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Shifting Ground: NATO’s Eastern Border Strategy and the Return of Landmines

In June and July 2025, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania formally announced their withdrawal from the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines. The so-called Ottawa Treaty prohibits the use of anti-personnel mines. The exit reflects the evolving threat landscape along NATO’s northeastern flank that borders Belarus and Russia. The states justify the move with the military lessons learned from the war in Ukraine and the growing pressure from Russian troop movements, hybrid operations and border provocations. Russia has used APMs in the war against Ukraine. For strategic reasons, President Zelensky announced Ukraine’s withdrawal from the treaty.

Key Take-aways

• For the first time, EU and NATO countries are coordinately withdrawing from an international disarmament agreement.
• Anti-personnel mines are to become an integral part of joint border defence systems (East Shield / Baltic Defence Line).
• The intended use is limited to defensive scenarios: deny access, restrict mobility, and channel enemy movement.
• The renewed deployment of APMs reflects a broader strategic shift, away from symbolic presence and toward operational defence capabilities.

Background

The Ottawa Treaty came into force in 1999. It prohibits the production, stockpiling, use and transfer of anti-personnel mines. To date, 164 countries have signed the treaty, including almost all EU states and NATO members. Anti-personnel mines (APMs) are intended as a deterrent. They are deployed to block terrain, control enemy movements and prevent mobility. However, their strategic purpose goes beyond this: they are also designed to injure and maim people, not necessarily to kill them, thereby tying up medical resources, burdening logistics, and reducing combat efficiency. Because of this, the Ottawa Treaty has long been regarded as a symbol of the humanization of armed conflict. The United States, China, Russia and Belarus have never signed the treaty. With Russia using APMs in the war in Ukraine, President Zelensky announced Ukraine’s withdrawal from the treaty in June 2025 for strategic reasons.

Analysis

The three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, share a 1,360 kilometers long land border with Russia and Belarus. Particularly critical is the 65-kilometre-wide Suwałki Gap between Poland and Lithuania. The corridor is NATO’s only land access to the Baltic states, flanked by Kaliningrad and Belarus. A coordinated offensive could cut this link and isolate the Baltic states. The Baltic Sea remains a strategically sensitive area, with Russian naval forces stationed in Kaliningrad and Kronstadt maintaining a constant presence.

In response, the Baltic states are jointly establishing the Baltic Defence Line, a border defence system with barriers, tank traps and bunkers. The forest- and lake-rich regions of eastern Latvia (Latgale) and eastern Lithuania (Aukštaitija) are particularly relevant. These are sparsely populated, topographically challenging areas with limited infrastructure. They are hardly suitable for a permanent troop presence, but offer potential axes for infiltration or hybrid operations, such as via the Russian-influenced Daugavpils. The potential use of anti-personnel mines can effectively block bottlenecks, paths and crossings here and restrict enemy movements in advance.

Poland also faces strategic vulnerabilities along its borders with Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Both are potential starting points for conventional or hybrid operations. As NATO’s logistical backbone in the eastern flank, Warsaw has a key role to play, especially in protecting the vulnerable Suwałki Gap.

With the ‘East Shield’ project, Poland is building a multi-layered defence system along its eastern border. In addition to modern surveillance technology and permanent barriers, the selective use of anti-personnel mines is being considered, particularly in rough terrain, at river crossings or sensitive junctions.

Although Finland has not announced a dedicated border infrastructure project, its natural geography already provides a strong defensive buffer. The decision to withdraw nonetheless signals a strategic shift towards integrating mine systems into territorial defence planning.

Conclusion

The potential use of anti-personnel mines is a prime example of a security policy shift along NATO’s eastern flank. The former ‘tripwire strategy’ based on limited presence and symbolic deterrence is being replaced by a concept of forward, layered, and immediate defence. Since the NATO Summit in Madrid (2022), the guiding principle has been clear: deterrence starts at the border, not behind it. Large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Baltic Defence Line and East Shield embody this logic.

