Category Archives: Uncategorized

Peru and its Political Prospect after Presidential Election

Peru has completed the counting of ballots in a close presidential run-off election, but an official declaration might take several days.

The Peruvian electoral office, ONPE, announced on Thursday evening after all polling station records were processed that left-wing populist candidate Pedro Castillo had received 50.179 percent of the vote. Keiko Fujimori, his right-wing opponent, earned 49.821 percent of the vote. The difference was less than 63,000 votes. Peruvians voted under a period of tremendous political turmoil. It cycled through three presidents, suffered one of the world’s highest coronavirus death rates and watched its economy shrink more than any in the region under the weight of the pandemic. Francisco Sagasti, the current president, is serving on an interim basis. After Congress decided to depose popular former leader Martin Vizcarra and Vizcarra’s successor, Manuel Merino, resigned, he became Peru’s fourth president in less than five years.

Many in the country hoped against the odds that the presidential election would offer a new start. Instead, nearly a week after the votes were cast, Peru is again gripped by uncertainty. The two candidates are in a tight race. One contender is claiming fraud and requesting that up to 200,000 ballots be thrown out, thus disenfranchising many poor and Indigenous voters. The other has called on his followers to go to the streets in order to protect those votes. The tension is straining democracy, increasing the schisms that run across a fundamentally divided nation and increasing concerns about the country’s future.

Castillo, a rural primary school teacher who has never held public office, campaigned on a promise to give states greater control over markets and natural resources as part of a plan to bring the benefits of economic growth to Peru’s poorest, despite warnings that his policies would recede the economy of the country like Venezuela.

Before winning the first round of the election, the primary school teacher was barely known, and she ran on a vow to aid the poor by raising taxes on big mining businesses in this copper-producing country. However, there are concerns that his initiatives could destabilise the country’s economy. Whoever wins will have a difficult challenge in uniting a divided country of 32 million people, whose economy has crumbled as a result of the recession.

On the other hand, Fujimori aimed to persuade voters that Peru’s current economic and political systems need adjusting rather than revamping, and that her administration would not result in further allegations of corruption and human rights abuses that marked her father Alberto Fujimori’s reign from 1990 to 2000.

However, it will likely take more days before a winner is announced. Authorities must continue calculate the results from polling locations whose results have been contested and are being reviewed by special election judges. Once the judges have addressed the issues, the count must be approved by the country’s National Jury of Elections (JNE). According to Peruvian law, a winner may be announced only after the JNE has reviewed all vote counts and settled any concerns from election observers. In Peru’s election system, there is no vote recount. According to the JNE President results might be available this month, but that the large number of nullification demands might postpone the process.

Ms. Fujimori requested that 300,000 ballots be reviewed, and 200,000 others be void. It might be days before a judgement is made on her petitions, as well as prospective appeals and reviews. Only then will the electoral tribunal be able to proclaim a winner.

Since 2018, Fujimori has been the subject of a corruption probe and money laundering. She spent 13 months in jail between 2018 and 2020, when she was released on parole. She has rejected the claims and has not been charged officially.

While ballots were still being tallied, the chief prosecutor in her case requested a court to sentence her to preventative jail. The request, according to Fujimori, was superfluous.

Ms. Fujimori has been accused of running a criminal organization that trafficked in illegal campaign donations and could be sentenced to 30 years in prison. Detained and released three times as the case proceeds, she is now accused by the prosecution of having contact with case witnesses, a violation of her release. If she is elected, she will be immune from prosecution for the duration of her five-year tenure.

The election, and the tensions it has stoked, are widening the schisms in Peruvian society.

Despite stable economic growth rates over the last two decades, Peru remains a severely unequal and divided country, with the richer and whiter population in its cities receiving the majority of the advantages of Ms. Fujimori’s father’s neoliberal economic model implemented in the 1990s.

When the pandemic swept across Peru, it widened existing social and economic divides, disproportionately affecting people that could not afford to stop working, lived in tight quarters, or had limited access to health care in a nation with a fragile safety net.

