Tag Archives: Iraq

The Islamic State (IS) in Libya: Key Dates

The so-called Islamic State (IS) group moved into Libya in 2014, amidst the chaos that followed the ouster of Moamer Kadhafi in 2011. On 1 August 2016, at the request of Libya’s unity government, United States warplanes carried out their first air strikes on positions in the IS bastion of Sirte.

Below are key dates of IS’ presence in Libya:

First Jihadist Attacks

• 19 November 2014 – The US says that it is “concerned” by reports that radical extremists with avowed ties to IS are destabilizing eastern Libya, having already seized vast areas of territory in Iraq and Syria.
• 27 December 2014 – IS claims responsibility for a car bombing outside the diplomatic security building in Tripoli. The attack causes no casualties.
• 27 January 2015 – IS claims responsibility for an attack on Tripoli’s luxury Corinthia Hotel, in which nine people, including five foreigners, are killed.

Since January 2015, IS has carried out a number of suicide attacks, including the February 2015 attack in Al-Qoba, near the eastern town of Derna, which killed 44 people; and the January 2016 attack that targeted a police school in Zliten, east of Tripoli, which killed more than 50 people.

IS Videos of Killings

• 15 February 2015 – IS releases a video depicting the beheading of 21 Coptic Christians, in which all but one was Egyptian. The militant group states that the act was filmed in January. Egypt carried out air strikes on IS in its then stronghold of Derna.
• 19 April 2015 – A new video shows the execution-style killing of 28 Christians originally from Ethiopia.

IS Seizes Sirte

• 9 June 2015 – IS announces that it has captured Sirte, which is located east of Tripoli. The city is the hometown of Kadhafi.
• 12 July 2015 – After weeks of fierce fighting with Derna’s Mujahedeen Council, IS finally acknowledges that it has been pushed out of the town.

First US Strikes

• 13 November 2015 – The US bombs IS leaders in Libya for the first time, stating that it killed Abu Nabil, an Iraqi also known as Wissam Najm Abd Zayd al-Zubaydi. Libyan officials identify him as the IS chief in Derna.
• 19 February 2016 – A US air strike on a jihadist training camp near Sabratha, which is located west of Tripoli, kills about fifty people.
• 24 February 2016 – Some 200 jihadists briefly occupy central Sabratha before being ousted by militias.

Offensive on Sirte

• 30 March 2016 – Despite the hostility of rival authorities, the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government, Fayez al-Sarraj, arrives in Tripoli.
• 12 May 2016 – A vast offensive to recapture Sirte is launched by forces loyal to the unity government.
• 4 June 2016 – Unity government forces say that they have retaken a jihadist air base located south of Sirte.
• 9 June 2016 – Government forces enter the centre of Sirte and besiege the jihadists.
• 23 July 2016 – Loyalist forces say that they have seized a building used by IS to manufacture explosives.
• 1 August 2016 – Sarraj confirms that the US has carried out airstrikes on IS positions in Sirte for the first time. He indicates that the move was at the request of the unity government. A US senior administration official disclosed that American troops will not take part in any ground operations in support of the government.

Islamic State has Lost Territory in Iraq and Syria This Year

According to a defense consultancy, the so-called Islamic State (IS) group has lost 12% of the territory it controlled in Iraq and Syria in the first half of this year.

IHS has found that the “caliphate,” which was proclaimed by IS two years ago, has shrunk to 68,300 sq km (26,370 sq miles). According to IHS, in January 2015, just six months after IS declared the creation of a caliphate, the terror group controlled some 90,800 sq km of Iraq and Syria, adding that by December, that had shrunk by 12,800 sq km to 78,000 sq km, a net loss of 14%. According to IHS, since then IS has lost a further 9,700 sq km and now controls 68,300 sq km, which is roughly the size of the Republic of Ireland or the US state of West Virginia.