The coordinated withdrawal from the Ottawa Treaty marks not just a tactical realignment, but also a political signal: European frontline states are asserting more national autonomy in how they shape their border defence. This is not a departure from NATO, but a complement to the alliance strategy. It is grounded in national resilience and terrain-based denial. The planned reintroduction of landmines reflects a pragmatic, though controversial, response to the operational demands of deterrence along NATO’s eastern frontier.

5 days of race riots in Northern Ireland

Key Judgements

• 5 days of violent race riots in the Ballymena area of Northern Ireland after the attempted rape of a teenage girl
• 32 police officers were injured, and several houses were burned or damaged
• Additional police officers and resources were requested from Great Britain

Timeline

7^th June

On the evening of the 7^th of June, the sexual assault and attempted oral rape of a teenage girl was reported to the PSNI in the Clonavon Terrace area of Ballymena. A police investigation began around the incident, which occurred between 7.30pm and 10.30pm. Two 14-year-old boys were arrested and questioned. Specialist officers supported the teenage girl who was left distressed and traumatised.

8^th June

On the 8^th, police announced the two teenage boys had been charged with attempted rape and were to appear before court on the morning of the 9^th. A Facebook post was circulated in the local community, telling people to gather at a local spot, “Ken’s car park”, at 7:30 p.m. on the 9^th to “show their anger”.

9^th June

On the 9^th, the two teenage boys appeared via video link before Coleraine Magistrates Court, confirming their names through a Romanian interpreter. A defence solicitor said both teens were denying the charge, and they were to appear before court again next month.

At around 7:30pm, hundreds gathered in Ballymena for a peaceful protest in support of the family of the girl. The vigil was initially peaceful as it made its way towards the Clonavon Terrace area of Ballymena. Police officers were present due to the large number of people.

Several masked individuals broke away from the vigil and began to build barricades, stockpiling missiles and attacking properties in the Clonavon Terrace area. Members of the crowd attacked officers with petrol bombs and masonry. This disorder was sustained and continued in the vicinity of Galgorm Street, Linenhall Street and the Larne Road Link. Riot Police in Land Rovers attempted to contain the crowds by blocking off the road.

As the disorder grew in intensity, police issued a statement urging people to avoid the Clonavon Road area. A makeshift barricade was made in the road and set alight. A crowd of people began targeting houses in the area, with individuals kicking doors down. Four houses in the area were set alight, and three people had to be evacuated from the properties. The NI Fire and Rescue Service arrived to tackle the blazes.

Police came under “sustained” attack for several hours as the disorder continued, and in total, 15 officers were injured. One person involved in the rioting was struck with a rubber bullet fired by police. Two police vehicles were also damaged during the disorder. In total, six properties in Clonavon Terrace had sustained damage to windows and doors. Police said they would investigate the actions as “racially motivated hate attacks”.

10^th June

On the 10^th, shortly after 12.20am, a vehicle at the Tobar Park area in the village of Cullybackey, a few miles outside Ballymena, was targeted in a petrol bomb attack. The blaze caused damage to a nearby property, with a woman and two children inside.

During the day police and local authorities began a clean-up operation with debris and burning items being cleared from the roads. Scorch marks and melted bins remained on the streets. Police said there was no evidence of paramilitary involvement. Two homes which had suffered significant smoke damage from the 9^th remained sealed off. A third arrest was made, a 28-year-old man, for the original sexual assault crime before being release from police custody following questioning.

Some homes begun displaying stickers outlining the residents’ nationalities including “British household” and “Filipino lives here”.  Local people had but up handwritten signs and Union Jack flags in their windows to ward off looters and rioters.

In the evening, riot police were deployed to Ballymena. Clashes between protesters and police occurred, with water cannons used and small burning barricades destroyed by police vehicles. One car was set on fire near the parking lot where the protests first began, while another was flipped over and burned out. Later, multiple homes were set on fire. There was a heavily pregnant woman in one of the houses set on fire who was removed from the property and taken to the police station for safety.

