MS Risk Blog

North Korea: Craving Attention

Following Kim Jong Un’s 10^th anniversary in power, the North Korean regime has stepped up its missile game with 7 missile tests in January 2022, the biggest show of strength since 2017. UN resolutions prohibit North Korea, which is largely politically isolated, from testing such missiles, which, depending on their design, can also carry a nuclear warhead. In fact, the missiles that have been used in January prove that North Korea has been capable of improving its missile technology. The regime has been sanctioned over the years and its economy has been moreover significantly affected by the self-isolation of the country during the COVID-19 pandemic. While some analysts see these exercises as part of the North Korean military’s winter exercises, there are three other explanations for this trend.

The main explanation is that North Korea wants to stay as a relevant actor in the international arena. With these tests the regime aims at projecting an image of self-sufficient country, capable of developing advanced technology and a relevant actor that can force changes in the regional and international balance of power. In 2022 there will be important events in the region, including the Beijing winter Olympics in February and the presidential elections in South Korea in March. If the conservative candidate Yoon Suk Yeol won the elections in South Korea, he would be expected to take a harder line against the North Korean regime, probably meaning a maximum disregard for the very fact of the existence of another Korean state. Kim Jon Un’s absence of an announcement on North Korea’s foreign policy direction in 2022 has been interpreted as a way of having “strategic flexibility” amid these uncertainties. Internationally, the fact that the US is paying more attention to the crisis in Ukraine or China-Taiwan relations is felt by the regime as a disdain. As a response, North Korea has fired an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), which would be able to strike the US territory of Guam in the Pacific Ocean. These tests could harm Biden’s foreign policy reputation, already damaged by US missteps in Afghanistan and the threat posed by Russia in Europe.

A second explanation is that North Korea seeks US concessions. The missiles are a rejection of US sanctions on the country and a rejection of Biden’s proposal on diplomatic talks, which have been seen as insufficient. In 2021 Kim rejected US offers to negotiate on denuclearisation, talks that have been stalled since Kim-Trump’s summit in Hanoi in 2019, arguing that the US had a “hostile” attitude towards NK. North Korea would like the US to lift economic sanctions, withdraw US troops in South Korea and suspend South Korea-US military drills in the area. The strategic flexibility that the regime is following in 2022 allows them to recalibrate North Korea’s strategy to exert pressure on the US. At the moment, exerting maximum pressure is seen as the only way of pushing the US to make concessions and start negotiations again. This is because the North Korean regime does not consider itself in a weak position vis-à-vis the White House. First of all, Kim Jong-un believes that he can achieve no greater gains through negotiation than showing his operational nuclear deterrent. Second, his regime has gambled that his ballistic tests alone will not be capable of triggering an American intervention.

However, it is not clear that Pyongyang is adequately managing the risk of accidental escalation. The hypothesis of a US attack in response to a missile launch cannot be totally excluded, since Joe Biden must give guarantees to his Asian allies. This scenario would have serious consequences, especially in a tense context between the US administration and China, North Korea’s main supporter. Ultimately, the behaviour of the Americans raises questions about their ability to propose a readable road map for the Korean peninsula. The organisation of a negotiation that establishes both the technical parameters of an agreement on North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic programs and the first steps towards a return to regional stability (a condition for the “freezing of the dangerous situation” to lead to a long-term solution), seems unattainable at this point. Not only is the US administration incapable of orchestrating Biden’s strategy (if he has one like his predecessor), but the US’s geopolitical weakness accentuates its regional allies’ loss of confidence in expanded deterrence. Under these conditions, there is a real risk that North Korean launches will generate a dynamic of regional nuclear proliferation.

Finally, a third explanation is that, beyond a show of force against President Joe Biden and his allies – first of all, South Korea – these missile launches appear to be a means of diverting the North Korean population’s attention from the growing internal difficulties and, specifically, food shortages. The country’s pre-pandemic scenario was already extremely delicate, with 40% of its population – around 10.5 million people – suffering from malnutrition and 70% of the country depending on food aid, according to a United Nations report. Now, with the huge increase in food shortages caused by the lack of Chinese imports the condition of North Korean citizens is increasingly precarious. From the government they state that the food crisis is mostly due to the economic and commercial sanctions imposed by the United States and the United Nations and due to the natural disasters that impact the country every year (floods, typhons); added to the severe health and financial crisis that has hit the world since 2020. Based on this explanation, the north Korean regime wouldn’t be so interested in starting denuclearisation negotiations again, but rather in continuing with its military build-up for itsfive-year plan to develop its defence technology and military system and for reinforcing Kim’s legitimacy in front of the NK people.

