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Deploying the Taurus KEPD 350 to Ukraine – Pros and Cons

Key Judgements:

• The German-Swedish manufactured Taurus KEPD 350 is an extremely versatile missile system that could be operationally, tactically and strategically be beneficial to the Ukrainian Armed Forces if it is given the green light to be deployed to Ukraine by Germany.
• The Ukrainian military could use the Taurus KEPD 350 to target Russian targets that are beyond the range of the United Kingdom’s Storm Shadow Missile or France’s SCALP.
• Despite the benefits of the missile, if it was deployed to Ukraine, it would entice Russia to become more aggressive and escalate the conflict. Because of this and other disadvantages of deploying Taurus KEPD 350, Germany ultimately will not deploy the missile. However, Germany could be forced to supply the system to Ukraine in the near future if Russia continues to make advances in Ukraine and if Ukraine continues to suffer from shortages of Western ammunition.

The Taurus KEPD 350 is a German-Swedish manufactured modular stand off long range missile system which can be used for precision strikes against hardened, deeply buried and high value point area targets. The missile incorporates stealth technology, carries a highly effective 481kg duel-stage warhead system known as MEPHISTO, has an operational range in excess of 500km. Taurus is designed to penetrate air defences via a very low level terrain following flight and remains the only stand off missile system which can be programmed to detonate on a specific pre-selected floor of a building. The missile system flies at an altitude of only 35 meters, and can reach speeds of up to 727 miles per hour which makes it impossible for radar systems to detect. The missile also comes equipped with four independent navigation systems which it uses to stay on course when in flight, a satellite supported GPS system which has been shielded against attempts to jam it and a terrain-referenced navigation system with image sensors which the missile uses to determine its position when honing in on a target. The Taurus KEPD 350 is evidently a very advanced, effective and operationally beneficial system, and one in which could have the potential to benefit Ukraine in its ongoing war against Russia. With Ukraine recently facing shortages of western ammunition as well as shortages of  air defence missile systems, the Taurus KEPD 350 certainly  looks more and more appealing to the Ukrainian military. However, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has continuously and repeatedly voiced his concerns surrounding sending Taurus to Ukraine. Scholz argues that sending the missile system to Ukraine would be “irresponsible” and also “a line that I – as chancellor – do not want to cross”. In contrast to Germany’s view, the United Kingdom and France have supplied Ukraine with their Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missile systems. This begs the following questions: Should Germany supply Ukraine with it’s Taurus KEPD 350 system? What would be the advantages or disadvantages for Ukraine if Germany supplied them with the missile system or chose not to?

The Taurus KEPD 350 has the potential to be a game changer for Ukraine in its war against Russia. From an operational perspective, if Germany choose to give the green light in supplying these missiles to Ukraine it would be advantageous to Ukraine as the missile system would have the potential to strengthen and bolster Ukraine’s own defensive capabilities whilst simultaneously offering Ukraine the advantage of being able to launch long range precision strikes against Russian targets from over 500km away. The UK’s Storm Shadow and France’s SCALP missile systems have a range of less than 300km. The Taurus’ longer range of 500km would be beneficial to Ukraine because it would allow Ukraine to engage Russian targets from a safe distance which would likely be well beyond the reach of most Russian air defence systems. Taurus’ longer targeting range in combination with MEPHISTO, would enable Ukraine to have the capability to conduct a variety of strikes on a range of Russian strategic and tactical targets, thus giving Ukraine the potential to destroy Russian defence systems that Ukraine previously may not have been able to target with Storm Shadow or SCALP missiles. Ukraine could potentially target Russian positions far behind the front line and could use the missile system to strike targets in Russian-occupied Crimea. The combination of the Taurus KEPD 350’s stealth technology and its low level terrain flights which are conducted at high speeds would arguably give Ukraine the ability to launch an conduct surprise strikes on Russian high value targets which are well fortified and protected without alerting Russian defence or radar systems. Another operational  advantage for Ukraine would be that if Germany chose to send these missiles over, it would allow Ukraine to have the capability to install them on various aircraft, ground and sea platforms therefore offering Ukraine a significant operational advantage as well as valuable strategic flexibility which are two very important assets for the Ukrainian military as it currently finds itself in an operationally challenging conflict environment. Overall, these advantages demonstrate that the Taurus KEPD 350 would be a potent addition to Ukraine’s armed forces.

