Europe’s Eastern Flank: Presidential Elections in Poland and Romania

Summary

Presidential elections were held in Poland and Romania on 18 May. In Romania, the independent, pro-European candidate Nicușor Dan, mayor of Bucharest, won the runoff election by a narrow margin against the right-wing populist George Simion. Both were considered anti-establishment. In Poland, the liberal mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, narrowly won the first round ahead of Karol Nawrocki of the national conservative PiS party; the runoff election is scheduled for 1 June.

The political situation is characterised by strong polarisation, institutional instability and external influence – from Russia, but also from actors in the United States and neighbouring European countries. The mobilisation of the political centre has remained reactive: a defensive success, but not a sign of structural stability.

Key judgements

• In both countries, pro-European candidates won the presidential elections, or the first round, but amid high political polarisation and institutional strain.
• In Romania, confidence in institutions remains fragile; forming a government is complicated and poses political risks for President Dan.
• In Poland, the runoff election on 1 June will be decisive for the Tusk government’s ability to implement reforms. A victory for Nawrocki would cement the domestic political stalemate.
• Both countries remain key security pillars within the EU and on NATO’s eastern flank, both militarily and in terms of energy and logistics.
• Populism has not disappeared but is merely being kept in check. External attempts to influence the situation – particularly from Russia and parts of the US MAGA camp – are exacerbating institutional tensions.

Analysis

The election in Romania will not bring immediate stabilisation, as institutional trust remains fragile. Polarisation remains unchanged and the capacity for reform continues to be limited. Forming a government remains complicated: no coalition option is politically unproblematic, and every decision carries the risk of damaging Dan’s independence. Involving established parties could undermine his reformist image, while excluding them could block the formation of a majority. Domestic political expectations are enormous. A comparable burden is evident in Poland, where the ability of Donald Tusk’s government to implement its reform promises depends largely on the outcome of the runoff election. For the PiS party, the question is whether the lost parliamentary election in 2023 was only a temporary setback or whether it can strategically prepare for a return to power.

Strategic Significance

Due to its location, Romania plays a central role for NATO logistics and in the development of a new Black Sea strategy for the EU. The air bases at Mihail Kogălniceanu and Deveselu are key strategic sites: Mihail Kogălniceanu serves as a major logistics and deployment hub, while Deveselu hosts the U.S. Aegis Ashore missile defense system, making both critical to NATO’s eastern flank. The Danube, as a supply corridor via the Black Sea, is also strategically important, especially for military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. In addition, the Neptun Deep offshore gas field in the Black Sea is considered an important building block in reducing European dependence on Russian natural gas.

Poland, as a frontline state bordering Belarus and Ukraine, is a key strategic actor in NATO’s eastern flank strategy. With defence spending at 4.7% of GDP, it ranks among the alliance’s top contributors. Beyond serving as a hub for arms deliveries and refugee logistics, Poland is shaping regional security policy and plays a leading role in strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in Eastern Europe. A stronger government under Prime Minister Tusk – together with Trzaskowski as a pro-European and party colleague – could significantly improve security coordination with the EU and transatlantic partners while reducing domestic tensions.

What happens next

In Poland, the outcome of the election on 1 June will be decisive for the Tusk government’s ability to act. A victory for Trzaskowski could bring about moderate stabilisation and massively weaken the power of the PIS party. A victory for Nawrocki would further block Tusk’s reform agenda and exacerbate the ongoing judicial conflict. The PiS would ultimately prepare to regain power.

In Romania, Dan’s election consolidates the country’s pro-Western orientation and strengthens its security policy position in the context of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, he could speed up Moldova’s integration into the EU and reduce the influence of pro-Russian groups in the region. (Moldova and Romania share deep historical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic ties). Regardless of the election outcome, one thing became clear: voters want a break with the established political system – a signal that is likely to have repercussions beyond Romania.

Conclusion and outlook

Both countries are prime examples of how democracies react to populist pressure – but without structural safeguards. In Bucharest, populism has been contained for the time being, and in Warsaw, the answer is still pending. External attempts to influence the situation, domestic polarisation and institutional weaknesses remain key risk factors – not only for the countries concerned, but for the political stability of Europe as a whole.

