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Attack on German Christmas Market

Context: Why was Germany chosen as an attack location?

Terrorism attacks are not new to Germany as the history of the country shows, during the Weimar Republic elected officials were beaten and murdered, and in the 1960s the Red Army Faction, a far-left military group, conducted kidnappings and murders in opposition to the socioeconomic system of West Germany, capitalism combined with elements of social democracy. In recent times, there have been attacks from Islamic extremists along with left and right-wing extremists. One of the most prominent was on the 19th of December 2016 when a man killed 13 individuals after driving a truck into a crowd at a market in Berlin, afterward, ISIS claimed responsibility.

One of the explanations for the rise in terrorist attacks is Germany’s position as a centre for terrorist and Islamic extremists in Europe where the group has grown at a faster rate compared with other European nations. Many Turkish and Kurdish Islamic groups are active in Germany as their top leaders fled there in the 2000s.

Another explanation is the growing resentment towards the national government as economic growth has decreased and the political consensus of social democracy is becoming less popular. This is driving citizens to more extreme political ideologies on both the left and right.

Possible motives behind the Christmas market attack  

The suspect of the 20 December 2024 attack in Magdeburg, Taleb al-Abdulmohsen, was a 50-year-old Saudi citizen who arrived in Germany in 20006 and worked as a doctor. The suspected attacker has no known links to Islamist extremism, however, German authorities have so far treated the attack as a terrorist incident. Six people were killed in the attack and at least 299 were injured, according to the latest figures from the interior ministry of Saxony-Anhalt.

Prosecutor Horst Walter Noepns has suggested the reasoning behind the crime could be linked to the mistreatment of Saudi Arabia refugees by German officials. The suspect has been seen as an outspoken critic of Islam and of European immigration policy, particularly on social media. Reports in the German media have shown the suspect campaigned against Islam while in Saudi Arabia and showed anger at German governments for letting in large numbers of Muslim refugees. Additionally, there are reports of the suspect helping young Saudi women and critics of the government escape and seek asylum in Germany, describing an “Islamism of Europe”. The suspect’s posts on the X platform show a distrust of authorities in Germany along with a belief in conspiratorial stories including accusing police of stealing a USB stick from him and destroying a criminal complaint he had filed. Along with threats of violence against German citizens and politicians. All this points to a strong negative view of Islam and the regime in Saudi Arabia along with German authorities.

Additionally, the mental state of the suspect can also be observed as a factor. The suspect had been treated for mental illness in the past and tested positive for drug use on the night of his arrest. Interior Minister Nancy Faeser has said so far no motive has been established but “there are striking signs of a pathological psyche” in the suspect.

Furthermore, there is reason to believe the suspect was already a potential threat to the public. German police had contacted the suspect in September and October of 2024 and tried but failed to meet up with him in December. Additionally, the Saudi government sent four official notifications to the German authorities, three to intelligence and one to the foreign ministry, warning them about the “very extreme views” held by the suspect. All of these were ignored, according to sources close to the Saudi government. Although German Police say the accusations from the Saudi government were too vague.

What has resulted?

The Interior Minister of Germany has argued lessons have been learned from this attack, specifically on tracking potential attackers who don’t fit conventional threat categories or profiles, new indicators and action plans will need to be created. Security experts have criticised the security apparatus of the Magdeburg Christmas market in which organisers had left an escape route open, designed for emergency service vehicles which the suspect used to drive past all the blockades. Additionally, elements were missing from the security plan, a chain to block the gap between two concrete blocks, for instance. Criminal charges have been made against the city and local police which could lead to investigations around the security plan and implementation for the market.

The result amongst the public has been an increased opposition to Germany’s current immigration policy and a rise in support for right-wing political parties such as the AfD, who have called for major rallies to take place across the country. This will become significant as the country prepares for an election in early 2025.

Romanian Presidential Election and Russian Interference

On November 24, 2024, Romania held its presidential elections, which resulted in no candidate securing an absolute majority, prompting a second round scheduled for December 8. However, on December 6, the Constitutional Court annulled the initial results because of Russian interference. Călin Georgescu, an independent NATO and EU-skeptic nationalist, won a relative majority in the first round, while liberal Elena Lasconi finished second. Georgescu’s rise to prominence was largely attributed to Russian influence and the extensive use of non-traditional media, particularly TikTok, which significantly boosted his campaign. Key issues in the election included corruption, traditional Christian values, Romania’s stance on EU and NATO membership, and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War.

