Poland at a Crossroads: Security Policy and the 2025 Presidential Election

The first round of the Polish presidential elections will take place on 18 May 2025. The election campaign reflects the division between the government and the national conservative camp. The focus is on security policy and the domestic political balance of power between the former governing party PiS (Law and Justice) and the current government under President Donald Tusk (PO – Civic Coalition). As a key state on NATO’s eastern border, Poland is faced with the security policy choice of further deepening the European cooperation it has embarked on – or focussing more strongly on national sovereignty and independence. The election marks a decision between European-cooperative security integration and a nationalist approach prioritising strategic autonomy.

After two terms in office, the incumbent President Andrzej Duda is not allowed to run for re-election. Current polls show three promising candidates. A run-off is to be expected, as an absolute majority is required in the first round of voting. The supporter of the Tusk government is the pro-European liberal-conservative Rafał Trzaskowski – mayor of Warsaw since 2018 and narrowly defeated by Duda in the 2020 election. Meanwhile, a national-conservative bloc has coalesced around Karol Nawrocki and Konfederacja’s right-wing populist candidate Sławomir Mentzen. The security policy ideas of these candidates reflect different concepts and fundamental approaches: Trzaskowski relies on close cooperation with the EU and NATO, advocates an increase in defence spending and emphasises the importance of constitutional and democratic oversight of the police and intelligence services. He also advocates the depoliticisation of security institutions and a strengthening of multilateral cooperation. Nawrocki, on the other hand, pursues a national conservative stance that relies on a strong, sovereign state with an independent defence policy and a critical distance to the European Union. Finally, Mentzen propagates a libertarian, isolationist approach, rejects further integration into European security structures and calls for a reduction in defence spending and the withdrawal of Polish troops from abroad.

Security policy has been a very high priority in Poland since its official independence in 1991. This is due to the country’s difficult past, the latent threat from Russia and the border with the exclave of Kaliningrad. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has massively changed Poland’s threat perception and reignited old fears. Defence spending increased from 2.4% to 4.7% of GDP (2022-2025). The budget for the current year amounts to around USD 45 billion, with a significant proportion going towards modernisation measures and border security. This places Poland at the top of NATO in terms of defence spending relative to GDP. As Ukraine’s neighbour, Poland also forms the logistical backbone of Western military assistance to Kyiv. Poland has thus established itself as the security policy hub of NATO’s eastern flank. Poland has so far provided over 600 million US dollars in military aid to Ukraine, with an estimated 80% of military donations to Ukraine having passed through Polish territory. This role is complemented by the permanent stationing of allied troops in Poland, including a multinational brigade under US command, the headquarters of the US 5th Army Corps in Poznań and the missile defence base in Redzikowo.

In Poland, effective policymaking in defence and security largely depends on cooperation between the president and the government. The president has far-reaching powers, including the veto power and supreme command of the armed forces. Depending on the political orientation, this can become an instrument of co-operation or blockade. In both political camps, the terms ‘security’ and ‘defence’ are highly ideologically charged.  The national-conservative forces associate them primarily with border protection, cultural homogeneity and state authority. The pro-European liberal camp associates it with the democratic control of security organisations, international cooperation and social resilience. The presidential election will therefore not only decide on personnel issues, but also on the institutional capacity to act in key areas of security policy.

In light of growing geopolitical uncertainty and possible shifts in transatlantic relations, the Polish presidential election is gaining additional relevance in terms of security policy. The European security architecture is coming under increasing pressure. As a militarily strong player on NATO’s eastern flank and a reliable partner within the EU, Poland is of central importance. The previous domestic political deadlock between the president and the government has made security policy action more difficult and hindered coordination at the European level. An election victory for Rafał Trzaskowski would open up the possibility of a more coherent foreign policy line and closer coordination with the government – which in turn could strengthen the EU’s ability to act in the security field. While national fragmentation could jeopardise European security, experts believe that in the long term a coordinated Polish approach could contribute to stabilisation and burden-sharing within the alliance.