Two days of shock  in Spain as power system experiences a national blackout

Key Takeaways

• Electrical power in Spain was interrupted for 10 hours
• At least 30 people died due to indirect effects
• No clear cause yet but many possible solutions
• ENTSO-e will establish an export panel to investigate and publish a report on the event

Timeline

On 28^th April, at 12:30pm local time a major power cut occurred across mainland Spain. About three hours before the outage, power quality sensors in homes in the Madrid area showed warning signs of an unstable grid – there were small fluctuations in voltage around 9:30am local time. Later the frequency of electricity dropped below the usual 50 hertz. The voltage measured went up and down by about 15 volts every 1.5 seconds. The automatic monitoring system noted a sharp drop at 12:35pm local time before readings stopped being reliable. Most of the drop in power happened in 5 seconds with 15GW being lost. The interconnection with France automatically tripped to prevent further damage in the form of a massive contagion in the rest of Europe. Around 15 gigawatts (GW) of electricity generation, nearly 60% of energy in use at the time, was lost.

The city of Madrid activated its emergency plan (PEMAM). Police were brought in to control the local traffic and keep the streets secure during the disruption. Later in the day power was returned to the airport with a 20% reduced capacity, but the long and medium distance train services did not resume until the next day. The Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez convened an emergency meeting of the National Security Council.

Around 4pm local time the Spanish electrical operator (REE) estimated it would take between 6-10 hours to restore normal service. The regions of Aragon-Cataluna and Galicai-Leon were the first to be reconnected. To alleviate the power cut, Morocco and France sent electricity through international power lines. Morocco delivered 900 MW through the interconnect that crosses the Strait of Gibraltar while France sent 2 GW through power lines supplying Catalonia and the Basque Country.

By 7am local time on the 29^th of April electricity had been restored to 99% of energy demand and full restoration was achieved by 11:00am local time. However, on the same day some institutions like the Ministry of Defence and the Navy headquarters were still suffering from power outages. During the morning, REE attributed the outage to a disconnection of the grid in the south-west of Spain, while ruling out a cyberattack. REE also announced it would be investigating the cause of the disconnection. At 6pm local time Pedro Sanchez held a press conference saying that no hypothesis could be ruled adding that the government did not yet know the cause of the blackout.

Effects

Several deaths occurred indirectly because of the outage. In Catalonia, 25 people were harmed by malfunctioning generators or misuse of them. In Madrid, at a Carabanchel neighbourhood, a woman died in a fire caused by a candle. The fire trapped several people in a building. Several people were also harmed as a result. In Alzira, Valencia, a 46-year-old woman who depended on an oxygen machine died. In Taboadela, Ourense, a couple and their son died of carbon monoxide inhalation due to a generator being used indoors. One of the people in the couple required a mechanical ventilator, which prompted the use of the generator.

As a result of the power outage many pieces of infrastructure had to be shut down. Spanish train operator Renfe confirmed all trains had stopped and 35,000 stranded passengers had been rescued. Spain’s Guardia Civil police force said it had rescued 13,000 passengers trapped on trains by itself. Madrid’s Barajas International Airport was left without power. The country’s nuclear power plants were automatically taken offline, and backup generators were used to supply cooling to keep the reactors safe. Hospitals were able to stay mostly functional by activating their backup generators.

All the democratic buildings included the Palacio de la Moncola (residency of the Spanish Prime Minister) were without power and both the Congress of Deputies and Senate suspended parliamentary activity for the 29^th of April.

Additionally, there was a major impact on the Spanish economy and national productivity, Spanish network traffic on fell to 17% of normal usage. The employers’ organisation CEOE estimated that the outage resulted in 1.6 billion euros of economic losses.

Possible causes

The causes of the power outage are currently under investigation. The purported reason was two fluctuations in the electrical grid, the second of which caused Spain’s power system to disconnect from the European grid. This has been linked by REE to an incident at two photovoltaic plants in the southwest of Spain. However, other experts have said this incident is unlikely to be the cause of the collapse of the whole system as there was many synchronous sources of electricity at the time of the outage including nuclear, hydropower and even coal.

The power outage did prompt discussion about the stability of an electricity system with a high proportion of renewable energy. However, REE and other experts argue it was unlikely to be the fault of renewable sources. Also, the benefits of cheaper and cleaner energy are difficult to ignore making it unlikely for a change in system to be adopted.

