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Islamic State’s threat in Iraq

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a Sunni Islamic jihadist group, rose from the ashes of Al-Qaeda in 2014, establishing a ‘caliphate’ in northern Iraq and Syria. In 2017, a US-led anti-terrorism coalition declared victory over ISIS, expelling them from their lands in northern Iraq. Following the withdrawal of US troops from the region in 2021, and even more since the escalation of conflict between Israel and Hamas in 2023, however, ISIS have been conducting an increasing number of attacks throughout the region, leading to more destabilised security conditions. This paper aims to analyse ISIS activities in 2024 to assess the likely threat they pose in the region over the next several months, as well as Iraq’s decision making in this regard.

The month of March 2024 saw ISIS’ most active month in terms of quantity of attacks since 2017 levels, conducting at least 69 attacks in central Syria in just that month. These attacks have resulted in the deaths of at least 84 Syrian soldiers and 44 civilians, which is more than double the confirmed operations ISIS have conducted in 2024. As well as these attacks in Syria, ISIS have been conducting operations in Iraq, with a recent attack on May 13^th, 2024, in the Salahuddin province resulting in the death of one Iraqi officer and four soldiers. These increasing levels of attacks in the last 6 months, as well as severity of the attacks, as demonstrated by ISIS-K in the Moscow concert hall shooting on March 22^nd, 2024, which saw the death of 145 civilians and at least 500 more injured, as well as the bombing in Iran on January 3^rd, 2024, which resulted in the deaths of 103 people and injured 284 others, indicate the increasingly severe threat posed by Islamic State.

This increase in attacks occurs as the Iraqi and US political leadership are discussing the withdrawal of US military personnel and the end of the international coalition which resulted in the defeat of ISIS in 2017. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s office stated in January of 2024 that “Military experts will oversee ending the military mission of the Global Coalition against Daesh [ISIL], a decade after its initiation and after its successful achievement of its mission in partnership with Iraqi security and military forces”. There are two crucial reasons behind this decision, the first being the increasing capabilities of the Iraqi military and security forces since 2017. Iraq has been prioritising the strengthening of its defence capabilities, primarily through the means of acquiring modernised aircraft for air superiority. In 2023, Iraq finalised a $3.2 billion contract with Dassault Aviation to purchase 14 Rafale aircraft, a French, twin-jet combat aircraft with both long- and short-range capabilities, high-accuracy strikes, and reconnaissance. This modernisation of the Iraqi forces comes as a direct result of the possible resurgence of ISIS in Iraq, and thus the talks to end the coalition indicate Iraq’s preparedness for military dominance over ISIS. There are currently 2,500 US troops present in Iraq as part of the coalition against ISIS. If these troops are to leave, there is a worrying potential for a similar power vacuum left in Afghanistan in 2021, providing ISIS with the opportunity to regain territory.

The second crucial reason is due to the activity in Iraq as a result of the Israel-Hamas conflict. Since October of 2023, Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria have targeted US troops over 170 times. The 2,500 troops have been targeted at Al-Asad air base numerous times, as well as in Jordan, where an attack in February of 2024 resulted in the death of three American soldiers. The US retaliation for the attack in Jordan was a series of strikes on over 85 targets throughout Iraq and Syria, resulting in the deaths of 16 people, including civilians, and over 25 injured. Even in 2020, US forces conducted an air strike outside Baghdad airport which killed the Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani, as well as Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Iraq has complained that these US attacks violate Iraq’s sovereignty, and thus is a further reason for the discussions of the removal of US troops. ISIS, however, have taken credit for the decision to begin the removal of US troops as a consequence of their force, and have promised to continue its attacks.

ISIS in 2024 has demonstrated its capabilities to execute complex attacks on an international scale, and therefore almost certainly poses a significant threat to regional security in Iraq in the short-term future. This is compounded with the intention to withdraw US forces from the region, leaving behind a significant power vacuum in Iraq’s security apparatus, providing ISIS with opportunity to engage with their intentions of re-establishing power. We assess with high confidence that ISIS will continue to attack US and Iraqi forces at a high rate over the next 6 months.