Police also dealt with sporadic incidents of disorder in Newtownabbey and Carrickfergus in County Antrim and north Belfast. Bins were set alight, and bricks were thrown at police by a group of 20 to 30 young people. One man, aged 29, was charged with riotous behaviour, disorderly behaviour, attempted criminal damage and resisting police after the violence on the 9^th.

11^th June

By the morning of the 11^th, six individuals had been arrested for public order offences, and one charged.

In the evening, police officers were attacked with petrol bombs, heavy masonry, a hatchet, bricks and fireworks. Officers responded by using water cannons, dogs and plastic batons and rubber bullets. Riot police with shields advanced on the crowd to disperse them down Bridge Street onto other roads. Rioters smashed the windows of a house on North Street and set multiple fires on streets in the surrounding area. The disorder and stand-off with police continued past midnight. Nine officers were injured, while two men, aged in their 20s, and one in their 30s, along with two teenagers, were arrested on suspicion of riotous behaviour and other offences. Additionally, masked rioters set fire to a leisure centre in nearby Larne that was hosting families fleeing the rioting in Ballymena.

12^th June

On the 12^th in the morning, 3 teenagers appeared in magistrates’ court and were charged with rioting offences. Two other teenage boys were arrested and released on bail to allow for further police inquiries.

Stormont Justice Minister Naomi Long said she would seek additional police for Northern Ireland police in the June Monitoring Round.

Police responded to a previous attack on the local leisure centre in Larne along with firefighters to clear up the building and surrounding area.

Elsewhere, masked protesters blocked local roads in the Marine Highway area of Carrickfergus, a teenager was arrested in Newtownabbey following disorder in the Station Road area and in Coleraine, a bus was attacked, bins were set alight on the train tracks and petrol bombs were thrown at police. However, associated protests passed without incident in the Antrim and Lisburn areas, and there were mainly peaceful protests in Belfast.

Analysis

There are a few likely factors behind the riots and the underlying tensions that lead to them.

Firstly, the local area, Ballymena, has a strong religious community  and had been dubbed the “buckle of the bible belt” of Northern Ireland. The area has been a Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) heartland with the firebrand preacher the Rev Ian Paisley winning for constituency for decades. The DUP have often spoken out against increased levels of migration and the issues of demographic changes.

Secondly, there had been long term concerns over the levels of migration into Ballymena with  DUP assembly member Paul Frew saying tensions had been rising and some people were frightened about illegal immigration. During the 1990s there had been rioting over areas like Drumcree and Ballymena over immigration and the changing social makeup. One of the reasons behind the levels of immigration is the relatively prosperous nature of Ballymena as a market town in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement secured peace. Some local politicians like North Antrim MP Jim Allister argued that local authorities failed to manage the integration of migrants and address concerns from local people, making them feel ignored. The number of migrants has increased, the net number of international migrants who have moved into Ballymena between 2001 and 2022 was 4,900, compared with 62,000 for the whole of Northern Ireland. However, only 3.5% of the population are from an ethnic minority, compared with 18% in England and Wales and about 13% in Scotland.

Thirdly, the use of social media likely helped to increase the number of people attending and supporting the riots. The example, Communities Minister Gordon Lyons had highlighted the use of the Larne leisure centres in a social media post hours before the attack. Mr Lyons will be referred to the standards commission as a result. Additionally, there had been widespread livestreaming of the violence with some videos directing people where to go, and how to get around the police barricades. This activity is likely to have helped the rioters cause additional disruption and spread awareness of the event to more interested parties.

What happens next?

After Stormont Justice Minister Naomi Long’s stated she would seek additional police for Northern Ireland police in the June Monitoring Round, it is highly likely that a greater amount of police resources will be deployed to Ballymena.

The controversy around immigration in the local area is unlikely to subside and politicians within the Northern Ireland Assembly are likely to debate on policy as a result.