However, the outage has highlighted the need for continual investment in power gird stability and resilience when using higher shares of renewable energy. Firstly, there was surprise amongst some industry experts at the inability to isolate the blackout to a specific area thus requiring the system to be re-energised from scratch. Additionally, it has shown the fact that Spain is an “energy island” with interconnections with the rest of the continent being far lower than the European commission demands. This has been blamed on French resistance because of this desire to protect its nuclear sector from competition including Spanish solar power. A future report from Brussels could put pressure on France to change its ways. Furthermore, it was shown the weakness in Spain’s delay to the mass deployment of batteries unlike in Germany, Australia and California. Storage of electricity through batteries or pumped hydroelectric would have likely helped the mitigate the blackout.

Spain’s National Cybersecurity Institute is investigating the possibility of a cyberattack as the cause of the incident along with the Joint Cyber Command under the Ministry of Defence. However, several government officials have ruled it out. A thorough forensic analysis is estimated to take 1-3 weeks. So far there have been no indications in Spain of an attack, the only successful  ones on a national scale took place in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016 by Russia. The National Cybersecurity Institute did warn in 2024 about a significant increase in cyberattacks affecting industrial environments and critical systems.” The institution cited the malicious software BlackEnergy as an example, which was used by Russian hackers on December 23, 2015, to sabotage the electricity distributors in the Ukrainian region of Ivano-Frankivsk, causing a blackout that affected 1.5 million people.

The Audienica Nacional (central criminal court) judge has initiated a preliminary investigation to determine whether the outage was an act of sabotage against critical Spanish infrastructure. If it was sabotage it would fit within the parameters of a terrorist crime.

Poland at a Crossroads: Security Policy and the 2025 Presidential Election

The first round of the Polish presidential elections will take place on 18 May 2025. The election campaign reflects the division between the government and the national conservative camp. The focus is on security policy and the domestic political balance of power between the former governing party PiS (Law and Justice) and the current government under President Donald Tusk (PO – Civic Coalition). As a key state on NATO’s eastern border, Poland is faced with the security policy choice of further deepening the European cooperation it has embarked on – or focussing more strongly on national sovereignty and independence. The election marks a decision between European-cooperative security integration and a nationalist approach prioritising strategic autonomy.

After two terms in office, the incumbent President Andrzej Duda is not allowed to run for re-election. Current polls show three promising candidates. A run-off is to be expected, as an absolute majority is required in the first round of voting. The supporter of the Tusk government is the pro-European liberal-conservative Rafał Trzaskowski – mayor of Warsaw since 2018 and narrowly defeated by Duda in the 2020 election. Meanwhile, a national-conservative bloc has coalesced around Karol Nawrocki and Konfederacja’s right-wing populist candidate Sławomir Mentzen. The security policy ideas of these candidates reflect different concepts and fundamental approaches: Trzaskowski relies on close cooperation with the EU and NATO, advocates an increase in defence spending and emphasises the importance of constitutional and democratic oversight of the police and intelligence services. He also advocates the depoliticisation of security institutions and a strengthening of multilateral cooperation. Nawrocki, on the other hand, pursues a national conservative stance that relies on a strong, sovereign state with an independent defence policy and a critical distance to the European Union. Finally, Mentzen propagates a libertarian, isolationist approach, rejects further integration into European security structures and calls for a reduction in defence spending and the withdrawal of Polish troops from abroad.

Security policy has been a very high priority in Poland since its official independence in 1991. This is due to the country’s difficult past, the latent threat from Russia and the border with the exclave of Kaliningrad. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has massively changed Poland’s threat perception and reignited old fears. Defence spending increased from 2.4% to 4.7% of GDP (2022-2025). The budget for the current year amounts to around USD 45 billion, with a significant proportion going towards modernisation measures and border security. This places Poland at the top of NATO in terms of defence spending relative to GDP. As Ukraine’s neighbour, Poland also forms the logistical backbone of Western military assistance to Kyiv. Poland has thus established itself as the security policy hub of NATO’s eastern flank. Poland has so far provided over 600 million US dollars in military aid to Ukraine, with an estimated 80% of military donations to Ukraine having passed through Polish territory. This role is complemented by the permanent stationing of allied troops in Poland, including a multinational brigade under US command, the headquarters of the US 5th Army Corps in Poznań and the missile defence base in Redzikowo.

