MS Risk Blog

Israel’s May 2023 Gaza Operation: Tactical Success, But Strategic Situation Unchanged

The five-day clashes between Israel and Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip last May can be considered a tactical success for the Israeli side. The fighting and subsequent ceasefire also affirmed Egypt’s crucial mediating role and Hamas’ reluctance to directly confront Israel. Still, since Israel’s Palestinian adversaries retain significant capabilities and none of the root causes of Israeli-Palestinian tensions have been addressed, while the security situation in the West Bank keeps deteriorating, a new round of fighting will almost certainly break out again in the coming months.

On 2 May, Khader Adnan, a senior member of the militant Gaza-based Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) group, died in Israeli custody after an 87-day hunger strike. PIJ and other armed groups in Gaza retaliated by firing more than 100 rockets into Israel, which responded by shelling and launching airstrikes against targets in Gaza. Then, on 9 May, Israel started a new operation against PIJ, with surprise airstrikes that killed three top PIJ commanders. This triggered a new major confrontation between Israel and PIJ. From 9 until 13 May, Gaza-based militants fired 1,469 rockets against Israeli targets, while Israeli forces struck 371 PIJ targets, eliminating three more PIJ leaders. On 13 May, the two sides agreed to a ceasefire through Egyptian mediation. Overall, 33 Palestinians died during the fighting, including 18 PIJ operatives, while 2 people in Israel were killed due to rocket strikes, one of whom was a Palestinian worker from Gaza.

This was the third round of fighting between Israel and PIJ, the previous two taking place in November 2019 and August 2022, respectively. Like the ones before, it lasted for a few days before a ceasefire was agreed. Examining this latest clash, four observations can be made:

First, Israel’s operations once again demonstrated the strength of its offensive and defensive capabilities. The opening strike killed three of the most high-ranking PIJ operatives within minutes. With three more subsequently killed, an Israeli report said that the “backbone” of PIJ’s structure in Gaza was significantly weakened. As for defense, Israel’s Iron Dome and (for the first time) David’s Sling air defense systems intercepted 439 rockets or about 91% of those heading for populated areas. The rest either landed in open areas without causing damage or fell into the Gaza Strip or the sea. According to Israeli officials, the campaign’s goal was weakening PIJ, an objective they said was achieved. Although PIJ and other Palestinian armed groups, such as Gaza-ruling Hamas, as well as their supporters Iran and Hezbollah, also praised their efforts as successful, it is hard to see how that was the case. According to reports, during Egyptian-mediated negotiations, PIJ set several conditions for a ceasefire, including an Israeli commitment to stop assassinations of its members and the release of Adnan’s body for burial. But the final ceasefire agreement was a mutual promise to stop firing and it came without any other conditions, as Israel demanded. Thus, the operation can be considered at least a tactical success for Israel.

Second, as in the past, the ceasefire negotiations again affirmed Egypt’s crucial role in mediating Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt has been a critical partner for Israel. Apart from Cairo’s role as a mediator, Egypt and Israel work together on jointly blockading the Gaza Strip, as Egypt’s ruling regime shares Israel’s fears about subversive forces in the region. On the other hand, cooperation with Egypt is indispensable for Gaza-based Palestinian armed groups too, since Cairo controls the Rafah border crossing, Gaza’s only entry and exit point not controlled by Israel. It has also been a major aid contributor, while Egyptian intelligence has good working relations with armed factions in Gaza. Its mediating role makes Egypt a critical partner not just for Israelis and Palestinians, but also for other states and organizations involved in the region. After the ceasefire was agreed, Egypt’s mediation efforts were praised by Israel, PIJ, Hamas, the US, and the United Nations.

