MS Risk Blog

Increase in coca cultivation in Colombia signals changing trends in post-conflict political economy

When it comes to Colombia and the US’ bilateral relationship, coca cultivation remains a hot – and controversial –  topic. Indeed, one of the main objectives of Plan Colombia was to reduce coca cultivation, often with methods that were opposed by local communities. Washington continues to closely monitor the crops cultivated in Colombia and if there are any noticeable changes, the US tends to be pretty vocal on the topic. Therefore, it is little surprise that the recent attention gained in national and international media around the increasing number of hectares dedicated to coca cultivation was sparked by a statement made by the US Ambassador in March. However, it is necessary to analyse what the recent uptick in production tells us about the changing patterns of illicit economic activity in Colombia, particularly in the context of the move towards a post-conflict environment, following the ongoing peace process between the government and guerrilla groups (FARC and the ELN).

According to the US Embassy’s report, the figures produced by the Whitehouse’s National Office on the Control of Drugs showed that between 2013-2015 the number of hectares of coca cultivated increased by 42%. This means that despite the ongoing well-funded fight against drugs, Colombia has once again become again the number one cocaine producer in the world.

While these numbers could point to failing policies in the fight against drug cultivation, closer analysis underlines that the rise has more to do with changing patterns in the areas being cultivated. Since May 2015 the Colombian government has prohibited the use of spraying glyphosate to eradicate crops, and has instead favoured other methods – likely less effective, if less harmful – such as manual eradication. The reason behind the reforms are primarily driven by the noted effects of glyphosate on the health of those living in such areas, and the government’s changing strategy to tackle illicit cultivation in the country by encouraging investment, rather than further alienating local populations. What the figures do tell us are that the areas where cultivation has increased are likely to present some of the most pressing challenges in the coming years, because beyond coca they are breeding grounds for other illicit economic activities.

Since October 2015 the new anti-drugs policy has reformed the previous strategy on crop eradication. One of the six key points includes substitution cultivation and voluntary eradication to incentivise planting other types of crops and productive initiatives. As our analysis on the passing of the Law on zones of rural, economic and social development (Zidres) outlined, part of the post-conflict strategy is to develop agricultural and agroindustrial initiatives in the country. Many in rural areas such as North Santander region or Orinoquía -where anti-drug policies are being implemented- are, at the same time, places of interest for economic agroindustrial projects. The potential connection between these new projects and drug eradication methods is likely to be a big concern for future investors and the government.

According to the figures released by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in 2015, during the year 2014 most of the coca cultivation areas were in the south of the country, in particular in Caquetá, Cauca, Nariño, Putumayo and Catatumbo. The report also underlines that coca cultivation remains dominant in the regions it has traditionally thrived, rather than spreading to other areas. However, these areas are now also home to other illicit economic activities – most notably, and of likely concern to international companies in the extractives sector, illegal mining. Moreover, the growing number of hectares used for coca cultivation are primarily concentrated in areas of increased activities of BACRIM (organised crime groups), guerrillas and other organised crime groups.

Coca cultivation has directly aided guerrilla groups, paramilitaries and other armed groups in financing their activities in Colombia in recent decades. The continued prevalence of coca underlines that despite the ongoing peace process taking place between the government and guerrilla groups, narco-trafficking and other illicit activities are likely to remain a key challenge in many regions.

In particular, it should be noted that:

• While the new policies tackling drug cultivation can be considered a triumph for many local communities in the south of the country, who had suffered greatly from the previous eradication methods, the increase in cultivation alongside other illicit activities will continue to directly affect the local social and environmental climate (eg illegal mining and logging). Moreover, the heavy presence of armed groups in the south, alongside the plans for reconstruction and development in these regions, points to the potential for armed conflict to continue at a localised level, even if Colombia is technically entering into a “post-conflict” state.
• The change in anti-drug policy also opens up the possibility to invest in the areas where coca is grown. Such investment is likely to pose significant challenges when assessing narco-trafficking routes in the country, the demobilisation of the FARC, the role that illegal mining now plays in areas with high levels of coca cultivation and in particular the change in dynamics between local and national institutions,  armed groups and local populations in each region. A few years ago former president Alvaro Uribe attempted to increase the presence of the state in such areas where coca was cultivated and control local populations. However, the measures saw coca cultivation move to increasingly remote rural areas where there was little state presence and armed groups moved, expanding narco-trafficking routes. This serves as an example of how trying to impose state control in rural areas, without negotiating with armed groups with a presence in the region, can have unintended implications. In particular, with the likely demobilisation of FARC, these efforts may enable the expansion of the areas of influence of other armed groups.

WHAT TO LOOK FOR

The Colombian government’s push to develop agroindustrial projects, alongside substituting coca for other productive crops, is aimed at tackling the social and local economic development issues in regions where armed groups have historically been their most prolific. However, the model could proffer explosive political and social consequences, when combining the development projects, alongside anti-drug policies, and the continued presence of demobilised guerrillas and other organised criminal groups in the same region.

