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Wagner legacy networks and influence activity in Eastern Europe during March

Key Judgements.

• Wagner-linked networks continue to operate in a fragmented but persistent manner following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, maintaining influence capabilities across parts of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
• Activity in March indicates a shift from centrally coordinated paramilitary operations to decentralised influence, training, and facilitation networks.
• Legacy actors are increasingly embedded within local political, security, and criminal ecosystems, reducing visibility while maintaining operational relevance.
• Unlikely to pose an immediate conventional security threat. However, these networks represent a sustained hybrid risk, particularly in politically fragile or pro-Russian environments.

Objective

To assess the evolution and activity of Wagner legacy networks in Eastern Europe during March and evaluate their implications for regional security and influence dynamics.

Context

Following the collapse of Wagner’s central command structure in 2023, Russian private military activity has undergone a period of reorganisation. While elements have been absorbed into official Russian military or intelligence structures, a significant portion of personnel, facilitators, and affiliated actors have transitioned into loosely connected networks.

These networks retain key capabilities including combat experience, logistical knowledge, and established international contacts. Many individuals involved in Wagner’s previous operations possess experience in irregular warfare, logistics coordination, and local force integration, making them valuable assets even outside formal structures.

In Eastern Europe, their role has shifted away from direct combat and towards influence operations, security facilitation, and informal advisory roles. This includes engagement with private security firms, political organisations, and nationalist groups that provide both cover and access to local networks.

Countries in the Western Balkans and parts of Eastern Europe provide a permissive environment for such activity. Weak institutional oversight, political fragmentation, corruption vulnerabilities, and the presence of pro-Russian sentiment create opportunities for embedded influence. In some cases, existing grievances against Western institutions or NATO integration further increase receptivity.

In March, reporting and indicators suggest continued engagement by Wagner-linked individuals in areas such as paramilitary-style training, political networking, and narrative reinforcement aligned with Kremlin strategic interests. The absence of overt, large-scale activity should be understood as a shift in method rather than a reduction in intent.

Timeline

Pre 2023 – Wagner operates as a semi-covert extension of Russian state power, conducting combat and security operations in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa.

Mid to Late 2023 – Leadership collapse following the death of Prigozhin results in fragmentation of command structures and redistribution of personnel.

2024 – Elements of Wagner are absorbed into Russian state structures, while others disperse into informal networks operating with reduced visibility.

2025 – Sustained reports of Wagner-linked individuals engaging in security consultancy, training roles, and informal political engagement across parts of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

March 2026 – Indicators of continued Wagner-linked activity across Eastern Europe, focused on influence, training, and network-building rather than direct paramilitary deployment.

Analysis

Wagner’s evolution reflects a transition from a centralised expeditionary force into a dispersed network of actors capable of operating across multiple domains. This decentralisation reduces visibility and attribution, making it more difficult for governments to identify and respond to activity in a timely or proportionate manner.

In March, the most notable trend is the continued embedding of Wagner-linked individuals within local systems. Rather than operating as an external force, these actors are integrating into existing political, economic, and security structures. This provides access to influence channels while minimising the perception of foreign interference. Over time, this type of integration can normalise their presence and increase their ability to shape local narratives and decision-making environments.

The shift towards training and advisory roles is particularly significant. Even limited paramilitary-style training or security consultancy can enhance the capabilities of local groups, especially in regions where institutional capacity is already constrained. This creates a multiplier effect, where small numbers of experienced individuals can have a disproportionate impact on local dynamics.

At the same time, these networks operate within a grey zone between legality and illegality. Activities are often framed as legitimate employment or cooperation, complicating efforts to counter them without appearing heavy-handed or politically motivated. This ambiguity benefits the actors involved, allowing them to maintain plausible deniability while continuing to exert influence.

The cumulative effect of this activity is unlikely to produce immediate instability. However, over time it contributes to the erosion of governance, the strengthening of pro-Russian narratives, and the creation of latent capabilities that could be leveraged in periods of heightened tension. As such, Wagner legacy networks should be understood not as a residual phenomenon, but as an adaptive and enduring component of Russian influence strategy in Eastern Europe.

Strategic Reorientation – The US Redeploys its Patriot Missile System out of the Korean Peninsula

Key Judgements

On the 10^th March, the South Korean President Lee Jae Myung expressed opposition to the redeployment of Patriot missile systems away from Osan Air Base to the Middle East.  The move weakens South Korea’s protective capability on the peninsula, despite the government’s public rhetoric underscoring continued defence readiness. The instance marks a departure from US-sponsored military strengthening in Southeast Asia, signalling a geostrategic reorientation in prioritisation of more immediate threats as the war in Iran continues.