Following the election results, serious allegations of manipulation and foreign interference emerged. Opinion polls had initially shown Georgescu as a minor candidate, raising doubts about his unexpected success. These claims of fraud prompted the Constitutional Court to order a recount, which confirmed the results and validated the runoff. However, on December 4, declassified intelligence reports revealed unusual activities surrounding the election. Reports indicated coordinated misinformation campaigns on TikTok, aimed at influencing public opinion in favor of Georgescu, and cyberattacks on the official Romanian election website, both linked to Russian interference. Illegal campaign financing was also uncovered.

The court’s decision to annul the results ignited significant controversy, both domestically and internationally. The situation deepened existing skepticism toward the government and political parties. Georgescu, a former senior civil servant and agricultural engineer, is known for his far-right nationalist views, which include skepticism toward both the EU and NATO. His rejection of further support for Ukraine and his focus on national interests over Western alliances made him a controversial figure, attracting attention both in Romania and internationally. Russia’s interest in the Romanian election lies in its broader strategy of weakening the unity of the West and undermining the EU and NATO by exploiting the vulnerabilities of individual member states. Romania has significant geostrategic importance as a key NATO ally on the eastern flank, with critical military infrastructure and contributions to regional security, particularly in the Black Sea. During the war, Romania expanded maritime trade opportunities with Ukraine in Danube and Black Sea ports, helping to secure new trade corridors. A destabilization of Romania could complicate strategic logistics and trade partnerships with Ukraine. The risk of an alienated Romania, with a Eurosceptic and NATO-skeptic president, distancing itself from its Western allies could seriously undermine NATO’s cohesion and its ability to respond effectively to regional threats. Moreover, Romania’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian energy, particularly through the Neptun Deep gas project in the Black Sea, threaten Russia’s influence in the region.

Russia’s campaigns aim to exploit public dissatisfaction with domestic governments, weaken trust in institutions, and erode support for NATO and EU policies by amplifying sensitive issues like economic struggles, social inequalities, and controversial policies. One such narrative portrays foreign investments, particularly from the U.S., in Romania’s resources as a threat to national sovereignty. These narratives aim to foster resistance to Western economic involvement, especially regarding the Neptun Deep gas project. At the same time, Russia has backed campaigns appealing to Orthodox Christian nationalist sentiment, increasing tensions between Romania and its Western allies. In addition, Russia has used disinformation campaigns, often launched from Moldova, to undermine the Romanian public’s trust in the government and Western institutions, exploiting social and economic discontent and also weakening public support for Ukraine. Through these tactics, Russia seeks to weaken Romania’s commitment to the EU and NATO, destabilize its political landscape, and further its strategic interests in the region.

The interference in the Romanian elections is a demonstration of the hybrid tactics used in Russia’s geopolitical strategy to weaken Western unity. It is unique because it is the first time that Russian interference has led to the annulment of an election with credible evidence. Romania’s handling of foreign interference will be closely watched by other countries facing similar threats, particularly in terms of transparency and public accountability. If Romania can effectively demonstrate that it identified, addressed and neutralised the interference in a way that strengthens institutional credibility, it could provide a model for responding to hybrid warfare tactics aimed at undermining democratic systems.

Netherlands Joining European Long-range Missile Strike Approach

Key Judgements

The Netherlands is considering joining the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA)

The Dutch defence minister believes it is essential to increase capacity against further Russian aggression

What is the European Long-Range Missile Strike Approach? 

France, Germany, Italy, and Poland launched the ELSA project in July 2024 to develop a ground-based missile for deep strikes against enemy positions. The United Kingdom and Sweden joined in October 2024. The programme aims to create a sovereign defence capability, strengthen the European defence industry and technology base and implement fairer sharing of the burden between Allies. The Ukraine War demonstrated the need for this approach as Russia used ballistic and cruise missiles to attack Ukrainian cities from a far distance.

