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Demonstrators Respond to Opposition’s Calls to March for Better Security in Burkina Faso

With growing insecurity in Burkina Faso, on 3 July 2021 thousands across the country protested, demanding a stronger response from the central government to the growing jihadist threat. The demonstrations come nearly a month after a massacre in the town of Solhan that shocked the nation. Since then, pressure has been mounting on the government of President Roch Kaboré to implement a response to the threat emanating from terrorist organizations, which have been expanding their operations in the West African country since 2015.

On Saturday 3 July, thousands of people took to the streets, calling for a stronger response to the rising bloodshed. Some travelled hundreds of kilometres to attend the demonstration in the capital, Ouagadougou, with protests also being held in Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouahigouya, the capital of Yatenga province. The march, organized by the opposition and civil society groups, is the first to take place since President Kaboré was re-elected last year. While in late June 2021, the Burkinabé leader had called on organizers to postpone the march, the opposition has since welcomed the “huge mobilisation across the country despite government calls for a boycott.”

The large numbers on the streets across the country on Saturday highlight the growing frustrations amongst Burkinabé’s and the sense that the central government has failed in their promises to stabilize and secure the country. Since 2015, armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) group, originally based in neighbouring Mali, have embedded themselves across the northern and eastern regions of Burkina Faso, where they regularly launch attacks on civilians. Anger has been rising in the wake of the 4 June attack on the village of Solhan, which was one of the worst incidents to take place in recent history in Burkina Faso. While the government has reported that the attack killed at least 132 people, with armed men, including “young people aged 12 to 14,” being responsible, local sources report that the toll was around 160, and included many children. In response to the rising frustrations over a lack of response to the growing insecurity, and in a bid to appease opposition leaders, President Kaboré on 30 June carried out a cabinet reshuffle. After dismissing his defence and security ministers, President Kaboré has since taken over as defence minister, though it remains to be seen if the latest reshuffle will push back the growing calls for the resignation of the government.

For years now, Burkina Faso has borne the brunt of the jihadist insurgency in neighbouring Mali, increasingly seeing terrorist activity rise within its own borders and transforming into an epicentre of violence. In many ways, the scenes witnessed across Burkina Faso over this past weekend are reminiscent of those seen in Mali a year ago – a population increasingly becoming frustrated with the central government and its failure to push back the rapidly evolving terrorist threat. While the Burkinabé government had called for the protests to be postponed, the fact that many travelled hundreds of kilometres to reach the capital in a desperate bid to have their voices heard shows the discontent amongst the local populations, who are reaching their limit when it comes to the instability in the West African country. After years of promises to secure the country and numerous government reshuffles to shake things up, it is evident that like the Malian population throughout 2020, Burkinabé’s have lost confidence in their government. In response to this growing pressure, President Kaboré on 30 June dismissed his ministers of defence and security and took over the role of defence minister in what is the latest cabinet reshuffle that aims to stop the wave of terrorist attacks in the country. However it remains to be seen what impact these protests and government reshuffle will have on Burkina Faso’s strategy, though the government appears to be paying close attention. While it is unlikely that the weekend’s demonstrations will destabilize government, it may lead to further changes within it in a bid to appease the opposition and protesters. This time around, however the government will need to carry out concrete steps to show the local populations that it is listening. The protests that occurred throughout last year in Mali led to the eventual downfall of the Keïta government after the Malian army launched a coup d’état in August 2020. A second coup d’état just nine months later in May 2021 further plunged the country into uncertainty, with ongoing concerns as to how this latest political crisis will impact the jihadist threat not only within the country, but in the wider West African region. Burkina Faso experienced its own coup d’état in 2015, though since then, it has experienced relative political stability. Today however, it is increasingly becoming apparent that the ingredients for a new coup d’état are becoming more present, and as the frustrations of the local populations bubbles over, Burkina Faso may be headed down a similar path to that seen in Mali nearly a year ago if radical changes are not implemented. In the long-term, however, Burkina Faso will need to implement a permanent solution to the jihadist threat, including securing the country’s porous borders to stem the flow of terrorists and weapons, and working closely with regional countries.