• The redeployment of highly symbolic assets is likely to damage US-South Korea relations, and reduces defensive capacity in relation to the North Korean missile threat.
• The deployment runs counter to the US’s long-running strategic policy of power balance in the region, demonstrating a willingness to sacrifice deterrence against China in favour of stemming further losses incurred in the Middle East. This reinforces questionable perceptions of the US as a reliable partner in broader issues related to Southeast Asian security concerns.

Objective

This analysis assesses whether asset redeployment represents a subordination of US goals in Southeast Asia in relation to the Middle East, or evidence of a resilient partnership in which South Korea is capable of withstanding short-term pressures.

Context

Whilst US military presence in South Korea has been a persistent feature since the Cold War, the topic of missile deployment holds enhanced significance in dictating and maintaining South Korea’s geopolitical orientation. The expansion of Patriot missile defence systems, valued at $1 billion USD, responded to heightened threats arising from North Korea’s nuclear missile testing. Strictly a defensive counter-missile system, Patriot integrates into a multi-layered network currently involving other systems such as the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, Aegis-equipped naval assets, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. South Korea’s deployment of the US’s THAAD system in 2017 resulted in a severe diplomatic fallout between China and South Korea, where economic restrictions were followed by the “Three No’s” compromise agreement a year later. The understanding ensured no additional THAAD deployments, no participation in a US-led missile defence network, and no trilateral military alliance with Japan and the US. Whilst a resolution was agreed, the event demonstrated South Korea’s precarious position in balancing security imperatives with its role as a strategic node between the Chinese and the US’s power aggregation. Subsequently, South Korea has progressively sought to enhance interoperability with the US and its own indigenous systems, ensuring that whilst South Korea’s share of responsibility has increased, Patriot itself continues to remain essential in counter-missile defence capability.

Timeline of US-South Korea Missile Partnership

• 1951 – US-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty – Establishes a formal alliance between the two states.
• 2017 – THAAD deployment in Seongju – Reinforced protection against North Korean missiles, but caused a rupture in the China-South Korea relationship.
• January 2026 – Pentagon announces a more limited role for the US in deterring North Korea, placing a greater burden on South Korea.
• 6 March 2026 – South Korean foreign minister Cho Hyun confirms that Seoul and Washington are in discussions surrounding the removal of the Patriot system to support the conflict against Iran.
• 10 March 2026 – President Lee states that South Korea cannot stop the US from moving the Patriot system, however insists that defensive capability is maintained.

Analysis

The withdrawal of the Patriot system signals an immediate US refocus away from deterrence priorities in Southeast Asia, although the redeployment does not currently leave South Korea in a critically insecure position. Removal of the system contributes to heightened vulnerability, particularly related to threats in which high numbers of missiles or drones are utilised to saturate conventional defence systems. Public rhetoric from the South Korean officials is likely an attempt to ease pressure on a delicate political relationship, where continued US support remains essential in South Korea’s interoperability project. The move further degrades broader regional perceptions that the US is a credible and reliable defence partner, particularly as tensions in Taiwan continue to involve neighbouring states such as Japan and the Philippines. The inability of the South Korean government to prevent the move on short notice reveals that efforts to strengthen Seoul’s burden have not reached a satisfactory level of maturity within South Korea itself. The current partnership remains highly asymmetric, and when coupled with the US redeployment of naval assets from Japan to the Arabian Sea, Washington’s actions signal to its Southeast Asian partners a lack of either will or capacity to maintain adequate security capabilities in both the Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern theatres. In light of recent US criticism of its European NATO allies, South Korea and its regional partners will likely seek accelerated self-sustainable defence efforts in the short-term. In the medium-term, fractured commitment to Southeast Asian allies provides impetus to transition away from overdependency on the US in favour of regional partners.

Regional Spillover of the US-Israel War on Iran: Implications for MENA Security

Key Judgements

• The US-Israeli campaign against Iran, launched on 28 February 2026, has triggered multi-front escalation across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and the Red Sea corridor, fundamentally reshaping the MENA security environment.
• Iran’s proxy network has been operationalised for retaliatory strikes, but internal fractures and declining public support will likely erode cohesion; Hezbollah’s entry into the war has probably constituted its most damaging strategic miscalculation in decades.
• The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the probable resumption of Houthi Red Sea attacks will almost certainly compound a global energy crisis, with oil prices likely to remain elevated for 60 to 90 days even under a ceasefire scenario.