Third, Hamas stayed out of the recent fighting, as it did in August 2022, showcasing its reluctance to directly confront Israel. Although Hamas officially coordinates with PIJ and other Gaza-based armed groups, its assistance to PIJ was limited to statements of support. This is mainly due to the different perspectives and responsibilities of PIJ and Hamas. PIJ does not participate in politics and is solely focused on military confrontation with Israel, seeking to eliminate the Jewish state and replace it with a Sunni Islamist entity. On the other hand, Hamas is the de facto ruling government of Gaza, having expelled its rival Fatah and seized control of the enclave in 2007, and is thus held responsible for its population’s safety and well-being. During its fourth and so far last conflict with Israel in May 2021, Hamas suffered severe casualties and Gaza was devastated. If the group was dragged into the latest PIJ-Israel clash, the fighting would have significantly escalated, inflicting much more misery on Gaza’s population and risking important Israeli concessions to Hamas, such as its permission for Qatar to transfer $30 million to Gaza every month, or Israel’s work permits for around 20,000 Palestinians from the area. By staying out of the fighting, Hamas achieves multiple objectives. It focuses Israel’s attention on PIJ, letting Israel weaken a potentially dangerous rival and thus strengthening its own grip on power. It presents itself as a more responsible political force in the context of its competition with Fatah. And finally, it keeps its own capabilities in Gaza intact while more discreetly operating against Israel through its cells in the West Bank. It can be argued that Israel’s strategy of powerful deterrence and economic incentives has constrained Hamas to a certain extent. As long as Hamas behaves in a restrained way, Israel actually prefers that it stays in power in Gaza, since its weakening would bolster the more extremist PIJ.

Fourth, despite being tactically successful, the campaign likely didn’t significantly change the overall balance of power, nor did it eliminate the root causes of the conflict. PIJ very likely retains its capability to renew fighting at a later stage, with its total force estimated at around 10,000 militants. Israeli reports have said that PIJ’s leadership structure was seriously hit due to the loss of six commanders, but they concede that PIJ was not dealt a catastrophic blow. Hamas’ force of approximately 40,000 fighters remained intact, while the much more powerful Hezbollah lurks across the northern border in Lebanon. The threat from Gaza, and Israel’s concerns about encirclement from pro-Iran forces in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon, remain. More broadly, Israel’s tactical success did not address the fundamental drivers of heightened Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Israel’s far-right nationalist government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expanding settlements in the West Bank and inching toward a de facto annexation of the territory, while government members indulge in inflammatory rhetoric against Palestinians. The security situation in the West Bank continues to deteriorate, with hundreds of Palestinian terrorist attacks already in the first four months of 2023. Israeli forces continue their near-daily operations in the occupied territory, with at least 160 Palestinians killed since the start of the year. The Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority (PA) led by President Mahmoud Abbas is rapidly losing popularity among the West Bank’s Palestinian population and its security forces are weakening, enabling PIJ and Hamas cells, along with numerous other armed groups, to proliferate and establish a presence in the region. And the Palestinians remain hopelessly divided between the Fatah-led PA in the West Bank and Hamas’ regime in Gaza, unable to speak with one voice.

It is thus almost certain that a new round of fighting will break out in the coming months. Diplomatic talks between Israel and the Palestinians have seemingly reached a deadlock, with neither side being willing nor capable to reach a negotiated settlement. In these conditions, escalation followed by crisis management seems the most likely course of action.

Implications of the end of ‘Title 42’ on Migration

The removal of ‘Title 42’ has decreased the severity of the migrant crisis that has been continuing throughout 2022 and early 2023, however it has now become more dangerous for migrants to move through Mexico to reach the border.

The end of the U.S COVID-era border policy ‘Title 42’, which allowed border officials to expel migrants back to Mexico without giving them the chance to request asylum, came to an end on 12 May 2023 and many feared that this would lead to a mass influx of migrants attempting to cross the border and thus an increase in detentions of those caught attempting to cross the border illegally. However, the expected influx of migrants never came. In contrast there has been a decline in the number of immigrants attempting to cross the border. The decrease in attempted illegal crossings can likely be attributed to the consequences for attempting to cross illegally becoming harsher as well as not being able to seek asylum. This has made attempting to cross illegally less favourable compared to crossing legally. However, the replacement for Title 42, the Circumvention of lawful pathways rule, severely restricts access to asylum for migrants, requiring them to meet one of a handful of criteria before obtaining asylum. As a result, illegal crossings may see another surge in the future. The dangers of crossing through Mexico have increased however, as the removal of ‘Title 42’ and incentives to cross the border legally has impacted the smuggling trade. A bus carrying 50 migrants was taken control of by smugglers leading to the kidnapping and ransoming of the migrants on board. It is likely that this will increase in the future as smugglers attempt to make up for the loss in income. Therefore, ‘Title 42’s’ removal has led to less pressure across the border, but an increase in risk for migrants travelling through Mexico.