In Poland, effective policymaking in defence and security largely depends on cooperation between the president and the government. The president has far-reaching powers, including the veto power and supreme command of the armed forces. Depending on the political orientation, this can become an instrument of co-operation or blockade. In both political camps, the terms ‘security’ and ‘defence’ are highly ideologically charged.  The national-conservative forces associate them primarily with border protection, cultural homogeneity and state authority. The pro-European liberal camp associates it with the democratic control of security organisations, international cooperation and social resilience. The presidential election will therefore not only decide on personnel issues, but also on the institutional capacity to act in key areas of security policy.

In light of growing geopolitical uncertainty and possible shifts in transatlantic relations, the Polish presidential election is gaining additional relevance in terms of security policy. The European security architecture is coming under increasing pressure. As a militarily strong player on NATO’s eastern flank and a reliable partner within the EU, Poland is of central importance. The previous domestic political deadlock between the president and the government has made security policy action more difficult and hindered coordination at the European level. An election victory for Rafał Trzaskowski would open up the possibility of a more coherent foreign policy line and closer coordination with the government – which in turn could strengthen the EU’s ability to act in the security field. While national fragmentation could jeopardise European security, experts believe that in the long term a coordinated Polish approach could contribute to stabilisation and burden-sharing within the alliance.

Advisory – Burkina Faso Foils Coup Plot (23 April 2025)

Advisory – Burkina Faso Foils Coup Plot (23 April 2025)

Summary

On 21 April 2025, Burkina Faso’s military government announced that it had foiled what it termed a “major plot” to overthrow junta leader Captain Ibrahim Traoré, with the army alleging that the coup plotters were based in neighbouring Ivory Coast. According to Security Minister Mahamadou Sana, the coup attempt was led by current and former soldiers working with “terrorist leaders,” adding that the intention was to attack the presidential palace last week. Speaking on state television on Monday 21 April, Sana disclosed that the aim of the plan was to “sow total chaos, and place the country under the supervision of an international organization.” The Ivory Coast has yet to comment on the claims, though tensions between the two countries have been on the rise in recent months.

Background

Reports, which first emerged on Monday 21 April, indicate that the coup had been planned for Wednesday 16 April. Reports indicate that several communications between a Burkinabé Armed Forces officer and terrorist leaders were intercepted, according to Sana, who disclosed that the investigation subsequently revealed “a major conspiracy” against the West African country. According to Sana, the coup plotters attempted to use Burkinabé religious and traditional leaders in a bid to sway army officers into backing the plan. Sana disclosed that “the manoeuvre was to culminate, according to the terrorist plotters’ plan, on Wednesday 16 April, 2025, in an assault on the presidency of (Burkina) Faso by a group of soldiers recruited by the nation’s enemies.” He went on to say that “the brains outside the country are all located in Ivory Coast, as he named in particular two former army officers believed to be behind the plot. Officer Abdramane Barry, serving in the military justice battalion, has been accused of providing sensitive information “to terrorists.” According to Sana, this information concerned the positions of the internal security forces, the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), and military operations “in order to intensify the attacks,” with the aim of sparking a revolt against Burkinabé authorities.

Security sources have reported that last week, several military personnel, including two officers, were arrested for planning to “destabilise” the Burkinabé government. Others however remain on the run and are presumed to be in Côte d’Ivoire. Sana claimed on Monday that “all the masterminds who have fled the country have been identified in Côte d’Ivoire, including Abdramane Barry, and the plot is actively continuing from their operations centre in Abidjan.”

Ivorian authorities have so far not commented on the allegations that it hosted the plotters, though the Burkinabé junta has previously blamed Ivory Coast of supporting its opponents in exile. Additionally, the latest allegations of a coup come just months after Ouagadougou said that it had thwarted another “destabilization” plot against the junta last November.

