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Analysing if France should deploy French troops into Ukraine and what ramifications it could have on Western and Southern Europe

Polish Border Crisis

Key Judgement:

• It is highly likely that Russia would attempt to destabilize Poland by weaponizing migrants (High confidence)
• It is highly likely that recent European Parliament election result would be supportive Poland’s extreme border control policy, and migrants flow would be helpful for right wing parties of Western Europe. (High confidence)
• It is unlikely that weaponizing migrants would led to stopping or deterring Ukraine aid in upcoming months. It is realistically possible if Trump win in upcoming US presidential election. (Medium confidence)

The border between Poland and Belarus has been a focal point of tension since the onset of the Ukraine war, primarily due to Belarus’s alignment with Russia. President Alexander Lukashenko, the long-standing dictator of Belarus, has ruled using tactics reminiscent of President Putin’s strategies. Since the 2020 Belarus crisis and subsequent Russian assistance in quelling political opposition, Lukashenko has closely aligned with Kremlin interests in Eastern Europe.

Poland, with its historical experiences of Russian occupation, maintains a cautious and adversarial stance toward Moscow. Since joining NATO and the EU, Poland has remained vigilant against Russian threats, unlike many Western European nations that have relaxed their defences since the Cold War. Poland’s significant military investments have positioned it as a leading NATO military power. Prior to the Ukraine war, Poland was among the few NATO countries already spending more than 2% of its GDP on defence. By 2024, military expenditures reached 3.9% of GDP, totalling $31.6 billion, making Poland the 14th largest military spender globally. The land forces plan to double in size to 300,000 troops, bolstered by substantial military imports from the US and South Korea, transforming Poland’s post-Soviet military into one of the most modern in the region. Additionally, Poland has transferred significant post-Soviet arms to Ukraine, including MiG-29 jets, modernized T-72 tanks, and Krab 155-mm howitzers. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy tracker, Poland has donated €3 billion to Ukraine, compared to France’s €544 million contribution.

The previous administration, led by the populist far-right PiS party, maintained a strong stance against Russia, actively supporting Ukraine and leveraging the Russian threat as a political advantage. This anti-Russian sentiment is one of the few issues with broad support within Polish society, and the current administration has not altered its stance on Russia, despite efforts to roll back many PiS policies. Discussions within the current administration about renegotiating military imports have not weakened Warsaw’s firm position against Moscow. The European Parliament election on June 9 saw the Civic Coalition triumph over the PiS party, likely enabling the continuation of current policies.

In light of the ongoing Ukraine war, Poland has emerged as a significant threat to Moscow’s ambitions to reestablish its influence in the region. Poland’s capability and willingness to deter Russian military activities make it a primary target for Russian intelligence operations. On May 14, Prime Minister Tusk announced increased investment in security agencies due to the growing threat from Russian and Belarusian intelligence services. While the Polish counterintelligence agency (BIRN) has not disclosed exact arrest figures related to Russian intelligence, it is known that since the Ukraine war began, 29 individuals have been arrested, and 19 charged with working for Russian intelligence. Notable incidents include the arrest of a Polish man collaborating with the GRU, providing information about Rzeszow-Jasionka Airport, the main hub for military aid to Ukraine, and involvement in an assassination attempt on the Ukrainian president. In January and May, networks attempting to sabotage strategic infrastructure were dismantled. Additionally, “Voice of Europe,” a propaganda network aimed at influencing European politics and public opinion, has targeted Poland, countered by Polish and other security agencies. The largest spy network scandal, involving 16 individuals conducting reconnaissance of key military facilities and critical infrastructure, was uncovered in November 2023.

Given these circumstances, it is highly likely that Russia will attempt to weaponize migrants against Poland using its border with Belarus. Weaponizing migrants has been a recurring Kremlin tactic against Europe to destabilize the region. Recent turmoil at the Finland-Russia border exemplifies this strategy. It is well-documented that Russia and the Assad regime in Syria have used migrant flows to Europe as an asymmetric warfare tool against the West. Russian mercenaries have also facilitated migrant entry from Libya to Europe, exacerbating the Mediterranean migrant crisis. With Russia’s dwindling options to pressure Poland, a large-scale migrant weaponization at the Poland-Belarus border is highly probable.