Advisory – Burkina Faso Foils Coup Plot (23 April 2025)

Advisory – Burkina Faso Foils Coup Plot (23 April 2025)

Summary

On 21 April 2025, Burkina Faso’s military government announced that it had foiled what it termed a “major plot” to overthrow junta leader Captain Ibrahim Traoré, with the army alleging that the coup plotters were based in neighbouring Ivory Coast. According to Security Minister Mahamadou Sana, the coup attempt was led by current and former soldiers working with “terrorist leaders,” adding that the intention was to attack the presidential palace last week. Speaking on state television on Monday 21 April, Sana disclosed that the aim of the plan was to “sow total chaos, and place the country under the supervision of an international organization.” The Ivory Coast has yet to comment on the claims, though tensions between the two countries have been on the rise in recent months.

Background

Reports, which first emerged on Monday 21 April, indicate that the coup had been planned for Wednesday 16 April. Reports indicate that several communications between a Burkinabé Armed Forces officer and terrorist leaders were intercepted, according to Sana, who disclosed that the investigation subsequently revealed “a major conspiracy” against the West African country. According to Sana, the coup plotters attempted to use Burkinabé religious and traditional leaders in a bid to sway army officers into backing the plan. Sana disclosed that “the manoeuvre was to culminate, according to the terrorist plotters’ plan, on Wednesday 16 April, 2025, in an assault on the presidency of (Burkina) Faso by a group of soldiers recruited by the nation’s enemies.” He went on to say that “the brains outside the country are all located in Ivory Coast, as he named in particular two former army officers believed to be behind the plot. Officer Abdramane Barry, serving in the military justice battalion, has been accused of providing sensitive information “to terrorists.” According to Sana, this information concerned the positions of the internal security forces, the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), and military operations “in order to intensify the attacks,” with the aim of sparking a revolt against Burkinabé authorities.

Security sources have reported that last week, several military personnel, including two officers, were arrested for planning to “destabilise” the Burkinabé government. Others however remain on the run and are presumed to be in Côte d’Ivoire. Sana claimed on Monday that “all the masterminds who have fled the country have been identified in Côte d’Ivoire, including Abdramane Barry, and the plot is actively continuing from their operations centre in Abidjan.”

Ivorian authorities have so far not commented on the allegations that it hosted the plotters, though the Burkinabé junta has previously blamed Ivory Coast of supporting its opponents in exile. Additionally, the latest allegations of a coup come just months after Ouagadougou said that it had thwarted another “destabilization” plot against the junta last November.

Advisory

Tensions in Burkina Faso are likely to remain elevated over the coming days as additional information pertaining to the coup plot comes to light. Security is likely to remain elevated on the ground, particularly in Ouagadougou and in and around sensitive locations including the airport, government buildings and embassies, and the presidential palace. Should the security situation deteriorate, or additional threats emerge, travel into and out of the country could be temporarily suspended. This includes the closure of borders and an interruption of operations at the main airport in Ouagadougou. There currently is an elevated risk of further fractures within the Burkinabé army and the gendarmerie, which may become apparent in the coming days and weeks. Any fractures within these entities could impact morale. On the ground, terrorist organizations operating in Burkina Faso could use the current situation to their advantage by launching attacks and raids on various locations. This may include targeting fixed positions, including within the capital city, as well as carrying out ambushes on supply convoys. This situation could also lead to an elevated risk of kidnap particularly of expats and Westerners operating in the country. Since the beginning of this year, expat kidnappings have taken place in Agadez, Niger, highlighting that the threat of kidnap remains significant in the wider West African region, including in Burkina Faso. Terrorist organizations operating in this wider region continue to have the capabilities and drive to target foreigners for kidnap, and the networks for moving and command and control remain entwined regionally across the AES states and beyond. In the event that the overall security conditions in Burkina Faso deteriorate further, or if there is a major event including a terrorist attack, it is not expected that government forces will be necessarily cohesive in their initial response. Additionally, western agencies and diplomatic missions are unlikely to have any meaningful influence in an early response.

Those currently operating in Burkina Faso, including mining companies and NGOs, are advised to keep up to date to the evolving situation. Companies should account for personnel and are advised to review their internal and international travel for the coming days. Any companies who are using host nation forces in direct support are advised to review tasking needs and to be able to quickly adapt and respond to interruptions of available forces. In the event of a further deterioration of the security situation, including any major terrorist attacks, those operating in Burkina Faso are advised to self-secure and adjust their operational tempos accordingly to the uncertainty that may play out in the coming days. Within the capital Ouagadougou, demonstrations in support of the junta and against could occur in the coming days. Such protests could turn violent with little warning and those operating in the capital and in other major cities across the country are advised to avoid them. While these perils are not new, and those operating in Burkina Faso have had a continuous hazard to mitigate and adapt to, it remains to be seen whether conditions on the ground will ease in the coming days and calm will be restored or if any residual problems arise.

