Lebanon’s Sovereignty Crisis: The State’s Break with Hezbollah and Its Strategic Limits

Key Judgements

• The Lebanese government’s unprecedented ban on Hezbollah’s military activities on 2 March and expulsion of Iran’s ambassador on 24 March represent the strongest assertion of state authority over non-state arms since the 1975–90 civil war; however, enforcement will almost certainly remain symbolic without a ceasefire that restores territorial control to the Lebanese Armed Forces.
• Israel’s ground invasion and declared intent to establish a security zone south of the Litani River have likelyundermined the government’s disarmament agenda by reinforcing Hezbollah’s narrative that its weapons remain necessary for national defence.
• If a broader ceasefire fails to materialise within the next 30 days, the government will probably face a choice between doubling down on its anti-Hezbollah posture at the risk of sectarian fracture, or walking back its decisions to preserve national unity ahead of the May 2026 parliamentary elections.

Objective

This report examines the Lebanese government’s March 2026 legal and diplomatic actions against Hezbollah and Iran, assesses their enforceability under conditions of active Israeli military operations, and evaluates the implications for Lebanon’s internal cohesion.

Context

On 2 March 2026, Hezbollah launched rockets and drones at Israel in response to the killing of Supreme Leader Khamenei during coordinated US–Israeli strikes on 28 February. The attack, conducted without state authorisation, triggered an emergency cabinet session chaired by President Joseph Aoun. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced an immediate ban on all Hezbollah military activities, declaring them illegal and demanding the group surrender its weapons. Significantly, the Amal Movement voted in favour, signalling that support for consolidating arms under state authority had broadened beyond traditional anti-Hezbollah blocs. A January 2026 poll found 73 percent of Lebanese supported disarmament efforts. Israel responded with over 250 airstrikes on 2 March alone. By 16 March, the IDF had launched a full ground invasion south of the Litani River, issuing evacuation orders covering approximately 15 percent of Lebanese territory. On 24 March, Lebanon declared Iran’s ambassador persona non grata, accusing the IRGC of directing Hezbollah’s operations. As of early April, more than 1,450 people had been killed and over 1.2 million displaced.

Analysis

A historic assertion with structural limits. The 2 March ban marks the first time a Lebanese government has formally declared Hezbollah’s military operations illegal. The breadth of the coalition behind it, including Amal’s support, suggests the political calculus around Hezbollah’s weapons has shifted in a way absent during the 2006 or 2008 crises. However, enforcement remains the decisive test. The LAF lacks the capacity to confront Hezbollah while Israel is simultaneously invading, and has withdrawn from some border positions as Israeli operations expand. The ambassador expulsion further exposed this gap: Ambassador Sheibani remained past the 29 March deadline, backed by Hezbollah, while Iran’s Foreign Ministry refused to comply. The government’s actions are therefore best understood as a legal framework that could gain enforcement power only under ceasefire conditions — not as an operational disarmament campaign.

The Israeli paradox. Israel’s stated objective of maintaining a security zone until the Hezbollah threat is removed directly undercuts Lebanon’s sovereignty narrative. Defence Minister Katz’s 31 March announcement that Israel would use Gaza-style tactics in southern Lebanon has probably reinforced Hezbollah’s core argument that its arms remain indispensable while Israel occupies Lebanese territory. This creates a strategic paradox: the government banned Hezbollah’s military activities because the group launched unauthorised attacks that invited Israeli escalation, yet the resulting invasion has likely strengthened the domestic justification for Hezbollah’s armed wing. If the security zone becomes a prolonged occupation resembling Israel’s 1985–2000 presence, Hezbollah will likely frame itself as the only credible resistance force, potentially reversing the political gains the state made in early March.

Alternative scenarios. Three trajectories are plausible. First, if a US–Iran ceasefire is reached and Israel withdraws, the government’s legal framework would likely gain enforcement credibility, the LAF could redeploy south, and political momentum could carry into the May 2026 elections. Second, if the war continues, the government will probably face pressure to soften its posture as Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc obstructs cabinet decisions and the group’s base remains mobilised by the ongoing assault. Third, and most dangerous, if the government attempts enforcement while Hezbollah is in active combat, it risks fracturing the LAF along sectarian lines — an outcome that would almost certainly collapse state authority rather than consolidate it. The outcome of US–Iran ceasefire negotiations, which Iran has conditioned on ending the Lebanon war, will likely prove decisive.