Operation Spiderweb: An Assessment

Summary

On 1 June 2025, Ukrainian forces conducted a coordinated FPV-drone strike against five Russian air bases located deep within the country. The targets included strategic long-range bombers – notably the nuclear-capable Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 – as well as A-50 early warning aircraft. The operation demonstrates Ukraine’s growing ability to strike high-value targets far inside enemy territory using commercially available technology. It challenges core assumptions about vulnerability, strategic depth, and deterrence within Russian airspace.

At the same time, the use of off-the-shelf drone systems and covert logistics highlights the rising relevance of asymmetric, technology-driven operations in modern warfare.

Key takeaways

• The perceived security of strategic depth has proven misleading – even distant bases are within reach.
• Asymmetric effectiveness: The operation illustrates the strategic impact of simple, technology-enabled capabilities.
• The loss of 10% of bombers – including nuclear-capable platforms – weighs heavily: low availability amplifies the operational impact, with estimated aircraft losses totaling $7 billion.
• The attack underscores the urgent need for NATO members to strengthen the protection of their own air assets and critical infrastructure against drone swarm threats.

Background

The operation was prepared over 18 months by Ukraine’s intelligence services under strict operational secrecy. A total of 117 FPV drones were covertly transported deep into the Russian hinterland. The targets comprised five strategic air bases – from Murmansk in the north-west to central Russia and the Far East on the Chinese border. The coordinated strike was executed on 1 June. Drones were deployed from mobile units including structures with retractable roofs and panels. They reportedly operated semi-autonomously, using AI-assisted visual navigation, GPS, and adaptive targeting (making them less susceptible to jamming). Ukrainian personnel had been exfiltrated in advance. The attack took place immediately before peace talks in Istanbul.

Analysis

The strike challenges Russia’s reliance on strategic depth and reveals the limited protection afforded by geography alone. The inadequate security of strategic platforms highlights a glaring underestimation of asymmetric threats posed by small, hard-to-detect FPV drones. At the same time, it reveals a structural problem with modern air forces: open airfields, a lack of protective structures and poorly developed defence concepts against swarm attacks also affect Western armies.

The operation shows how technological agility can balance out classic superiority – with minimal resources but maximum effect. The targeted use of commercially available drones, combined with camouflage, AI-supported navigation and precise planning, marks a paradigm shift in strategic warfare.

The loss of several nuclear-capable bombers reduces Russia’s operational flexibility. Due to low availability, the effective loss of capability is greater than the material damage would suggest.

Conclusion and Outlook

Operation Spiderweb does not mark a turning point, but it sends a clear message: even core components of strategic air power can be targeted with simple means. Geographic depth can no longer be relied upon as a protective buffer. For Russia, it represents a tangible capability loss; for Ukraine, it is a demonstrative show of competence; and for Western armed forces, a call to reassess their own vulnerabilities.

Arson attack on property linked to UK Prime Minister

Key Judgements

• Alleged arson attacks occurred at properties connected to Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer
• Three men were arrested and have been charged with counts of arson and conspiracy to endanger life.
• Counter Terrorism police are investigating the cause and motivations of the three incidents.

Timeline

On 8 May, just before 3:00am, a car, a Toyota RAV4, the prime minister sold to a neighbour last year caught fire on the Kentish Town street where he lived before moving to Downing Street. A neighbour on the same street, Linda Perry, 80, described being woken up, saying “you could see the flames without looking outside the window”. She told the BBC: “I could hear two people shouting ‘fire, fire’ – they looked like food delivery men. As I looked out you could see it [the fire] lighting up the street.”

On 11 May, in the early hours, firefighters dealt with a small fire at the front door of a house converted into flats in nearby Islington, a property Sir Keir lived at during the 1990s. One person had to be rescued via an internal staircase by firefighters who were using breathing apparatus. Police officers were in the area until the early evening and then back again the next day, making house-to-house inquiries asking for footage “even of someone walking by.”

On 12 May, at 1:11am, a fire broke out at the prime minister’s private home in Kentish Town. Police were alerted at 1:30am by the London Fire Brigade to reports of a fire. Damage was caused to the property’s entrance, the doorway of his home was charred after being set ablaze, but nobody was hurt. The fire was under control within about 20 minutes. Charles Grant, 66, who lives on the same street, told reporters that police officers searched his garden to look for a “projectile”. “They didn’t find anything,” he said.