Cargo Ship causes destruction in the North Sea

Key Judgements

• On the 10^th of March a cargo ship struck an oil tanker in the North Sea
• One crew member went missing and was presumed dead, while the rest of the crew were rescued
• No cause has been found for the collision, but several possibilities exist, including Russian sabotage
• Environmental damage from the collision on nearby beaches and waters is being assessed and monitored

Context

The Stena Immaculate, a US-flagged tanker, had been anchored before making its way to Hull from a Greek port with the goal of transporting jet fuel for the US military. The tanker had been carrying 220,000 barrels of jet fuel when it was struck. Jet fuel is toxic and if ingested can kill marine organisms, which can then become harmful to seabirds that feed on them.

The Solong cargo ship had been making its way south to Rotterdam in the Netherlands from Grangemouth in Scotland. Amongst the crew of the Solong were Russians and Filipinos. The collision took place about 13 miles (20km) off the East Yorkshire coast, near Hull and Grimsby, in a busy shipping area.

The UK is responsible for responding to marine pollution up to 200 nautical miles from land, with a specialist coastguard team expected to lead the effort.

Timeline

On the 10^th of March, the Stena Immaculate, a US-flagged tanker, was anchored and drifting at a speed of 0.1 knots at 09:48 GMT. The Portuguese flagged cargo ship, the Solong, struck the larger oil tanker in waters off Hull just before 10:00am at around 16 knots (around 18mph). According to crew on the Stena and the Solong, the tanker came out of nowhere and those on board had seconds to react when the impact happened. After the Solong crashed, the crew on board the Stena tried to fight the fires by triggering a crucial firefighting system but realised it was futile and chose to abandon ship. They grabbed their essential belongings from their cabins and, after everyone was accounted for, boarded the lifeboat together. The captain was the final person to leave the ship with the whole process taking about 30 minutes. By the evening the search for the final Solong crew member, a Filipino national Mark Angelo Pernia aged 38, was called off after an extensive search by the coastguard. A total of 36 crew members from both vessels were brought back to shore. One person was taken to hospital.

On the 11^th of March, the ship’s captain, a 59-year-old Russian national called Vladimir Motin was arrested on suspicion of gross negligence manslaughter.

By the 12^th of March, the Solong was still on fire while the fire at the oil tanker had been extinguished. By the afternoon, the fire on the Solong had diminished but was still emitting smoke and the occasional report of flame. The Solong had separated from the Stena and drifted south while marine firefighters dealt with the fire. Chief Coastguard Paddy O’Callaghan said in a statement in the evening that aerial surveillance flights “have not indicated any pollution on the surface of the water attributable to either of the casualty vessels”.

After the accident, the owner Ernst Russ and co-owner Stena Bulk confirmed the ship was safe at anchor and they would decide what to do with it. An exclusion zone of 1km was put in place around both vessels. The UK transport secretary said the Maritime Accidental Investigation Branch would begin a preliminary assessment of the crash, but early indications suggested both vessels were not expected to sink.

On the 15^th of March Vladimir Motin appeared at Hull Magistrates Court and was charged with gross negligence manslaughter. He was remanded in custody to appear before the Central Criminal Court in London on 14 April. He was charged early at the Old Bailey with gross negligence manslaughter and is due to stand trial in January 2026.

A week after the Solong collided with the oil tanker was still burning.

On the 28^th of March, the Solong was towed to Aberdeen at around 7am for “safe berthing” and a damage assessment. The Solong was accompanied by a vessel with counter-pollution measures. Owners of the cargo vessel Ernst Russ said the Solong will be assessed by specialist marine assessors and insurers in Aberdeen.

Afterwards, 200,000 barrels of jet fuel were removed from the oil tanker salvage teams transferred the fuel to the Fure Vyl, another tanker.

Possible Cause of the incident

It is still unclear what caused the collision. Humberside Police have stared a criminal probe into the cause of the collision and will work with the UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch. So far, the maritime security sources have found no evidence of any malicious activity.