‘Abraham Accords’ and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The violence, which erupted in the final days of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan between Israel and Palestine have brought UAE in a controversial place, where national interest crosses public opinion, as well as the country’s Arab identity. While the majority of the Arab world has rebuked Israeli aggression, and along with Palestine perceived Emirates’ attitude as betrayal, the so-called ‘Abraham Accords’ has offered the UAE long term and strategic benefits that cannot be neglected. Public opinion in the Emirates has openly expressed its support to Palestine, mainly on social media, and wants the leadership to stand firm on this conflict. But US weapon sales, cyber-security cooperation, and more economic-oriented sectors are among the benefits stemmed from the treaty, and constitute determining factors for the government’s attitude towards Israeli aggression.

On 13 August 2020, Israel and the UAE signed an agreement, known as ‘The Abraham Accords’ and mediated by U.S. President Donald Trump, under which the two countries established full diplomatic relations. The main purpose of Trump’s administration, as then-national security adviser Robert O’Brien said was to bring peace to the Middle East and for President Trump to be remembered as a peacemaker. In terms of bilateral relations, the UAE-Israel deal paved the way for an alliance between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv aimed at countering regional foes Turkey and Iran in many hotspots around the Middle East, such as Syria, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, and the Gulf states. The biggest win for the UAE from the deal may be a U.S/Israeli concession to overcome restrictions imposed by the Congressional Israel Qualitative Military Edge Act of 2017, which bans the sale of advanced U.S. weapons to Israel’s Arab foes in order to ensure Israel’s ability to defend itself. Consequently, the UAE could also be able to defend its interests against Iran for example, in Yemen. In order to effectively deal with such threats, the normalization agreement also stipulates the cooperation of the two countries in the fields of intelligence and cyber security. In fact, one of the first moves after the signing of the agreement was the meeting between the two countries’ cyber czars in Tel Aviv, where the cyber-security chiefs discussed cooperation. Meanwhile, economically, the UAE would benefit from the economic dividend of normalization with Israel. On the grounds that Israelis are avid investors, consumers, and travelers and that several hi-tech companies already cooperate with partners in the UAE, the agreement would flourish further their cooperation, offering the Emirates access to cutting-edge technology.

Palestinians on the other hand, perceived this agreement as a betrayal, breaking a long-standing Arab consensus that the price of normal relations with Israel was independence for the Palestinians. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE’s de facto ruler, affirmed that his price for the deal was Israel’s agreement to put a stop to the Israeli plan to annex parts of the occupied West Bank. Therefore, Palestine for many years had the card of the Arab consensus that normalising relations with Israel could only occur after a Palestinian state is established based on the 1949-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. However, the world has now become witness of one of the worst conflicts between Palestine and the Jewish State, turning the Abraham Accords into a failure and eroding the Arab consensus. Diplomatic ties ushered in by last year’s treaty, seems to have given UAE little leverage and done nothing to ease the root cause of the Arab-Israeli crisis.

For the first time in the many clashes between the two foes, regional unity over who is to blame and what should be done to stop the fighting has splintered. In the face of ongoing Israeli aggression, protests erupted in many countries with Muslim majorities, such as Turkey and Iran, supporting Palestinians and accusing Israel of incitement at the al-Aqsa mosque last May and committing atrocities in Gaza. Turkey’s foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu was even more pointed during the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s meeting, accusing the Abraham Accord countries of having “lost their moral compass” and undercutting regional solidarity. In Qatar, the government allowed hundreds to protest on May 16, as Hamas’ top leader delivered a speech. In Morocco demonstrations have taken place in 46 Moroccan cities following Israel’s deadly assault on Gaza, with protesters denouncing Morocco’s normalisation of relations with Israel, while the Moroccan government has released an official statement concerning the ongoing “violent incidents” in Palestine’s Al Quds and the Al Aqsa Mosque.