Advisory

Tensions in Burkina Faso are likely to remain elevated over the coming days as additional information pertaining to the coup plot comes to light. Security is likely to remain elevated on the ground, particularly in Ouagadougou and in and around sensitive locations including the airport, government buildings and embassies, and the presidential palace. Should the security situation deteriorate, or additional threats emerge, travel into and out of the country could be temporarily suspended. This includes the closure of borders and an interruption of operations at the main airport in Ouagadougou. There currently is an elevated risk of further fractures within the Burkinabé army and the gendarmerie, which may become apparent in the coming days and weeks. Any fractures within these entities could impact morale. On the ground, terrorist organizations operating in Burkina Faso could use the current situation to their advantage by launching attacks and raids on various locations. This may include targeting fixed positions, including within the capital city, as well as carrying out ambushes on supply convoys. This situation could also lead to an elevated risk of kidnap particularly of expats and Westerners operating in the country. Since the beginning of this year, expat kidnappings have taken place in Agadez, Niger, highlighting that the threat of kidnap remains significant in the wider West African region, including in Burkina Faso. Terrorist organizations operating in this wider region continue to have the capabilities and drive to target foreigners for kidnap, and the networks for moving and command and control remain entwined regionally across the AES states and beyond. In the event that the overall security conditions in Burkina Faso deteriorate further, or if there is a major event including a terrorist attack, it is not expected that government forces will be necessarily cohesive in their initial response. Additionally, western agencies and diplomatic missions are unlikely to have any meaningful influence in an early response.

Those currently operating in Burkina Faso, including mining companies and NGOs, are advised to keep up to date to the evolving situation. Companies should account for personnel and are advised to review their internal and international travel for the coming days. Any companies who are using host nation forces in direct support are advised to review tasking needs and to be able to quickly adapt and respond to interruptions of available forces. In the event of a further deterioration of the security situation, including any major terrorist attacks, those operating in Burkina Faso are advised to self-secure and adjust their operational tempos accordingly to the uncertainty that may play out in the coming days. Within the capital Ouagadougou, demonstrations in support of the junta and against could occur in the coming days. Such protests could turn violent with little warning and those operating in the capital and in other major cities across the country are advised to avoid them. While these perils are not new, and those operating in Burkina Faso have had a continuous hazard to mitigate and adapt to, it remains to be seen whether conditions on the ground will ease in the coming days and calm will be restored or if any residual problems arise.

Cargo Ship causes destruction in the North Sea

Key Judgements

• On the 10^th of March a cargo ship struck an oil tanker in the North Sea
• One crew member went missing and was presumed dead, while the rest of the crew were rescued
• No cause has been found for the collision, but several possibilities exist, including Russian sabotage
• Environmental damage from the collision on nearby beaches and waters is being assessed and monitored

Context

The Stena Immaculate, a US-flagged tanker, had been anchored before making its way to Hull from a Greek port with the goal of transporting jet fuel for the US military. The tanker had been carrying 220,000 barrels of jet fuel when it was struck. Jet fuel is toxic and if ingested can kill marine organisms, which can then become harmful to seabirds that feed on them.

The Solong cargo ship had been making its way south to Rotterdam in the Netherlands from Grangemouth in Scotland. Amongst the crew of the Solong were Russians and Filipinos. The collision took place about 13 miles (20km) off the East Yorkshire coast, near Hull and Grimsby, in a busy shipping area.

The UK is responsible for responding to marine pollution up to 200 nautical miles from land, with a specialist coastguard team expected to lead the effort.

Timeline

On the 10^th of March, the Stena Immaculate, a US-flagged tanker, was anchored and drifting at a speed of 0.1 knots at 09:48 GMT. The Portuguese flagged cargo ship, the Solong, struck the larger oil tanker in waters off Hull just before 10:00am at around 16 knots (around 18mph). According to crew on the Stena and the Solong, the tanker came out of nowhere and those on board had seconds to react when the impact happened. After the Solong crashed, the crew on board the Stena tried to fight the fires by triggering a crucial firefighting system but realised it was futile and chose to abandon ship. They grabbed their essential belongings from their cabins and, after everyone was accounted for, boarded the lifeboat together. The captain was the final person to leave the ship with the whole process taking about 30 minutes. By the evening the search for the final Solong crew member, a Filipino national Mark Angelo Pernia aged 38, was called off after an extensive search by the coastguard. A total of 36 crew members from both vessels were brought back to shore. One person was taken to hospital.

On the 11^th of March, the ship’s captain, a 59-year-old Russian national called Vladimir Motin was arrested on suspicion of gross negligence manslaughter.

