions revolved around the possible deployment of upgraded missile launchers. This would supplement the installation of a mid-range Typhon missile launcher system in 2024, which currently places China and Taiwan within the 1,600km range of its Tomahawk-capable payload. Pledges to boost this capability with additional systems signal that the Philippines is reorientating away from sole domestic posture into being an integrated member of US forward deterrence architecture. In the immediate-term, this positioning is likely to escalate grey-zone confrontations with China as it seeks to test the limits of the partnership and respond with development of its own land-based capabilities. In the mid-term, the move represents a solidification of bloc-politics in the region, where the Philippines will attempt to reduce China’s political and economic leverage through closer engagement with US-foreign policy objectives.

Syria’s Northeastern Integration Agreement: Implications for MENA Security

Key Judgements

• The 30 January agreement between Syria’s interim government and the Kurdish-led SDF marks the most significant territorial consolidation since Assad’s fall, with government forces deploying to al-Hasakah and Qamishli for the first time in over a decade.
• Implementation hinges on three contested issues — Kurdish autonomy, the custody of 40,000+ ISIS detainees, and Türkiye’s stated intent to eradicate the PKK from Syrian soil — any of which could trigger a resumption of hostilities.
• Failure would create a vacuum for ISIS reconstitution and invite Turkish military intervention, with cascading effects on Iraqi border security and broader regional counterterrorism coordination.

Objective

This report assesses the January–February 2026 ceasefire and integration agreement between Syria’s interim government and the SDF. It identifies the key factors that will determine whether northeastern Syria transitions toward stability or renewed fragmentation, with implications across the MENA region.

Context

Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Syria’s interim government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa has pursued the reintegration of territories outside central control. The SDF, which built autonomous administrative structures across northeastern Syria during the civil war, controls critical oil fields, border crossings, and detention facilities housing over 40,000 ISIS suspects.

A March 2025 agreement called for SDF integration into government forces by year-end, but implementation stalled over autonomy demands. In November 2025, the US admitted Syria into the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, undermining the SDF’s position as Washington’s primary strategic partner. On 13 January 2026, the interim government launched a military offensive against SDF positions, expanding rapidly across Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor before a US-mediated ceasefire on 18 January and a comprehensive agreement on 30 January.

Timeline

Mar 2025:  Initial Syria-SDF integration agreement signed; implementation stalls over autonomy demands.

Nov 2025:  US admits Syria to Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, reducing SDF leverage.

13 Jan 2026:  Syrian government launches offensive in eastern Aleppo; expands to Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor by 17 January.

18 Jan:  US-mediated 14-point ceasefire announced. Reports emerge of ISIS fighters escaping detention facilities.

30 Jan:  Comprehensive agreement reached — ceasefire, phased military integration, government deployment to al-Hasakah and Qamishli, handover of oil fields and border crossings.

2–4 Feb:  Interior Ministry forces deploy in al-Hasakah and Qamishli. SDF public relations chief appointed governor of al-Hasakah.

Analysis

A structural shift, not just another ceasefire. Unlike previous arrangements that focused on temporary ceasefires or contact-point management, the 30 January accord provides for the integration of entire SDF units into the Syrian army, government deployment to SDF-held cities, and the appointment of a Kurdish figure as governor of al-Hasakah. This represents genuine political accommodation — but fundamental obstacles remain.

The ISIS detainee problem. The SDF managed camps holding over 40,000 ISIS suspects in degrading conditions. During the January offensive, the UK raised alarm at the UN Security Council over reports of ISIS fighters escaping detention facilities. Iraq absorbed 7,000 high-risk detainees in January to avert mass breakouts, but Iraqi intelligence warned these individuals could reconstitute insurgent networks from within the penal system. If camp administration transfers to Damascus without adequate security guarantees, the risk of further escapes or radicalisation is significant.

Türkiye as spoiler. Ankara views SDF command structures as extensions of the PKK. On 11 February, Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry reiterated its determination to eradicate the PKK from Syrian territory, citing Sinjar, Makhmur, and Qandil. If Türkiye perceives the integration process as preserving Kurdish military autonomy under a different label, unilateral military intervention remains likely — as Ankara has done repeatedly in northern Iraq. Such action would collapse the agreement and destabilise the broader region.

Diminishing US guarantees. Washington mediated the January ceasefire but its broader strategic recalibration away from Syria leaves the agreement without a credible external guarantor. The EU has committed €620 million for 2026–2027, and the UN estimates 16.5 million Syrians remain in need, but recovery requires sustained institutional investment. If the agreement holds, it opens a pathway to reconstruction and foreign investment. If it collapses, northeastern Syria risks becoming a fragmented zone of competing armed factions, ISIS resurgence, and cross-border instability affecting Iraq, Türkiye, and the broader Levant. The next 90 days will be decisive.