MS Risk Blog

ISIS Sleeper Cells in Turkey

3 February- Information leaked from a Turkish National Police intelligence has divulged a threat of potential attacks conducted by ISIS sleeper cells across the country. The police report gives warning of as many as 3,000 operatives living in Turkey who are directly associated with the terrorist group that has taken large swaths of land in Iraq and Syria. The report details a list of cities in Turkey that are vulnerable to attack, including the administrative and cultural capitals, Ankara, and Istanbul.

Turkey shares a 565 mile border with Syria. During the 2011 Syrian uprising, Turkey opened its border to Syrian rebels in an effort to assist in the overthrow of Syrian president Bashar al Assad. As the popular uprising metastasised into a civil war, fighters were able to travel between the nations’ borders. These included members of al-Qaeda affiliated group al Nusra Front, and the group which came to be known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The open border has provided a transit route for ISIS, which has been used to transport fighters, as well as black market oil and numerous weapons.

In the years since the 2011 uprising, extremists have established networks and infrastructure within Turkey that allows them to facilitate illegal activity. The group has reportedly established logistical bases in Turkey, and built a network of cells.

While the Turkish National Police are only now acknowledging this threat, Turkish and America media have been reporting for months about Islamic State recruitment activity in Turkey. In September 2014, the Turkish daily, Hurriyet, identified Islamic State activities in cities such as Istanbul and Kocaeli in the western portion of the country, and Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, and Diyarbakir to the east. Similarly, a New York Times report also detailed ISIS recruitment in Ankara, a report that was echoed in Newsweek which added that other conservative pockets in Turkey, such as the Dilovasi neighbourhood in Ankara are particularly susceptible for recruitment. Turkish daily newspaper Aydinlik noted that ISIS militants were operating in other towns, such as Konya, which is known for its conservative Islamic culture.

In January, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu acknowledged that there are approximately 700 Turkish nationals fighting for ISIS. Financial inducements may play a role; a New York Times report suggests that ISIS offers $150 a day to Turkish recruits who agree to fight.

Further weakening Turkish security is the idea that Turkey may be home to ISIS sympathisers. Ali Ediboglu, a Turkish opposition deputy, claims that “at least 1,000 Turkish nationals are helping […] foreign fighters sneak into Syria and Iraq to join ISIS.” Videos have emerged of gatherings in Istanbul which proclaim support for fighters in Syria, including ISIS. In October 2014, police arrested three students who clashed with protestors at an anti-ISIS rally. Further, a group of 20 people referring to themselves as “Musluman Gencier” (Muslim Youth) interrupted an anti-ISIS demonstration at Istanbul University wearing black masks and wielding bats. The group has reportedly attacked the campus on more than one occasion.

In the midst of the civil war, Turkey has become home to at least 1.5 million Syrian refugees. There is reason to fear that among those numbers are some that could be susceptible to radicalisation. Intelligence reports have suggested that the ISIS may be targeting young men and boys in refugee camps for recruitment.

The impact of ISIS has already been felt in Turkey. On January 6, a suicide bomber attacked a police station in Istanbul’s historic district of Sultanahmet. The bomber is believed to have had ties to the Islamic State. Continued attacks could cause irreparable damage to Turkey’s vital tourism sector and create alarm throughout the nation. However, ISIS may not benefit from targeting Turkey. The group has become reliant on the relatively open border and illicit oil sales in the nation. South-eastern Turkey has a “rather permissive environment” where “authorities don’t seem terribly alarmed over the presence of extremists”. Further, despite the nation’s proximity to the fighting, the Turkish government has not played an active role in the US-led coalition to eradicate ISIS. Turkey has refused to allow its military bases to be used for coalition operations. However the number of ISIS sympathisers and operatives within Turkish borders puts the country at risk. If Ankara decides to take a harsher stance against ISIS, it is likely that the terrorist group could activate cells within the nation. Turkey will need to tread carefully to take a concerted stance against ISIS while ensuring its national security.