On 12 May, ‘Title 42’, introduced under the Trump administration came to an end. The end of the policy led some to anticipate a high influx of migrants crossing the border and severe issues with border control. On the same day as the policy’s end, New York Governor Kathy Hochul asked for federal government assistance with constructing and operating temporary shelters in anticipation of several thousand migrants arriving in New York. The migrant crisis that has persisted throughout 2023 certainly gave credibility to this concern. However, in contrast to people’s beliefs the number of migrants illegally crossing the border has decreased, with the number of migrants intercepted by border patrol whilst attempting to cross being down seventy percent, and the situation along the border has dramatically calmed down. The Biden administration’s new policy has likely had some effect on migrants’ decision to cross the border illegally. The new Circumvention of lawful pathways rule, which has been introduced by the Biden administration as a replacement for Title 42, has increased the severity of punishments for those who cross illegally as well as made it more difficult to obtain asylum for migrants entering the country. Migrants now must meet one of a handful of criteria before obtaining asylum as opposed to the larger number of criteria prior. Despite asylum being more difficult to obtain for migrants, the Biden administration has created avenues to incentivise entering through legal means. An expanded parole program for migrants from Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Haiti now allows for up to 30,000 people a month from these countries to apply for asylum should they apply from outside the U.S. Furthermore, migrants who cross the border illegally will now face a 5-year ban on applying for asylum in the future, further incentivising entering through legal measures.

The dangers of crossing through Mexico have been heightened with the ‘Title 42’s’ removal. The incentivisation and increase in punishments of being caught crossing illegally have led to migrants relying less on smugglers to cross the border. This has led to a significant impact to their income. On 16 May, a bus heading to the border holding fifty migrants disappeared near Matehuala, San Luis Potosi. The smugglers who kidnapped the migrants called the bus company ransoming each passenger for one-thousand dollars. The migrants were eventually all found and rescued however the smugglers are still at large. A large-scale kidnapping such as this does not come without many risks, and the timing of the kidnapping suggests that the smugglers business has been heavily impacted by the removal of ‘Title 42’. It is likely therefore that more attempts such as this will be made by migrant smugglers in attempts to make up for lost business.

Overall, the removal of ‘Title 42’ will likely lead to an increase in migrants crossing the border, primarily through legal means. It is unlikely that this will lead to violent incidents along the border which we have been seeing throughout 2023 as there has been a dramatic decrease in such incidents since the policy was removed. There may be some attempts to cross illegally as the new measures introduced still make it difficult for all migrants to cross. It will be more dangerous for migrants crossing through Mexico as smugglers will now resort to new measures to obtain money to make up for lost business, this will likely appear in the forms of kidnappings and ransom.

Russian interests and goals in Sudan

Russia has significant stakes in the conflict that broke out in Sudan on 15 April between the Sudanese military and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), respectively led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as “Hemedti”). Moscow’s main interests in Sudan are access to its gold reserves and its plan for establishing a naval base in the country. Although some reports claimed Russia has provided support to the RSF, Moscow will likely refrain from overtly favoring either side and will maintain a balanced approach, focusing on forestalling any potential democratic transition in Sudan while maintaining its commercial and military presence in the country.

Moscow’s involvement in Sudan can be traced back to November 2017, when then-President Omar al-Bashir met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi and sought to establish a new alliance with Russia. During Bashir’s visit, the two countries inked agreements on gold mining concessions and the establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. These constitute Moscow’s two main interests in Sudan today. Even though a coup deposed Bashir in April 2019, Russia continued strengthening its presence in the country and maintained close ties with the two leading figures that rose to power in the coup’s aftermath, Burhan and Hemedti.

Russia’s interest in the gold reserves of Sudan, which is Africa’s third-largest gold producer, is directly tied to the Wagner Group, the mercenary network managed by oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin. Right after Bashir’s meeting with Putin, employees of Meroe Gold, a company controlled by Prigozhin, arrived in Sudan and started exploiting the country’s gold reserves. According to reports, the Russians buy large amounts of gold from local miners and send it to a processing plant near the town of al-Ibaidiya, northeast of Khartoum. The gold is then smuggled out of Sudan either through flights from Khartoum and Port Sudan’s airports to the Syrian port city of Latakia, where Russia has a major airbase, or through a land route to the Central African Republic (CAR), where Wanger has also established a powerful presence. Amassing gold has enabled Moscow to accumulate wealth bypassing international sanctions imposed after its 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine. A large portion of the money has reportedly been used to finance Wagner’s operations in Ukraine.