On the other hand, the decision to supply and deploy the Taurus KEPD 350 missile system to Ukraine has a risk of escalating the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The missile system is sufficiently far reaching and it could  hit  targets deep inside Russia, which could make the Kremlin view Germany and by extension NATO becoming more involved in the war. Russia has repeatedly warned against the delivery of the Taurus weapon system to Ukraine. Therefore it is highly likely that their deployment to Ukraine would coincide with a noticeable and sharp surge in Russian escalation of the conflict. Germany’s decision not to deploy Taurus could also be operationally detrimental to Ukraine in the short term as it could enable Russian forces to advance deeper into Ukraine, enabling them to occupy, annex and control more territory without worrying about far away Russian targets   as the ones that are outside of the range of the Shadow Storm and SCALP missiles would be largely safe to some degree. A small  disadvantage would be that if the Taurus system was given to Ukraine, the integration of the long range missile system onto the SU-24M would take up to six months. It would take two months to install the missile on the jets and up to four months to prepare the personnel involved in the use of the weapons. The Taurus KEPD 350 can also be installed on F-16’s. Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Belgium have promised to give Ukraine 45 F-16’s over the course of 2024 and into 2025. Experts predict that the missile would take up to twelve to eighteen months to integrate onto the F-16. This presents a small disadvantage operationally to Ukraine because they wouldn’t be able to install the missile on their aircraft immediately, which would be arguably beneficial for Russia. Another disadvantage of handing over the missile system to Ukraine is that there are also very few copies of the Taurus’ complex data which are needed to program the missile. Therefore if Germany handed over these missiles to Ukraine it is likely that it would lose access to the scarce complex data material which makes it a risky move for Germany. Germany also believes that the missiles could only be deployed using soldiers from the Bundeswehr, which would run the risk of dragging Germany into the war against Russia.

With the operational advantages and disadvantages in mind, should Germany send the Taurus KEPD 350 to Ukraine? Despite offering various tactical and strategic advantages for Ukraine, the deployment of the Taurus missile system to Ukraine would undoubtably raise Russian aggressiveness and could provoke Russia to pursue an escalation of the contemporary conflict, which would present a variety of issues to Ukraine and her NATO allies both now and in the near future. Moreover, the deployment of the missiles have been assessed in Germany as being unable to be deployed or used responsibly by without the deployment of German soldiers. This in combination with a large amount of the German public supporting the decision not to send these missiles to Ukraine makes it painfully clear that the decision to deploy Taurus to Ukraine is one which should ultimately not go ahead despite the military advantages that it would provide Ukraine. However, if Russia keeps advancing into Ukraine, and Ukraine continues to struggle to gain vital western ammunition supplies then a line may have to be crossed for Germany in the future in which it may be forced to play its hand and deliver the missiles to Ukraine. What is certain is that currently these missiles will remain in German hands and will not be deployed to Ukraine despite the operational advantages and benefits they could offer the Ukrainian military. The operational and strategic environment on the battlefield is always subject to change but as Sun Zu in the Art of War notes, one must “Ponder and deliberate before you make a move”.

UK economic consequences from Red Sea disruption

Key Judgments:

1. It is likely that negative market sentiment will drive inflationary pressures in the next 12 months. (High confidence).
2. It is likely that the Bank of England will not cut interest rates in the next 12 months. (Low confidence).
3. It is highly likely that the UK GDP will not grow in the next 12 months. (Low confidence).

