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Failed Coup in Guinea-Bissau (2 Feb 2022)

Guinea-Bissau’s President Umaro Sissoco Embalo survived an attempted coup on Tuesday 1 February, though he said that many members of the security forces had been killed repelling an attack on democracy that may have been linked to drug trafficking. Heightened security is likely to persist in Guinea-Bissau through at least mid-February after the foiled coup attempt against President Embalo’s government. Official government sources indicate that at least six people – four attackers and two guards – were killed and several others were injured during gunfire exchanges near the Government Palace in the capital, Bissau.

Earlier in the day, heavy gunfire rang out near a government compound where the president was chairing a meeting. The situation remained unclear for several hours, during which both the African Union (AU) and West African bloc ECOWAS condemned what they called “an attempted coup.” At around 17:20, military forces loyal to the Embalo government reportedly entered the Palace of Government and also deployed to several locations within the nation’s capital. They established a security perimeter around the palace, with troops also stationed near the Palace of Justice.

Appearing on Tuesday evening in a video posted on the presidency’s Facebook page, President Embalo stated that attackers had tried to enter the compound just after the cabinet meeting but had been repelled. He went on to say that “it wasn’t just a coup. It was an attempt to kill the president, the prime minister and all the cabinet,” adding that the attack “was well prepared and organized and could also be related to people involved in drug trafficking,” giving no further details. Guinea-Bissau is viewed by the United Nations as a major waypoint for Latin American cocaine headed for Europe. US and European authorities have long suspected that some in the country’s military are involved in the drug trade. During the video on Tuesday, President Embalo suggested that the army was not involved in the attack, stating, “I can assure you that no camp joined this attempted coup. It was isolated. It is linked to people we have fought against,” without elaborating. He also disclosed that arrests had begun of people involved, tough he did not disclose how many were detained. At around 10:00 on Tuesday morning, President Embalo had begun chairing an extraordinary cabinet meeting, entering the government palace with a heavy security detail, a diplomatic source reported. While he was present in the building, gunfire began outside. The cabinet meeting was being held to prepare for a forthcoming ECOWAS summit on 3 February in response to last week’s military takeover in Burkina Faso.

Advisory

Heightened security is likely to persist in Guinea-Bissau through at least mid-February after the foiled coup attempt against President Embalo’s government. Forces in Bissau are likely to maintain an elevated security posture until the situation stabilizes. Additional clashes between rival forces cannot currently be ruled out. Additional security measures, including checkpoints and random searches of vehicles and pedestrians may be carried out in the coming days. Authorities may also impose an overnight curfew, should the situation destabilize. Anyone currently in Guinea-Bissau should shelter in place, maintain close contact with their diplomatic representation, and adhere to all instructions issued by the local authorities. This includes possible curfew-related restrictions. Government buildings, security installations, large groupings of police and soldiers, and any demonstrations should be avoided.

Possible Coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau (1 Feb 2022)

Reports have emerged of a possible coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau. As of Tuesday 1 February evening, the situation in the country remains tense in the wake of an incident that occurred earlier in the day. This incident has been described by both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as an attempted coup. At around 15:00, shots and explosions were heard near the Government Palace in the capital, Bissau. The incident occurred as President Umaro Embalo was chairing a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Reports indicate that military forces have deployed to several locations of the capital city and have established a security perimeter around the Palace of Government and have stationed troops near the Palace of justice. Reports further indicate that the military may have entered the National Television station building, though these have not been verified. The situation in Guinea-Bissau remains fluid and the current whereabouts of President Embalo and Prime Minister Nuno Gomes Nabiam remain unclear.

Advisory

The situation is rapidly developing and MS Risk is currently closely monitoring events on the ground in Guinea-Bissau. Anyone currently in the country, including the capital city Bissau, is strongly advised to shelter in place, maintain close contact with their diplomatic representations, adhere to all instructions issued by the local authorities, including any possible curfew-related restrictions that could be imposed in the coming hours. Avoid government buildings, security installations, large concentrations of soldiers and police, and any demonstrations that may occur.  It is likely that security across the city will remain extremely tight in the coming hours. It is possible that local authorities could implement movement restrictions, which could potentially include curfews. Telecommunications could be restricted in the coming hours.

Revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: what will happen if diplomatic talks fail?

This report aims to talk about some potential consequences if diplomatic talks to reinstate the Iran Nuclear deal fail and how this could affect relationships between other global powers, mainly the United State and Iran, and the impact behind the likelihood of imposed sanctions upon Iran should talks collapse. Negotiations remain at a stalemate with neither side willing to compromise their national interests, despite countries maintaining that this deal is the best framework to address this situation.

