MS Risk Blog

France to Stage Mock Fan Zone Attack as it Prepares to Host Euro 2016

According to sources, officials and security services from the football tournament’s ten host cities will take part in the counter-terrorism exercise, which is due to take place on 16 March in the southern city of Nimes.

Fan zones are thought to be areas that are at most risk as thousands of supporters from France and the twenty-three other competing nations congregate in confined spaces.

Last year, France endured several terror attacks, including the November coordinated attacks in Paris, which resulted in the deaths of 130 people. One of the targets was the Stade de France, which is the venue for the 10 July final game. On 13 November, three suicide bombers detonated their devices outside the stadium as France played Germany, killing themselves and one other person. At least one of the bombers reportedly tried to enter the stadium but was turned away.

Jihadist Threat Appears to Be Spreading Across West Africa as AQIM Turns Focus on Soft Targets

The 13 March 2016 shooting rampage on a beach resort in Ivory Coast is the latest in a series of high-profile assaults that have occurred in northern and Western Africa. The attack is also the latest sign in what appears to be al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) shift in focus to soft targets that are associated with foreigners in an effort to destabilize economies and to gain the group credibility amongst jihadis in its ongoing rivalry with the so-called Islamic State (IS) group.

On Sunday, three gunmen targeted the Grand Bassam beach resort, killing 18 people. AQIM has since claimed responsibility of the attack, as the terror group increasingly moving out of its desert stronghold and into urban city centres. IN recent months, AQIM has carried out devastating attacks that have seen militants target luxury hotels frequented by foreigners.

While AQIM was once known for striking military posts in Algeria and neighbouring countries, such attacks made little impact internationally. Since November 2015, AQIM has carried out three major attacks. The first occurred when gunmen targeted a hotel in Mali, and then in January, a similar attack was carried out in Burkina Faso. On Sunday, the moved even farther south, to an Ivorian resort popular with tourists and locals alike. AQIM is effectively moving its strategy from operating in northern Mali and neighbouring states, to city centres, where attacks not only leave high numbers of causalities and cause fear but also strike at the heart of the economy of the affected nation and business confidence of the surrounding region.

The recent attacks in the region are generally viewed as targeting France and its allies, after Paris intervened militarily in Mali in 2013 to drive out al-Qaeda-linked militants who had seized the desert north a year earlier.

Sunday’s attack also raises fears of where they might strike next, and poses serious security questions for former regional colonial power France, which has thousands of citizens and troops in the region. While some 18,000 French citizens live in Ivory Coast, over 20,000 reside in Senegal. France also has 3,500 troops in the region, from Senegal in the far west to Chad. A French military base in Abidjan, which is manned by around 800 soldiers, serves as a logistical hub for regional operations against Islamist militancy in the Sahel.

Here is an overview of the worst such attacks that have occurred over the past year, all of which have been claimed by jihadist groups:

2016

• 13 March – At least 15 civilians and three special forces troops are killed when gunmen storm the Ivory Coast beach resort of Grand-Bassam. According to the government, one French and one German national are amongst the dead. Al-Qaeda’s North African branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), claim responsibility for the attack, which is the first to occur in Ivory Coast.
• 15 January – Thirty people, including many foreigners, are killed in at attack on a top Burkina Faso hotel and a nearby restaurant in the capital Ouagadougou. AQIM claims the assault, stating that the gunmen were from the al-Murabitoun group of Algerian extremist Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

2015

• 20 November – Gunmen take guests and staff hostage at the luxury Radisson Blu hotel in the Malian capital of Bamako. The siege leaves at least twenty people, including fourteen foreigners, dead. The attack is later claimed by AQIM, which says it was a joint operation with the al-Murabitoun group. Another jihadist group from central Mali, the Macina Liberation Front, also claims responsibility for the attack.
• 31 October – A Russian passenger jet is downed on its way from Egypt’s Sharm el-Sheikh resort to Saint Petersburg, Russia, killing all 224 people on board. The Egyptian branch of the Islamic State (IS) group claims responsibility. Russia confirms that the crash was caused by a bomb.
• 26 June – Thirty Britons are amongst 38 foreign holidaymakers killed in a gun and grenade attack on a beach resort near the Tunisian city of Sousse. The attack is claimed by IS.
• 18 March – Gunmen kill 21 tourists and a policeman at the Bardo Museum in Tunis, Tunisia. The attack is claimed by IS.
• 7 March – A grenade and gun attack on La Terrasse nightclub in the Malian capital Bamako kills five people – three Malians, a Belgian and a Frenchman. The attack is claimed by al-Murabitoun.

