Tag Archives: United States

Islamic State has Lost Territory in Iraq and Syria This Year

According to a defense consultancy, the so-called Islamic State (IS) group has lost 12% of the territory it controlled in Iraq and Syria in the first half of this year.

IHS has found that the “caliphate,” which was proclaimed by IS two years ago, has shrunk to 68,300 sq km (26,370 sq miles). According to IHS, in January 2015, just six months after IS declared the creation of a caliphate, the terror group controlled some 90,800 sq km of Iraq and Syria, adding that by December, that had shrunk by 12,800 sq km to 78,000 sq km, a net loss of 14%. According to IHS, since then IS has lost a further 9,700 sq km and now controls 68,300 sq km, which is roughly the size of the Republic of Ireland or the US state of West Virginia.

In Syria, IS has come under pressure from Syrian government forces, who are backed by Russia and Iran, and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters who are supported by a US-led multinational collation.   In February, the SDF captured the eastern town of Shaddadi, which was a major hub for IS, while in March, the ancient town of Palmyra was retaken by government forces. In neighbouring Iraq, troops and allied militiamen are preparing a long-awaited offensive to retake the northern city of Mosul, which is IS’s last remaining urban stronghold there.

IHS has reported that the losses of land in Iraq and Syria had led IS to set up its attacks on civilian targets elsewhere in the Middle East and in Europe, noting that such attacks are likely to intensify. Last week, almost 300 people died in an IS suicide bombing in Baghdad, Iraq. The attck came just days after the Iraqi government declared that it had retaken full control of the city of Fallujah, which is located just west to the capital.

Chilcot Report: Taking a Look at the Findings

Earlier this month, Sir John Chilcot outlined his findings on the UK’s involvement in the 2003 Iraq War and the lessons to be learned from it.

The newly released report spans almost a decade of UK government policy decisions that occurred between 2001 and 2009. It covers the background to the decision to go to war, whether troops were properly prepared, how the conflict was conducted and what planning there was for its aftermath.

The main points of the report are the following

Military Action 

• The UK chose to joint the invasion of Iraq before all peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. At the time, military action was not a last resort.
• The report states that military action might have been necessary later, however in March 2003, there was no imminent threat from the then Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, noting that the strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time and that the majority of the United Nations Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring.
• On 28 July 2002, then Prime Minister Tony Blair assured US President George W. Bush that he would be with him “whatever.” However in the letter, he pointed out that a US coalition for military action would need: Progress on the Middle East peace process, UN authority and a shift in public opinion in the UK, Europe and amongst Arab leaders.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

• Judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD’s were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
• Intelligence had “not established beyond doubt” that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.
• The Joint Intelligence Committee disclosed that Iraq had “continued to produce chemical and biological agents” and that there had ben “recent production.” It added that Iraq had the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons, however it did not state that Iraq had continued to produce weapons.
• Policy on the Iraq invasion was made on the basis of flawed intelligence assessment. The report notes that it was not challenged and should have been.

The Legal Case

• The report states that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were “far from satisfactory.”
• While the invasion began on 20 March 2003, it was not until 13 March that then Attorney General Lord Goldsmith advise there was, on balance, a secure legal basis for military action. Furthermore, apart from No 10’s response to his letter on 14 March, there was no formal record made of that decision and the precise grounds on which it was made remain unclear.
• The UK’s actions undermined the authority of the United Nations Security Council: The UN’s Charter puts responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the Security Council. The UK government was claiming to act on behalf of the international community “to uphold the authority of the Security Council,” however it knew that it did not have a majority supporting its actions.
• In Cabinet, there was little questioning of Lord Goldsmith about his advice and no substantive discussion of the legal issues recorded.

Military Preparedness

• The report notes that there was “little time” to properly prepare three military bridges for deployment in Iraq, noting that the risks were neither “properly identified nor fully exposed” to ministers, which effectively resulted in “equipment shortfalls.”
• Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability areas, which included armoured vehicles, reconnaissance and intelligence assets and helicopter support.
• It was not sufficiently clear which person in the department within the Ministry of Defense had responsibility for identifying and articulating such gaps.
• The report notes that delays in providing adequate medium weight protected patrol vehicles and the failure to meet the needs of UK forces for reconnaissance and intelligence equipment and helicopters should not have been tolerated.

Iraq’s Aftermath

• Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated, with the report noting that the planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were “wholly inadequate.”
• The government failed to achieve the stated objective, which it had set itself in Iraq. More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict. Iraqi people also suffered greatly. By July 2009, at least 150,000 Iraqis had died, probably more, and more than one million were displaced. 

Lessons Learned

• The report found that Mr Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq, adding that the UK’s relationship with the US does not require unconditional support.
• It stated that ministerial discussion, which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge, is important. As is ensuring civilian and military arms of government of being properly equipped.
• In future, all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with rigour. Decisions need to be fully implemented.

CIA Chief Warns IS ‘Formidable’ Despite Losses

According to CIA Director John Brennan, the efforts of the US-led coalition that is fighting the so-called Islamic State (IS) group have failed to reduce its ability to carry out militant attacks.