Iraq, however, has been investing in the modernisation of its equipment, with a priority on aircraft, and as such is certain to have military dominance over ISIS, in contrast to in 2014 when Iraq’s security structure was highly ineffective. We therefore assess with moderate confidence that Iraq has the capabilities, the training, and the experience, to effectively combat ISIS’ attempts to regain land in Iraq. This was recently demonstrated on the 22^nd of June 2024, by an announcement by the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) regarding a successful joint operation with the Iraqi National Intelligence Service against an ISIS cell in the city of Tuz Khurmato in northern Iraq. The operation resulted in the death of at least 7 militants, including the leader of the cell. The ISOF stated that F-16 aircraft carried out strikes that destroyed tunnel systems and hideouts, resulting in the death of all the cell’s militants.

Analysing if France should deploy French troops into Ukraine and what ramifications it could have on Western and Southern Europe

Polish Border Crisis

Key Judgement:

• It is highly likely that Russia would attempt to destabilize Poland by weaponizing migrants (High confidence)
• It is highly likely that recent European Parliament election result would be supportive Poland’s extreme border control policy, and migrants flow would be helpful for right wing parties of Western Europe. (High confidence)
• It is unlikely that weaponizing migrants would led to stopping or deterring Ukraine aid in upcoming months. It is realistically possible if Trump win in upcoming US presidential election. (Medium confidence)

The border between Poland and Belarus has been a focal point of tension since the onset of the Ukraine war, primarily due to Belarus’s alignment with Russia. President Alexander Lukashenko, the long-standing dictator of Belarus, has ruled using tactics reminiscent of President Putin’s strategies. Since the 2020 Belarus crisis and subsequent Russian assistance in quelling political opposition, Lukashenko has closely aligned with Kremlin interests in Eastern Europe.

Poland, with its historical experiences of Russian occupation, maintains a cautious and adversarial stance toward Moscow. Since joining NATO and the EU, Poland has remained vigilant against Russian threats, unlike many Western European nations that have relaxed their defences since the Cold War. Poland’s significant military investments have positioned it as a leading NATO military power. Prior to the Ukraine war, Poland was among the few NATO countries already spending more than 2% of its GDP on defence. By 2024, military expenditures reached 3.9% of GDP, totalling $31.6 billion, making Poland the 14th largest military spender globally. The land forces plan to double in size to 300,000 troops, bolstered by substantial military imports from the US and South Korea, transforming Poland’s post-Soviet military into one of the most modern in the region. Additionally, Poland has transferred significant post-Soviet arms to Ukraine, including MiG-29 jets, modernized T-72 tanks, and Krab 155-mm howitzers. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy tracker, Poland has donated €3 billion to Ukraine, compared to France’s €544 million contribution.

The previous administration, led by the populist far-right PiS party, maintained a strong stance against Russia, actively supporting Ukraine and leveraging the Russian threat as a political advantage. This anti-Russian sentiment is one of the few issues with broad support within Polish society, and the current administration has not altered its stance on Russia, despite efforts to roll back many PiS policies. Discussions within the current administration about renegotiating military imports have not weakened Warsaw’s firm position against Moscow. The European Parliament election on June 9 saw the Civic Coalition triumph over the PiS party, likely enabling the continuation of current policies.

In light of the ongoing Ukraine war, Poland has emerged as a significant threat to Moscow’s ambitions to reestablish its influence in the region. Poland’s capability and willingness to deter Russian military activities make it a primary target for Russian intelligence operations. On May 14, Prime Minister Tusk announced increased investment in security agencies due to the growing threat from Russian and Belarusian intelligence services. While the Polish counterintelligence agency (BIRN) has not disclosed exact arrest figures related to Russian intelligence, it is known that since the Ukraine war began, 29 individuals have been arrested, and 19 charged with working for Russian intelligence. Notable incidents include the arrest of a Polish man collaborating with the GRU, providing information about Rzeszow-Jasionka Airport, the main hub for military aid to Ukraine, and involvement in an assassination attempt on the Ukrainian president. In January and May, networks attempting to sabotage strategic infrastructure were dismantled. Additionally, “Voice of Europe,” a propaganda network aimed at influencing European politics and public opinion, has targeted Poland, countered by Polish and other security agencies. The largest spy network scandal, involving 16 individuals conducting reconnaissance of key military facilities and critical infrastructure, was uncovered in November 2023.