Tensions in this region have been escalating for years, with the border serving as a gateway for migrants entering the EU. The previous PiS administration publicly committed to defending the border at all costs, a stance that remains unchanged despite the regime change. Poland is currently fortifying its border with Belarus, and the recent tragic death of a Polish soldier, who was stabbed by migrants, has garnered public support for these measures.

The recent European Parliament election saw right-wing parties in Western Europe gain seats, indicating a significant shift in migrant policy in Western Europe. Traditionally, Western European countries have supported pro-migrant policies, while Eastern Europe has opposed them due to bearing the brunt of incoming migrants. Although right-wing party’s lost seats in Eastern Europe, Western influence in Parliament is more substantial, and Eastern European left-wing parties do not align with the pro-migrant stance of their Western counterparts. Therefore, possible

Right-wing parties in Europe have historically been more pro-Russian, and Russia has supported them for years. In this political climate, a massive migrant influx could bolster public support for far-right parties in Europe, potentially influencing election outcomes and disrupting the ongoing Ukraine war. With intensifying Western support and weapons starting to strike targets inside Russian territory, Russia’s desperation is growing.

In conclusion, it is highly likely that weaponizing migrants in Poland will be observed in the next six months, given the current geopolitical dynamics. Russia would actively use migrants to cultivate chaos in Poland, and to support ongoing dominance of right-wing party that could possibly stop or deter support for Ukraine. However it is unlikely that right wing party dominance would led to stopping Ukraine aid in upcoming months. Actual possible difference would be possible after the biggest political event of 2024, which is the US election in November.

Gaza Escalation: Understanding Israel’s Rafah Operation and Its Broader Implications

This paper analyses Israel’s military operation in Rafah on May 6th, 2024, within the broader context of the Gaza Strip conflict. It explores the factors leading to the operation, its immediate consequences, and its regional and international implications, including diplomatic tensions and humanitarian concerns.

On May 6th, 2024, Israel launched an operation in and around Rafah as part of its invasion of the Gaza Strip, gaining control of a crucial border crossing and shutting off most supplies to the neighbourhood a day before indirect discussions on a ceasefire agreement were scheduled to commence. The Israeli operation began hours after Hamas officials said on Monday night that they would accept a recent ceasefire proposal presented by Qatari and Egyptian mediators. Israeli forces airdropped leaflets to Palestinians in east Rafah on Sunday night, telling them to flee to a safe zone; yet the operation began only hours later. The Israeli military seized control of the Gaza side of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt on Tuesday, after airstrikes on the southern Palestinian city on Monday.

Yoav Gallant, Israel’s defence minister, stated that the attack would continue until Hamas soldiers in Rafah “and the entire Gaza Strip” were “eliminated”, or the militant Islamist organization began to release captives.

According to the IDF, six rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip’s Rafah sector on May 7th towards Kerem Shalom and the Re’im region in southern Israel in retaliation to the Israeli operation.

The United States, Israel’s staunchest ally, has repeatedly urged Israel against launching a significant military assault in Rafah, where more than a million civilians evacuated from other parts of Gaza are seeking refuge. In addition, aid groups have forecast a major humanitarian disaster. On the other hand, President Netanyahu later reacted, stating that the civilian losses from Sunday’s strike on the Rafah camp were a ‘tragic error’.

This Israeli action has and will have far-reaching ramifications for regional stability. Neighbouring nations have already expressed their displeasure, with Egypt reportedly considering downgrading ties with Israel, perhaps ending the peace accords between the two countries. The operation would necessitate the relocation of Palestinians into Egyptincreasing tensions with Egypt since the arrival of so many displaced people would be difficult for Egypt as well and would impede the return of Palestinians to their land after the conflict. On Lebanon now, as the IDF makes its first steps on the southern Gaza city of Rafah, Hezbollah announces the use of new weaponry in strikes over the northern border, calls for further soldier mobilisation, and sends other signs of impending escalation. Whether their claims are legitimate or simply an effort to cause fear, the pressure on Israel is increasing.

