MS Risk Blog

Heightened fears of conflict on the Russia-Ukraine Border

The primary security concern across Eastern Europe in January remained the Russian military build-up in Russia’s southern region and US and NATO fears of an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine. A Kremlin decision in the first week of January to dispatch troops as part of a CSTO mission to quell political unrest in Kazakhstan exacerbated western fears of Russian expansionist intentions. A series of diplomatic talks between Russian, US and NATO delegations followed but appeared to offer little hope for a resolution, as Russian demands on NATO to withdraw forces from Eastern Europe and commit to a restriction against Ukrainian membership were continually rebuffed, while western calls for Russia to deescalate the crisis by withdrawing troops from the Ukrainian border were ignored. Later in the month, US intelligence alleged that Russian operatives were active in Ukraine and planning to stage a false-flag incident to provide a justification for military action against Ukraine, accusations which Russian officials strongly denied. On 17 January Russian military forces began to move into Belarus, ostensibly in preparation for joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises in February, but further inflaming western fears that the Kremlin was preparing for a two-pronged assault into Ukraine while maintaining a pretense of diplomatic de-escalation efforts.

By the end of January, relations appeared to have deteriorated significantly, with a flurry of negotiations between Western states as NATO members offered military support to Ukraine and Eastern European neighbors. Russian officials expressed little hope for negotiations as NATO continued to refuse any concessions on Moscow’s security demands. Despite continued insistences that Russia does not want war, further expanded Russian military deployments to Belarus and the Ukrainian border as well as indicators such as cyber-attacks against Ukrainian government websites and the stockpiling of blood supplies as part of Russia’s preparations have made the prospect of conflict appear more real than at any point since the crisis began. Looking ahead, it is difficult to anticipate what course the situation on the Russia-Ukrainian border will take in the next months, appearing to entirely depend on whether the Kremlin will instigate some form of conflict or choose instead to de-escalate by withdrawing its forces.

Several factors may lead to the conclusion that Vladimir Putin will choose not to attack Ukraine. Recent Russian conflicts, such as in Syria or the annexation of Crimea, have primarily emphasized the use of ‘low cost’ and low casualty methods of airstrikes, hybrid warfare, mercenaries and maskirovka to secure strategic aims. However, during the Ukraine Crisis the US and NATO allies have utilized strategies to increase potential casualties from an attack on Ukraine. US intelligence agencies negated the element of surprise by announcing an anticipated attack early, negating the possibility of any plausible deniability. In addition, the US and allies have increased the likely costliness of an attack in terms of casualties by supplying Ukraine with armaments and security assistance, and by threatening a coordinated suite of sanctions in the event of conflict which would be likely to significantly impact the Russian economy. While western governments have almost entirely ruled out direct intervention in any conflict, it is likely that lethal support to Ukraine would increase dramatically. It is also possible that the Russian government may have never intended to attack Ukraine and that the military build-up on the border was a carefully engineered bluff, designed to coerce concessions from the US and NATO.

However, the crisis on the Ukrainian border, which has now lasted for nearly two months, may have gone on for too long to allow a dignified de-escalation without some form of gain for Russia. If the military build-up had been designed as a bluff to secure concessions, then the bluff has been called by the US and NATO who have flatly refused all of Russia’s extremely ambitious demands, with both sides adhering to their respective ‘red lines’. The maintenance of such substantial military forces at a state of readiness in both Ukraine and Belarus must also be placing a significant and growing financial burden on the Russian government which will have gone to waste if nothing is achieved. If true, more recent US intelligence accusations that Russia is planning to fabricate a false-flag provocation may signal that the Kremlin is attempting to retrieve a possibility of plausible deniability, while claims of a plot to replace the Ukrainian government with a more favourable regime may indicate that Russia is seeking to find a new ‘low cost’ method to achieve its goals in Ukraine. While NATO responses have made a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine extremely costly and unlikely, it is a distinct possibility that the Russian Federation will engage in some form of limited conflict in the Ukraine region within the near future in order to avoid a clear ‘loss’ to NATO. Such an action might entail a small ‘flashpoint’ between Russian and Ukrainian forces as a pretext to return to the negotiating table with amended demands which might be accepted by the West.