By the 12^th of March, the Solong was still on fire while the fire at the oil tanker had been extinguished. By the afternoon, the fire on the Solong had diminished but was still emitting smoke and the occasional report of flame. The Solong had separated from the Stena and drifted south while marine firefighters dealt with the fire. Chief Coastguard Paddy O’Callaghan said in a statement in the evening that aerial surveillance flights “have not indicated any pollution on the surface of the water attributable to either of the casualty vessels”.

After the accident, the owner Ernst Russ and co-owner Stena Bulk confirmed the ship was safe at anchor and they would decide what to do with it. An exclusion zone of 1km was put in place around both vessels. The UK transport secretary said the Maritime Accidental Investigation Branch would begin a preliminary assessment of the crash, but early indications suggested both vessels were not expected to sink.

On the 15^th of March Vladimir Motin appeared at Hull Magistrates Court and was charged with gross negligence manslaughter. He was remanded in custody to appear before the Central Criminal Court in London on 14 April. He was charged early at the Old Bailey with gross negligence manslaughter and is due to stand trial in January 2026.

A week after the Solong collided with the oil tanker was still burning.

On the 28^th of March, the Solong was towed to Aberdeen at around 7am for “safe berthing” and a damage assessment. The Solong was accompanied by a vessel with counter-pollution measures. Owners of the cargo vessel Ernst Russ said the Solong will be assessed by specialist marine assessors and insurers in Aberdeen.

Afterwards, 200,000 barrels of jet fuel were removed from the oil tanker salvage teams transferred the fuel to the Fure Vyl, another tanker.

Possible Cause of the incident

It is still unclear what caused the collision. Humberside Police have stared a criminal probe into the cause of the collision and will work with the UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch. So far, the maritime security sources have found no evidence of any malicious activity.

Although there are suspicions of Russian sabotage. The fact the tanker was carrying jet fuel in support of the US Department of Defence cooperates this viewpoint. Although the incident has not impacted operations or combat readiness Russia has been conducting a “shadow fleet” across the Baltic and North Sea over the last couple months. It is possible to link this ship collision as previous shadow vessels have been linked to a series of suspected sabotage incidents damaging energy and communication infrastructure, including underseas cables, in the Baltic Sea.

According to the chief executive of the port of Grimsby East, Martyn Boyers, the area had been “very foggy” on the morning of the 10^th of March, this could have contributed to visibility issues. This is cooperated by a rescuer who said the fog was so thick during the initial search the crews could “not see a thing”.

The Solong cargo ship also had several safety and technical issues in the months leading up to the incident. Inspection documents from 2024 show warnings the ship’s compass reading and passion communications were “not readable.” This was amongst 10 issues highlighted by Irish inspection officials. Other problems included the alarms being “inadequate”, survival craft not being properly maintained and fire doors being “not as required.”  Another inspection in Scotland in October 2024 found two issues including that the lifebuoys were “not properly marked.” Ernst Russ said: “All deficiencies that were detected during routine port state control inspections of the Solong back in 2024 were promptly rectified”. However, it is possible that some of these safety issues were background factors in the crash, especially that ship’s compass readings being inaccurate as these would have related to the position of the Stena, without these issues its possible the two ships colliding could have been prevented.

Impact of the Incident

Early assessment suggests the amount of environmental damage has been minimal. The amount  of fuel released into the sea is limited with some fuel having burnt off and evaporated. Air quality tests measured on the 13^th of March, registered no toxins. Afterward the initial incident the Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) said there had been no further reports of pollution form either vessel. However, the extent of the risk will depend on how much fuel has leaked out and the speed at which authorities contain the spill. It also depends on natural conditions, such as how quickly bacteria can break down the liquid. Local wildlife trusts have warned of the impact on local habitats and species including threatened seabird colonies, grey seals, harbour porpoises, fish and minke whales. Solong’s owners said they had a team engaged with local authorities and would work with clean-up teams to mitigate further impacts on the marine environment. The clean-up is likely to be difficult, time consuming and require investment in heavy equipment, whilst need to happen as soon as possible to minimise impact.

Following the collision, thousands of plastic pellets used in plastics production, known as nurdles, were released from ruptured containers on the Solong and began washing up on beaches on the Norfolk coast. According to conservationists, the nurdles are not toxic but can harm animals if ingested. King’s Lynn and West Norfolk Council said it had begun removing the nurdles, focusing initially on the stretch of beaches between Holme-next-the-Sea and Old Hunstanton.