The elections were fought along the same economic, racial, and class lines, with Ms. Fujimori receiving the majority of her support from urban regions and Mr. Castillo from the rural highlands, which are home to many mixed-race and Indigenous Peruvians.

Hundreds of voters on both sides have taken to the streets to protest for their candidate, mostly peacefully and at times with musicians and dancers.

The malfunctioning of Peruvian institutions, on the other hand, has the potential to create new waves of dissatisfaction and upheaval, particularly as the government attempts to distribute COVID-19 vaccinations while still growing the economy. The emergence of polarising and even fringe presidential candidates in Peru may be a foreshadowing of what is to come elsewhere in Latin America, where high inequality, rising unemployment, fractured party systems, fiscal crises, and the worst effects of the pandemic are fuelling disdain for politics as usual.

Western Europe’s Response to the Belarus Flight Diversion

On May 23, Flight FRA4978 was approaching its final destination of Vilnius, Lithuania when it was forced to divert to Minsk, Belarus. The plane was accompanied by a MiG-29 fighter jet that guided the plane into the Belarusian capital. Soon after its arrival, a passenger, Roman Protasevich, was arrested. The 26-year-old journalist was the editor of the opposition channel on the Telegram messaging app called Nexta. He left that position to live in exile in Lithuania, where he covered the events of the 2020 Belarus presidential election, after which he was charged with terrorism and inciting riots. Belarus has said that the plane was diverted because a bomb threat onboard and claims the threat came from Switzerland. However, no bomb was found on the flight and the Swiss foreign ministry says it has no knowledge of a bomb threat issued from Switzerland. The incident has promoted a reaction from several western European governments who responded without delay or hesitation.

The fallout from the diversion has propelled Belarus to the front pages for the first time since the mass protests against President Alexander Lukashenko that took place in 2020 throughout the summer and fall. The EU has responded swiftly, announcing a new package of sanctions targeting state enterprises, those in Lukashenko’s inner circle, and Belarus’ state airline. Most of western Europe’s airlines have also been suspended flights entering Belarusian airspace.

This caused other implications, with Russia- an ally of Belarus, taking several days to grant Air France and Austrian Airlines flights to Moscow the clearance to use Russian airspace to divert around Belarus, resulting in cancelations. Along with the EU, the UK has told flights to avoid Belarusian airspace and UK Transport Secretary Grant Shapps has suspended the operating permit of the Belarus’ state airline, Belavia, effectively banning it from the UK. The current situation is seeing cancelations and delays. If the situation escalates further passengers and airlines could see flight times increased, a rise in fares, higher operation costs, and longer haul, nonstop flights needing to make re-fueling stops along the way. Cases of what can become more likely have already occurred. On the day of the incident, the ban on Belarusian airspace had already taken place when a British Airways flight from London to Islamabad was already in transit, causing it to divert to Moscow to refuel, before continuing.

Normally, this is not an ideal situation for the airline and travel industries but is even more inconvenient as airlines in Europe hope to have a busy summer season following the 15-month significant decrease in travel due to coronavirus restrictions. The events have caused the aviation map of Europe to be adjusted with mild challenges and if the situation increases the challenge of drawing a new map will be tough. One road to avoid Belarus airspace would be to fly over the Ukraine however there are already restrictions on flying over Ukraine, after Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down in 2014. For the UK, an option would be to fly over Crimea, but no British operator has flown over Crimea for quite some time. Belarus has seen an increase in traffic as flights have been going around Ukraine since 2014. Now as flights avoid Belarus, Latavia and Lithuania are likely to see an increase in air travel.

The United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Belgium are just a few of the western European countries that have banned the Belarusian airline, Belavia. The airline has had to cancel flights to 22 destinations until at least the end of the summer. It is unclear when the conflict will lessen but the Belarusian government is standing firm in their actions and the EU is standing firm in their response. Airlines are often forced to adjust operations in response to major geopolitical disruptions. For example, several U.S. airlines canceled flights to and from Israel as conflict with Palestine increased and some airlines needed to add fueling stops after the hacking of a fuel pipeline that serves airports on the East Coast of the United States. The brazen decision by President Lukashenko to force a commercial flight to land in order to arrest a journalist has showed how quickly aviation can become entangled in geopolitics.