Interest rates

UK interest rates starting from August 2023 to March 2024 have been set to 5.25%, the highest since the 2008 financial crisis. The inflation rate, as a result of these high interest rates, has dropped from 10% in November of 2022, to 4% as of Jan 2024, which means the high interest rates served their purpose effectively. This drop in inflation has resulted in the prospect of easing interest rates by the Bank of England. Assuming continued disruption in the Red Sea, which appears to be almost certain, a shift of market sentiment will highly likely occur, as well real economic disruption, which are likely to reignite inflationary pressures. Additionally, the government will have to commit more resources to defense and rearmament. With these sustained inflationary pressures on the UK market, it is likely that the Bank of England will keep interest rates high to continue to battle these pressures. It is worth noting that interest rates are determined by many more factors than a singular disruptive event, and thus the Bank of England may still opt to decrease interest rates for other reasons in the next 12 months.

GDP

Of the UK’s £3.1 trillion GDP, £1.74 trillion of this was as a result of trade in 2023. UK exports to countries affected by the Red Sea shipping lane make up an estimated £128 billion, and imports from these countries amount to roughly £120 billion. Sustained disruption of up to £250 billion in trade is likely to affect the ability of the UK to expand its industries. The manufacturing sector has already been impacted, with a reading from the S&P Global composite PMI highlighting a three-month drop to 44.9 for manufacturing output. A reading above 50 indicates growth, and below 50 indicates shrinkage. Given that the UK’s industrial sector makes up 20% of its GDP and has already begun to feel the impacts of the disruption in the Red Sea, it is likely that continued disruption will affect the UK’s ability to grow its GDP.

Escalation

Furthermore, the Houthis announced on 14 March 2024 that they are set to expand their operations, now aiming to prevent Israeli-linked ships from passing through the Indian Ocean towards the Cape of Good Hope, the only remaining supply route aside from the Red Sea between Europe and Asia. Whilst the claim is that its targets will be Israeli ships, this was also the claim in the Red Sea, wherein all ships, regardless of ownership or destination, were targeted by missiles. We can infer then that UK owned or operated vessels will be at high risk even whilst attempting to circumvent the Red Sea, further exacerbating the issues of inflationary pressure and strain on GDP growth mentioned above.

Summary

Assuming that the Houthis continue to disrupt commercial shipping in the Red Sea and successfully expand to the Indian Ocean, the economic consequences on the UK would be felt rather quickly by the population. Effects on the manufacturing sector to name one, as well as up to £250 billion of trade with Middle Eastern and Asian countries, are likely to affect the UK’s ability to grow its GDP. Negative market sentiment due to the uncertainty of disruption and conflict is a driving factor for inflation, which will further impede the UK’s ability to grow its GDP due to the likelihood of the Bank of England maintaining high interest rates.

Poland’s Political Situation

Key Judgement: Within the next three months, it is likely that political disruption of current administration would be continue. It is likely that current government would not strongarm farmer protest.

The current Polish Prime Minister, who first ascended to power in 2007, initially gained recognition for his moderate approach towards political rivals. However, his subsequent administration, following an eight-year hiatus dominated by the Law and Justice (PiS) party, has adopted a more confrontational stance against its predecessor. The PiS party, which secured a majority government through the 2015 parliamentary elections and was re-elected in 2019, draws its primary support from blue-collar workers. These individuals perceive leftist economic policies as neglectful of their needs. The party’s core base—older, religious, conservative, and patriotic citizens—predominantly resides in rural areas and small towns, especially in the southeast, a region historically marked by occupation and brutality at the hands of the USSR in the 20th century. Within this context, PiS has pursued nationalistic campaigns while assuming control over the judiciary, media, and cultural institutions, thereby exacerbating political polarization.

The 2023 parliamentary elections resulted in a coalition government formed by the Civic Coalition, Third Way, and The Left, under the leadership of Donald Tusk, which garnered 54% of the vote. This victory, however, sparked controversy due to PiS still winning a plurality of seats. In the parliamentary system, this scenario necessitates Tusk, the Civic Coalition leader, to forge alliances with the other two parties to secure a majority against PiS. Complicating matters further is the re-election of Polish President Andrzej Duda, a PiS member, in 2020 for a five-year term. Although the presidency is largely ceremonial in Poland’s parliamentary system, it possesses sufficient authority to challenge the current administration with PiS’s support.