Although there are suspicions of Russian sabotage. The fact the tanker was carrying jet fuel in support of the US Department of Defence cooperates this viewpoint. Although the incident has not impacted operations or combat readiness Russia has been conducting a “shadow fleet” across the Baltic and North Sea over the last couple months. It is possible to link this ship collision as previous shadow vessels have been linked to a series of suspected sabotage incidents damaging energy and communication infrastructure, including underseas cables, in the Baltic Sea.

According to the chief executive of the port of Grimsby East, Martyn Boyers, the area had been “very foggy” on the morning of the 10^th of March, this could have contributed to visibility issues. This is cooperated by a rescuer who said the fog was so thick during the initial search the crews could “not see a thing”.

The Solong cargo ship also had several safety and technical issues in the months leading up to the incident. Inspection documents from 2024 show warnings the ship’s compass reading and passion communications were “not readable.” This was amongst 10 issues highlighted by Irish inspection officials. Other problems included the alarms being “inadequate”, survival craft not being properly maintained and fire doors being “not as required.”  Another inspection in Scotland in October 2024 found two issues including that the lifebuoys were “not properly marked.” Ernst Russ said: “All deficiencies that were detected during routine port state control inspections of the Solong back in 2024 were promptly rectified”. However, it is possible that some of these safety issues were background factors in the crash, especially that ship’s compass readings being inaccurate as these would have related to the position of the Stena, without these issues its possible the two ships colliding could have been prevented.

Impact of the Incident

Early assessment suggests the amount of environmental damage has been minimal. The amount  of fuel released into the sea is limited with some fuel having burnt off and evaporated. Air quality tests measured on the 13^th of March, registered no toxins. Afterward the initial incident the Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) said there had been no further reports of pollution form either vessel. However, the extent of the risk will depend on how much fuel has leaked out and the speed at which authorities contain the spill. It also depends on natural conditions, such as how quickly bacteria can break down the liquid. Local wildlife trusts have warned of the impact on local habitats and species including threatened seabird colonies, grey seals, harbour porpoises, fish and minke whales. Solong’s owners said they had a team engaged with local authorities and would work with clean-up teams to mitigate further impacts on the marine environment. The clean-up is likely to be difficult, time consuming and require investment in heavy equipment, whilst need to happen as soon as possible to minimise impact.

Following the collision, thousands of plastic pellets used in plastics production, known as nurdles, were released from ruptured containers on the Solong and began washing up on beaches on the Norfolk coast. According to conservationists, the nurdles are not toxic but can harm animals if ingested. King’s Lynn and West Norfolk Council said it had begun removing the nurdles, focusing initially on the stretch of beaches between Holme-next-the-Sea and Old Hunstanton.

Romanian Presidential Election

Romania’s presidential elections will be held again on 4 and 18 May 2025. The Constitutional Court annulled the original vote of November 2024 on 6 December, citing foreign interference and irregularities. Independent candidate Călin Georgescu, a nationalist and EU and NATO sceptic, had won a relative majority in the first round. On 9 March 2025, Georgescu was barred from running in the new elections by the Central Election Commission. A new ruling cited his inability to uphold democratic values, referring to previous rulings by the Constitutional Court. This sparked national protests and demonstrations and attracted international attention. Supporters view it as a triumph of militant democracy, while critics accuse the institutions of electoral manipulation.

Following the commission’s decision clashes between his supporters and police broke out. The decision was later upheld by the Constitutional Court. Virtually unknown before the election, Georgescu was a former senior civil servant. He rose to prominence through a coordinated social media strategy and illegal and undeclared payments to social media influencers. In the days leading up to the vote, approximately 25,000 previously inactive TikTok accounts began amplifying his content, helping it go viral. According to the Romanian intelligence service, the election was also targeted by roughly 85,000 cyberattacks on the country’s electoral IT infrastructure, with Russia allegedly responsible. The Kremlin denies these allegations, although Georgescu’s positions are clearly in line with Russian strategic interests. He is known for his far-right nationalist views, his opposition to continued aid to Ukraine and his advocacy of distancing Romania from Western alliances. These positions made him a highly polarizing figure both domestically and internationally. After the annulment, he received vocal support from prominent U.S. figures including Vice President J.D. Vance and businessman Elon Musk. Georgescu was able to appeal to rural areas, foreign Romanians and those disillusioned with politics. He was successful in exploiting the broad social divide between the urban and the rural, the educated and the marginalised, modern values and traditional identity. This divide will continue to shape the dynamics of the election.