On the contrary, other countries, including UAE, have never been more restrained before. UAE now find themselves balancing their recently established relationship with Israel against citizens who have been vocal in their anger towards Jewish aggression. Some citizens have openly donned the black-and-white checkered Palestinian keffiyeh on Instagram while others have tweeted under hashtags supportive of Palestinians. The government simply expressed deep concern about the violent incidents in Jerusalem and condemned the Israeli authorities for the storming of the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as the potential evictions. The leadership is aware of the dynamics in the region, not to mention all the benefits the UAE can expect from further development of their cooperation with Israel in various sectors, including investments, science, and technology. Therefore, it was not among its options to be overtly vituperative on UAE’s strategic partner.

It becomes apparent that the more advanced the relations between UAE and Israel, the higher the price that Emirati rulers will likely have to pay politically, in case of an upcoming outbreak of violence between the two foes, Israel and Palestine. The normalisation of relations between Israel and the UAE under the Abraham Accords, although a breakthrough with numerous benefits for UAE, has brought the Arab state’s leadership in a very difficult position, where it needs to weight all variables, pros and cons, in order to serve both national interest and its people. But the economic development, coupled with the backing the UAE might possibly receive in light of their rivalry with Turkey and Iran in the Libyan and Yemeni fronts accordingly, implies a rather restrained stance on Emirates’ ends, in spite of the political cost.

Moldova’s Upcoming Parliamentary Elections – Regional Implications

Moldovan president for just six months, Maia Sandu has lost no time in taking on the hostile political establishment after winning several key constitutional victories. A parliamentary election on July 11 looks set to offer her a sizeable majority that could finally, three decades after independence, kick start genuine reform of Europe’s poorest country which will be seen by Kremlin as moving towards the EU. Consequently, the Transnistrian situation can’t be overlooked, the frozen conflict has all the ingrediencies to be ignited at the behest of Moscow’s desires.

Ever since she was elected president of Moldova in November last year, Maia Sandu has made little secret of her desire to radically reform Europe’s poorest country. Long portrayed by the international media, in overly simplistic terms, as “pro-European” (as opposed to her predecessor Igor Dodon, who favours closer ties with Russia), since taking office the Harvard-educated Sandu has made not Europe her priority, but fighting corruption, which she believes – not without reason – to be the main cause of the country’s widespread poverty.

So far, she has been held back by a parliament which, as she puts it, “does not truly represent Moldovans”. On July 11 however, the country will vote for a new parliament, and if the latest opinion polls can be believed, Sandu’s party, Action and Solidarity (known by its Romanian acronym, PAS), is set for a landslide victory. An opinion poll published on June 20 suggests that Moldovans are about to hand Sandu’s party not just a majority, but a majority large enough to implement constitutional changes.

The poll puts support for PAS at 38.1 per cent, well ahead of Dodon’s Socialists (who have formed an electoral pact with the Moldovan Communist party of another former president, Vladimir Voronin) on 21.4 per cent. Amongst those who say that they are certain to vote, support for PAS jumps to almost 50 per cent. What’s more, besides PAS and the Socialists, no other party or electoral alliance would enter parliament, meaning that PAS would be redistributed enough to seats to claim its constitutional majority.

Moldova’s ethnic Russian, Ukrainian, and Gagauz minorities — who make up around a quarter of Moldova’s population – get understandably spooked when Romania takes any kind of interest in the country, viewing it as the first step towards the eventual unification of the two countries. Most of present-day Moldova was for part of the 20th century an integral part of Romania, but while talk of reunification was once prominent, few have ever given the idea serious credence: not least because most Moldovans oppose it. Furthermore, except for a few extreme nationalists, such as the Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR; a Romanian parliamentary party which is fielding candidates in Moldova’s election), most Romanian politicians appear to have tacitly accepted that history and politics aside, Romania simply could not afford to absorb Europe’s poorest country.