Objective

This report examines how the US-Israeli war on Iran (Operation Epic Fury) has cascaded across the MENA region in its first twelve days. It assesses the activation of Iran’s proxy network in Iraq and Lebanon, the fracturing of the Lebanese state’s relationship with Hezbollah, the risk of Houthi re-engagement, and the spillover into Syria’s post-Assad order.

Context

On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes against Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei alongside Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, IRGC commander Mohammad Pakpour, and Defence Council secretary Ali Shamkhani. The campaign followed the collapse of Omani-mediated nuclear talks in Geneva on 26 February and came amid the largest anti-government protests in Iran since 1979, which had drawn a violent crackdown killing thousands across over 100 cities. Iran retaliated with over 500 ballistic missiles and nearly 2,000 drones aimed at Israel, US bases in Iraq, and facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. As of 11 March, over 1,300 civilians have been killed in Iran, 634 in Lebanon, 13 in Israel, and eight US service members. The IRGC attempted to mine the Strait of Hormuz before the US Navy destroyed 16 minelayers. Mojtaba Khamenei was elected Supreme Leader on 8 March, signalling hardliner continuity.

Timeline

28 Feb:  US-Israel launch strikes. Khamenei killed in Tehran. Kataib Hezbollah base at Jurf al-Sakhar (Babil province) struck. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz begins to be severely disrupted.

1 Mar:  Iran confirms Khamenei’s death. Islamic Resistance in Iraq claims 21 drone operations against US bases in Erbil. Hezbollah vows retaliation.

2 Mar:  Hezbollah fires rockets at Israel for first time since the November 2024 ceasefire. Israel responds with 250+ strikes across Lebanon. Lebanese PM Salam bans all Hezbollah military activities.

4–5 Mar:  Israel issues evacuation orders south of the Litani River. IDF enters Kfar Kila, Houla, Yaroun, and Khiam. Lebanon orders arrest and repatriation of IRGC Quds Force personnel. US strike kills Kataib Hezbollah commander Abu Hassan al-Fariji in Babil.

7–8 Mar:  Rocket attack on the US embassy in Baghdad. Mojtaba Khamenei elected Supreme Leader. IDF abducts four Syrian children from Quneitra.

10–11 Mar:  Over 760,000 displaced in Lebanon. Iran and Hezbollah conduct joint five-hour attack on 50+ Israeli targets. WHO warns of toxic “black rain.”

Analysis

Iraq as the unwilling frontline. The IRI has claimed over 200 attacks against US positions since 28 February, concentrated on the Kurdistan Region where remaining US forces are based. Unclaimed airstrikes, almost certainly by US or Israeli forces, have hit PMF facilities across Babil, Nineveh, Kirkuk, and Mosul. PM al-Sudani condemned the embassy attacks as “terrorist acts” but lacks the political capital to confront Iran-backed factions embedded in Iraq’s security architecture. If US strikes intensify, al-Sudani will likely face pressure to expel US forces from Kurdistan. If he fails to restrain the militias, Washington will probably expand its target set to PMF leadership, destabilising Iraq’s governing coalition.

Hezbollah’s isolation deepens. The Lebanese government’s ban on Hezbollah’s military activities and expulsion of IRGC advisers is unprecedented. Even Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri was reportedly furious, revealing that the group’s political wing had no control over its military wing and that the IRGC held decisive influence. Israel has exploited the escalation, issuing evacuation orders affecting 800,000+ people and expanding ground operations south of the Litani. The LAF has refused to deploy against Hezbollah while fighting continues, reflecting the risk of a sectarian fracture within its ranks. Lebanon has sought direct talks with Israel via US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack, but Washington has shown no interest in mediating. If the war continues, a full-scale Israeli ground invasion remains the most dangerous near-term scenario.

The Houthis: a calculated pause. Despite mass demonstrations in Sanaa and threats to resume Red Sea operations, the Houthis have not launched new maritime attacks. This restraint likely reflects internal debate over the risk of renewed US strikes on infrastructure in Hodeida, Hajjah, Sa’adah, and al-Jawf. However, missile launchers and radar have been repositioned along the Red Sea coast. Given the group’s record of calibrating attacks to political timing, the pause is probably strategic, not structural. Re-engagement would compound the Hormuz closure, with major carriers already suspending Suez transits.