ISIS benefits from Libya’s Upheaval

29 January- Militants have attacked a hotel in the Libyan capital Tripoli, killing at least nine people including five foreigners, officials say. The Corinthia Hotel is often used by foreign diplomats, government officials and foreign companies. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has hosted several workshops at the hotel. Several gunmen stormed the Corinthia Hotel and opened fire in the reception area; a car bomb also exploded nearby. Unconfirmed reports say some of the assailants have blown themselves up. The officials say the dead include one US and one French citizen. The US state department has confirmed the death of a US citizen, US Marine Corp veteran David Berry. The French national is reported to have been working for Libya’s Buraq Air. There are conflicting reports as to the total number of attackers.

A Twitter account linked to ISIS said the group had carried out the attack in revenge for the death of Abu Anas al-Liby, a Libyan fighter who was suspected of involvement in the bombings of two US embassies in East Africa in 1998.  As chaos erupts in Libya, officials in Geneva are rushing to put together a peace plan before ISIS can gain a foothold in the country. The attack on the hotel is the latest sign of ISIS flexing its muscles in a country that has become a failed state, and which could reach levels of chaos currently seen in Syria.

Libya has seen continual fighting since the death of Dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Beginning as small, localised skirmishes, the fighting turned into civil war last summer after national elections ushered in a moderate government, the House of Representatives, which heavily defeated Islamist parties and replaced the Islamist leaning General National Convention. Islamists and their allies, particularly tribal militias, reacted to the defeat by declaring parliament void, forming the Libya Dawn militia alliance and seizing Tripoli. The newly elected parliament fled and moved its administrative seat to Tobruk, in eastern Libya. The two sides, based at opposite ends of the country, have been at war ever since, resulting in thousands of deaths, towns wrecked and more than 400,000 of Libya’s six million population displaced.

In the midst of the chaos, ISIS has taken advantage and formed units across all three of Libya’s provinces. They have declared the eastern coastal town of Derna an Islamic caliphate, with parades of fighters waving black flags and ritual beheadings. ISIS claimed responsibility for the murder of 14 soldiers killed as they slept near the south-western town of Sebha, and earlier this month for the execution of two kidnapped Tunisian journalists, which is as yet unconfirmed. Earlier this month ISIS units attacked the living quarters of Egyptian guest workers in Sirte, separating Christians from Muslims and then taking the Christians away. ISIS later posted pictures of the kidnapped men on social media.

There are fears that the foothold in ISIS presence a threat to Europe, particularly in light of Libya’s proximity. At the Geneva talks, UN special envoy Bernardino Leon is warning that the window to agree a peace deal is closing. “Libya’s running out of time. How much time will Libya have, it’s difficult to say but the general impression is that the country is very close to total chaos.”

The UN is struggling to develop a deal, in large part because only one of the warring parties has turned up for the peace talks. Libya Dawn is refusing to take part. The group pulled out of the discussions after forces loyal to the Tobruk-based government seized the Benghazi branch of the central bank last week. Tobruk in turn said that, as the internationally recognised government, it is entitled to control its own central bank, further poisoning relations between the two sides. Because the Tobruk-based government is internationally recognised, it ostensibly controls oil revenues, and is reluctant to agree to a ceasefire while its expanding army is making gains on the battlefield.

In Benghazi, army units have bottled up Ansar al Sharia, a militant group, in the port area. Meanwhile the air force, loyal to Tobruk, last month repulsed a Libya Dawn offensive aimed at capturing Es Sider, the largest oil port.

Libya is quickly running out of money. The central bank, a neutral institution, pays soldiers on both sides of the conflict, and its reserves are running low, unable to be replenished as oil production has slowed considerably due to the fighting. The population is almost wholly dependent on cash from foreign reserves, and these are starting to run dry.

In the absence of a peace agreement and with depletion of resources, ISIS may become the beneficiary of the anarchy in the failed state, unless at least temporary terms between the two governments can be reached in haste.

Greek Elections

For the first time since the collapse of the military junta in 1974, Greek people decided to put an end to the domination of the two principal parties, New Democracy and PASOK. Syriza, a radical left wing party, won 36,3 per cent of the votes, surpassing New Democracy’s 27,9 per cent. Syriza, won 149 seats in the parliament, just two short of an overall majority. The new government is a coalition between Syriza and the right-wing populist party Independent Greeks. After the end of the elections, Syriza’s leader, Alexis Tsipras, reconfirmed his party’s intent to reject the TINA argument (There is No Alternative) that previous Greek administrations used to justify the imposed austerity measures. However, Syriza’s win was not the only note-worthy event during the Greek elections. The neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, came third with 6,3 per cent of the votes. The party is politically isolated, with its leadership and many of its members in prison with no access to mainstream media. Golden Dawn’s electoral results follow the general rise of far-right parties across Europe.