The necessity for the international community to enhance diplomatic efforts and humanitarian help to solve the rising catastrophe in Gaza is growing significantly, and Netanyahu is under pressure from both the international community and his own administration.

The Driving Forces behind the Houthis  

It is highly likely that the Houthis will continue to use their current Red Sea strategy in order to consolidate their power and territory in Yemen and achieve political legitimacy. It is assessed with high confidence that political leverage over the Yemeni government, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is the driving force behind the Houthis Red Sea strategy. 

The Houthi’s, a Shia-Islamic militant group based in Yemen, have been disrupting maritime trade in the Red Sea region via drone attacks, ballistic missiles, as well as piracy, since October 7^th, 2023. This disruption was initially targeted at only Israeli-linked vessels; however, this has since spread to encompass all shipping in the region. The overt reason for the disruption is to degrade Israeli trade in solidarity with Hamas in Gaza, one of the groups, along with the Houthis and Hezbollah, which makes up Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”. The Houthis, however, have been active and operating since the 1980s, and have been in a civil war in Yemen since 2014, thus indicating that the group has their own agenda, which is separate from Iran’s machinations. This paper will therefore analyse the formation of the Houthis via their political and religious lines and aim to assess the short to medium term goals of the Houthis, removed from Iranian influence.

Religion is the focal point of the Houthi movement and identity, which was born in the late 1980s to early 1990s as a response to the marginalisation being faced by the Zaydi population (Zaydism being a branch of Shi’ism) by the Sunni Yemen Arab Republic. Saudi Arabia was very involved in pushing the Sunni belief system amongst the largely Zaydi population of Northern Yemen in order to undermine the Zaydi elites, with an aim to consolidating a religiously unified territory. In response to the marginalisation faced by Zaydi’s, the Houthi’s nurtured a network of ‘Believing Youth’, and increasingly adopted Shi’ite symbols similar to those common in Iran, thus sowing the seeds of sectarianism which eventually led to several rounds of conflict with the Yemeni government between 2004 and 2010. This was followed by failed negotiations at the National Dialogue Conference in 2013-2014, which led to the Houthi capturing of the Yemeni capital Sanaa and continuing to march south to consolidate the west coast of Yemen. This has since developed into a civil war between the Yemeni government, backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the Houthis, who at this time started to receive increased levels of support from Iran and Hezbollah.

The Houthi’s political arm, known as ‘Ansar Allah’ (Partisans of God), is positioned directly in line with their religious ideology. Their political influence, however, extends further than their originating religious and geographical roots. Whilst the Zaydi population makes up roughly 30% of the Yemeni population, the Houthis now control the geographic territory which holds roughly 66% of the Yemeni population, which is 20 million people. Politically, the Houthis strategy for attacking ships in the Red Sea have several layers to them. Domestically within Yemen, the Houthis can frame their attacks as a ‘Just War’, appealing to the population of Yemen based on moral and religious propaganda. This serves as a recruitment tool, as well as a political tool, both to legitimise the Houthis in Yemen, and against the Yemeni government.

In the Middle East and internationally, the Houthi’s strategy in the Red Sea serves as a publicity and bargaining tool, achieving the dual purpose of garnering international attention to amplify their message, as well as increasing their power in the political sphere to leverage an end to the war with Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. By proving their military capabilities in the Red Sea, the Houthis have applied pressure to Saudi Arabia and their coalition, who are likely to want to end direct conflict to focus on their internal economic and tourism industries.

By posturing as moral fighters in a ‘Just War’, the Houthis have used their Red Sea strategy to gain political legitimacy, bolster support within a suffering Yemeni population, and gain political power in the Middle East. Whilst Iran are the key enablers for the Houthis complex attacks due to the advanced weapons systems that they provide, they are not steering the Houthis politically. It is highly likely that the Houthis will continue to use their current Red Sea strategy in order to consolidate their power and territory in Yemen and achieve political legitimacy. It is assessed with high confidence that political leverage over the Yemeni government, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is the driving force behind the Houthis Red Sea strategy.