Syria under pressure. Israel has expanded incursions into Quneitra and Daraa provinces, establishing checkpoints and detaining civilians. An Islamic Resistance Front in Syria has reportedly begun forming military cells with likely Iranian backing. If Iraqi militias transit Syrian territory toward the Golan, it would probably provoke Israeli strikes on Syrian government positions, collapsing the January security understandings and jeopardising the landmark SDF integration agreement reached in February.

What to watch. The next 30 days will likely be decisive. Iran’s declining missile launch rate suggests stock depletion, which will probably push Tehran toward a ceasefire through intermediaries, potentially Russia. The Houthi decision on Red Sea re-engagement will likely come within two weeks; continued abstention would signal strategic decoupling from Iran. In Lebanon, the government’s viability hinges on whether the LAF can enforce the Hezbollah ban without fracturing along sectarian lines. The broader pattern is a stress test of Iran’s Axis of Resistance: Hezbollah is isolated, Iraqi militias are drawing retaliatory strikes, and the Houthis are hedging. Failure to mount a coordinated response would likely accelerate fragmentation of Iranian influence across the region.

Night Wolves mobilisation activity in Eastern Europe during February 2026

Key Judgements

• The Night Wolves motorcycle club sustained symbolic and network-building activity across parts of Eastern Europe in February 2026, reinforcing pro-Kremlin historical narratives under a cultural and patriotic banner.
• Public-facing events remain framed as commemorative or charitable in nature, providing a socially acceptable platform for soft-power projection and relationship cultivation.
• Activity levels appear calibrated rather than escalatory; mobilisation is symbolic and narrative-driven rather than operationally disruptive.
• Unlikely to generate immediate instability. However, cumulative presence contributes to long-term normalisation of Russian-aligned identity messaging within receptive communities.

Objective

To assess Night Wolves activity in Eastern Europe during February 2026 and evaluate its role in Russian-aligned identity projection and influence operations.

Context

The Night Wolves is a Russian ultra-nationalist motorcycle club with close ties to the Kremlin and longstanding public support for President Vladimir Putin. The group has historically combined biker subculture with patriotic spectacle, Orthodox symbolism, and World War II commemorative narratives.

Since 2014, the organisation has been associated with pro-Russian mobilisation in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, as well as high visibility “Victory Road” rides through Central and Eastern Europe. While several European states have restricted entry to key members, the broader network retains the ability to engage supporters, affiliates, and sympathetic civic groups.

In February, activity centred on smaller-scale commemorative gatherings, youth outreach, and cross-border coordination messaging on social platforms. Rather than mass convoy events, the focus appeared to be narrative continuity: reinforcing themes of Slavic unity, anti-fascism, and resistance to Western moral and political influence.

Timeline

Pre 2022                   Night Wolves conduct regular transnational rides marking Soviet WWII anniversaries, occasionally prompting diplomatic friction in Poland, the Baltics, and the Czech Republic.

2022-2024                 Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine increases scrutiny of pro-Kremlin civic networks. Several Eastern European governments tighten monitoring of affiliated organisations.

2025                           Reduced visibility of large convoys but sustained digital engagement and symbolic gatherings continue in sympathetic regions.

2026                           Smaller commemorative and identity-focused events take place across parts of Eastern Europe, emphasising historical memory and Orthodox-aligned cultural themes rather than overt geopolitical messaging.

Analysis

The Night Wolves model blends spectacle with deniability. Publicly, events are framed as cultural, historical, or charitable. They reinforce narratives aligned with Kremlin strategic communication: the sanctity of Russian historical memory, moral conservatism, and scepticism toward Western institutions.

February’s activity suggests consolidation rather than expansion. There were no indicators of mass mobilisation or direct confrontation. Instead, the group-maintained relevance through continuity, ensuring that aligned communities remain socially connected and ideologically primed.

The strategic value lies in long-term narrative reinforcement. Identity movements of this nature lower the barrier between cultural affinity and political alignment. Over time, repeated symbolic engagement can entrench pro-Russian sentiment within specific demographic pockets, particularly among socially conservative or historically nostalgic audiences.

For Eastern European governments, the challenge remains proportionality. Heavy-handed responses risk amplifying the group’s victimhood narrative, while passive tolerance may enable gradual influence entrenchment. As observed in February, the Night Wolves are unlikely to destabilise states directly; however, their presence contributes incrementally to the broader contest over historical memory and political identity in the region.