Previously, during the Cold War, ground-launched missiles were prohibited from having a range of 1,000-2,000 kilometres under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. However, this agreement collapsed in 2019 after the US and Russia withdrew. This happened after the US accused Russia of violating the pact by building a new type of cruise missile.

The Dutch defence minister, Ruben Brekelmans, announced an interest in participating while in Paris on 27th November 2024. He highlighted how essential it is for European armies to increase their capacity to deter further aggression from Russia. The Ukraine War has demonstrated the need for ground-launched deep strike capability as Russian missiles have destroyed Ukrainian cities from far-off ranges. The decision to join by the Netherlands comes as Russia announces plans to place the latest intercontinental ballistic missile system  (RS-28 Sarmat) on combat duty. This has been made to help Russia modern its nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile system with the capability to strike targets in Europe and the US.

Why is the Netherlands joining?

Brekelmans acknowledged the incoming US administration under Donald Trump, saying European capitals need to show America they are taking on more of the burden for defence within NATO. This also explains the development of the ELSA project as European powers feel it is better to develop their own independent system than purchase one from an outside power like the US. This feeds into an overall sense that Europe wants to become more reliant on itself for security rather than the US. Part of this decision comes from a fear of President Trump reducing US involvement in NATO, or pulling out altogether as he has threatened in the past.

European powers also want to fill a perceived capability gap between themselves and Russia. All the current ELSA participants already possess air and for some, sea-launched cruise missiles but they all have a smaller range of 500 kilometres. One of the advantages of cruise missiles is they fly lower than other projection weaponry like ballistic systems. Only Turkey possesses a ground-based system. The reason behind this capability gap is the significant drop in overall defence spending by NATO allies in Europe after the Cold War, falling by 20 per cent after 2008. In particular, high-intensity combat has been structurally underfunded. By closing this capability gap European powers aim to deter further aggression from Russia.

The Netherlands in particular has been looking for an increase in long-range strike capacity for some time, hence their decision in February of 2024 to purchase 120 air-launched cruise missiles from the US. The European power has made other investments in its military including a 4 billion Euro investment plan with a focus on its maritime domain with new Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, new frigates and new submarines. The reason behind these investments is mainly to help combat the growing security threat from Russian aggression and, like other European nations, to limit any dependency on outside powers for defence. However, it will likely still need support from overseas as many of the suppliers it has partnered with manufacture their products offshore, including in the US, Norway and Israel.

There has been a growing strategic closeness on defence issues between European nations. The Netherlands signed a contract in late September of this year to buy four Barracuda submarines from the French shipmaker Naval Group. Indeed, one of the objectives of the ELSA is to reduce the costs of the system by spreading them amongst the various nations. This aligns with the French president, Emmanuel Macron’s goal of creating a new European security framework

What happens next? 

It will take some time for this decision by the Dutch government to take full effect as the reality of ELSA is still a few years away. Additionally, the full cost of the system has not been announced and there is the possibility of citizens feeling less warm towards an expensive military project in a time of economic downturn.

While the stated goal of European defence officials is to create ground-launched capability it is important to note that this is not explicitly stated in any of the official statements or announcements surrounding the ELSA. In fact, the Swedish defence minister, Pal Jonson,  has said his country won’t prioritise ground-based strike options, instead focusing on naval and aerial domains, which are of greater national interest.

It is possible that if the ELSA initiative moves closer towards implementation, MBDA, a European defence firm, will be the one developing the technology. This gives further support that European powers are concentrating on building up their domestic industries. It also means the development of a cruise missile is more likely than a ballistic system as many of the European defence-industrial firms have greater experience and expertise in the former. However, there are also concerns as the implementation of new weapons systems takes a considerable chunk of time, take the Anglo-French Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon that is still under development and will not be ready before 2028 at the earliest despite being announced in 2017.

Assessing the upcoming Moldovan election

• It is likely that current Moldovan administration would win presidential election and EU referendum on 20 October. It is unlikely Russian interference would make significant change on the result of election.
• It is highly likely that Russia and pro-Russian movement would attempt to destabilize Moldova. It is realistically possible that Russian attempt would lead to indirect military conflict within few months.