The general public has little knowledge about the Moldova/Transdniestria conflict, and in general those who do find it “fantastic, incredible” that it might have serious geopolitical implications. Transdniestria has been the most relaxed of the “frozen” conflicts arising from the Soviet Union’s collapse. There has been no credible threat of renewed hostilities. The two sides—Moldova on the right bank of the Dniestr/Nistru River and the separatist region of Transdniestria on the left bank—are in constant contact, negotiation, and cooperation with one another. Thousands regularly cross the river for work, education, family visits, transit, and shopping. In 2021, however, the potential for a new war has been played up since an angry and aggressive statement by Dmitry Peskov, the spokesperson for Russia’s president. There followed a steady drumbeat, not exclusively from Moscow, of concern about a “political crisis” in Moldova amid warnings that Transdniestria may be “the most volatile dispute in this region.”

Moldova inherited significant political divisions from the Second World War. The majority Moldovan, ethnically diverse right bank of the Dniester/Nistru was annexed by Romania in 1918 while the left bank remained within the Soviet Union. The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gave the right bank to the Soviets, who invaded in 1940. Romania and its Nazi allies invaded in 1941, and the Soviets re-invaded in 1944. Each new invader persecuted, deported, and executed untold thousands suspected of cooperation with the last. The result is a divided population: since independence, a plurality on the right bank—regardless of ethnicity—identifies with its Soviet heritage, fears Romania, and votes for communist or socialist parties. A slightly smaller group identifies with its Romanian heritage, fears Russia, and votes for right or center-right parties. A group in the middle holds the balance.

More significant, however, is how Moldova’s domestic politics fits into Russia’s existential—as it sees it—struggle with Ukraine following the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The Kremlin and its patriots believe that a Ukraine charting its own course separate from Russia would doom Putin’s ambitions throughout the post-Soviet region. In April, Russia escalated its military pressure on Ukraine, massing its military along the border while fighting intensified in Donbas. Since Russia’s troops in Transdniestria must be supplied and replenished through Ukrainian airspace, its war with Ukraine has turned them into hostages to potential Moldovan-Ukrainian cooperation—including military cooperation. Russia’s next actions on the issue mystifies even Transdniestria’s leadership. It is unclear how the upcoming elections will play out. Russia’s attitude and actions towards Moldova will have little to do with Moldova’s internal politics and more to do with the conflict in Ukraine and the regional geopolitical arrangements Russia is pursuing regardless of Maia’s leaderships success.

Seven Months Later: The Humanitarian Crisis in Ethiopia’s Tigray

In November 2020, fighting between government troops and Tigrayans erupted in Ethiopia in an operation to oust the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The move was presented by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed as a “law enforcement operation” aimed at rounding up TPLF members, but ensuing fighting has killed thousands and left 5.2 million people in Tigray in need of food aid. Seven months since the start of the conflict, one of the world’s most senior humanitarian figures, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock spoke candidly about the conditions in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region. Ethiopia, where, only four decades ago, the modern world became aware of the scourge of hunger, which spawned charity supergroups, money-raising songs, ‘Band Aid’ concerts, and a slew of assurances that we – the world – would never allow it to happen again. Now, when speaking at the G7 summit, Lowcock states that “There’s famine now in Tigray.” Lowcock placed the responsibility squarely on forces from Eritrea, a neighbouring country.