Mexico’s Legislative Elections: Lives and Power Lost

During Mexico’s mid-term legislative elections this week, various instances of violence towards those running for power have been committed from criminal gangs routed in altering and changing the results of the elections in their favour. These attacks, violent in their nature, have become increasingly common in the country particularly around election time.

The elections have been seen as a challenge for current left-leaning leader Obrador, who is currently halfway through his 6-year term and will test popular support for his Fourth Transformation reformist project. Criticisms toward the government regarding their handling of the COVID 19 pandemic as well as the rise in violence and criminality in the country could potentially harm the high approval ratings that the President has already been previously having.

Mexican cartels have been seen using bribery and violence to try and influence many of the elections that have been occurring across the country, with some reporting that up to 90 people have been killed, while others saying that deaths could have been up to 150. Mexican authorities have logged 398 threats or attacks on candidates since campaigning started on the 6^th of April.

At a voting station in the border city of Tijuana, a man has been reported to have thrown a severed head as well as leaving plastic bags filled with body parts nearby. The man ran away according to authorities, and it is unconfirmed whether he has been captured or not. Elsewhere on voting day, someone has been reported to of thrown an inactive grenade into a voting station in Mexico state.

Another incident involving union leader Alberto Alonso, who was running for mayor in the Mexican beach resort of Acapulco shot repeatedly just 200 metres from his home. After leaving his home and driving in his car, a motorcycle closed in and pulled out a handgun, shooting his car. Alonso’s bodyguard fired back which forced the attackers to flee, luckily, he escaped physical harm but had to be admitted to the hospital for stress reasons.

Campaigning has since been suspended in various municipalities around the country because of the violence and even the ruling Morena party stopped campaigning in the southern part of the state of Mexico after an ambush in March had killed 13 police officers.

Despite the President’s attempts to protect candidates, the attacks are frequent and ongoing, and the criminal cartels feel there are no repercussions for their actions, so they feel free to carry on. In areas like Guerrero, south of Mexico City, a lot of the violence takes place. President Obrador has accused the media of sensationalising the murders to demoralise the government’s efforts, despite the attacks being malicious and ongoing, with many innocent lives lost.

Following the elections results President Obrador’s coalition hung on to its control of Congress, despite losing its majority in the lower house. Also, his Morena party lost leadership in half of the 16 boroughs in the capital. Despite this, they were still the biggest party in the elections and captured enough seats to form a majority with its allies, not the worst situation for Obrador but it is a slight contrast from his landslide victory 3 years ago.

With political killings being an ongoing issue in Mexico it seems little has changed in the country. Despite the President’s pledges when first elected to reduce the violence, the events during the mid-term elections prove that there is much still to be done to resolve this issue.

Vietnam’s COVID-19 Dilemma

Vietnam’s initial successful control of COVID 19 put them in an enviable position. However, now, as vaccination programs progress around the world, Vietnam is going back into lockdown with less than 3% of the population vaccinated and its borders firmly closed. Until a vaccination program is begun in earnest, this situation is likely to repeat itself.

Vietnam’s initial success in stopping the spread of COVID 19 was due to early action taken by the government, and a high level of public buy-in for disease prevention methods like mask wearing. By closing the borders quickly, the government was able to construct an effective track and trace system that was not overwhelmed, and that continues to perform well. However, this initial success has left the country in a relatively unique position.

While many countries around the world have been forced to focus on vaccination programs because they have not been able to stop the spread of COVID, Vietnam has been able to take its time.  Vietnam has a good record with regard to respiratory diseases being one of the first countries to contain and eliminate SARS in the early 2000s. This confidence has led to the government pinning their vaccination hopes on a locally produced vaccine. Instead of making large purchases from the US or Europe, or accepting doses of the Sinopharm vaccine from China, Vietnam has waited for Nanocovax, and two other local vaccines, to pass through clinical trials.