After Bashir’s ouster, both Burhan and Hemedti assisted Russia’s siphoning of Sudanese gold. With the ruling generals’ consent, Wagner’s dealings have circumvented state institutions and financial monitors, resulting in potentially hundreds of millions lost in government revenue and leading some officials to accuse Russia of “pillaging Sudan”. In return, Wagner’s mercenaries deployed in Sudan and provided training and weapons to the military and the RSF. They also assisted Sudanese security forces in cracking down on popular pro-democracy protests in 2018 and 2019, supporting both Bashir at first and Burhan and Hemedti after their coup. In October 2021, Russia supported a new coup by Burhan and Hemedti that overthrew a transitional civilian government formed after Bashir’s fall.

Russia’s plans for a naval base in Sudan, if realized, would also significantly bolster its strategic posture. With Moscow is seeking to increase its influence in Africa in the context of its broader global confrontation with the US and its allies, a military presence on Sudan’s strategic Red Sea coast would serve multiple Russian interests. First, it would provide Moscow with a foothold in a critical shipping lane between Europe, Asia, and Africa through which passes around 10% of global trade. Second, combined with its naval base in Tartus, Syria, it would enhance Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean by alleviating Tartus’ resupply commitments and allowing it to develop into a multi-purpose naval base, as described by Russian experts. Third, it would enable Russia to broaden its reach and project military power into the Indian Ocean, where the Soviet Union had important naval facilities that were lost after its collapse. Moscow would thus be in a better position to challenge the US and other major Western powers’ interests.

According to a draft 25-year agreement approved by the Russian government in November 2020, Russia will be able to station up to four warships, including nuclear-powered ones, and 300 personnel at the base. In exchange, Sudan will receive weapons and military equipment. Nevertheless, despite its significance for Moscow, the naval base project was significantly derailed after Bashir’s ouster in 2019. After the second Russian-backed coup in 2021 again isolated Sudan’s military from the West, prospects for the base’s opening warmed again. Still, since ratifying the deal requires approval from the parliament, which does not exist in Sudan since the 2019 coup due to political infighting, and the country is currently mired in chaos due to the ongoing conflict, it is unlikely that the Russian base will be operating any time soon.

Under these circumstances, which side does Russia support in the conflict between the two generals? According to analysts, in 2021 and 2022 Wagner strengthened its ties with Hemedti and the RSF. Prigozhin’s main motive was gaining access to more gold in territories Hemedti controls. The RSF have reportedly provided security for Wagner’s smuggling operations. Furthermore, RSF support is crucial for Wagner’s smuggling to the CAR, which borders Sudan’s Darfur region where Hemedti has his base of operations, and access to Libya, where both Wagner forces and the RSF support warlord Khalifa Hifter. On the other hand, Burhan is seen as less close to Russia, and his main patron, Egypt, opposes the establishment of the Russian base in Sudan. Last April, media reports said that Wagner and Hifter provided weapons to the RSF, including surface-to-air missiles.

Still, experts are cautious about the extent of direct Russian involvement in the conflict, since instability in Sudan poses a threat to Russia’s interests in the country. So far, neither side seems capable of achieving a decisive victory. Support for Hemedti would probably not be enough to enable him to take power and form a stable government, while completely alienating Moscow from Burhan’s faction which has also received Russian backing in the past. Furthermore, it would worsen relations between Russia and Egypt, a crucial regional partner for Moscow. And as long as the conflict persists, the goal of establishing a naval base in Sudan will remain unattainable. As for Wagner, Sudan’s destabilization due to continued conflict could hinder its gold smuggling operations. More recent reports have suggested that rumors about Wagner’s assistance to the RSF may be exaggerated, and Prigozhin himself has publicly offered to mediate between the two sides, denying involvement in the fighting. Thus, it seems likely that Russia will try to balance between Burhan and Hemedti and officially support a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Moscow’s main goals in Sudan will likely be preserving its Wagner-linked commercial interests and preventing any potential democratic transition that could end authoritarian rule. According to Samuel Rabani, such a transition is not in Russia’s interests, as a more democratic government would likely seek improved relations with the West and would not tolerate its opaque economic activities and gold smuggling.

In conclusion, despite its significant interests in Sudan, Russia is unlikely to provide significant support for either side, since it has good relations with both generals. Instability in Sudan does not serve Moscow’s goals, as it hinders both its gold smuggling operations and plans for establishing a naval base. Therefore, Moscow will likely pursue a balanced policy, declaring its support for a diplomatic solution, while seeking to preserve its commercial interests in Sudan through Wagner and keep alive its project for establishing a naval base, if and when conditions allow for it.