In accordance with the JCPOA, signed by Iran and the P5 + 1, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to lift crippling economic sanctions if Iran agreed to limiting its nuclear activities and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unrestricted access to its factories with regular inspection. It also aimed at reducing much of Iran’s regional influence and moreover, relieve regional tensions between fellow rivals Israel and Saudi Arabia.

In 2018, under the then-Trump administration, the United States had abandoned the deal and reinstated economic sanctions, claiming the deal failed in its aims and so initiated a pressure campaign hoping that Iran would negotiate a deal that would further limit their ballistic capabilities. Following the re-imposition of sanctions Iran has begun stockpiling uranium beyond the levels agreed in the deal, while also developing centrifuges, increasing its acceleration of uranium enrichment.

President Biden expressed his desire to re-join the deal last year; but the US and Iran have since remained in indirect negotiations to revive the JCPOA with talks repeatedly faltering. Tehran remains sceptical of the US’ ability to provide sanctions that would be of viable economic benefit and want a binding treaty, which realistically cannot be guaranteed for the following future administrations nor would be passed in Senate. On the other hand, Washington is questioning whether they can secure the deal’s previous non-proliferation demands, following Iran’s significant nuclear development. Talks are rapidly reaching a decision point as Iran’s continued HEU growth will eventually become unattainable under the JCPOA.

There is a consensus that this deal presents the ideal framework to tackle this issue, but allied countries have since been thinking of alternate plans should talks fail, such as full implementation of sanctions to military operations, which would impair Iran’s nuclear program. These all present drawbacks that are otherwise unfavourable in the long term.

If talks were to fail, it is very likely that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will receive full support to reimplement full sanctions against Iran, despite the US having already done so without UNSC backing. However, the impact of this is arguable as Iran has since continued trading with other countries, such as China and Russia, regardless of the imposed sanctions. China and Iran have also signed an agreement bolstering economic ties between them. The sanctions therefore may not be as effective if such a trade continues. It is not within China and Russia’s interests to have a power with unchecked nuclear capability nor is it clear how willing the countries are to risk their own global trade to ally themselves with Iran. Consequently, relations are being strained over this potentiality.

Regardless of sanctions, it is also unlikely that Iran will be hindered from continuing with their nuclear programs. They have repeatedly insisted that their program is not for weapons applications, but this is impossible to confirm as with the end of the deal, Iran would likely never allow the IAEA to inspect their facilities, thereby providing them the opportunity of plausible deniability. However, it is unlikely that the US or other countries would dismiss the potentiality of Iran gaining a nuclear weapon and is likely to take military action to prevent this.

Regionally, Israel has mentioned and is gearing for a possible military confrontation if talks are unsuccessful. Iran and Israel have maintained a tenuous relationship and remains on shaky ground amidst the possible negotiations; Israel has remained uncompromising in its position that the JCPOA is too lenient and has tried to push away from negotiations, claiming them as fruitless. Tensions continue to rise with military exercises taking place in Iran in a blatant intimidation in response to talks between the US and Israel defence chiefs concerning possible military exercises in a worst-case scenario. Thus, it is likely that there will be an escalation of conflict, which will result in the rest of region being embroiled in conflict.

An ideal outcome for the west would be a return to the JCPOA but this seems unlikely given the harsh sanctions already implemented by the United States; they will not remove them unless Iran concedes. A compromise with both moderate sanction relief and moderate nuclear compromise, otherwise known as a ‘less-for-less’ deal, is the approach that Iran hopes for, but this would receive heavy criticism from the west.

Ethiopia Situation update (27 Jan 2022)

Despite security issues in East Africa centring around common themes and issues, by far the biggest threat to regional peace and stability remains in Ethiopia. This remains true for the end of 2021. There have however been several important shifts in the power dynamic in the ongoing war which has been fought for well over a year.

It is our judgement that several major identifiable factors have contributed to a recent shift in momentum, favouring the Ethiopian National army of the Abiy Ahmed regime (ENDF) in their war with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Abstract

By mid-November 2021, through a combination of protracted bush fighting and guerrilla tactics, the TPLF had taken (amongst others) two key strategic cities in Afar and Amhara regions. Tactically this this likely provided the TPLF with capability to launch an attack on Addis Ababa. The towns of Dessie and Kombolcha sat either side of the A2 highway. The A2 is the main arterial route between north and south Ethiopia and links Ethiopia with Eritrea and Djibouti. It is and remains vital for fuel, food aid and any movement of troops. Whilst in control of these positions, the TPLF refused to return over two hundred food aid trucks which would have been suitable for troop transport. It is our assessment that these factors increased the threat of the Tigrayan leadership mobilising their forces on Addis Ababa. Until early December the ENDF showed no demonstrable indication they were able to provide effective opposition.