Despite these challenges, Tusk is spearheading ambitious reforms to dismantle the legacy of the eight-year PiS rule. Notably, two former PiS ministers were arrested within the Presidential Palace, and the public television station TVP was shut down due to its role as a major propaganda tool for the former administration in December 2023. Tusk’s administration has also initiated efforts to reverse the abortion ban and launched an investigation into the use of Pegasus spyware, allegedly employed by the previous government to target political adversaries. On the international front, Tusk has focused on strengthening ties with the EU and the US, a move that has inspired hope among Poland’s liberal populace while stirring dissent among conservatives. Acts of political sabotage by President Duda, such as pardoning the two arrested former ministers, further complicate the situation for the current administration.

Another critical juncture for Tusk is the upcoming local elections on April 7, which will determine city and provincial leaderships. A victory for PiS, especially in the provincial assemblies, is crucial to maintaining its political influence. Conversely, success in the local elections could stabilize the current government’s position. The European Parliament elections in June also pose a significant challenge for Tusk and the EU, with Poland electing 53 seats, the fourth largest contingent. The outcome could potentially undermine Tusk’s government domestically, especially when PiS supported EU parliament members start anti-EU policy with the help from other European nation’s far right members.

The ongoing nationwide farmers’ protest, fueled by opposition to EU green regulations and cheap Ukrainian imports, has become a pivotal issue. With 77.2% of the Polish population supporting the farmers’ movement, Tusk is compelled to endorse it. The protests, which have led to blockades at the Ukraine-Poland border, place the government in a precarious position, as any aggressive response could bolster PiS’s support, particularly in its stronghold in the southeast. Additionally, framing the protest as undermining Ukraine could contradict Tusk’s anti-Russian foreign policy, offering PiS another opportunity to criticize the government.

In conclusion, the current farmers’ protest serves as a critical leverage point for both the government and the PiS party. It is probable that the protest leaders recognize their advantageous position in the coming months. PiS is likely to capitalize on this for the local and EU Parliament elections, while the government may find itself unable to enact drastic measures to quell the movement. Ironically, the protest inadvertently supports Russia’s campaign in Ukraine, thus challenging Tusk’s foreign policy stance. As such, the political landscape in Poland is expected to remain turbulent in the upcoming months.

Escalating U.S. airstrikes in Syria and Iraq: a new phase of conflict in the Middle East

In response to a drone strike that killed three U.S. soldiers at the U.S. Tower 22 facility in Jordan, the United States began targeted airstrikes against Iran-backed militia positions in Syria and Iraq. President Biden emphasised a measured approach, while Syrian and Iraqi authorities expressed alarm over sovereignty violation.

The U.S. has launched targeted airstrikes on multiple sites in Syria and Iraq from February 2^nd, primarily aimed at Iran-backed militia groups and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, in response to a drone strike that killed three U.S. service members in Jordan and injured more than 30, on January 28^th. The strikes, involving more than 85 targets, focused on command-and-control operations, intelligence centres, weapons storage facilities, and logistical supply chains associated with the militia groups and their IRGC sponsors. More specifically, areas that were targeted include Deir Ezzor, Al-Bukamal, Al-Mayadeen, and their surrounds on the Syrian-Iraqi border. President Joe Biden has stated that the U.S. is against conflict but would respond to any harm committed to Americans. U.S. officials have clarified that there is no plan to bomb Iran directly, aiming to avoid further escalation. However, the airstrikes have sparked concerns about regional instability and sovereignty violations, with Iraqi officials warning of potential consequences. The U.S. has indicated that these strikes are the beginning of a broader response, with additional actions planned to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on U.S. and coalition forces.