Given these circumstances, it is highly likely that Russia will attempt to weaponize migrants against Poland using its border with Belarus. Weaponizing migrants has been a recurring Kremlin tactic against Europe to destabilize the region. Recent turmoil at the Finland-Russia border exemplifies this strategy. It is well-documented that Russia and the Assad regime in Syria have used migrant flows to Europe as an asymmetric warfare tool against the West. Russian mercenaries have also facilitated migrant entry from Libya to Europe, exacerbating the Mediterranean migrant crisis. With Russia’s dwindling options to pressure Poland, a large-scale migrant weaponization at the Poland-Belarus border is highly probable.

Tensions in this region have been escalating for years, with the border serving as a gateway for migrants entering the EU. The previous PiS administration publicly committed to defending the border at all costs, a stance that remains unchanged despite the regime change. Poland is currently fortifying its border with Belarus, and the recent tragic death of a Polish soldier, who was stabbed by migrants, has garnered public support for these measures.

The recent European Parliament election saw right-wing parties in Western Europe gain seats, indicating a significant shift in migrant policy in Western Europe. Traditionally, Western European countries have supported pro-migrant policies, while Eastern Europe has opposed them due to bearing the brunt of incoming migrants. Although right-wing party’s lost seats in Eastern Europe, Western influence in Parliament is more substantial, and Eastern European left-wing parties do not align with the pro-migrant stance of their Western counterparts. Therefore, possible

Right-wing parties in Europe have historically been more pro-Russian, and Russia has supported them for years. In this political climate, a massive migrant influx could bolster public support for far-right parties in Europe, potentially influencing election outcomes and disrupting the ongoing Ukraine war. With intensifying Western support and weapons starting to strike targets inside Russian territory, Russia’s desperation is growing.

In conclusion, it is highly likely that weaponizing migrants in Poland will be observed in the next six months, given the current geopolitical dynamics. Russia would actively use migrants to cultivate chaos in Poland, and to support ongoing dominance of right-wing party that could possibly stop or deter support for Ukraine. However it is unlikely that right wing party dominance would led to stopping Ukraine aid in upcoming months. Actual possible difference would be possible after the biggest political event of 2024, which is the US election in November.

Gaza Escalation: Understanding Israel’s Rafah Operation and Its Broader Implications

This paper analyses Israel’s military operation in Rafah on May 6th, 2024, within the broader context of the Gaza Strip conflict. It explores the factors leading to the operation, its immediate consequences, and its regional and international implications, including diplomatic tensions and humanitarian concerns.

On May 6th, 2024, Israel launched an operation in and around Rafah as part of its invasion of the Gaza Strip, gaining control of a crucial border crossing and shutting off most supplies to the neighbourhood a day before indirect discussions on a ceasefire agreement were scheduled to commence. The Israeli operation began hours after Hamas officials said on Monday night that they would accept a recent ceasefire proposal presented by Qatari and Egyptian mediators. Israeli forces airdropped leaflets to Palestinians in east Rafah on Sunday night, telling them to flee to a safe zone; yet the operation began only hours later. The Israeli military seized control of the Gaza side of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt on Tuesday, after airstrikes on the southern Palestinian city on Monday.

Yoav Gallant, Israel’s defence minister, stated that the attack would continue until Hamas soldiers in Rafah “and the entire Gaza Strip” were “eliminated”, or the militant Islamist organization began to release captives.

According to the IDF, six rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip’s Rafah sector on May 7th towards Kerem Shalom and the Re’im region in southern Israel in retaliation to the Israeli operation.

The United States, Israel’s staunchest ally, has repeatedly urged Israel against launching a significant military assault in Rafah, where more than a million civilians evacuated from other parts of Gaza are seeking refuge. In addition, aid groups have forecast a major humanitarian disaster. On the other hand, President Netanyahu later reacted, stating that the civilian losses from Sunday’s strike on the Rafah camp were a ‘tragic error’.

This Israeli action has and will have far-reaching ramifications for regional stability. Neighbouring nations have already expressed their displeasure, with Egypt reportedly considering downgrading ties with Israel, perhaps ending the peace accords between the two countries. The operation would necessitate the relocation of Palestinians into Egyptincreasing tensions with Egypt since the arrival of so many displaced people would be difficult for Egypt as well and would impede the return of Palestinians to their land after the conflict. On Lebanon now, as the IDF makes its first steps on the southern Gaza city of Rafah, Hezbollah announces the use of new weaponry in strikes over the northern border, calls for further soldier mobilisation, and sends other signs of impending escalation. Whether their claims are legitimate or simply an effort to cause fear, the pressure on Israel is increasing.