Drawing on an authoritative assessment of the emergency by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (ICP), the ICP evaluated that around 353,000 people in Tigray are in phase 5 (catastrophe), with another 1.769 million in phase 4 (emergency). While the ICP did not use the word “famine”, by definition, Phase 5 indicates that famine applies to a population. The system has five levels from Phase One (food secure) through to Phase Four (emergency) and Phase Five (catastrophe or famine). Behind these figures is a horrific human tragedy. Hunger-related deaths in large numbers are inevitable. It is, in fact, already taking place. Young children are the first to perish in a famine, accounting for two-thirds of those who perish. According to the most recent data from Tigray, 300,000 children are expected to die. The figures are on the conservative side. Because the survey teams were unable to reach all locations, they had to rely on extrapolation from limited data.

The Ethiopian authorities would almost certainly contest the “famine” warning, citing the technicality that the “catastrophe” circumstances were dispersed across Tigray, with no single place having a proportion of people in phase five above 20%, the normal criterion for declaring famine.

Undoubtedly, the region has long been plagued by issues, having been destroyed by the effects of climate change, drought, and locusts, leaving swaths of the people living on the periphery of pervasive poverty. But unmistakeably, this current crisis that is currently unfolding in Tigray is the result of conflict. This crisis has emerged from the cumulative effects of violence, including population displacements, movement restrictions, limited humanitarian access, loss of harvest and livelihood assets, and dysfunctional or non-existent markets, as evidenced by the IPC system statistics.

Humanitarian services have been affected and the government’s largest emergency response apparatus – the “productive safety net programme,” – was shut down as a result of the war. Forces from the neighbouring Amhara region captured Tigray’s most fertile areas, depriving Tigrayans of their farms and shutting down the most lucrative seasonal labour options. The Eritrean soldiers who joined the fight have also been accused of massive pillage, as well as burning crops, demolishing health facilities, and stopping farmers from ploughing their land, together with the Ethiopian army.

Rape has become widespread – usually perpetrated by soldiers. The United Nations estimated that 22,000 rape survivors will require assistance. Furthermore, fear of sexual abuse keeps women and girls hidden, preventing them from seeking food. However, humanitarian organisations have been delayed in their response, hampered by insecurity as well as several procedural roadblocks erected by Ethiopian officials. According to the United Nations, 2.8 million individuals have received relief. Humanitarian workers privately believe that is way too optimistic. There are also regular reports that troops steal aid offloaded from trucks, with several Tigrayan people reporting that Eritrean forces arrive shortly after relief handouts and seize the food.

Aid workers have also been slain in this conflict, the most recent being on May 28. Aid workers are often stopped by the Ethiopian army as they travel deep into rural areas, alleging that they are aiding the rebels. Specifically, nine aid workers have been killed since the fighting broke out. Samantha Power, chief of USAID, believes that the attacks on humanitarian workers are clearly premeditated, and it is part of a worrying trend of harassment and violence directed against aid workers.

Lowcock has said  “Now, we are at a tipping point,”. While expressing his dissatisfaction with the UN Security Council’s lack of action, he also said “Despite all we have told you of the widespread and systematic scale of the rapes, we continue to receive horrific reports of widespread sexual violence,”. Moving forward, Lowcock emphasised three areas where immediate change is required: humanitarian access, money, and a quickening of relief delivery. The UN has also called for an inquiry into the  war crimes, and the US has halted Ethiopia’s economic and security help and barred anyone implicated in the violence or in blocking humanitarian relief from visiting the US. Similarly, on the 26th of May, in a statement, President Joe Biden said, “The large-scale human rights abuses taking place in Tigray, including widespread sexual violence, are unacceptable and must end.”

As US Special Envoy Jeff Feldman cautions, we “should not wait to count the graves” before proclaiming the crisis in Tigray as it is: a man-made famine. Ethiopia evidently does not want the outside world to know about the unchecked murder, rapes, abduction, and hunger that is taking place, thus journalists are not welcome, and the famine and extensive human rights abuses have mostly gone unnoticed. So, what are the options? Once more, diplomatic pressure must be applied on cruel authorities in order to bring about a cease of hostilities and allow humanitarian agencies urgent and unimpeded access.

China’s Political Encroachment into Hong Kong