On 13 May, a Ukrainian national, Roman Lavrynovych, from Sydenham, 21, was arrested, in the early hours, and charged with three counts of arson with intent to endanger life. On 16 May, Lavrynovych appeared in court and did not enter any pleas to the charges. At the same time Prosecutor Sarah Przybylska said: “At this stage, the alleged offending is unexplained.” She also told the court that Lavrynovych was interviewed under caution after his arrest and denied arson. Lavrynovych was remanded in custody to appear at the Old Bailey on 6 June

On 17 May, self-proclaimed male model and actor, Stanislav Carpiuc, who was born in Ukraine but has Romanian nationality, and lives in Romford, east London, 26, was also arrested at Luton Airport and charged with conspiracy to commit arson with intent to endanger life.

On 19 May, Ukrainian national, Petro Pocynok, 34, from Holloway Road in Islington, north London, was arrested in Chelsea on suspicion of conspiracy to commit arson with intent to endanger life. Metropolitan Police accused him of conspiring with Roman Lavrynovych and Stanislav Carpiuc and other unknown people to cause damage by fire to property belonging to another. Pocynok later appeared before district judge Daniel Sternberg dressed in a prisoner’s grey tracksuit and spoke only to confirm his name, date of birth, and address.

On 20 May, Stanislav Carpiuc appeared in Westminster Magistrates Court, dressed in a blue adidas hoodie and grey tracksuit bottoms Prosecutor Sarah Przybylska said: “At this stage, the alleged offending is unexplained.” The court heard Carpiuc gave a no comment interview to police but denied being present at the scene of any of the fires.

All three charged men have remained in custody to appear at the Old Bailey on 6 June.

Reaction

The fires were widely condemned by politicians across the divide including from opposition ministers like shadow justice secretary Robert Jenrick who said it is “important that the prime minister and anyone in public life has their family, their homes, protected.” Home secretary, Yvette Cooper, said she had been briefed about the incidents and expressed her support for the ongoing police investigation. The prime minister’s official spokesperson said the police should be given the “time and space” to complete their investigations. Adding that the prime minister thanked the emergency for their work but was carrying with his public duties.

Analysis

The cause of the fires is not confirmed yet by police but Westminster Magistrates Court heard that accelerant, preliminarily deemed to be of a “slow burning nature,” was used in at least one of the fires. Additionally, during the incidents neighbours described hearing a loud bang and said police officers were looking for a “projectile.” This indicates the possibility of a flaming object being used in one of fires.

Detectives are still investigating whether all three of the fires were connected. However, given the closeness in time and location it is likely coordination occurred between the three incidents.

Counterterrorism detectives are leading the investigation because of the “property having previous connections with a high-profile public figure”, in this case the prime minister. The charges were authorized by the Crown Prosecution Service’s Counter Terrorism Division, which is responsible for prosecuting offenses relating to state threats, among other crimes.

Detectives are also investigating the possibility that the attacks could be linked to a “hostile state.” Specifically British security officials are examining the potential of Russian involvement given the ongoing geopolitical conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, of which the UK is exercising its influence in, this is reasonable possibility. It is key to note that on 26 May, the Kremlin rejected claims of involvement in the attacks.

What happens next?

Currently, counter-terrorism officers are working “at pace” to establish the cause of the fires and “any potential motivation.” Additionally, the three current suspects need to appear at the Old Baily on 6 June.

Police have said “enquiries are ongoing to establish what caused it. All three fires are being treated as suspicious at this time, and enquiries remain ongoing.” It is likely that discovering the cause of the fires will take considerable time, along with determining the full involvement of the three current suspects.