The centre purpose of the airstrikes was to retaliate against Iran-backed militia groups responsible for attacks on U.S. personnel, to degrade their capabilities, and to deter future attacks. Strategically, the airstrikes aimed to disrupt the militia groups’ operational capabilities, hinder their ability to launch attacks against U.S. and coalition forces, and send a strong message about the United States’ determination to defend its soldiers and interests in the region.

In terms of effectiveness, the airstrikes succeeded in hitting multiple targets associated with the militia groups and the IRGC Quds Force, causing significant damage and reportedly resulting in the deaths of at least 18 Iran-backed fighters. However, the long-term impact on the capabilities of these groups and their willingness to continue engaging in hostilities remains to be seen.

The consequences of the airstrikes on civilian casualties and infrastructure in Syria is not fully clear at this time. While the strikes were reportedly focused on military targets, there is always a risk of unintended civilian casualties or damage to infrastructure near the targeted areas. The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has already reported that 23 people had been killed in Syria, bringing the total number killed in both countries to 39. On the other hand, Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces, a state security force that includes Iran-backed organisations, reported 16 of its personnel were killed, including fighters and doctors. The authorities had stated that at least 16 individuals, including civilians, were killed and 23 were injured.

Russian Defector Targeted in Spain

Topic: An analysis of the targeted killing of Russian defector Maxim Kuzminov in Spain and online Russian disinformation campaigns in Western and Southern Europe: What effects do these events have on the security of Western and Southern Europe?

Key Judgements:

• Maxim Kuzminov is highly likely to have been killed by the GRU or the wider Russian Intelligence Services in Spain on February 13th 2024. 
• Russia is seeking to target states in Western and Southern Europe that support Ukraine through conducting online disinformation campaigns. 
• Russia has an active interest in destabilising Ukraine’s partners in Western and Southern Europe and is able to do so through a “wide range of opportunities”.

On August 9, 2023, Maxim Kuzminov, a captain of Russia’s 319th separate helicopter regiment officially became a Russian defector after he flew a Mil MI8 helicopter into Ukrainian territory and handed himself in as part of a special operation in coordination with Ukrainian Intelligence (GUR). The GUR operation, codenamed “Synitsa” had been in the works for six months. Kuzminov had originally contacted Ukrainian GUR agents in December 2022, expressing that he wanted to surrender to Ukraine in exchange for a large sum of money (€500,000) and to have a new life with his family in Ukraine. After defecting to Ukraine, Kuzminov was awarded the equivalent of €500,000 and spoke critically about Russia’s war in Ukraine at a high level press conference in Kyiv, encouraging other Russian’s fighting in Ukraine to do the same, by stating that “You won’t regret it.” Six months later, on February 13, 2024, Kuzminov was killed in Villajoyosa, a coastal town on the Costa Blanca in Spain. Kuzminov moved to Spain from Ukraine in December 2023. Prior to moving to Spain, he was issued fake documents by Ukrainian officials which stated that the 28 year-old Russian citizen was a “33-year-old citizen of Ukraine”. These documents were found at the scene of the targeted killing and his identity has been officially confirmed by police and Ukrainian Military Intelligence. Kuzminov’s body was “riddled with bullets”. He was shot “at least six times” and had been hit by a car (white SUV, Hyundai) in the targeted killing which occurred outside of a community garage in an apartment complex. The perpetrators fled the scene in a white Hyundai SUV used in the targeted killing. The vehicle was found to have been set on fire, 18km away in the nearby town of El Campello, which is a 20 minute drive away from Villajoyosa.

Whilst some contemporary news reports in the media claim that they are uncertain about who killed him, there is already strong evidence to suggest that Kuzminov was targeted by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, known as the GRU or by the wider Russian Intelligence Services. In October 2023, Russian State TV  Channel, Rossiya 1 broadcasted a very brief interview with several Russian Spetsnaz operators from the GRU. In the very brief interview, a Spetsnaz operator states that “the order to (assassinate Kuzminov) has already been received and its execution is only a question of time”. Other operators additionally pitch in commenting that “We will find him and punish him to the fullest extent of the law of or government”. Towards the end of the interview one operator comments “Of course we will find him, we can reach anyone, our arms are long.”