Moldova, with a small population of 2.5 million, is located between Romania and Ukraine. Its geopolitical position has historically allowed Russian influence to dominate the country, a situation that persisted even after the dissolution of the USSR, of which Moldova was a part. Moldova remains heavily dependent on Russia economically, and Moscow has consistently demonstrated a clear intention to maintain its control over the country.

The separatist region of Transnistria has been supported by Russia, resembling similar situations in both Georgia and Ukraine. In Ukraine, pro-Russian separatists were instrumental in Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent Donbass War. Similarly, South Ossetian separatists were used to justify Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, leading to South Ossetia’s continued claim as an independent republic within Georgian territory. The lesson for Moldova is clear: Russia has both the intent and the capability to destabilize the country by leveraging the existing pro-Russian population against the current government, a strategy that has been in play ever since Moldova’s pro-Western political parties secured control of the government.

The situation in Transnistria has always posed a security threat to Moldova, but since the onset of the Ukraine war, the separatist region has increasingly served as an entry point for Russia’s hybrid operations. The separatist government has received significant economic and political support from Moscow, which has publicly acknowledged Transnistria as an independent nation. Tensions between the Moldovan administration and Transnistria have escalated in recent months, with the Moldovan government issuing frequent warnings against separatist movements, while Transnistria has expressed its desire to align with Russia. For instance, the Transnistrian parliament recently outlawed the use of the term “Transnistria,” insisting on the use of the Russian name “Pridnestrovie.”

These rising tensions pose a real threat as Moldova approaches its upcoming presidential election and a referendum, both scheduled for October 20, 2024. The referendum will ask Moldovans whether they support constitutional changes that could pave the way for the country’s eventual accession to the European Union. Despite the Moldovan courts banning the activities of pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor, authorities have uncovered attempts to corrupt the election process through the illegal use of millions of euros. Given Russia’s long history of interfering in the democratic processes of foreign nations, it is clear that Moscow is employing its well-established tactics to undermine Moldova’s political future.

Recent polls suggest that 55-65% of the population supports the referendum, and it is likely that President Maia Sandu will win the upcoming election. However, Russia continually presents the possibility of an opposite outcome. Currently, around 1,700 Russian troops are stationed in Transnistria, and the economic disconnection from Russia has severely impacted Moldova’s economy, which was already suffering due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its related inflation. The ongoing war in Ukraine has exacerbated this, causing inflation to rise by 40%, while Gazprom has significantly reduced gas supplies to Moldova. Moldovan authorities have also accused Shor and Moscow of orchestrating a complex “mafia-style” voter-buying scheme, attempting to bribe approximately 130,000 Moldovans to vote against the referendum and in favor of pro-Russian candidates. The political and economic tensions are unfavorable for the current administration and are likely to intensify as the election approaches.

The ongoing war in Ukraine has also heightened fear among the Moldovan population. With Russian missiles frequently crossing or landing on Moldovan territory, the possibility of a Russian invasion seems increasingly realistic. The presence of Russian forces in Transnistria further complicates the situation, as any military interference by Russia would severely undermine Moldova’s fragile government. The deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West suggests that Moscow may find it easier to initiate further aggression against its former Soviet republics.

It is possible that the Moldovan population’s understanding of the situation could affect the current overwhelming support for the referendum. For the Sandu administration, winning both the presidential election and the referendum is crucial to consolidating its fragile policy direction. While it is likely that the election results will align with President Sandu’s goals, it is equally likely that Russia will view this as a threat to its influence in Moldova and attempt to destabilize the current government through various means. In conclusion, the upcoming elections will be a pivotal moment for Moldova’s future and for Russia’s regional strategy.

Russia’s Shadow Feet: An overview of the fleet, how they operate, and the threat they pose to Western and Southern Europe

What is Russia’s shadow fleet and how big is it?