The rise of Syriza has been fuelled by the economic crisis. After the 2008 economic crisis, Syriza had a steady rise on the electoral rounds that followed. On the 2009 elections it won 4,6 percent of the vote, and after the two electoral rounds in May and June of 2012, it succeeded in winning 26,8 percent of the votes. It surpassed the governmental party, New Democracy, for the first time during the European elections in May 2014 where it won 26,6 percent of the votes, against New Democracy’s percentage of 22,7 per cent. Syriza’s meteoric rise reflects Greek people’s indignation with the choices of the previous governments and the austerity measures that they imposed. It is quite possible that this win is going to affect Syriza’s relationship with its supporters and change the dynamics between the party. Up to 2012, Syriza was a coalition of left parties and organisations. Its history contains a series of splits and consolidations involving numerous left-wing political formations that, in many ways can trail their origins to the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). In its current formation it is a strategic coalition comprising of a wide spectrum of political platforms that include social democrats, radical socialists and communists, environmentalists, anti-globalisation campaigners and human rights advocates. Its synthesis creates friction between the members and could affect its ability to implement a unanimous policy.

Syriza promised to rescind many of the austerity measures that the previous governments signed with the EU and the IMF. Since 2010, and partly due to the austerity measures, the country has seen its GDP shrink nearly a quarter, its unemployment rate reached a third of the labour force (26%) and almost half of its population fell bellow the poverty line. The national debt instead of decreasing has risen to 175 per cent of the annual GDP. Due to these factors, and despite the governmental change, the political system in Greece remains extremely vulnerable. Syriza’s position differs from the previous governments’ positions in two key factors. First, Syriza believes that the only way of making the European Union treat Greece reasonably and limit the austerity measures is to spearhead an immediate re-think of the Greek bailout program through the suspension of the policies demanded from the Troika and through the threat of using its veto power in the European Council. Secondly, Syriza wants to apply a tough bargaining line with a radical agenda that will entail a deep social change in Greece, including a big swift in the tax base, the re-introduction of a decent minimum wage – currently the minimum wage in Greece is 586 euros – and increase the funding for social security and public health provisions.

At the same time, it is quite possible that Syriza’s election is going to be a jolt in European politics. The people from the crisis-plagued countries of the South can identify with the win of a pro-European party that is committed to the European dimension of its country, but also a party that, due to its radical disposition, is ready to pressure the European Council to address the problems they have been ignoring over the past five years. Syriza’s biggest threat is the path of compromise that may be pressured to follow. For Greek people Syriza represents their last hope after a series of betrayals from their governments since the crisis started. Its political battle could reignite other similar anti-austerity movements across European countries that face economic problems, namely Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal. Like Greece, these countries were pressured to implement strict fiscal programs. Even though the measures proved to bring positive results in the macroeconomics sector, the economy’s growth halted and the economic crisis was combined with a big humanitarian crisis. Nevertheless, if Syriza fails in fulfilling its promises against the Greek people and does not improve Greece’s performance both internally and at the international forums, similar European anti-austerity parties that now benefit from Syriza’s political dynamic could be negatively affected. Spain, Ireland and Italy are due to hold elections over the next two years. In Spain, the anti-austerity party Podemos continues to gain popularity as the country moves closer to the December 2015 elections. Spain is battling a 24 per cent unemployment rate, second only to Greece’s 26 per cent. Similarly, in Ireland the Anti-austerity Alliance party has increased its power since the 2009 elections, amid protests against the new austerity measures implemented by the government. Italy faces similar problems that underline the people’s dissatisfaction with the high rates of unemployment, the lack of healthcare and the increase of poverty rates.