Russian and Chinese Intelligence Operations in the UK and Germany (April 2024)

Key Judgements:

• There has been a recent surge of Russian and Chinese backed espionage operations in regions across Western and Southern Europe. These operations have greatly affected the security of Western and Southern Europe and demonstrate that both Russia and China are gearing towards a more active stance to focus on undermining European Security.
• Operations of this nature are likely to continue to be employed by both the Russian and Chinese intelligence services and are highly likely to continue to be a persistent and adamant threat to the security of Western and Southern Europe both now and in the near future.

Over the course of April 2024, there have been multiple incidents of Russian and Chinese backed espionage operations which have occurred in the regions of Western and Southern Europe. Of course, intelligence agencies such as Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (the SVR), Russia’s Military Intelligence Service (the GRU) and the Chinese Intelligence Agency, the Ministry of State Security (the MSS) have a history of launching espionage operations across Western and Southern Europe for the purposes of destabilising and undermining security in the region. As recently as March 2024, a Russian hacking group known as APT29 or “Cosy Bear”, targeted German opposition politicians by sending them malware laced emails, inviting them to attend a dinner party and to fill out an online questionnaire. ATP29 who works for the SVR, used the incident in an attempt to gain access to sensitive computer systems run by Germany’s Christian Democratic Party (CDU) in an effort to compromise and influence the German political landscape. Fortunately, the SVR’s operation was detected by Mendicant, a US cyber security company, who raised the issue with Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. In response, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution issued a warning to all German political parties making them aware of the SVR’s malicious activities.

Like the SVR, the GRU have also been active in Western and Southern Europe, with one source noting that “there is now growing evidence that Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service… and its Military Intelligence Agency… are aggressively trying to rebuild their human espionage networks – particularly with an eye toward military aid going to Ukraine.” Looking towards the MSS, between 2019 and 2022, Daniel Woo, an MSS Officer actively pushed a former Belgian senator, Frank Creyelman to directly use his status to influence discussions in Europe on multiple issues including “China’s crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong to its persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang”. What’s clear from these historical examples are that Chinese and Russian backed operations are widespread from an operational perspective and that they actively aim and achieve to undermine the security of nations across Western and Southern Europe. This trend as we shall see has continued to rear its ugly head over the course of April 2024, serving as a reminder that both Russia and China are gearing towards a more aggressive and active stance in their operations across the region.

Over the duration of April 2024, Germany saw a surge of arrests of suspected spies for the Chinese and Russian Intelligence Agencies, with six suspects being arrested across the nation. In one of these cases, two German-Russian nationals only identified publicly as Dieter S, 39 and Alexander J, 37 were arrested in the southern German state of Bavaria on suspicion of spying for the GRU. Both men are accused of scouting and conducting reconnaissance on a US military base “at Grafenwöhr, Bavaria, where Ukrainian soldiers are being trained to use M1 Abrams tanks”, and at other industrial/transport sites in Germany with the aim to conduct arson and explosive attacks on these sites in an attempt to undermine Germany’s military exports to Ukraine. Dieter S has specifically been accused of “a string of offences, including plotting an explosion, arson and maintaining contact with Russian intelligence”, while Alexander J is accused of helping Dieter S since March 2024 to “identify potential targets for the attack”. Other Prosecutors believe that Dieter S is alleged to have discussed potential sabotage operations in Germany with his GRU contact since as early as October 2023. Given that Germany “is the second largest donor of military aid after the US, earmarking some €28 billion since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022”, it should come as no surprise that the GRU is keen to inflict as much harm and damage as they can on military exports to Ukraine coming from Germany and by proxy, the US. Because of Germany’s large military exports to Ukraine, the country has become an attractive target for the Russian Intelligence Services, with one source noting that “Germany has emerged as a leading target for Russian clandestine operations in Europe.” German officials summoned Russian ambassador Sergei Nechaev in response to the foiled GRU operation, however, the Russian Embassy in Berlin claimed that he was presented with “no proof” that the suspects are connected with the GRU. Moreover, the Russian embassy denounced and dismissed German accusations that the GRU were planning to attack military and industrial facilities, calling the accusations “absurd and ridiculous” whilst also commenting, “we made it clear that any unfriendly actions against Russia will not go without consequences.”  Whilst the foiling of this clandestine operation may be seen as a short-term victory for German counterintelligence, the fact that Germany is a high value target for Russia’s Intelligence Services unveils the possibility that more attempts by the GRU to undermine Germany’s military exports to Ukraine are highly likely to occur both now and in the near future.