Failed Coup in Guinea-Bissau (2 Feb 2022)

Guinea-Bissau’s President Umaro Sissoco Embalo survived an attempted coup on Tuesday 1 February, though he said that many members of the security forces had been killed repelling an attack on democracy that may have been linked to drug trafficking. Heightened security is likely to persist in Guinea-Bissau through at least mid-February after the foiled coup attempt against President Embalo’s government. Official government sources indicate that at least six people – four attackers and two guards – were killed and several others were injured during gunfire exchanges near the Government Palace in the capital, Bissau.

Earlier in the day, heavy gunfire rang out near a government compound where the president was chairing a meeting. The situation remained unclear for several hours, during which both the African Union (AU) and West African bloc ECOWAS condemned what they called “an attempted coup.” At around 17:20, military forces loyal to the Embalo government reportedly entered the Palace of Government and also deployed to several locations within the nation’s capital. They established a security perimeter around the palace, with troops also stationed near the Palace of Justice.

Appearing on Tuesday evening in a video posted on the presidency’s Facebook page, President Embalo stated that attackers had tried to enter the compound just after the cabinet meeting but had been repelled. He went on to say that “it wasn’t just a coup. It was an attempt to kill the president, the prime minister and all the cabinet,” adding that the attack “was well prepared and organized and could also be related to people involved in drug trafficking,” giving no further details. Guinea-Bissau is viewed by the United Nations as a major waypoint for Latin American cocaine headed for Europe. US and European authorities have long suspected that some in the country’s military are involved in the drug trade. During the video on Tuesday, President Embalo suggested that the army was not involved in the attack, stating, “I can assure you that no camp joined this attempted coup. It was isolated. It is linked to people we have fought against,” without elaborating. He also disclosed that arrests had begun of people involved, tough he did not disclose how many were detained. At around 10:00 on Tuesday morning, President Embalo had begun chairing an extraordinary cabinet meeting, entering the government palace with a heavy security detail, a diplomatic source reported. While he was present in the building, gunfire began outside. The cabinet meeting was being held to prepare for a forthcoming ECOWAS summit on 3 February in response to last week’s military takeover in Burkina Faso.

Advisory

Heightened security is likely to persist in Guinea-Bissau through at least mid-February after the foiled coup attempt against President Embalo’s government. Forces in Bissau are likely to maintain an elevated security posture until the situation stabilizes. Additional clashes between rival forces cannot currently be ruled out. Additional security measures, including checkpoints and random searches of vehicles and pedestrians may be carried out in the coming days. Authorities may also impose an overnight curfew, should the situation destabilize. Anyone currently in Guinea-Bissau should shelter in place, maintain close contact with their diplomatic representation, and adhere to all instructions issued by the local authorities. This includes possible curfew-related restrictions. Government buildings, security installations, large groupings of police and soldiers, and any demonstrations should be avoided.

Possible Coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau (1 Feb 2022)

Reports have emerged of a possible coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau. As of Tuesday 1 February evening, the situation in the country remains tense in the wake of an incident that occurred earlier in the day. This incident has been described by both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as an attempted coup. At around 15:00, shots and explosions were heard near the Government Palace in the capital, Bissau. The incident occurred as President Umaro Embalo was chairing a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Reports indicate that military forces have deployed to several locations of the capital city and have established a security perimeter around the Palace of Government and have stationed troops near the Palace of justice. Reports further indicate that the military may have entered the National Television station building, though these have not been verified. The situation in Guinea-Bissau remains fluid and the current whereabouts of President Embalo and Prime Minister Nuno Gomes Nabiam remain unclear.