In Syria, IS has come under pressure from Syrian government forces, who are backed by Russia and Iran, and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters who are supported by a US-led multinational collation.   In February, the SDF captured the eastern town of Shaddadi, which was a major hub for IS, while in March, the ancient town of Palmyra was retaken by government forces. In neighbouring Iraq, troops and allied militiamen are preparing a long-awaited offensive to retake the northern city of Mosul, which is IS’s last remaining urban stronghold there.

IHS has reported that the losses of land in Iraq and Syria had led IS to set up its attacks on civilian targets elsewhere in the Middle East and in Europe, noting that such attacks are likely to intensify. Last week, almost 300 people died in an IS suicide bombing in Baghdad, Iraq. The attck came just days after the Iraqi government declared that it had retaken full control of the city of Fallujah, which is located just west to the capital.

Chilcot Report: Taking a Look at the Findings

Earlier this month, Sir John Chilcot outlined his findings on the UK’s involvement in the 2003 Iraq War and the lessons to be learned from it.

The newly released report spans almost a decade of UK government policy decisions that occurred between 2001 and 2009. It covers the background to the decision to go to war, whether troops were properly prepared, how the conflict was conducted and what planning there was for its aftermath.

The main points of the report are the following

Military Action 

• The UK chose to joint the invasion of Iraq before all peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. At the time, military action was not a last resort.
• The report states that military action might have been necessary later, however in March 2003, there was no imminent threat from the then Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, noting that the strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time and that the majority of the United Nations Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring.
• On 28 July 2002, then Prime Minister Tony Blair assured US President George W. Bush that he would be with him “whatever.” However in the letter, he pointed out that a US coalition for military action would need: Progress on the Middle East peace process, UN authority and a shift in public opinion in the UK, Europe and amongst Arab leaders.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

• Judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD’s were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
• Intelligence had “not established beyond doubt” that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.
• The Joint Intelligence Committee disclosed that Iraq had “continued to produce chemical and biological agents” and that there had ben “recent production.” It added that Iraq had the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons, however it did not state that Iraq had continued to produce weapons.
• Policy on the Iraq invasion was made on the basis of flawed intelligence assessment. The report notes that it was not challenged and should have been.

The Legal Case

• The report states that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were “far from satisfactory.”
• While the invasion began on 20 March 2003, it was not until 13 March that then Attorney General Lord Goldsmith advise there was, on balance, a secure legal basis for military action. Furthermore, apart from No 10’s response to his letter on 14 March, there was no formal record made of that decision and the precise grounds on which it was made remain unclear.
• The UK’s actions undermined the authority of the United Nations Security Council: The UN’s Charter puts responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the Security Council. The UK government was claiming to act on behalf of the international community “to uphold the authority of the Security Council,” however it knew that it did not have a majority supporting its actions.
• In Cabinet, there was little questioning of Lord Goldsmith about his advice and no substantive discussion of the legal issues recorded.

Military Preparedness

• The report notes that there was “little time” to properly prepare three military bridges for deployment in Iraq, noting that the risks were neither “properly identified nor fully exposed” to ministers, which effectively resulted in “equipment shortfalls.”
• Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability areas, which included armoured vehicles, reconnaissance and intelligence assets and helicopter support.
• It was not sufficiently clear which person in the department within the Ministry of Defense had responsibility for identifying and articulating such gaps.
• The report notes that delays in providing adequate medium weight protected patrol vehicles and the failure to meet the needs of UK forces for reconnaissance and intelligence equipment and helicopters should not have been tolerated.

Iraq’s Aftermath

• Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated, with the report noting that the planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were “wholly inadequate.”
• The government failed to achieve the stated objective, which it had set itself in Iraq. More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict. Iraqi people also suffered greatly. By July 2009, at least 150,000 Iraqis had died, probably more, and more than one million were displaced. 

Lessons Learned

• The report found that Mr Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq, adding that the UK’s relationship with the US does not require unconditional support.
• It stated that ministerial discussion, which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge, is important. As is ensuring civilian and military arms of government of being properly equipped.
• In future, all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with rigour. Decisions need to be fully implemented.

US Officials Warn No Links Between Boko Haram and IS

US officials indicated in early June that they see no evidence that Nigerian-based militant group Boko Haram has received significant operational support or financing from the so-called Islamic State (IS) group, more than a year after Boko Haram pledged allegiance to it.