George Simion, the leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), has emerged as Georgescus successor, seeking to inherit his electoral base. Simion, a 38-year-old nationalist and outspoken critic of the political establishment, shares Georgescu’s anti-system rhetoric and nationalist positions. Despite the similarities, he lacks the media reach and momentum of his predecessor. While polls suggest he could lead in the first round, analysts question whether his support is broad or mobilizable enough to ensure a second round victory. Meanwhile, Bucharest mayor Nicușor Dan has emerged as the leading reformist candidate, running as an independent and attracting support from the centre-right, including former PNL and USR voters. Known for his technocratic style and focus on anti-corruption and urban governance, Dan benefits from a reputation as a political outsider. Crin Antonescu, the candidate of the ruling coalition (PSD, PNL, UDMR), relies on party infrastructure but faces internal resistance and lacks public enthusiasm. Recent polls suggest that Dan would defeat both Simion and Antonescu in a run-off, making him the current frontrunner in a polarised political climate.

Beyond the candidates, the state of democratic institutions in Romania remains the other key issue. Trust in the state, its institutions and the political system has declined in recent years. This is due to repeated government changes, persistent instability and the absence of meaningful reform. In addition, many voters believe that corruption, nepotism and abuse of power are widespread. Although the Constitutional Court justified Georgescu’s exclusion on the grounds of protecting constitutional values, critics argue that it introduced a new and controversial interpretation of the Romanian constitution. Under the new ruling, candidates were judged on their “democratic commitment”. This broke with long-standing legal precedent. Although intelligence reports cited Russian influence in the annulment, no hard evidence was made public. This has led to accusations that the court acted in the interests of certain political forces, particularly the ruling coalition. As a result, some see the decision not as a defence of democracy, but as a strategic use of legal mechanisms to engineer a preferred election outcome. This perception reinforces conspiracy thinking, deepens institutional distrust and fuels the belief that the state protects the elite from the people rather than representing them.

In democratic systems, unlike authoritarian regimes, even extreme or system-critical candidates must be tolerated, making them more vulnerable to internal and external manipulation. Georgescu benefited from this openness. While the cancellation of the election and his exclusion were legally justified, they moved within a legally and politically ambiguous space—and are perceived by parts of the population as politically motivated. This perception reinforces conspiracy narratives, deepens distrust in state institutions, and intensifies social polarisation. Romania faces the challenge of defending democratic principles without further eroding public trust. To do so, it must strengthen transparency and define clear standards for political candidacy. Investments in cybersecurity are needed to protect elections from digital interference. Combating disinformation requires greater efforts in media literacy and civic education. At the same time, reforms in the judiciary and public administration remain essential. Romania is not alone in facing such hybrid threats. In the long run, only strong and resilient democracies can serve as reliable partners within Europe.

Implications of the Italian Spyware Scandal

Key Judgements

• Allegations that the Italian government used its technology to hack into the phones of criticis, using technology from the Israeli Spyware maker, Paragon Solutions
• Most of the individuals targeted have expressed criticism of the Melloni Italian administration
• The Paragon case has raised questions by opposition parties about citizens’ democratic rights and laws surrounding wiretapping in Italy
• The Meloni government continue to deny any involvement with the hacking operation but suspended its contract with Paragon Solutions

Context

Paragon Solutions, an Israeli spyware company, has a flagship product known as “Graphite”, which can be used to gain complete access to a target’s phone. Paragon claims to sell its technology exclusively to “a select group of global democracies, primarily the United States and its allies.”  The company is a competitor to NSO group, which manufactures a similar spyware product called “Pegasus”.

Timeline

During a meeting on the week of the 3^rd of February with Copasir, the parliamentary committee for the intelligence services, Giovanni Caravelli, Aise’s chief, admitted the agency had used the Paragon spyware but not to monitor journalists or activists.

The Italian government confirmed in a statement on the 5^th of February 2025 that 7 mobile phone users in the country had been hacked, calling the incident “particularly serious”, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s office denied any involvement and asked Italy’s National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN) to investigate it.