Regardless of which explanation is more accurate, the fact is that analysts firmly believe that north Korea will probably continue undertaking missile tests and holding military parades. The regime wants to remain a popular international actor and to have US attention amid escalating tensions in other parts of the globe. Moreover, it is the right time for Kim to increase his internal popularity.

Heightened fears of conflict on the Russia-Ukraine Border

The primary security concern across Eastern Europe in January remained the Russian military build-up in Russia’s southern region and US and NATO fears of an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine. A Kremlin decision in the first week of January to dispatch troops as part of a CSTO mission to quell political unrest in Kazakhstan exacerbated western fears of Russian expansionist intentions. A series of diplomatic talks between Russian, US and NATO delegations followed but appeared to offer little hope for a resolution, as Russian demands on NATO to withdraw forces from Eastern Europe and commit to a restriction against Ukrainian membership were continually rebuffed, while western calls for Russia to deescalate the crisis by withdrawing troops from the Ukrainian border were ignored. Later in the month, US intelligence alleged that Russian operatives were active in Ukraine and planning to stage a false-flag incident to provide a justification for military action against Ukraine, accusations which Russian officials strongly denied. On 17 January Russian military forces began to move into Belarus, ostensibly in preparation for joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises in February, but further inflaming western fears that the Kremlin was preparing for a two-pronged assault into Ukraine while maintaining a pretense of diplomatic de-escalation efforts.

By the end of January, relations appeared to have deteriorated significantly, with a flurry of negotiations between Western states as NATO members offered military support to Ukraine and Eastern European neighbors. Russian officials expressed little hope for negotiations as NATO continued to refuse any concessions on Moscow’s security demands. Despite continued insistences that Russia does not want war, further expanded Russian military deployments to Belarus and the Ukrainian border as well as indicators such as cyber-attacks against Ukrainian government websites and the stockpiling of blood supplies as part of Russia’s preparations have made the prospect of conflict appear more real than at any point since the crisis began. Looking ahead, it is difficult to anticipate what course the situation on the Russia-Ukrainian border will take in the next months, appearing to entirely depend on whether the Kremlin will instigate some form of conflict or choose instead to de-escalate by withdrawing its forces.

Several factors may lead to the conclusion that Vladimir Putin will choose not to attack Ukraine. Recent Russian conflicts, such as in Syria or the annexation of Crimea, have primarily emphasized the use of ‘low cost’ and low casualty methods of airstrikes, hybrid warfare, mercenaries and maskirovka to secure strategic aims. However, during the Ukraine Crisis the US and NATO allies have utilized strategies to increase potential casualties from an attack on Ukraine. US intelligence agencies negated the element of surprise by announcing an anticipated attack early, negating the possibility of any plausible deniability. In addition, the US and allies have increased the likely costliness of an attack in terms of casualties by supplying Ukraine with armaments and security assistance, and by threatening a coordinated suite of sanctions in the event of conflict which would be likely to significantly impact the Russian economy. While western governments have almost entirely ruled out direct intervention in any conflict, it is likely that lethal support to Ukraine would increase dramatically. It is also possible that the Russian government may have never intended to attack Ukraine and that the military build-up on the border was a carefully engineered bluff, designed to coerce concessions from the US and NATO.

However, the crisis on the Ukrainian border, which has now lasted for nearly two months, may have gone on for too long to allow a dignified de-escalation without some form of gain for Russia. If the military build-up had been designed as a bluff to secure concessions, then the bluff has been called by the US and NATO who have flatly refused all of Russia’s extremely ambitious demands, with both sides adhering to their respective ‘red lines’. The maintenance of such substantial military forces at a state of readiness in both Ukraine and Belarus must also be placing a significant and growing financial burden on the Russian government which will have gone to waste if nothing is achieved. If true, more recent US intelligence accusations that Russia is planning to fabricate a false-flag provocation may signal that the Kremlin is attempting to retrieve a possibility of plausible deniability, while claims of a plot to replace the Ukrainian government with a more favourable regime may indicate that Russia is seeking to find a new ‘low cost’ method to achieve its goals in Ukraine. While NATO responses have made a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine extremely costly and unlikely, it is a distinct possibility that the Russian Federation will engage in some form of limited conflict in the Ukraine region within the near future in order to avoid a clear ‘loss’ to NATO. Such an action might entail a small ‘flashpoint’ between Russian and Ukrainian forces as a pretext to return to the negotiating table with amended demands which might be accepted by the West.