AQIM Gunmen Launch Attack in Southern Ivory Coast

On Sunday 13 March, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) gunmen launched an attack in Ivory Coast, killing 18 people, including four Europeans, at a beach resort town in the West African country. Six shooters targeted the Chelsea Hotel and Hotel Etoile due Sud, which are located on a beach at the Grand Bassam – popular with westerners and which is located about 40 km (25 miles) east of the commercial capital Abidjan. Witnesses reported that the gunmen followed a pathway onto the beach where they opened fire on swimmers and sunbathers before turning their attention to t he packed seafront hotels where people were eating and drinking at lunchtime. The gunmen were later killed by security forces. Foreign citizens from France, Germany, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Mali were amongst those killed. Ivorian authorities have launched an investigation into the attack.

According to US-based SITE intelligence monitoring group, AQIM, which has carried out other recent attacks in the region, claimed responsibility for Sunday’s shootings. In a statement, it indicated that the attack had been carried out by just three militants. 

Security Advisory

Sunday’s attack in Ivory Coast comes barely two months after Islamist militants killed dozens of people in a hotel and café frequented by foreigners in neighboring Burkina Faso’s capital city Ouagadougou. In November 2015, gunmen also attacked a hotel in the Malian capital Bamako. Both of these attacks were also claimed by AQIM and raised concern that the militant group was expanding its area of operation far beyond their traditional zones of operation in the Sahara and the arid Sahel region.

While the Ivory Coast was previously untouched by Islamist violence, despite its proximity to countries that have severely been affected, in the wake of the two deadly attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso, analysts warned of further such attacks across the region, including in Ivory Coast. In the wake of the attack in Ouagadougou, Ivory Coast was on high alert, with security visibly bolstered at potential targets, including shopping centres and high-end hotels. While security was also increased in the northern regions of the country, particularly near the borders with Mali in a bid to keep Islamist militants out, Grand Bassam is located in the south on the Atlantic Coast, indicating that the militants have not just cross the border, but may also have a greater presence in the country. It also further demonstrates the capacity of jihadists to blend into the public and strike soft targets.

This threat is spreading across West Africa and will likely result in further similar attacks carried out in other countries in the region. Regional government will now have to focus on increasing their policing, as well as intelligence gathering and will need to act both individually and collectively. This may also result in France increasing its military campaign in the region as it looks to protected its vast and entrenched interests in its former colonies.

Strategic intentions behind the Iranian 2015 JCPOA

Islamic Republic of Iran test-fires ballistic missiles for two consecutive days. In the Alborz Mountains in the northern area of Tehran, on Tuesday 08^th March, a medium range missile was successfully tested covering a range of 750km. The following day at the same lunching site a further test was performed to establish the nation’s longer range capabilities; covering over 1400km, landing in the south-east part of the country. We assess that such range and proved capabilities poses a plausible threat to neighbor’s countries. Missiles are capable of reaching Iran’s archenemy Israel in the event of a potential direct attack. This is causing friction and tensions within the international arena raising questions over the violation of UNSC resolutions and the current nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers.

Since January 2016, Tehran met the demands for implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Despite these developments, Iran presents an enduring threat due to its support to regional terrorist and militant groups and the Assad regime. A key agenda item within the Iranian regime is the development of advanced military capabilities. Tehran views itself as leading the “axis of resistance” which includes the Assad regime and subnational militia groups aligned with Iran, especially Lebanese Hezbollah (considered an international terrorist organization by the U.S.) and Iraqi Shia militants; all antagonist of Israel.

Iran support to the Shia group Hezbollah is of particular interest considering the hardening of the Lebanese current scenario. There are indications arising from recent events of an alleged Hezbollah plan to take over Beirut by purposely bombing the organization’s own munition factories as well as military positions of the Lebanese army. It is believed that Hezbollah in cooperation with forces in the Lebanese army may plan to initiate a wave of attacks against its own facilities in Lebanon which will give it legitimacy to cease Beirut. A clear indicator of the unfolding of this events is the current fighting between opposition and government supporters; on the 9^th of March after a series of armed attacks Hezbollah ceased most of western Beirut.