The Current situation

On the 5^th of December, both Ethiopian news sources and trusted 3^rd party  outlets reported that ENDF had successfully retaken Dessie and Kombolcha from the TPLF. This was later confirmed by the official communication channels of the TPLF, referring to a “strategic repositioning”. In the TPLF retreat several UN food aid depots, local business, dry docks and homes were raided and emptied. These were coupled with widely reported cases of extreme sexual violence and non-judicial executions. After losing these positions, The TPLF were pushed back further into northern territories before losing another key position, the city of Lalibela. The loss of the three positions represented a huge reduction in any pre-established capability of the TPLF following through on their initial plans to capture Adidis Ababa and remove Abiy Ahmed.

As of late January, the TPLF have gone into full retreat and no longer occupy Amhara or Affar regions, with all troops now back inside Tigrayan state borders. The ENDF have been ordered to halt any counter operations and have stopped at the Tigrayan border. It is our best judgement that this provides the first and most significant opportunity for peace talks in a country with millions of people in desperate need of food assistance. Tigrayan Leader Debretsion Gebremicahel has stated his intention to use the change in the power dynamic as a catalyst for diplomatic talks.

Contributing Factors and Key Assessments

Ethiopia has been highly closed off to reporting during the past 14 months, it is however possible to make some assessment as to the nature of the TPLF retreat and defeat. Open Source satellite imagery analysis first reported by Al Jazeera and confirmed by the US state department has shown an airbridge of private charter flights originating in the UAE performing frequent weapons deliveries to Addis Ababa. The jets, which are chartered privately through 3^rdparty nations have been confirmed to be carrying Chinese, Iranian and Turkish UAV equipment and weapons. We judge that the timing of these deliveries in relation to the resurgence of the ENDF is likely too significant to ignore.

Further assessment of the nature of the two belligerents likely indicates the lack in TPLF ability to conduct conventional warfare against a standing state force. With years of guerrilla and bush war experience, their capture of the towns pointed to success in rural conflict zones, but an in ability to hold strategic cities so far from their central command and control structure.

As of the ICOD, neither side has commenced meaningful talks, but hostilities on the ground appear to have cooled off. It should be noted that Tigrayan state media and government communications is still reporting daily government drone activity in Tigray. But at this time, it is not possible to fully confirm the validity of these claims.

Burkina Faso Coup

During the afternoon hours on Monday 24 January, Burkina Faso’s army ended growing speculation about the events of the previous 24 hours and announced that it had ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. The army also announced that the country’s constitution had been suspended, that the government was dissolved, that national air and land borders were closed and that a curfew (2100 – 0500) will be in place until a new order. The announcement followed hours of confusion after gunfire erupted at army camps on Sunday night. The former president has not been seen since Sunday and his whereabouts currently remain unknown.

MPSR & Damiba

The military takeover statement was made in the name of a previously unknown entity, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR). On Monday, it announced that the “MPSR, which includes all sections of the army, has decided to end President Kaboré’s post today.” It cited the deterioration of the security situation in the country and what it described as Kaboré’s inability to unite the nation and ineffective response to the challenges it faces.