Failed Coup in Guinea-Bissau (2 Feb 2022)

Guinea-Bissau’s President Umaro Sissoco Embalo survived an attempted coup on Tuesday 1 February, though he said that many members of the security forces had been killed repelling an attack on democracy that may have been linked to drug trafficking. Heightened security is likely to persist in Guinea-Bissau through at least mid-February after the foiled coup attempt against President Embalo’s government. Official government sources indicate that at least six people – four attackers and two guards – were killed and several others were injured during gunfire exchanges near the Government Palace in the capital, Bissau.

Earlier in the day, heavy gunfire rang out near a government compound where the president was chairing a meeting. The situation remained unclear for several hours, during which both the African Union (AU) and West African bloc ECOWAS condemned what they called “an attempted coup.” At around 17:20, military forces loyal to the Embalo government reportedly entered the Palace of Government and also deployed to several locations within the nation’s capital. They established a security perimeter around the palace, with troops also stationed near the Palace of Justice.

Appearing on Tuesday evening in a video posted on the presidency’s Facebook page, President Embalo stated that attackers had tried to enter the compound just after the cabinet meeting but had been repelled. He went on to say that “it wasn’t just a coup. It was an attempt to kill the president, the prime minister and all the cabinet,” adding that the attack “was well prepared and organized and could also be related to people involved in drug trafficking,” giving no further details. Guinea-Bissau is viewed by the United Nations as a major waypoint for Latin American cocaine headed for Europe. US and European authorities have long suspected that some in the country’s military are involved in the drug trade. During the video on Tuesday, President Embalo suggested that the army was not involved in the attack, stating, “I can assure you that no camp joined this attempted coup. It was isolated. It is linked to people we have fought against,” without elaborating. He also disclosed that arrests had begun of people involved, tough he did not disclose how many were detained. At around 10:00 on Tuesday morning, President Embalo had begun chairing an extraordinary cabinet meeting, entering the government palace with a heavy security detail, a diplomatic source reported. While he was present in the building, gunfire began outside. The cabinet meeting was being held to prepare for a forthcoming ECOWAS summit on 3 February in response to last week’s military takeover in Burkina Faso.

Advisory

Heightened security is likely to persist in Guinea-Bissau through at least mid-February after the foiled coup attempt against President Embalo’s government. Forces in Bissau are likely to maintain an elevated security posture until the situation stabilizes. Additional clashes between rival forces cannot currently be ruled out. Additional security measures, including checkpoints and random searches of vehicles and pedestrians may be carried out in the coming days. Authorities may also impose an overnight curfew, should the situation destabilize. Anyone currently in Guinea-Bissau should shelter in place, maintain close contact with their diplomatic representation, and adhere to all instructions issued by the local authorities. This includes possible curfew-related restrictions. Government buildings, security installations, large groupings of police and soldiers, and any demonstrations should be avoided.

Possible Coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau (1 Feb 2022)

Reports have emerged of a possible coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau. As of Tuesday 1 February evening, the situation in the country remains tense in the wake of an incident that occurred earlier in the day. This incident has been described by both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as an attempted coup. At around 15:00, shots and explosions were heard near the Government Palace in the capital, Bissau. The incident occurred as President Umaro Embalo was chairing a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Reports indicate that military forces have deployed to several locations of the capital city and have established a security perimeter around the Palace of Government and have stationed troops near the Palace of justice. Reports further indicate that the military may have entered the National Television station building, though these have not been verified. The situation in Guinea-Bissau remains fluid and the current whereabouts of President Embalo and Prime Minister Nuno Gomes Nabiam remain unclear.