The MSS, like the GRU have also been active in Germany over April 2024. Out of the six individuals apprehended in Germany in over the month on espionage charges, 4 out of the 6 are linked to the MSS. Thomas R, Herwig F and Ina F were arrested by German authorities on April 17, 2024, for allegedly supplying information and intelligence on military technology to the MSS. All three suspects are “strongly suspected of having worked for the Chinese Secret Service since an unspecified date before June 2022”. In an official press release, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office stated that “Thomas R acts as an agent for the employee of the Chinese Secret Service MSS who is staying in China. On behalf of this person, Thomas R obtained information on military-usable innovative technology in Germany”. Thomas R is alleged to have cooperated with  Herwig F and Ina F who ran a company in Düsseldorf which was used to contact people within German science and technology research organisations. Through an MSS employee and the Düsseldorf-ran company, the trio were able to gain, collect and pass on sensitive information “including designs for an engine suitable for use of combat ships” onto China. This project was directed and financed by the MSS. At the time of their arrest, “the accused were in further negotiations on research projects which could be useful for the expansion of China’s maritime combat power in particular”. The trio are also accused of creating “a special laser from Germany on behalf of and with payment of the MSS and exported it to China without permission”. The laser is banned under the EU Dual Use regulations which prohibits sending goods which can be used for both military and civilian purposes to certain countries.

In a separate and unrelated incident, which occurred in the UK in April 2024, Christopher Cash, 29, a parliamentary researcher and Christopher Berry, 32 were charged under the Official Secrets Act with allegedly spying for China after they allegedly handed over information which could be considered to be “useful to an enemy”. The pair have been accused of passing on “articles, notes, documents or information” to China. A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy commented “I would like to already reaffirm that the claim that China is suspected of ‘stealing British Intelligence’ is completely fabricated and nothing but malicious slander”. Circling back to Germany, a German employee for the European Parliament and a member of the German political party Alternate for Deutschland (AfD), Jian Guo was arrested in April 2024 in Dresden, for repeatedly passing on information about German parliamentary decisions to Chinese intelligence services. Guo is a duel German Chinese citizen and is alleged to have committed espionage activities by “posing as a critic of the Chinese Government and joining dissident groups of Chinese expatriates in Germany. He would then provide information about the activities of these groups to Chinese intelligence”. In similar fashion to the unrelated case in the UK, China yet again dismissed any accusations that came its way as nonsense.

Both officials in Germany and the UK have branded the foiling of these cases as a success in the realm of counterintelligence yet one must bear in mind that these incidents in fact show that both Russia and China have actively sought to increase their meddling and degrading of the security of Western and Southern Europe, especially since the inception of the Russo Ukraine war. Whilst successes must always be seen as a good thing, especially in the world of intelligence, one must be aware that there are and will be plenty of more opportunities for the Russian and Chinese Intelligence Services to continue to disrupt and exploit the security and political landscapes of Western and Southern Europe both now and in the near future. With a string of individuals being arrested in both Germany and the UK over the course of the month for espionage related activities, one can draw the conclusion that it is highly likely that clandestine operations of this nature which are backed or directly funded by the MSS and Russia’s Intelligence Services are likely to press on into the future, repeating and reappearing with both surprise and frequency whilst simultaneously continuing to be a pressing security issue for regions across Western and Southern Europe.