Munich Security Conference 2026 – European Rearmament and Deterrence Recalibration

Key Judgements                   

• The 2026 Munich Security Conference signalled that the post-Cold War model of European security dependence is eroding, as allies prepare for a future in which a US security guarantee cannot be assumed to be stable or unconditional.
• Emerging consultations among France, the UK and Germany on strengthening European deterrence using existing French and British nuclear capabilities signal a profound recalibration in European strategic posture.
• As European governments expand defence spending and commit to sustained rearmament, the credibility of this strategic shift will depend on whether increased budgets translate into deployable military capability rather than remaining largely declaratory.

Objective

This report assesses how discussions at the Munich Security Conference (13–15 February) reflect a structural shift in Europe’s defence posture, focusing on the drivers of rearmament, the emerging rethink of nuclear deterrence, and the constraints that will shape Europe’s future security direction.

Context

The 2026 Munich Security Conference took place against the backdrop of continued war in Ukraine and sustained Russian hostility toward the European security order. Western European leaders, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, arrived amid growing concern over a widening deterrence gap. While Russia remains the most immediate threat, with the outcome of the Ukraine war described as an urgent and ‘existential’ situation for Europe, the 2026 Munich Security Report, titled ‘Under Destruction’, framed a deeper structural instability: an era of alliance politics characterised by unpredictable US signalling. What some officials described as a ‘wrecking ball’ dynamic has unsettled long-standing assumptions about the durability of the American security guarantee. As a result, the core question for Western European governments is no longer whether defence spending must increase, but how rapidly strategic dependency on Washington can be reduced.  Munich therefore became a forum not only for reaffirming NATO commitments, but for exploring greater European responsibility within the alliance. France, the UK and Germany emerged central to this discussion, including consultations on whether French and British nuclear capabilities could reinforce European deterrence. At the same time, persistent shortfalls in munitions, air defence and industrial output underscored the gap between political intent and operational readiness.

Timetable of events leading up to.

February 2022 – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine  – Fundamentally recalibrates European threat understanding and reveals capability cracks.

2023-24 – European defence budgets skyrocket – Production constraints restrain capability progression.

February 2025 – US Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech  – Signalled a more conditional approach to transatlantic support, exposing visible strains within the alliance.

June 2025 – NATO Summit, The Hague – New benchmark set: 3.5% of GDP core defence and 1.5% broader security resilience.

Late 2025 – US rhetoric about Greenland  – Creates diplomatic strain and highlights emerging fractures within the alliance.

February 2026 – Munich Security Conference (‘Under Destruction’) – European leaders frame rearmament as structural and publicly acknowledge discussions on supplementing the US nuclear umbrella with French and British capabilities.

Analysis

Moving Toward Strategic Sovereignty

The 2026 Munich Security Conference confirmed that the change in Europe’s defence posture is no longer reactive but structural. Since 2021, European NATO members have increased defence spending by roughly 30%, and the 2025 Hague target,  3.5% of GDP for core defence within a broader 5% ambition, indicates long-term intent rather than temporary adjustment. What has changed is not only the increased threat from Russia, but the degree of uncertainty surrounding US strategic continuity. As European leaders increasingly plan for a future in which US security guarantees are less predictable, higher defence spending is used to hedge against strategic uncertainty. This reflects a gradual shift toward greater European responsibility within the transatlantic framework. Whether that transition stabilises the alliance or produces further divergence will depend on how coherently Europe can sustain political and fiscal consensus.

Breaking the Nuclear Taboo

Consultations among France, the UK and Germany regarding how French and British nuclear capabilities might reinforce European deterrence represent a deeper psychological shift. Germany is not seeking nuclear weapons, but its willingness to engage in deterrence architecture discussions marks a significant departure from its traditionally cautious posture. Once extended deterrence becomes a matter of active consideration rather than inherited assumption, it changes strategic signalling. Moscow must now account for a Europe more openly engaged in nuclear burden-sharing debates, while Washington faces a Europe preparing contingencies. Even absent institutional reform, the act of discussing nuclear integration reshapes expectations about Europe’s long-term strategic posture.

The Gap Between Intent and Capability

Ambitious spending commitments alone will not secure deterrence credibility. Throughout the Munich conference, warnings about ammunition shortages, air defence shortfalls and industrial bottlenecks revealed that financial pledges still outpace operational readiness. Initiatives such as the SAFE framework and closer UK/EU industrial coordination are designed to address financial and structural weaknesses, but industrial mobilisation requires time, skilled labour and sustained political will. If higher budgets fail to produce visible capability gains within the next several years, the strategic shift outlined at Munich 2026 risks being perceived as rhetorical rather than substantive and will not go unnoticed by Moscow. Conversely, if spending translates into scaled production and improved readiness, Europe will materially strengthen its deterrent posture and bargaining power within NATO.