On the 6^th of February, Fanpage director Francesco Cancellato, Mediterranea Saving Humans mission chief Luca Casarini, David Yambio, spokesperson for Refugees in Libya and Husam El Gomati, a  Sweden-based Libyan activist all received warnings from Meta that their devices had been “compromised by a high-level spyware operation using one of the most sophisticated surveillance tools available.” Meta’s WhatsApp chat service alleged that spyware was used to target 90 WhatsApp users in two dozen countries. The Italian government said they were told by WhatsApp that those targeted had phone numbers with prefixes from countries including Spain, Portugal, Greece, Sweden, Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Targeted individuals were sent a “zero-click hack”, a malicious document that required no user interaction to compromise the device.

The Italian government issued a statement saying a total of 90 individuals across 14 EU countries have been targeted in violation of established engagement rules and 7 cases have been confirmed in Italy so far. Additionally, the European Commission spokesperson Markus Lammert said national authorities would be responsible for probing these allegations, not the EU executive. She did note that in general, “any attempt to illegally access the data of citizens, including journalists and political opponents, is unacceptable if proven.” On the same day, Paragon Solutions terminated its relationship with clients in Italy including an intelligence agency and law enforcement agency, “out of an abundance of caution” following initial allegations of potential misuse. The contract did not allow for journalists or members of civil society to be targeted.

On the 7^th of February, the Italian intelligence agency, Asie revealed it had suspended its contract with Paragon pending investigations. The former Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, said those responsible must be held to account.

On the 12^th of February, the Ministry for Parliamentary Relations Luca Ciriani refuted the claims of the government spying on journalists and said the government would take legal action against any accusers. On the same day, Undersecretary to the Prime Minister, Alfreado Mantovano stated if there had been any misuse it fell under judicial authorities, and they were awaiting the outcome of investigations by the parliamentary intelligence oversight committee and the National Cybersecurity Agency (Agnenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale).

On the 18^th of February Sandro Rutolo, a Democratic Party MEP, said “This is one of the most serious attacks on the rule of law in Europe” adding “We want to know which countries have illegally spied on their citizens, why, and how we can protect European citizens”. He sent a letter signed by opposition forces in Italy to the European Parliament President, requesting an inquiry committee.  He also raised the issue at a hearing in the European Parliament’s civil liberties committee, noted in attendance was European Commissioner of Technological Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen. On the same day, the president of the Italian parliament signed a document involving a rule allowing the government to refrain from responding to questions related to the scandal, claiming that “all unclassified information has already been shared” and any other details were under secrecy rules.

On the 19^th of February, Italy’s national union for journalists (FNSI) a criminal complaint in response to this decision.  The secretary general, Alessandra Costante said  “We want clarity, we want journalists to be able to do their job without the risk of being intercepted. We’re dealing with facts that not only violate the criminal code but the constitution itself. It is also extremely serious that the government has decided not to report to parliament.” The Order of Journalists and the FNSI also announced legal action, calling on the Italian public prosecutor’s office in Rome to seek clarification about the wiretapping of an Italian journalist.

Analysis

Most of the individuals in Italy who were involved were linked by criticism towards the current administration and Prime Minister Meloni. Cancellato’s outlet had published two major investigations into Giorgia Meloni’s party over the past year including a high-profile investigation that exposed young fascists within Meloni’s party. Casarini engaged in sea rescue operations for migrants through a non-government organisation. He was critical of Italy’s alleged complicity in abuses suffered by migrants in Libya. The Meloni government has vowed to cut arrivals to Italy’s shores. El Gomati had been critical of the Italian and Libyan governments’ activities against immigrants in the Mediterranean Sea.

The Italian government denied any suspicion of Paragon and then suspended their contract the next day, this raises questions about their involvement in the hacking operation. Additionally, the refusal to answer questions in parliament makes them appear afraid of revealing information.

If the Italian government were involved in the Paragon case it raises questions about the rights of their citizens and the rule of law within Italy as it would represent a severe constitutional breach of democratic rights.

What happens next?

According to Italian law preventive wiretaps may be conducted by intelligence agencies or the police but only if the targeted individuals are a serious danger to the national and economic security of the nation. These measures can be used before a crime has been committed.  This authorisation rests with the prime minister, interior minister or justice minister. In the aftermath of the Paragon case, this legal framework will likely be changed due to pressure from opposition political parties. Members of the Five Star Movement (M5S) have already raised concerns about this case and the protection of privacy and the freedom of the press.