According to the UK Government policy paper ‘The ‘Shadow Fleet’: A Call To Action’, Russia’s shadow fleet “comprises ships engaged in illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs or engaging in other illegal activities”.  The Kiev School of Economics highlights that “Russia’s efforts to establish its own shadow fleet… began in the latter half of 2022 [and] continue to date”. Ships in Russia’s shadow fleet regularly engage in illictly smuggling Russian oil. Estimates of the size of Russia’s shadow fleet vary across multiple sources. For example, CNN in March 2023, estimated that the size of the shadow fleet was “at roughly 600 vessels, or about 10% of the global number of large tankers”. More recent publications such as The Spectator’s article ‘The shadow fleet helping Russia to evade sanctions’, published in May 2024, estimates that the fleet has grown by 17% in 2024 and is made up of “787 vessels… equivalent to nearly 14 per cent of the world’s total tanker tonnage”. Academic institutions such as the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) estimated in 2024 that the collection of ships within the fleet was “about 1,400 vessels worldwide”. Whilst estimates on the exact number of ships are obscure and vary between sources, the general consensus is clear: Russia’s shadow fleet’s activities have surged throughout the Russo-Ukraine war, allowing Russia to generate profits for its offensive in Ukraine whilst simultaneously undermining the effects of Western sanctions and posing a direct threat to the security of Western and Southern Europe. The shadow fleet, as noted by CEPA, “may operate in the shadows, but its indisputably there, and its activities are growing”.

Structure of the fleet and methods of operation.

In terms of structure, the shadow fleet can be separated into two different categories: dark fleets and grey fleets. Dark fleets, as defined in a Windward and Vortexa joint report, as ships/vessels/tankers that carry out “clandestine trade of sanctioned commodities, using diverse methods of obfuscating their origins”. According to the report, the dark fleet uses a variety of deceptive shipping practices (DSP’s) “such and ID and location tampering” as well as “the intentional disabling of the automatic identification system” to move wet cargo (oil). Grey Fleets, according to the report, are “a completely new phenomenon evolving from the [Russo-Ukraine) war”. These fleets are defined as “grey” due to the difficulty of determining the legality and sanction compliances of these vessels in a lot of cases. Grey fleet vessels regularly switch flags (known as ‘flag hopping’), making them hard to locate and verify. More generally, Russia’s shadow fleet has been known to operate under the radar by travelling without insurance, forging documents, and painting over the name of the vessels to disguise their true identity. According to Tayo Yousef in his September 2024 publication, ‘U.S Sanctions Are Ineffective: Russia’s Dark and Grey Fleet and its Circumvention of Sanctions’, vessels in Russia’s Shadow Fleet “have been outfitted with state-of-the-art spoofing technology… making the vessels difficult to track”.

Evidence of the evasion of sanctions by Russia’s shadow fleet and its increased activities during the Russo-Ukraine War.

In December 2022, the G7 introduced an oil price cap of a “maximum price of 60 USD [US Dollars] per barrel of crude oil” in an effort to limit Russia’s profit revenues from oil trading whilst simultaneously keeping the global energy market stable.  A recent report by S&P Global Commodity Insights “noted nearly 80% of Russian exports are potentially shipped outside of the G7 oil price cap”. Therefore, “a significant number of [Russian] oil transactions and shipments are… evading sanctions”. By shipping and trading oil above the set G7 price cap, Russia is able to generate enormous profits to help fund its war in Ukraine. A May 2023 Oil Market Report pointed out that “Russian oil supply has proved resilient following its invasion of Ukraine with crude exports re-routed to new markets as deep price discounts attract traders as well as refiners willing to risk handling the barrels”. In the same report, the International Energy Agency noted that Russia was still exporting 8.3 million oil barrels per day, which it described as “a post invasion high”. The report also estimated that because of this, Russian revenue “increased by $1.7 billion to $15 billion” due to the exportation of crude oil.

Data from Windward and Vortexa reveals that since the start of the Russo-Ukraine war, “the grey fleet has carried around 1.4 million crude oil barrels per day… each month post-invasion, which translates to a 111 percent increase when compared to pre-invasion levels. Similarly, the same comparison for the dark fleet is estimated at a smaller, but nevertheless considerable, 19 percent”.  Both companies also pointed out that in the Gray Fleet, there was a “69% increase” in the monthly average of oil product barrels exported per day. For the dark fleet, “there was a 22 percent increase in the monthly average of BPD [barrels per day]… after the start of the war”. The statistics and data extracted from Windward and Vortexa shows that Russia’s shadow fleet has seen an increase in its activities since the start of the Russo-Ukraine War. Additionally, evidence from S&P Global shows that Russia is using its shadow fleet to actively evade sanctions imposed on it by the G7 and the West. As of September 2024, a total of 74 vessels have from Russia’s shadow fleet have been sanctioned by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Given that Russia’s shadow fleet is has seen an increase in the scope of its activities during the Russo-Ukraine war and has been proven to be evading sanctions, going forward, more needs to be done by the West to target Russia’s shadow fleet.