However, Vietnam is now experiencing its largest COVID outbreak in both the north and south of the country and the Vietnamese government faces a difficult decision. As the Indian variant, and a potential hybrid “Vietnamese” variant, spreads faster than before, the government must decide if they can afford to wait, or if they should purchase vaccines from overseas.

In early June the government committed to purchasing 120 million does in 2021, for a population of 100 million people. Small purchases of AstraZeneca and Sputnik V have been made already, and there are plans to produce Sputnik V and Pfizer-BioNTech in country. But these avenues are unlikely to be productive until 2022. The Chinese Sinopharm vaccine is potentially a solution to Vietnam’s problem, but so far Vietnam is the only nation in Southeast Asia not to accept the Chinese vaccine, with it only just receiving approval for use in the country. Generally speaking, the Vietnamese public are sceptical about Chinese intentions, and there is a large amount of anti-Chinese sentiment throughout the country and in the government.

If Vietnam is able to stop their current outbreak quickly, then they may be able to withstand pressure to purchase large amounts of vaccines from overseas and wait for their own to finish trials. But if the virus continues to spread, they will have little choice but to invest significantly in purchasing vaccines. If their purchases include the Sinopharm vaccine it will be interesting to see how the government sells the vaccine to the Vietnamese public, and if that has any effect on the number of people willing to be vaccinated.

The Islamic State’s Presence in Syria Today

Syria’s yearlong civil war has plunged the country into instability and insecurity, providing  a fertile ground for the Islamic State not only to grow, but also to last and maintain its existence, despite its degradation dated back in 2019. ISIS has successfully continued recruiting fighters, by propagating the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, enticing a global audience, including youths and women, while it has secured the funding of its operations through illegal means. In recent months, the risk of an ISIS insurgence has been acknowledged by the majority of the international community, actively involved in the Syrian affairs. This, coupled with the lessons learned from the past, have led them to be considerably cautious and pro-active, particularly during the month of Ramadan, carrying out simultaneous and occasionally coordinated operations against the Islamic threat. By no means, should the international community be complacent, by underestimating the IS capabilities and the possibility of a storming revival across the Syrian territory.

The fear of a possible ISIS break-out attempt during Ramadan between April 12 and May 22, led all the forces operating in the Syrian terrain to preempt such strikes and to eventually achieve decisive blows against ISIS during April, halting its hopes for a comeback. For instance, the Syrian Democratic Forces conducted the “Humanitarian and Security Operation” against the Islamic State cells at the al-Hol camp from March 27 to April 12. At least 150 ISIS affiliates were arrested during the raids, who were deemed to be responsible for a number of residents’ beheadings, shootings, or injuries by grenades in early 2021. On April 4, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) conducted at least four strikes on ISIS cells in Syria, at least one of which hit targeted cells 50 km west of Hasakah City, likely in the Abdul Aziz or Bayda mountains, Hasakah Province. About two weeks later, Russian-backed forces launch coordinated ground and air assault on ISIS hideouts in Jabal Bishri. As admiral Alexander Karpov, leader of the Russian Reconciliation Center in Syria, reported, the Russian Air Force killed 200 ISIS militants and destroyed 24 trucks and a IED production facility between April 17 and 18. The uptick in ground operations and airstrikes marks a move intended to stem ISIS’s Ramadan campaign in the Central Syrian Desert, which last year reached some 260 attacks, killing or wounding hundreds of people. Furthermore, just two months ago, in February, ISIS carried out the deadliest reported surprise attack in recent years, claiming the lives of 19 Syrian regime personnel and allied militia forces, sounding the alarm for Syrian authorities.