Syriza does not promote Greece’s exit from the Eurozone. What it aspires to do is to create breathing room from the imposed fiscal programs to undertake basic restorative policies, and to lay the ground for a more cohesive and long-term economic strategy. Syriza’s leader has explicitly stated that his party does not intend to destroy the euro or to force Greece out of the Eurozone. Nevertheless, he has mentioned that he is not willing to keep Greece in the economic alliance under any cost. If Greece follows that path it will not be voluntary but a choice forced to make. This attitude allows him to appease Greek people internally, and promote the image that he is willing to negotiate with his European partners externally. By generating a campaign that focused on change not only for Greece but for Europe as a total, he succeeded in deflecting the narrative of Greek exceptionalism regarding the sovereign debt. Using the widespread crisis and the struggle of many European countries, he makes the case that the issue of the Greek debt must not be regarded as an isolated problem, but as a variable of a wider issue that has at its core a problematic European economic governance.

Syriza’s win rekindled the ‘’Grexit’’ speculations. However, that does not seem to be the case. The various EU Treaties do not include a clause regarding how a country could leave the euro. Currently there is no treaty provision that legally contains the requirements for a member state to be expelled from the EU or EMU. Even though a withdrawal from the EU is not legally impossible, the exit clause itself is, prima facie, not in harmony with that rationale of the European unification project and can create many legal problems, as an exit from the EMU without simultaneous exit from the EU is legally inconceivable. At the same time, even if a negotiated exit can be achieved and the European economy can limit its losses considerably, which is dubious at best, a member’s exit will provoke a general vulnerability at the core of everything the EU represents. The EU’s existence can come into question, due to the fact that there are going to be no guarantees for countries that face similar problems, such as Spain and Italy, that they will not have to follow Greece’s path.

Despite Syriza’s aspiring announcements, a radical revolution both in Greece and in Europe does not seems to be in the cards. The most possible scenario is that Syriza will succeed in finding a more flexible financial agreement, which is not going to deviate substantially from what the previous government agreed to. An agreement is necessary for the new government to continue receiving financial aid in form of loans from the IMF and European partners, and include Greece in the new program of quantitative easing that the European Central Bank announced recently. Syriza’s win represents the need for change in Europe, especially in the European South. Mostly, it reflects a reality that most European governments do not seem to fully comprehend and be prepared to address effectively. This change is expected to further challenge the European cohesion amid the multiple security, economical and political problems that the EU currently faces.

Renewed Violence in Northern Mali

Security sources disclosed Wednesday that an attack overnight in northern Mali by a pro-government armed group using suicide bombers, killed a dozen people. According to a military source, “GATIA fighters, accompanied by suicide bombers, attacked a rebel Tuareg and anti-government Arab position in the night from Tuesday to Wednesday near the town of Tabankort. There were a dozen deaths in total.” A security source from the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA, also confirmed the death toll, adding that two fighters blew themselves up while a third was killed before he was able to detonate his explosives. The overnight attack comes as renewed violence has once again affected the northern region of the country.

Over the past several days, tensions have been rising across the country as protesters have demanded that the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali withdraw. Tensions have risen in the wake of a UN military mission last week, which targeted rebels near Tabankort. Furthermore, the signing of an agreement over the weekend to create a “temporary security zone” in the Tabankort district of the region of Gao, has resulted in demonstrations, with protesters calling for the UN mission to leave.

On Tuesday, three people were killed in northern Mali after a second day of demonstrations against the UN military missions. On the ground sources have described how a large crowd of angry youths threw stones and attempted to storm the MINUSMA headquarters in Gao in protest at the UN taking control of a troubled area north of the city. An official in the ministry for security and civil protection confirmed the deaths, adding that the situation in the area remained “very tense.” According to Arnaud Akodjenou, deputy representative of the MINUSMA force, “our officers were besieged by protesters this morning, but I can tell you that no one from MINUSMA fired on the demonstrators. Absolutely no order was given to use weapons,” adding “we are in very close contact with the Malian authorities.” A youth leader in Gao however has rejected this statement, instead blaming UN troops for the deaths of the demonstrators. According to Ousmane Dicko, of the Youth Collective activist group, “MINUSMA shot at us. MINUSMA killed civilians. We demand the departure of MINUSMA from Mali.”