What threats does Russia’s shadow fleet pose to Western and Southern Europe?

The fleet poses significant threats to Western and Southern Europe. For example, according to the UK government, the fleet “poses serious maritime security and environmental risks” as many of the vessels in within the fleet are “old and unsafe”.  The fleets use of DSP’s also “flouts international maritime standards and increases the likelihood of catastrophic incidents”. Tayo Yousef adds weight to this argument, noting that, “suspected Dark Fleet takers have been involved in a barrage of collisions, fires and spoils, and in the case of a major incident will mean massive environmental consequences”. The fleet also posed a major security threat to Western and Southern Europe, as by evading sanctions, Russia is actively undermining Western polices. The fleet’s activities enable Russia to pursue and influence relationships with countries who are not bounded to uphold US or Western policies, whilst keeping a steady stream of income that it can use to support its offensive in Ukraine. Moreover, considering that the shadow fleets vessel’s insurance “do not cover sanctions invasions, Western countries might not have any choice but foot the clean-up bills that accrue as a result of a major accident”. This highlights that Russia’s shadow fleet also has potential financial risks and consequences for the West should any maritime environmental accidents occur either now or in the future.

What methods should the West use to deal with Russia’s shadow fleet in the near future?

As outlined in the previous section above, the fleet poses environmental, financial and security risks to Western and Southern Europe. So, how should the West tackle these issues? Going forward, the West must employ a multipronged approach to deal with the threats of the shadow fleet., and should consider these following recommendations:

1. The West and her allies should establish a joint Maritime Police Taskforce/Agency that caters to Western interests and “monitors the activities of entities suspected of being in cahoots with the Russian state”.
2. The West and her allies should “jointly develop a high-resolution satellite surveillance technology and program capable of monitoring maritime activities to a high degree of precision”.
3. Create a “real-time monitoring system that can track vessel movements, identify unauthorized ship-to-ship transfers, and detect spoofing techniques used to mask vessel locations”.
4. Collaborate with allied nations by using artificial intelligence (AI) to collect and analyse substantial amounts of information, including “maritime data… AIS signals, satellite imagery, shipping manifests and historical shipping patterns”. The use of AI could potentially make tracking Russia’s shadow fleet (and their dark/grey fleets) a potentially easier task.
5. Use AI to “develop algorithms capable of detecting anomalies in vessel behaviour, such as sudden changes in routes, disabling of AIS transponders, or irregularities in ship-to-ship transfers”.
6. Use machine leaning models and programs to greatly improve the accuracy of verifying and identifying suspicious vessels and their illicit activities.
7. Further develop partnerships with maritime, surveillance and cyber security companies to create “innovative solutions for tracking and verifying vessel movements”.
8. Look into “the use of blockchain-based platforms [and technology] for maintaining transparent and tamper-proof records of maritime transactions, including ship registrations, cargo movements, and insurance costs”.
9. Create joint task forces for coordinating responses to sanction evasion activities that occur across borders and assist in continuously monitoring the effectiveness of Western sanctions.
10. Place “stricter regulations on maratime insurance providers to prevent them from providing vessels engaged in sanctions evasion”.
11. Share more intelligence and data with international partners and organisations to improve the effectiveness of efforts to enforce sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet.
12. Sanction a larger number of vessels within Russia’s shadow fleet as only 74 vessels have been sanctioned by the United Kingdom, United States and European Union as of September 2024.
13. Immediately readjust and significantly lower the G7 price cap to “tighten the choke on the Kremlin’s revenue” from the shadow fleet.
14. Regularly conduct assessments of existing maritime technology “to identify areas for improvement and innovation”.
15. Continuously “adapt and refine strategies based on lessons learned and emerging threats in the evolving landscape of sanctions evasion”.