Europe’s Eastern Flank: Presidential Elections in Poland and Romania

Summary

Presidential elections were held in Poland and Romania on 18 May. In Romania, the independent, pro-European candidate Nicușor Dan, mayor of Bucharest, won the runoff election by a narrow margin against the right-wing populist George Simion. Both were considered anti-establishment. In Poland, the liberal mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, narrowly won the first round ahead of Karol Nawrocki of the national conservative PiS party; the runoff election is scheduled for 1 June.

The political situation is characterised by strong polarisation, institutional instability and external influence – from Russia, but also from actors in the United States and neighbouring European countries. The mobilisation of the political centre has remained reactive: a defensive success, but not a sign of structural stability.

Key judgements

• In both countries, pro-European candidates won the presidential elections, or the first round, but amid high political polarisation and institutional strain.
• In Romania, confidence in institutions remains fragile; forming a government is complicated and poses political risks for President Dan.
• In Poland, the runoff election on 1 June will be decisive for the Tusk government’s ability to implement reforms. A victory for Nawrocki would cement the domestic political stalemate.
• Both countries remain key security pillars within the EU and on NATO’s eastern flank, both militarily and in terms of energy and logistics.
• Populism has not disappeared but is merely being kept in check. External attempts to influence the situation – particularly from Russia and parts of the US MAGA camp – are exacerbating institutional tensions.

Analysis

The election in Romania will not bring immediate stabilisation, as institutional trust remains fragile. Polarisation remains unchanged and the capacity for reform continues to be limited. Forming a government remains complicated: no coalition option is politically unproblematic, and every decision carries the risk of damaging Dan’s independence. Involving established parties could undermine his reformist image, while excluding them could block the formation of a majority. Domestic political expectations are enormous. A comparable burden is evident in Poland, where the ability of Donald Tusk’s government to implement its reform promises depends largely on the outcome of the runoff election. For the PiS party, the question is whether the lost parliamentary election in 2023 was only a temporary setback or whether it can strategically prepare for a return to power.

Strategic Significance

Due to its location, Romania plays a central role for NATO logistics and in the development of a new Black Sea strategy for the EU. The air bases at Mihail Kogălniceanu and Deveselu are key strategic sites: Mihail Kogălniceanu serves as a major logistics and deployment hub, while Deveselu hosts the U.S. Aegis Ashore missile defense system, making both critical to NATO’s eastern flank. The Danube, as a supply corridor via the Black Sea, is also strategically important, especially for military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. In addition, the Neptun Deep offshore gas field in the Black Sea is considered an important building block in reducing European dependence on Russian natural gas.

Poland, as a frontline state bordering Belarus and Ukraine, is a key strategic actor in NATO’s eastern flank strategy. With defence spending at 4.7% of GDP, it ranks among the alliance’s top contributors. Beyond serving as a hub for arms deliveries and refugee logistics, Poland is shaping regional security policy and plays a leading role in strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in Eastern Europe. A stronger government under Prime Minister Tusk – together with Trzaskowski as a pro-European and party colleague – could significantly improve security coordination with the EU and transatlantic partners while reducing domestic tensions.

What happens next

In Poland, the outcome of the election on 1 June will be decisive for the Tusk government’s ability to act. A victory for Trzaskowski could bring about moderate stabilisation and massively weaken the power of the PIS party. A victory for Nawrocki would further block Tusk’s reform agenda and exacerbate the ongoing judicial conflict. The PiS would ultimately prepare to regain power.

In Romania, Dan’s election consolidates the country’s pro-Western orientation and strengthens its security policy position in the context of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, he could speed up Moldova’s integration into the EU and reduce the influence of pro-Russian groups in the region. (Moldova and Romania share deep historical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic ties). Regardless of the election outcome, one thing became clear: voters want a break with the established political system – a signal that is likely to have repercussions beyond Romania.

Conclusion and outlook

Both countries are prime examples of how democracies react to populist pressure – but without structural safeguards. In Bucharest, populism has been contained for the time being, and in Warsaw, the answer is still pending. External attempts to influence the situation, domestic polarisation and institutional weaknesses remain key risk factors – not only for the countries concerned, but for the political stability of Europe as a whole.