Rafael Pardo, the Minister for post-conflict has outlined that substitution cultivation plans will be inherent with the peace policies that are being implemented in the country. However, the increase in coca cultivation outlines the continued threat that organised criminal activity will have for future investors in these regions, even if the country is no longer in a state of armed conflict. Importantly, it should be noted that where coca cultivation takes place, so too does arms trafficking, labs for processing the coca to cocaine, and other illicit trades that armed groups have traditionally derived their income from. In particular investors looking at agricultural and mining projects are likely to face hostility from the unregulated illegal sectors operating at a local level. The rise in illegal mining in regions of coca production also poses severe social and environmental impacts, which have negative implications in terms of trust and reputation for extractive companies potentially interested in working in these areas.

These regions have historically had a limited state presence and many local industries are often in some way associated with organised criminal or guerrilla groups operating there. Foreign companies looking to make the most of investing in Colombia’s post-conflict economic opportunities, must be sure to carry out detailed local due diligence. However, the substitution cultivation plans do offer companies the possibility to also support local farmers, and cooperatives, to increase productivity and offer rural regions access to larger economic markets. Understanding the local dynamics and supporting local communities will be key for building successful operations in Colombia ahead.

Rise in Child Bombers in Nigeria

The United Nations child agency has reported that Boko Haram’s use of child bombes has increased over the last year, with one in five suicide attacks being carried out by children.

According to a new report, girls, who are often drugged, were behind three-quarters of such attacks that were committed by the militant Islamist group in Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria. This represents an 11-fold increase, with four such attacks carried out in 2014, compared to 44 the next year, including January 2016. Analysts note that this change in tactics reflects the group’s loss of territory in Nigeria over the past several months. A regional offensive by Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon last year drove Boko Haram from much of its territory it held in northern Nigeria, effectively undermining its six-year campaign to carve out an Islamist caliphate. Despite this loss of territory, the militants have struck back with suicide bombing and hit-and-run attacks targeting civilians.

Meanwhile aid agency Mercy Corps reported on Monday that Boko Haram has lured young entrepreneurs and business owners in northeastern Nigeria to join the Islamist group by providing or promising capital and loans to boost their businesses. According to Mercy Corps, seeing successful business ownership as a way to escape poverty, many Nigerian youths, ranging from butchers and beauticians to tailors and traders, have accepted loans for their businesses in return for joining Boko Haram. The report from the US-based aid agency notes however that this lure of business support is often a trap, as those who cannot repay their loans are either forced to join the militants or are killed. Report author and Mercy Corps peacebuilding adviser Lisa Inks has disclosed that “Boko Haram is tapping into the yearning of Nigerian youth to get ahead in an environment of massive inequality,” adding, “it is incredibly clever – either such loans breed loyalty or Boko Haram use mafia style tactics to trap and force young people to join them.”

According to the latest statistics released by Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics, six in ten Nigerians live in absolute poverty, on less than one dollar a day, a figure which rises to three quarters of the population in the northeastern region of the country. Many young people told Mercy Corps that they would struggle without the support of powerful “godfathers” to provide capital for their businesses, or cash transfers for equipment and goods. Mercy Corps, which conducted interviews with 145 people including young former Boko Haram members, family of former members and youths who resisted joining, has reported that Bok Haram has therefore been able to fill a critical gap in financial services.

The report has called for increased access to financial and business services, more support for conflict-hit communities and greater efforts to reintegrate people who have fled the militant group.

Guinea Ebola Case Toll Climbs to Seven

Despite the World Health Organization (WHO) voicing confidence that remaining isolated cases of Ebola could be contained, health officials confirmed on Wednesday 30 March that a resurgence of the deadly virus in a rural Guinean community has killed seven people. The news comes just a day after the WHO reported that the Ebola outbreak in West Africa no longer constituted a international emergency.

The announcement of new cases demonstrates the continued difficulty of managing the aftermath of the virus. The death of a man, two of his wives and his daughter were announced by Guinean health authorities two weeks ago. On Wednesday, they confirmed that a third wife and a mother-in-law also died after becoming infected in the village of Korokpara. According to Fode Tass Sylla, spokesman for Guinea’s Ebola response unit, “on March 30, there are nine registered cases and seven deaths: three suspected and four confirmed.” Outside the family, a man died on 22 March after testing positive for the virus in the city of N’Zerekore. Sylla further disclosed that two more people, one suspected case and one confirmed, were receiving treatment at a dedicated Ebola facility in southern Guinea, not far from the border with Liberia. More than a thousand people who are believed to have come into contact with the victims are being monitored for symptoms and offered support by the authorities, with restrictions placed on their movements.

While the country was declared free of Ebola transmission at the end of last year, a significant number of deaths are believed to have gone unreported and flare-ups relating to the persistence of the virus in survivors’ bodies pose ongoing challenges. A WHO report on Ebola, which was released on Wednesday, disclosed that the virus present in the blood of one of the confirmed cases was “closely relate to (the) virus that circulated in southeastern Guinea in November 2014.” In its report, the WHO warned that “additional cases are likely because of the large number of contacts. Those most at risk are also being vaccinated against the virus.