Meanwhile a lieutenant appointed to oversee security in Ouagadougou has emerged as the leader of the military coup. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba was presented as the president of the MPSR. The 41-year-old Damiba had been promoted in December 2021 by ousted leader Kaboré to commander of Burkina Faso’s third military region in what some viewed as an effort by the president to shore up support within the army. The appointment to the strategic position came in the wake of the November attack on a gendarmerie post in the northern town of Inata, which killed 49 military officers and four civilians. Reports that troops had gone without food rations for two weeks had sparked anti-government protests and calls for Kaboré to step down. In his new post, Damiba proceeded to reorganize the military ranks, appointing new officers to key roles with the declared intent of battling the uprising. While Kaboré has been faulted by the army for the rising rebel violence, Damiba has sought to present himself as an expert in countering terrorism. He studied at a military academy in Paris, France, and obtained a Master’s degree in criminal sciences from the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers. In June, he published a book titled West African Armies and Terrorism: Uncertain Responses? in which he analysed anti-terrorism strategies in the Sahel region and their limits. Between 1987 – 2011, Damiba had been part of the Regiment of Presidential Security (RPS) of former president Blaise Compaore. Once Compaore was overthrown in 2014, after hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in protest at plans to extend his rule, the unit was dissolved by the transitional government, in a move that caused resentment amongst some officers. Reports indicate that Damiba resigned from the RPS in 2011 following a wave of protests and a violent army mutiny. He was later posted to the north-eastern town of Dori as Commander of the 11^th Infantry Commando Regiment (RIC) and to the northern town of Ouahigouya as Commander of the 12^th RIC. In 2015, he and other officers took part in an attempted coup that briefly deposed the transitional government. Burkinabé media indicate that Damiba later testified in the trial of conspirators behind the coup. Following the coup in 2015, Damiba left the country to pursue further military studies, though details of his time abroad remain limited. Upon his return, he took the leadership of the 30^th RCAS, a regiment tasked with supporting Burkina Faso’s’ counter-terrorism strategy. On 3 December, ousted president Kaboré entrusted Damiba with protecting Ouagadougou from the threats posed by a religious rebellion. There are reports that Monday’s coup began as a mutiny at a military base hosting a prison where some of the key military figures that were involved in the 2015 coup attempt are imprisoned.

Regional & International Reactions

In the wake of this past weekend’s events, the African Union and the West African bloc ECOWAS earlier on Monday both condemned what they called an attempted coup. The United States and the European Union have also called for Kaboré’s “immediate release.” He is currently being held at an army base. On the ground however, more than 1,000 people gathered in the main square (Place de la Nation) in Ouagadougou on Monday to celebrate the coup, with some burning the French flag while others dancing as live music played. The burning of the French flag is the latest sign of the growing frustration about the former colonial power’s military role in the region.

As of Tuesday 25 January, French President Emmanuel Macron has disclosed that the situation in Burkina Faso appears to be calm as he condemned the coup, and said that ousted President Kaboré was in good health and not being threatened. The governing party in Burkina Faso meanwhile has reported that what began as an army mutiny is rapidly evolving into a coup. In a statement on Monday, the People’s Movement for Progress disclosed that President Kaboré and a government minister had survived assassination attempts.

While in its announcement on Monday, the army indicated that a return to democracy would be swift, it remains to be seen in the coming days and weeks what the transitional period will look like. For the moment, ECOWAS has not made any announcements on possible repercussions that those behind the coup could face. However, given the fact that it imposed economic sanctions on Mali and Guinea in the wake of those respective coups, it is likely that similar moves will be made in the coming days.

Current Situation

On Tuesday 25 January, celebratory gatherings occurred in Ouagadougou, with participants gathering in support of the military takeover made on behalf of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguarding and Restoration (MPSR). Despite the latest turmoil, life in Ouagadougou seemed to continue as normal on Tuesday, with the city’s main market, shops and petrol station open. The troop presence appears to be mainly army, with the gendarmerie being less visible. While initially, the ruling military had closed Burkina Faso’s air and land borders, on Tuesday, it announced the resumption of air traffic while reopening land borders for vehicles carrying humanitarian, military and essential goods. As of Tuesday morning, mobile internet appears to have been restored, a move that has been welcomed by the populace. The 2100 – 0500 curfew remains in place until further notice.

Advisory

An increased security presence is likely in the coming hours and days across the country, notably in the capital Ouagadougou. Associated localized transport, commercial and telecommunications disruptions are also likely to persist. Further flight disruptions are likely and officials may suspend international travel and or close borders in response to the latest developments. Checkpoints across Ouagadougou may also be set up. Protests either in support or in opposition to the recent developments could also occur in major cities nationwide. Anyone planning to travel to Burkina Faso is advised to avoid all non-essential travel until the situation stabilizes. In the event that travel is necessary, reconfirm transport services, including flights, before departure. Persons currently in the country are advised to shelter in place and to maintain close contact with their diplomatic representation. Individuals should ensure that they have enough supplies for the next several days and should limit travel both within Ouagadougou and outside of the capital. Avoid government buildings, security installations, large concentrations of police and soldiers, or any protests that may materialize. Heed all instructions by the local authorities – remain courteous and cooperative if approached and questioned by security personnel.

With much of the focus now concentrating on the political situation in Burkina Faso, jihadists groups operating in the country may use this period to launch attacks both in major cities across the country and rural areas as a mechanism to instil further fear amongst the local populations. Attacks could be indiscriminate and could affect Burkinabé security forces, religious sites, restaurants, schools, markets and places frequented by foreigners. Anyone currently in Burkina Faso is advised to maintain heightened vigilance at all times.