Nicaragua: a repressive regime towards Catholics

Daniel Ortega’s regime maintains constant and violent pressure on its population, and in particular it has targeted the Catholic Church since 2018, which it has accused of supporting the opposition, spreading false news, and conspiring against the state. In 2023, it is highly likely that the Nicaraguan regime will seek to silence Catholics in order to maintain its power and it is probable that the anti-Catholic measures will maintain a status quo in the next 6 months. It is also likely that neighboring countries will not take concrete action against Nicaragua in the next 6 months or be directly affected by the repression. The measures against the Church are very specific to Nicaragua and it is unlikely that a similar situation will prevail in a Central American country such as Honduras or El Salvador, despite their undemocratic regimes.

Member of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and President of the Republic of Nicaragua since 2007, Daniel Ortega has governed his country with authoritarianism. This authoritarianism took a more repressive and violent turn in April 2018, when major riots broke out in the streets, demanding social and political reforms. Out of fear for its power, the regime severely repressed the riots, resulting in hundreds of deaths, injuries, and arbitrary arrests. In a country with a Christian tradition, where 50% of the population claim to be Catholic, the Church has sought to mediate with the demonstrators and has never condemned the riots, sometimes even going so far as to give refuge. It was since been accused by the Ortega regime of spreading false news, fueling the demonstrations and conspiracy. The situation has only worsened since 2018, with international observers regularly expressing concern about attacks on press freedom, religious freedom and human rights, with the security forces not hesitating to arbitrarily arrest and sometimes torture anyone suspected of being an opponent of the regime. Daniel Ortega’s regime therefore meets with little resistance, and it is possible that the population is too afraid to demonstrate and revolt regarding the violence exerted.

In March 2023, a United Nations (UN) report went so far as to describe these violations as crimes against humanity, thereby demonstrating the scale of the repression. The NGO Nicaragua Nunca Más estimated that more than 50 religious leaders have fled Nicaragua because of the situation. Since 2018, at least 529 attacks against Catholics have been listed by Martha Patricia Molina, a researcher and lawyer, including 84 attacks the year of the anti-regime social riots, 80 in 2019, 59 in 2020, 55 in 2021, 161 in 2022 and 90 between January and April 2023, raising fears that 2023 will be even more repressive than 2022. The increase in actions taken in 2022 could be the result of a wider crackdown, not just on the Church but on opponents in general, as in February and March the authorities opened a series of trials held behind closed doors against political opponents. Catholic institutions and associations are dissolved one after the other by the regime. On 7 March this year, the Catholic University John Paul II and the Autonomous Christian University Association of Nicaragua (UCAN) were dissolved. According to the Nicaraguan Freedom Foundation, on 13 April, while religious processions were banned during Easter, the authorities confiscated a monastery in the town of San Pedro de Lóvago in the diocese of Juigalpa and arrested 20 people elsewhere in the country. On 18 May, Catholic University of the Immaculate Conception in Managua was also dissolved. People close to Bishop Rolando Álvarez, a mediatic critic of the regime who was sentenced to 26 years in prison last February and who refused to join the 222 political opponents released by the authorities, are also targets of pressure. On 3 April, the authorities expelled Donancio Alarcon, a Panamanian priest in charge of the parish of María Auxiliadora, diocese of Estelí, whose apostolic administrator was Bishop Rolando Alvarez himself. Although Donancio Alarcon is Panamanian, his expulsion did not arouse massive indignation in his home country. The effects on Nicaragua’s neighbours are negligible for the moment. On 18 May, Yonarqui de los Ángeles Martínez García, Bishop’s lawyer, had his license to practice law in the country revoked by the Supreme Court of Justice, without any reason being given. Later, on 27 May, the national police opened an investigation into several Catholic Church dioceses in the country on suspicion of money laundering and consequently froze several bank accounts, marking a significant step towards discrediting the Catholic Church and attacking its funding.

The rupture with the Church was consummated when on 12 March the authorities unilaterally closed the Vatican embassy in Managua and broke off all diplomatic relations with Rome. This measure only served to increase international pressure, as the Vatican sought to use its influence to win over other countries. As an example, on 21 April, the US bishops, through the USCCB Committee on International Justice, called on the US government to take action against the Ortega regime. On 11 May, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, has declared Nicaragua in a report as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) due to the increasing persecution of the Church and Catholics, a similar level shared with North Korea and China. Antony Blinken, US Secretary of State, officially condemned Ortega’s regime for its religious persecution in a speech a few days later, on 21 May, without explicitly announcing any sanctions. Few days later, on 31 May, John Kirby, National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications for the Biden administration condemned Ortega’s attempts to discredit the Church by accusing it of an illegal money laundering scheme. Despite the US support it has managed to obtain, the Vatican seems powerless to combat the repression in Nicaragua which seems set to last.