The assessment, which is detailed by multiple US officials, suggests that Bok Haram’s loyalty pledge has so far mostly been a branding exercise designed to boost its international jihadi credentials as well as to attract recruits and appeal to the IS leadership for assistance. The US view of Boko Haram as a locally-focused, homegrown insurgency, is likely to keep the group more to the margins of the US fight against IS in Africa. The US military’s attention is largely centred on Libya, which is home to IS’ strongest affiliate outside the Middle East and where the US has carried out air strikes. According to officials, no such direct US intervention is currently being contemplated against Boko Haram. One US official has disclosed that “if there is no meaningful connection between ISIL (IS) and Boko – and we haven’t found one so far – then there are no grounds for US military involvement in West Africa other than assistance and training,” adding, “this is an African fight, and we can assist them, but its their fight.”

In public comments, senior US officials have disclosed that they are closely watching for any increased threat to Americans from Boko Haram and any confirmation of media reports of deepening ties with IS.

The Islamic State Group in Libya (2014 – Present)

On 9 June, unity government force surrounded the so-called Islamic State (IS) group’s Libyan bastion Sirte, where clashes have erupted as the Unity Government attempts to oust the militant group. The jihadist group, which moved into the North African country in 2014 amidst chaos that followed the ouster of Moamer Kadhafi, has become yet another player in the lawless country, where rival authorities and militas are battling for control of territory and major oil reserves.

2014

• 19 November – The United States indicates that it is “concerned” by reports that radical extrmeists with avowed ties to IS are destabilizing eastern Libya, after having already seized vast swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria.   News reports emerge indicated that the eastern coastal city of Derna is emerging as an IS stronghold.
• 27 December – A car bomb explodes outside the diplomatic security building in the capital city Tripoli. The attack, which is claimed by IS, causes no casualties.

2015

• 27 January – IS claims responsibility for an attack on Tripoli’s luxury Corinthia Hotel that kills nine people.
• 15 February – IS releases a video showing the beheading of 21 Coptic Christians, all but one Egyptians, that the jihadist say they filmed in January. Egypt carries out air strikes on IS in Derna
• 20 February – IS claims responsibility for suicide car bombings in Al-Qoba, which is located near Derna. Those attacks kill 44 people, with IS stating that the attacks are to avenge losses in the air strikes.
• 19 April – A new video depicts the execution-style killing of 28 Christians originally from Ethiopia.
• 9 June – IS announces that it has captured the city of Sirte, which is located east of Tripoli.
• 12 July – The group acknowledges that it has been pushed out of Derna after weeks of fierce fighting with members of the town’s Mujahedeen Council.
• 13 November – The US bombs IS leaders in Libya for the first time and states that it has killed Abu Nabil, an Iraqi also known as Wissam Najm Abd Zayd al-Zubaydi. Libyan officials later identify him as the head of IS in Derna.

2016

• 7 January – A suicide truck bombing at a police school in Zliten, east of Tripoli, kills more than fifty people in what is the worst attack to take place in Libya since the 2011 revolution. IS claims responsibility for the attack.
• 5 February – US officials disclose that the number of jihadists has almost doubled in Libya to about 5,000.
• 19 February – A US air strike on a jihadist training camp located near Sabratha, west of Tripoli, kills about fifty people.
• 24 February – Some 200 jihadists briefly occupy the centre of Sabratha, however they are later ousted by militas.
• 30 March – The head of Libya’s United Nations-backed unity government, Fayez al-Sarraj, arrives at a naval base in Tripoli, despite the hostility of rival authorities.
• 31 May – UN special envoy Martin Kobler calls on all of Libya’s armed groups to untie against IS.
• 4 June – Unity government forces say that they have retaken a jihadist air base, Al-Gordabyia, which is located south of Sirte.
• 5 June – Sarraj rules out an international military intervention on the ground.
• 9 June – Unity government forces enter the centre of Sirte where clashes continue with IS.