Advisory

The situation is rapidly developing and MS Risk is currently closely monitoring events on the ground in Guinea-Bissau. Anyone currently in the country, including the capital city Bissau, is strongly advised to shelter in place, maintain close contact with their diplomatic representations, adhere to all instructions issued by the local authorities, including any possible curfew-related restrictions that could be imposed in the coming hours. Avoid government buildings, security installations, large concentrations of soldiers and police, and any demonstrations that may occur.  It is likely that security across the city will remain extremely tight in the coming hours. It is possible that local authorities could implement movement restrictions, which could potentially include curfews. Telecommunications could be restricted in the coming hours.

Revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: what will happen if diplomatic talks fail?

This report aims to talk about some potential consequences if diplomatic talks to reinstate the Iran Nuclear deal fail and how this could affect relationships between other global powers, mainly the United State and Iran, and the impact behind the likelihood of imposed sanctions upon Iran should talks collapse. Negotiations remain at a stalemate with neither side willing to compromise their national interests, despite countries maintaining that this deal is the best framework to address this situation.

In accordance with the JCPOA, signed by Iran and the P5 + 1, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to lift crippling economic sanctions if Iran agreed to limiting its nuclear activities and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unrestricted access to its factories with regular inspection. It also aimed at reducing much of Iran’s regional influence and moreover, relieve regional tensions between fellow rivals Israel and Saudi Arabia.

In 2018, under the then-Trump administration, the United States had abandoned the deal and reinstated economic sanctions, claiming the deal failed in its aims and so initiated a pressure campaign hoping that Iran would negotiate a deal that would further limit their ballistic capabilities. Following the re-imposition of sanctions Iran has begun stockpiling uranium beyond the levels agreed in the deal, while also developing centrifuges, increasing its acceleration of uranium enrichment.

President Biden expressed his desire to re-join the deal last year; but the US and Iran have since remained in indirect negotiations to revive the JCPOA with talks repeatedly faltering. Tehran remains sceptical of the US’ ability to provide sanctions that would be of viable economic benefit and want a binding treaty, which realistically cannot be guaranteed for the following future administrations nor would be passed in Senate. On the other hand, Washington is questioning whether they can secure the deal’s previous non-proliferation demands, following Iran’s significant nuclear development. Talks are rapidly reaching a decision point as Iran’s continued HEU growth will eventually become unattainable under the JCPOA.

There is a consensus that this deal presents the ideal framework to tackle this issue, but allied countries have since been thinking of alternate plans should talks fail, such as full implementation of sanctions to military operations, which would impair Iran’s nuclear program. These all present drawbacks that are otherwise unfavourable in the long term.

If talks were to fail, it is very likely that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will receive full support to reimplement full sanctions against Iran, despite the US having already done so without UNSC backing. However, the impact of this is arguable as Iran has since continued trading with other countries, such as China and Russia, regardless of the imposed sanctions. China and Iran have also signed an agreement bolstering economic ties between them. The sanctions therefore may not be as effective if such a trade continues. It is not within China and Russia’s interests to have a power with unchecked nuclear capability nor is it clear how willing the countries are to risk their own global trade to ally themselves with Iran. Consequently, relations are being strained over this potentiality.

Regardless of sanctions, it is also unlikely that Iran will be hindered from continuing with their nuclear programs. They have repeatedly insisted that their program is not for weapons applications, but this is impossible to confirm as with the end of the deal, Iran would likely never allow the IAEA to inspect their facilities, thereby providing them the opportunity of plausible deniability. However, it is unlikely that the US or other countries would dismiss the potentiality of Iran gaining a nuclear weapon and is likely to take military action to prevent this.

Regionally, Israel has mentioned and is gearing for a possible military confrontation if talks are unsuccessful. Iran and Israel have maintained a tenuous relationship and remains on shaky ground amidst the possible negotiations; Israel has remained uncompromising in its position that the JCPOA is too lenient and has tried to push away from negotiations, claiming them as fruitless. Tensions continue to rise with military exercises taking place in Iran in a blatant intimidation in response to talks between the US and Israel defence chiefs concerning possible military exercises in a worst-case scenario. Thus, it is likely that there will be an escalation of conflict, which will result in the rest of region being embroiled in conflict.