Demonstrators in Gao are protesting an agreement to create a “temporary security zone” in the Tabankort district of the region of Gao. The agreement, which was reached between MINUSMA and three rebel groups – the High Council for the Unity of Azawad, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and an anti-government wing of the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) – places the zone under the exclusive control of UN troops and guarantees “the free movement of people and goods.” The area is controlled by pro-government militias who have in recent weeks clashed with armed rebels, leading to the deaths of both civilians and fighters. According to a local government source, the creation of the zone “will force loyalist armed groups to disarm or abandon their posts.” Sources have reported that loyalist armed movements, including the Imghad and Allies Tuareg Self-Defence Group, as well as a pro-government wing of the MAA and various vigilante groups, “strongly encouraged” the demonstration.

The latest violence comes over a week after MINUSMA helicopters destroyed a rebel vehicle near Tabankort, north of Gao, in what MINUSMA officials have maintained was in “self-defence.” The attack on 20 January followed what MINUSMA described as “direct fire with heavy weapons” on its peacekeepers. Rebel groups however have indicated that the action, which killed seven militants and left twenty wounded, violated UN neutrality. The strikes sparked demonstrations hostile to MINUSMA in the northeastern rebel stronghold of Kidal.

Saudi Arabia– Who is King Salman?

On 23 January, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah passed away at the age of 90. His crown was immediately passed to his younger half-brother King Salman. He takes the royal reins at a time when Yemen is experiencing government upheaval, tensions with Iran are extremely high, the threat of ISIS is increasing and some OPEC allies are calling for a shift in policy. Here are some facts about the new leader.

King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, born 31 December 1935. He was named successor to the throne in 2012. Salman had been chairing cabinet meetings for months as King Abdullah grew more ill, and began representing the kingdom as he travelled for state visits in place of Abdullah. In 2011, he was appointed Saudi’s Minister of Defence. He favours a positive relationship with the West and is responsible for the nation’s joining of the US-led coalition to strike ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Prior to this role, Salman was the governor of Riyadh province for nearly 50 years, working to attract tourism, capital projects and foreign investment. Under his tenure, the province grew from 200,000 to seven million inhabitants. His tenure was noted for good governance and lack of corruption.  Salman holds stake in one of the country’s largest media groups, and reportedly maintains relationships with a number of prominent journalists in the country. Saudi Arabia scores 84 (100 being the worst) on a press freedom index.

Salman is known to have provided an estimated $25million a month to the Afghan mujahedeen during the peak of the anti-Soviet conflict, before American financial assistance arrived. He is also known to have helped raise money for Bosnian Muslim in the war with Serbia.

One of his first messages to the 28 million citizens of Saudi Arabia is that he will continue the policies of his older brother. However some believe that Salman is less likely to be focused on social reform. An intercepted 2007 ambassador cable published by Wikileaks states, “[Salman] pointed out that democracy should not be imposed. He said that the KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] is composed of tribes and regions and if democracy were imposed, each tribe and region would have its political party.”

At the age of 79, he is suffering health issues. It is known that the monarch has suffered a stroke which left limited movement in his left arm. There have been persistent speculation that Salman suffers from dementia and the Economist reports he’s believed to be suffering from Alzheimer’s. Saudi media, with its close ties to the monarchy, does not publish information about the ailments of leaders, but these have been strongly denied by the palace. The number of meetings on the King’s official schedule suggests these prognoses may be overstated. However some argue that his ambition to maintain stability for his country could be superseding his health concerns. His successor, who was appointed in 2013, is his half-brother, 69 year old Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, who was partially educated at the Royal Air Force College.

Salman’s most critical issue now is addressing the turmoil in Yemen, which borders the kingdom in the south. In addition to the threat of penetration by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Yemen’s Houthi movement has taken de facto control of the nation after the president and cabinet stepped down last week. The group signed an agreement on 27 January to form a coalition government, however the Shiite rebel fighters are heated rivals to Saudi Arabia’s Sunni government. Salman may seek to engage more proactively in Yemen in order to contain Iranian influence while encouraging an inclusive government.

In Tehran, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has pushed for better ties between the two countries. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has visited the kingdom for Abdullah’s funeral and the formal paying of respects. However, Tehran may view the new monarch as unwilling to engage in détente, particularly in light of the kingdom’s perception of Iranian support of the Houthis (which Tehran has denied) and their support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whom the Saudis are opposed to. Bernard Haykel, professor of near east studies at Princeton, has said, “Salman is quite hawkish on Iran. He’s personally quite hawkish. The Iranians would have to do a lot for him to change his policy.”