Iranian long standing position is to undermine Israel; the supreme leader expressed his belief in several occasions by clearly stating that Israel as a country will not exist within the next 25 years. The country wishes Israel to cease existing but there is no gathered evidence of any intentions in engaging into a direct conflict, at least in the medium term.

The JCPOA played the important role of enhancing the transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities. A broader access has been granted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other investigative authorities under the Additional Protocol in line with the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement. As a result, the international community is well postured to promptly detect changes to Iran’s declared nuclear facilities designed to shorten the time Iran would need to produce fissile material. Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about a year. Furthermore the JCPOA also provides tools for the IAEA to investigate possible breaches of prohibitions on specific unauthorized R&D.

Iran most likely views the JCPOA as a mean to uplift sanctions while preserving some of its nuclear capabilities and a safe option to eventually expand its nuclear infrastructure. However, it is unclear wheatear or not Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.

We assess with a moderate degree of confidence that the strategic objectives of implementing and enhancing regional influence, prestige, security, financial and economic ties with several players both domestically and internationally will lead to pursue the required capabilities in the research and development of nuclear energy and technological industry. This will indivertibly confer the ability to build deliverable RCBNs in the event that such political choice will be made. The lack of foreseeable technical barriers within the production process makes Iran’s political will the central issue. The pursuit of this strategy will define its level of adherence to the JCPOA over time.

We judge that, in the event of deploying RCBNs, Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred delivering system. Tests run in the last days are indicators or proven capabilities in terms of delivery system. The U.S. intelligence community assessed that Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and they are inherently capable of delivering WMD.

The country’s desire to deter the United States and its allies provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including ICBMs. A supplementary area of concern for the global security industry is the Iran’s progress on space launch vehicles. It has been reported to cooperate with Russia and China both technologically and financially in gaining ground in the ongoing outer space race.

The Balkan Migrant Crisis Has Worsened

There has long been a fear that Greece will become the victim of a bottleneck through the Balkans. This often discussed fear has finally become a reality. On March 8, three Balkan nations joined with a growing number of countries imposing increasingly restrictive immigration policies. Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia announced they would only allow people to cross their borders if they already possessed valid visas. This would effectively stop the thousands of migrants in Greece from moving north in an attempt to reach asylum in Germany. Also on March 9, Macedonia announced it would no longer allow migrants to freely enter the country. One report estimated that 13,000-15,000 migrants were currently living in makeshift camps near Greece’s border with Macedonia. Though exact estimates differ, numerous media organizations reported on March 9 that over 35,000 migrants from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan are currently inside Greece. The number is expected to rise as more migrants land on mainland Greece and islands near the border with Turkey.

This last development puts even greater pressure on Greece. However, it also poses new challenges for other countries in the region. Hungary had seen a drop in migrants attempting to enter the country after it built a border fence and increased penalties for entering illegally. According to the Washington Post, over 2500 people were arrested for attempting to enter Hungary in February (far higher than previous months). Bulgaria and Albania have both increased monitoring are their borders with Greece. The Italian Government is particularly concerned migrants about migrants reaching the Albanian cost and then crossing the Adriatic Sea to Italy. As a result, the two countries announced they would conduct joint military patrols in the Adriatic Sea.

The European Union’s latest attempt to handle the crisis has come under considerable public criticism and legal scrutiny. On March 8, EU and Turkish leaders announced a new plan to return discourage further migrants from attempting the dangerous trip to Greece. The plan indicated that all undocumented migrants arriving in Greece would returned to Turkey. In exchange, the Turkish Government had requested that the EU resettle one Syrian migrant for each returned to Turkey (the so-called ‘one for one’ policy). As part of the plan, the EU also pledged to more quickly implement visa-free travel for Turks and faster approval of a €3 billion Euro aid package. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has criticised the agreement as a violation of the EU’s international obligations and the European Convention on Human Rights. Even if the plan is not stopped by a legal challenge, it is unclear when it would be fully implemented.