The Tentative EU-Turkey Agreement on Migrants is Holding – For Now

On April 8, the recent EU-Turkey agreement on migration achieved a modest milestone. Two ferries carried over 120 migrants from the Greek island of Lesbos to the Turkish mainland. Earlier this week, on April 4, two ferries carried 202 migrants from the Greek islands of Lesbos and Chios to Turkey. That same day, 32 Syrian migrants travelled from Turkey to Germany. Of the deportations conducted thus far, a large portion have been migrants of Pakistani, Afghan or North African origin. The migrants travelling officially from Turkey to Europe have mainly been Syrian nationals. If this practice continues, it will address the long-standing complaint by many European politicians that many of the arriving migrants were not legitimate refugees from conflict zones.

Despite these successes, Europe’s migration-related challenges are far from over. There have been reports that nearly one third of the 52,000 migrants in Greece have not moved to the newly designated processing facilities. Large numbers of migrants remain living in unofficial, makeshift camps near the port of Piraeus and at the northern border with Macedonia. The Greek Government has issued an ultimatum requiring the migrants living near Pireaus to disperse within two weeks or be removed by force. It remains unclear how exactly such dispersals would take place without violent protests. As recently as April 1, 8 people were injured during a clash at one of the migrant camps near Pireaus.

For the EU-Turkey agreement to ultimately be successful, it will require careful coordination and sustained support for the Greek Government. Greek officials have criticized that support for being slow to arrive. Earlier this week, there were numerous complaints that less than half of the 2300 Frontex personnel (the EU’s border agency) had been deployed as promised.

There have also been continued divisions regarding proposed reforms to the EU’s asylum system. The European Commission had argued that the Dublin placed incredible stress on Italy and Greece by requiring migrants to claim asylum in the first EU country they reach. One proposal would be the creation of a permanent fairness mechanism to redistribute asylum seekers throughout the European Union away from the frontline countries bordering the Mediterranean. Other potential reform policies include legal penalties against irregular movement by non-EU nationals or a central distribution system that allocate asylum claimants though a comprehensive quota scheme. However, the Czech Republic and United Kingdom have both officially announced their opposition to any major reform of the current policy. As anti-migrant sentiment continues to grow across Europe, any of the proposed reforms could prove highly controversial and difficult to implement. Despite the initial successes of the EU-Turkey deal, a truly long term solution to the migrant crisis remains elusive.

Over a Dozen Killed in Post Election Violence in Republic of Congo

The government reported on Tuesday, 5 March that at least seventeen people died Monday in fighting in the capital Brazzaville, adding that they had been killed in a “terror attack” and the subsequent “rapid intervention” by security forces.”

Government spokesman Thierry Moungalla posted on Twitter Tuesday that “three members of the security forces, two civilians and 12 attackers” were killed in the unrest that occurred in the city’s south, adding that “six members of the security forces were inured, as well as some civilians. The number is being evaluated.” Moungalla also stated that six police stations, a town hall and two customs checkpoints were torched along with many vehicles, adding that attackers had made off with “weapons of war and ammunition.” He also stated that “in the course of the police operation during the assault, security forces arrested around fifty former milita members, the perpetrators of the attack,” adding that officials have identified them as former members of the disbanded Ninja Nsiloulou milita. The Ninjas is a rebel group that fought two civil wars in the 1990’s. It is headed by Protestant preacher Frederic Bintsamou, known as Pastor Ntumi, who disbanded the group in return for a junior government position. He recent came out in favor of presidential candidate Guy-Brice Parfait Kolelas, who came second to President Denis Sassou Nguesso in last month’s election. According to Moungalla, “the overwhelming evidence held by relevant services clearly points to the active implication of Mr Bintsamou in the events of Monday.” On Monday, thousands of people fled the heavy fighting in southern Brazzaville districts loyal to the opposition. Residents were woken by automatic gunfire and explosions before dawn on Monday. The fighting continued sporadically until sunset, forcing many to spend the night sheltering in churches and government buildings. On Tuesday, troops were deployed across key points of the capital city and manned roadblocks.

On Wednesday, 6 March the runner-up in Republic of Congo’s election called on his supporters to accept the official results of the violence-tainted poll, which returned longtime president Denis Sassou Nguesso to power. Guy-Brice Parfait Kolelas disclosed that he did not wish to stir up controversy by challenging Monday’s Constitutional Court ‘s findings that Sassou Nguesso, who has been in power for 32 years, won the 20 March election with over 60 percent of the vote. Speaking to reporters in the capital Brazzaville, Kolelas stated that “I accept the Constitutional Court’s verdict, however questionable,” adding “I nonetheless invite President Sassou Nguesso, the declared winner, to be humble in victory because this election has been marred by all sorts of irregularities.” Kolelas further called on the president to work to heal the divisions brought on by the vote.