This clearly shows that the GRU  had an active interest in targeting Kuzminov after he had defected from fighting for Russia in August 2023. In light of Kuzminov’s death in Spain, the interview certainly does add weight to the argument that the GRU and Russian Intelligence more broadly  were involved in the targeted killing of Kuzminov. When news of Kuzminov’s death broke out, Sergei Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (the SVR) commented saying that Maxim Kuzminov was a “traitor and a criminal” who “became a moral corpse at the very moment when he planned his dirty and terrible crime”. This supports the fact that the wider Russian Intelligence community had an active interest in conducting a targeted killing on Kuzminov. Before Kuzminov’s identity was confirmed, Russian media were also the first to report on his death in Spain. Multiple news outlets have also reported that Russian ammunition has been discovered at the scene of the incident. One local news source stated that “Sources close to the investigation consider the assassins used Russian ammunition so there would be no doubt the execution, with its exemplary overtones, came from Russia and was the direct and announced consequence of the high-profile desertion.” Again this ties the Russian state and their intelligence services to Kuzminov’s death in Spain.  Recent evidence by Ukrainian sources has shown that prior to his death, Kuzminov had called his ex-girlfriend and “had invited her to Spain… afterwards he was found dead.” It is a realistic possibility that “that call could have been intercepted by Russian secret services”, allowing them to pinpoint his location and carryout a successful targeted killing. The following evidence presented above adds undeniable and transparent evidence that the murder of Maxim Kuzminov is highly likely to have been carried out by GRU,  the wider Russian Intelligence Services or the Russian State. 

As tragic as Kuzminov’s death at the hands of the Russian Intelligence Services and the wider Russian state is, it additionally creates security issues and challenges for countries in Western and Southern Europe. Kuzminov’s death is a “theatrical act of violence”, with the intention of demonstrating that Russia is willing and able to “kill with impunity all over the world”, including in the far corners of Southern Europe. Russia definitely does have long arms, as pointed out by the Spetsnaz operator in October 2023, and indeed ones which are able to pry their way into Europe bringing  mayhem and chaos to the forefront of European security. 

Alongside targeted killings, Russia has also been stepping up  recent disinformation campaigns in various regions in Southern and Western Europe. Viginum, a French foreign-disinformation watchdog revealed in mid February 2024, that it had uncovered “a Russian network of 193 websites” which it concluded Russia had created to use “for a large disinformation campaign in France, Germany, Poland and other European countries, tied in part to the second anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the elections to the European Parliament in June.” Current traffic on these sites are low, however, “French authorities think they are ready to be activated aggressively as part of what one official calls a “massive” wave of Russian disinformation”.  Over 50 of these websites have been created since 2022. The aim of these websites is “to spread ‘deceptive and false’ content about the war in Ukraine, both on websites and via social media” and by proxy, attempt destabilise various regions in Western and Southern Europe. Russia’s online disinformation campaigns and its targeted killing of Maxim Kuzminov’s highlights that “as the war in Ukraine protracts, Russia has an interest in creating crises further afield.” The targeted killing of Kuzminov in Spain also shows that despite the GRU’s reach into Europe having originally “suffered real setbacks from the widespread expulsion of Russian intelligence officers and the exposure of its personnel in the lead-up to the invasion of Ukraine… Russia is now actively trying to rebuild the capacity to embark on such operations”, and they are not afraid to do so.

Russia’s targeted killing of Kuzminov and its online disinformation campaigns in Western and Southern Europe ultimately makes clear that “Russia… has an active interest in destabilising Ukraine’s partners” and is able to do so through a “wide range of opportunities”. Ultimately, the targeted killing of Kuzminov is evidently an attempt to destabilise security in Southern Europe and put various countries in Western and Southern Europe on edge, whilst simultaneously sending a message to other Russian defectors who reside in Western and Southern Europe: they are not untouchable or safe despite however far away from Russia they may be.