Speaking to the Senate intelligence committee, in an update on the threat from extremists, Mr Brennan told the hearing that the group remains “formidable” despite territorial losses. He stated, “unfortunately, despite all our progress against ISIL (Islamic State) on the battlefield and in the financial realm, our efforts have not reduced the group’s terrorism capability and global reach.” He indicated that he estimates that IS now has more fighters than al-Qaeda when that militant group was at its strongest, adding that there are as many as 22,000 IS fighters operating in Iraq and neighbouring Syria. He also indicated that the CIA is particularly concerned about the growth of Libya as an IS base.

While Mr Brennan indicated that the US-led coalition had made progress against IS, the group has “a large cadre of Western fighter who could potentially serve as operatives for attacks in the West,” warning that “to compensate for territorial losses, ISIL will probably rely more on guerrilla tactics, including high-profile attacks outside territory it holds.”

Mr Brennan’s appearance comes just days after the attack on a gay nightclub in Florida. The gunman, Omar Mateen, had pledged allegiance to IS, however Mr Brennan told the hearing that the CIA had not uncovered any direct link between Mateen and foreign militant groups.

US Officials Warn No Links Between Boko Haram and IS

US officials indicated in early June that they see no evidence that Nigerian-based militant group Boko Haram has received significant operational support or financing from the so-called Islamic State (IS) group, more than a year after Boko Haram pledged allegiance to it.

The assessment, which is detailed by multiple US officials, suggests that Bok Haram’s loyalty pledge has so far mostly been a branding exercise designed to boost its international jihadi credentials as well as to attract recruits and appeal to the IS leadership for assistance. The US view of Boko Haram as a locally-focused, homegrown insurgency, is likely to keep the group more to the margins of the US fight against IS in Africa. The US military’s attention is largely centred on Libya, which is home to IS’ strongest affiliate outside the Middle East and where the US has carried out air strikes. According to officials, no such direct US intervention is currently being contemplated against Boko Haram. One US official has disclosed that “if there is no meaningful connection between ISIL (IS) and Boko – and we haven’t found one so far – then there are no grounds for US military involvement in West Africa other than assistance and training,” adding, “this is an African fight, and we can assist them, but its their fight.”

In public comments, senior US officials have disclosed that they are closely watching for any increased threat to Americans from Boko Haram and any confirmation of media reports of deepening ties with IS.

Growing Concerns as IS Seen Making Inroads into Kenya

Recent arrests have indicated that the so-called Islamic State (IS) group’s presence in East Africa is growing, with officials indicated that they are recruiting young Kenyans for jihad abroad and raising fears that some of them will return to threaten the country, which has already been affected by Somali-based al-Qaeda aligned al-Shabaab.

Kenyan intelligence agencies estimate that around one hundred men and women may have gone to join IS in Libya and Syria. This has triggered concerns that some may chose to come back in order to stage attacks on Kenyan and foreign targets in a country that has already been the victim of regular, deadly terrorism. According to Rashid Abid, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group think tank, which is based in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, “there is now a real threat that Kenya faces from IS and the danger will continue to increase.”

The first al-Qaeda attack in Kenya was the 1998 US embassy bombing and the most recent large attack was a university massacre in Garissa in 2015. The IS threat however is new and as yet ill defined. In March, four men appeared in court accused of seeking to travel to Libya in order to join IS. Then in early May, Kenyan police announced the arrest of a medical student, his wife and her friend. All three have been accused of recruiting for IS and plotting an anthrax attack. At the time, two other medical students were said to be on the run. Kenyan police chief Joseph Boinnet described a countrywide “terror network” linked to IS and led by Mohamed Abdi Ali, a medical intern at a regional hospital, “planning large-scale attacks” including one to “unleash a biological attack…using anthrax.” Three weeks later, police announced the arrest of two more members of “the ISIS (another acronym for IS) network that is seeking to establish itself in Kenya in order to conduct terror attacks against innocent Kenyans.” Police indicated that they had found “materials terrorists typically use in the making of IEDs” – homemade bombs – as well as “bows and poisoned arrows.”

While some experts have dismissed the suggestion of an imminent large-scale attack in Kenya, they have noted that the threat of IS radicalization, recruitment and return in the East African nation is genuine, with one foreign law enforcement official, who has examined the anthrax allegation, disclosing that “we cant see either the intent to carry out such an attack nor any real planning of it…But there is something in it: there is IS here, mainly involved in recruitment and facilitation.”   Other officials also note that the recent arrests show that radicalization continues to be an issue affecting the entire country. While officials note that recruitment into Somali-based al-Shabaab remains the primary danger, there are increasing credible reports that other groups, such as IS, are gaining ground.

For now, Kenyan authorities have struggled to manage the return of their nationals from Somalia, where hundreds of Kenyans make up the bulk of al-Shabaab’s foreign fighters. In the future, experts have noted that that they will also likely have to deal with returning IS extremists as well as self-radicalized “lone wolf” attackers who have been inspired by the group’s ideology and online propaganda.