The necessity for the international community to enhance diplomatic efforts and humanitarian help to solve the rising catastrophe in Gaza is growing significantly, and Netanyahu is under pressure from both the international community and his own administration.

The Driving Forces behind the Houthis  

It is highly likely that the Houthis will continue to use their current Red Sea strategy in order to consolidate their power and territory in Yemen and achieve political legitimacy. It is assessed with high confidence that political leverage over the Yemeni government, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is the driving force behind the Houthis Red Sea strategy. 

The Houthi’s, a Shia-Islamic militant group based in Yemen, have been disrupting maritime trade in the Red Sea region via drone attacks, ballistic missiles, as well as piracy, since October 7^th, 2023. This disruption was initially targeted at only Israeli-linked vessels; however, this has since spread to encompass all shipping in the region. The overt reason for the disruption is to degrade Israeli trade in solidarity with Hamas in Gaza, one of the groups, along with the Houthis and Hezbollah, which makes up Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”. The Houthis, however, have been active and operating since the 1980s, and have been in a civil war in Yemen since 2014, thus indicating that the group has their own agenda, which is separate from Iran’s machinations. This paper will therefore analyse the formation of the Houthis via their political and religious lines and aim to assess the short to medium term goals of the Houthis, removed from Iranian influence.

Religion is the focal point of the Houthi movement and identity, which was born in the late 1980s to early 1990s as a response to the marginalisation being faced by the Zaydi population (Zaydism being a branch of Shi’ism) by the Sunni Yemen Arab Republic. Saudi Arabia was very involved in pushing the Sunni belief system amongst the largely Zaydi population of Northern Yemen in order to undermine the Zaydi elites, with an aim to consolidating a religiously unified territory. In response to the marginalisation faced by Zaydi’s, the Houthi’s nurtured a network of ‘Believing Youth’, and increasingly adopted Shi’ite symbols similar to those common in Iran, thus sowing the seeds of sectarianism which eventually led to several rounds of conflict with the Yemeni government between 2004 and 2010. This was followed by failed negotiations at the National Dialogue Conference in 2013-2014, which led to the Houthi capturing of the Yemeni capital Sanaa and continuing to march south to consolidate the west coast of Yemen. This has since developed into a civil war between the Yemeni government, backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the Houthis, who at this time started to receive increased levels of support from Iran and Hezbollah.

The Houthi’s political arm, known as ‘Ansar Allah’ (Partisans of God), is positioned directly in line with their religious ideology. Their political influence, however, extends further than their originating religious and geographical roots. Whilst the Zaydi population makes up roughly 30% of the Yemeni population, the Houthis now control the geographic territory which holds roughly 66% of the Yemeni population, which is 20 million people. Politically, the Houthis strategy for attacking ships in the Red Sea have several layers to them. Domestically within Yemen, the Houthis can frame their attacks as a ‘Just War’, appealing to the population of Yemen based on moral and religious propaganda. This serves as a recruitment tool, as well as a political tool, both to legitimise the Houthis in Yemen, and against the Yemeni government.

In the Middle East and internationally, the Houthi’s strategy in the Red Sea serves as a publicity and bargaining tool, achieving the dual purpose of garnering international attention to amplify their message, as well as increasing their power in the political sphere to leverage an end to the war with Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. By proving their military capabilities in the Red Sea, the Houthis have applied pressure to Saudi Arabia and their coalition, who are likely to want to end direct conflict to focus on their internal economic and tourism industries.

By posturing as moral fighters in a ‘Just War’, the Houthis have used their Red Sea strategy to gain political legitimacy, bolster support within a suffering Yemeni population, and gain political power in the Middle East. Whilst Iran are the key enablers for the Houthis complex attacks due to the advanced weapons systems that they provide, they are not steering the Houthis politically. It is highly likely that the Houthis will continue to use their current Red Sea strategy in order to consolidate their power and territory in Yemen and achieve political legitimacy. It is assessed with high confidence that political leverage over the Yemeni government, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is the driving force behind the Houthis Red Sea strategy.