An ideal outcome for the west would be a return to the JCPOA but this seems unlikely given the harsh sanctions already implemented by the United States; they will not remove them unless Iran concedes. A compromise with both moderate sanction relief and moderate nuclear compromise, otherwise known as a ‘less-for-less’ deal, is the approach that Iran hopes for, but this would receive heavy criticism from the west.

Ethiopia Situation update (27 Jan 2022)

Despite security issues in East Africa centring around common themes and issues, by far the biggest threat to regional peace and stability remains in Ethiopia. This remains true for the end of 2021. There have however been several important shifts in the power dynamic in the ongoing war which has been fought for well over a year.

It is our judgement that several major identifiable factors have contributed to a recent shift in momentum, favouring the Ethiopian National army of the Abiy Ahmed regime (ENDF) in their war with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Abstract

By mid-November 2021, through a combination of protracted bush fighting and guerrilla tactics, the TPLF had taken (amongst others) two key strategic cities in Afar and Amhara regions. Tactically this this likely provided the TPLF with capability to launch an attack on Addis Ababa. The towns of Dessie and Kombolcha sat either side of the A2 highway. The A2 is the main arterial route between north and south Ethiopia and links Ethiopia with Eritrea and Djibouti. It is and remains vital for fuel, food aid and any movement of troops. Whilst in control of these positions, the TPLF refused to return over two hundred food aid trucks which would have been suitable for troop transport. It is our assessment that these factors increased the threat of the Tigrayan leadership mobilising their forces on Addis Ababa. Until early December the ENDF showed no demonstrable indication they were able to provide effective opposition.

The Current situation

On the 5^th of December, both Ethiopian news sources and trusted 3^rd party  outlets reported that ENDF had successfully retaken Dessie and Kombolcha from the TPLF. This was later confirmed by the official communication channels of the TPLF, referring to a “strategic repositioning”. In the TPLF retreat several UN food aid depots, local business, dry docks and homes were raided and emptied. These were coupled with widely reported cases of extreme sexual violence and non-judicial executions. After losing these positions, The TPLF were pushed back further into northern territories before losing another key position, the city of Lalibela. The loss of the three positions represented a huge reduction in any pre-established capability of the TPLF following through on their initial plans to capture Adidis Ababa and remove Abiy Ahmed.

As of late January, the TPLF have gone into full retreat and no longer occupy Amhara or Affar regions, with all troops now back inside Tigrayan state borders. The ENDF have been ordered to halt any counter operations and have stopped at the Tigrayan border. It is our best judgement that this provides the first and most significant opportunity for peace talks in a country with millions of people in desperate need of food assistance. Tigrayan Leader Debretsion Gebremicahel has stated his intention to use the change in the power dynamic as a catalyst for diplomatic talks.

Contributing Factors and Key Assessments

Ethiopia has been highly closed off to reporting during the past 14 months, it is however possible to make some assessment as to the nature of the TPLF retreat and defeat. Open Source satellite imagery analysis first reported by Al Jazeera and confirmed by the US state department has shown an airbridge of private charter flights originating in the UAE performing frequent weapons deliveries to Addis Ababa. The jets, which are chartered privately through 3^rdparty nations have been confirmed to be carrying Chinese, Iranian and Turkish UAV equipment and weapons. We judge that the timing of these deliveries in relation to the resurgence of the ENDF is likely too significant to ignore.

Further assessment of the nature of the two belligerents likely indicates the lack in TPLF ability to conduct conventional warfare against a standing state force. With years of guerrilla and bush war experience, their capture of the towns pointed to success in rural conflict zones, but an in ability to hold strategic cities so far from their central command and control structure.

As of the ICOD, neither side has commenced meaningful talks, but hostilities on the ground appear to have cooled off. It should be noted that Tigrayan state media and government communications is still reporting daily government drone activity in Tigray. But at this time, it is not possible to fully confirm the validity of these claims.