Advisory

The situation is rapidly developing and MS Risk is currently closely monitoring events on the ground in Guinea-Bissau. Anyone currently in the country, including the capital city Bissau, is strongly advised to shelter in place, maintain close contact with their diplomatic representations, adhere to all instructions issued by the local authorities, including any possible curfew-related restrictions that could be imposed in the coming hours. Avoid government buildings, security installations, large concentrations of soldiers and police, and any demonstrations that may occur.  It is likely that security across the city will remain extremely tight in the coming hours. It is possible that local authorities could implement movement restrictions, which could potentially include curfews. Telecommunications could be restricted in the coming hours.

Revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: what will happen if diplomatic talks fail?

This report aims to talk about some potential consequences if diplomatic talks to reinstate the Iran Nuclear deal fail and how this could affect relationships between other global powers, mainly the United State and Iran, and the impact behind the likelihood of imposed sanctions upon Iran should talks collapse. Negotiations remain at a stalemate with neither side willing to compromise their national interests, despite countries maintaining that this deal is the best framework to address this situation.

In accordance with the JCPOA, signed by Iran and the P5 + 1, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to lift crippling economic sanctions if Iran agreed to limiting its nuclear activities and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unrestricted access to its factories with regular inspection. It also aimed at reducing much of Iran’s regional influence and moreover, relieve regional tensions between fellow rivals Israel and Saudi Arabia.

In 2018, under the then-Trump administration, the United States had abandoned the deal and reinstated economic sanctions, claiming the deal failed in its aims and so initiated a pressure campaign hoping that Iran would negotiate a deal that would further limit their ballistic capabilities. Following the re-imposition of sanctions Iran has begun stockpiling uranium beyond the levels agreed in the deal, while also developing centrifuges, increasing its acceleration of uranium enrichment.

President Biden expressed his desire to re-join the deal last year; but the US and Iran have since remained in indirect negotiations to revive the JCPOA with talks repeatedly faltering. Tehran remains sceptical of the US’ ability to provide sanctions that would be of viable economic benefit and want a binding treaty, which realistically cannot be guaranteed for the following future administrations nor would be passed in Senate. On the other hand, Washington is questioning whether they can secure the deal’s previous non-proliferation demands, following Iran’s significant nuclear development. Talks are rapidly reaching a decision point as Iran’s continued HEU growth will eventually become unattainable under the JCPOA.

There is a consensus that this deal presents the ideal framework to tackle this issue, but allied countries have since been thinking of alternate plans should talks fail, such as full implementation of sanctions to military operations, which would impair Iran’s nuclear program. These all present drawbacks that are otherwise unfavourable in the long term.

If talks were to fail, it is very likely that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will receive full support to reimplement full sanctions against Iran, despite the US having already done so without UNSC backing. However, the impact of this is arguable as Iran has since continued trading with other countries, such as China and Russia, regardless of the imposed sanctions. China and Iran have also signed an agreement bolstering economic ties between them. The sanctions therefore may not be as effective if such a trade continues. It is not within China and Russia’s interests to have a power with unchecked nuclear capability nor is it clear how willing the countries are to risk their own global trade to ally themselves with Iran. Consequently, relations are being strained over this potentiality.

Regardless of sanctions, it is also unlikely that Iran will be hindered from continuing with their nuclear programs. They have repeatedly insisted that their program is not for weapons applications, but this is impossible to confirm as with the end of the deal, Iran would likely never allow the IAEA to inspect their facilities, thereby providing them the opportunity of plausible deniability. However, it is unlikely that the US or other countries would dismiss the potentiality of Iran gaining a nuclear weapon and is likely to take military action to prevent this.

Regionally, Israel has mentioned and is gearing for a possible military confrontation if talks are unsuccessful. Iran and Israel have maintained a tenuous relationship and remains on shaky ground amidst the possible negotiations; Israel has remained uncompromising in its position that the JCPOA is too lenient and has tried to push away from negotiations, claiming them as fruitless. Tensions continue to rise with military exercises taking place in Iran in a blatant intimidation in response to talks between the US and Israel defence chiefs concerning possible military exercises in a worst-case scenario. Thus, it is likely that there will be an escalation of conflict, which will result in the rest of region being embroiled in conflict.

An ideal outcome for the west would be a return to the JCPOA but this seems unlikely given the harsh sanctions already implemented by the United States; they will not remove them unless Iran concedes. A compromise with both moderate sanction relief and moderate nuclear compromise, otherwise known as a ‘less-for-less’ deal, is the approach that Iran hopes for, but this would receive heavy criticism from the west.