Violence in Mexico Reaches Tourist Areas

The recent string of Cartel violence in tourist areas in Mexico suggests that the weakening of the Sinaloa Cartel and Mexico’s decreased willingness to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement agencies are causing Cartel’s to become more emboldened and operate more frequently.

Over April, there has been a string of incidents related to cartel violence in the coastal state of Quintana Roo, especially the tourist sites of Cancun and Tulum. Cartel violence in Mexico is increasing and has been over the past year. Whilst the victims of the violence have not been in extreme numbers, the frequency of the attacks have been increasing. The latest statistics available show that the homicide rate in 2021 was 28 homicides per 100,000, with around 90 percent never reported. The increase in cartel violence is likely a result of the U.S. government indicting 28 Sinaloa cartel members, including three of ‘El Chapo’ Guzman’s sons; Ovidio Guzman Lopez, Jesus Alfredo Guzman Salazar, and Ivan Archivaldo Guzman Salazar. The charges against the members have weakened the Sinaloa cartel’s power, which appears to have driven them to increase activity and rival cartels to challenge their position. Mexican President Lopez Obrador’s criticisms to the U.S. charges exemplifies the deteriorating relationship between the two countries. The cartels have likely taken advantage of the deteriorating relationship which has decreased the DEA’s ability to operate in the country.

On 14 April, the U.S. Department of Justice announced charges against twenty-eight Sinaloa cartel members in response to the growing fentanyl crisis. The U.S. saw a rapid increase in the amount of fentanyl overdoses in 2021, with around 70,000 people dying from overdoses in 2021, almost a four-fold increase over five years. In 2022, the DEA seized more than fifty million fake prescription pills laced with fentanyl along with more than 10,000 pounds of fentanyl powder. The indictments were aimed at hitting the cartel’s global network; a complex manufacturing and supply network including Chinese and Guatemalan citizens supplying chemicals required to make fentanyl, as well as running suspected drug labs in Mexico.

Mexican President Lopez Obrador’s response to the U.S. Department of Justice’s announcement may have emboldened cartels to act more freely. On 17 April, Lopez Obrador criticised the Sinaloa investigation by the Drug Enforcement Association (DEA), claiming it was “abusive, arrogant interference that should not be accepted under any circumstances.” The increased hostility towards the U.S. was highly likely a result of U.S. allegations of corruption in Mexico back in March, which furthered the already souring relationship between the two countries. The Mexican government has imposed restrictive rules on how agents can operate in Mexico, and slowed down visa approvals for a time since the return of General Salvador Cienfuegos who was on U.S. charges of aiding a drug gang in 2020. The continued deterioration has aided in leading to a dramatic increase in cartel violence as the reduction in ability for the DEA to move against the cartels appears to have emboldened them giving them freedom of movement.

The spread of cartel violence to tourist towns supports the theory that cartels are increasing their span of influence. On April 26, authorities discovered eight bodies dumped in the tourist city of Cancun. Whilst not unusual for bodies to often be found dumped and mutilated by the cartel, they are rarely found in Cancun, which is the heart of Mexico’s tourism industry on the coast. This also coincides with the fighting for territory between cartel’s, which is likely a result of the recent decrease in the Sinaloa cartel’s power with the capture of Guzman’s sons. The cartels often use violence to send a message to those who would challenge them. Whilst the bodies have not been identified, it is likely that they were either dumped there to send a message to those who would challenge the currently weakened Sinaloa cartel, or as a message to challenge the Sinaloa cartel by either the Gulf cartel, the New Generation Jalisco cartel, or Grupo Regional, all of whom have been identified as operating in the area. The most likely of the three being the Jalisco cartel as they are well known rivals of the Sinaloa cartel.

With both the limitations imposed on U.S. operatives in Mexico by the Mexican government as well as the weakening of the Sinaloa cartel, who are considered the most powerful in the world, it is likely that cartel violence will continue to increase unless drastic measures are taken. The increase in trends in both fentanyl smuggling and cartel violence over the past few years are indicative of this argument.