The reason ISIS is still capable of infrequently performing such attacks, is that despite the loss of most of its territories, as well as several leading figures, it features considerable experience that allows it to do so. Since the fall of the caliphate in 2019, the group has adapted its recruitment tactics and it has preserved the ability to self-finance its operations through three different sources: the sale of natural resources, the taxation of local communities and criminal activities. Oil sales was the prevalent income resource up until 2014, when the coalition forces launched a series of air strikes, destroying about half of the group’s refineries. Within the next three years, it is estimated that the U.S-led international coalition managed to cut the group’s monthly oil revenues by nearly 90%. Therefore, the leadership soon realized that alternative resources should be employed, with criminal activities and taxation of local communities currently covering a much greater portion of the group’s revenue. Ad hoc criminal activities, particularly kidnapping for ransom,  extortions and thefts constitute the most common tactics for the group. A great deal of reports have revealed that ISIS generates revenue worth of $800 million each year, from taxes imposed on agricultural products, such as wheat and barley crops, collected by civilians. This is an attainable tactic on Daesh’ ends, since its presence is more significant in the government-held areas of Syria, especially in the Badiya desert south of the Euphrates and east of Palmyra, where it intermittently holds some terrain there and is frequently able to cut off local communications. In this region, terrorist are used to intimidate and shake local merchants and farmers down financially. ISIS has also been engaged in other criminal activities, such as trafficking migrants from Libya into Europe, drug smuggling across the Middle East, and illegally selling antiquities from archaeological sites in Iraq and Syria.

In terms of recruitment methods, the Islamic State has highly sophisticated social media platforms and networks. In fact, undergoing investigations carried out by Turkish security teams have shown that there are individuals who are actively organizing the trade of arms, as well as the making of ammunition transfers for Daesh/ISIS members in conflict zones in Syria and Iraq, indicating the group’s efforts to climb back. On top of that, Turkey’s Ministry of National Defence announced on April 27, that its security forces arrested a Daesh terror suspect, while trying to infiltrate into Turkey through illegal means, over charges of making propaganda for the group. ISIS’s strategic use of social media demonstrates the resourcefulness of the Islamic State, which mobilized an estimated 40,000 foreign nationals from 110 countries to join the group. It is noteworthy, that the Islamic State has largely focused on appealing youths and men from around the globe, invoking them to join the group and contribute to its vision. The use of social media platforms, as well as slick and well equipped videos, has turned out to be few easy tools to be employed in order to achieve this goal. The group can successfully communicate its messages to a wider global audience, and eventually entice those, who are the most vulnerable to the extremist ideology.

Surprisingly, one of the most popular demographics that ISIS recruits, are women, particularly young Muslim-American females, who are marginalized by their environment and who are eventually recruited by other women. ISIS’ propaganda magazines, Dabiq and Rumiyah, are circulated in various languages worldwide, and have a separate section that is aimed at women, consisting of articles written by other women attempting to incite them to join the terrorist group. A primary point of these articles is the woman’s “duty” to give birth to the next generation of fighters and then raise them to be good mujahideen. Additionally, increasing internet access in the African region and the Middle East means has allowed ISIS to acquire supporters despite its territorial losses and the loss of power over the past years. Being partly a byproduct of Arab Spring in 2011 and populations’ dissatisfaction with their nations’ politics, along with nowadays’ increased social media access, the Islamic State has employed information and communication technologies (ICTs) to regain support and territory among the region’s politically aggrieved domestic audiences.

Undoubtably, the Islamic State is still present, even after its deconstruction in 2019, and following the recent operations conducted by national, regional, or international forces. Led by intelligent figures, the terrorist group has managed to survive all-out strikes, to come up with all the necessary means to continue financing its activities, as well as to maintain a respectful number of supporters across the globe. Young people, as well as people from poor, unshaped backgrounds constitute an easy target, while in the age of Internet they might be extremely prone to the propagating tactics employed by ISIS. These people should be the first to be protected. Therefore, both international and regional forces need to remain vigilant, as it is likely that ISIS will keep ramping up its efforts to reclaim its power in countries such as Syria, which could be better described as vulnerable and a breeding ground for terrorism.