MS Risk Blog

Security Advisory: Yemen, Red Sea, Bab-al-Mandab

Background:

10 January 2018: Overnight, the Houthi movement in Yemen threatened to block the Red Sea shipping lane if the Saudi led coalition continues its push north toward the port of Hodeidah. Houthi Political Council Chief, Saleh al-Samad, the latter was quoted as saying, “If the aggressors keep pushing towards Hodeidah and if the political solution hits wall, there are some strategic choices that will be taken as a no return point, including blocking the international navigation in the Red Sea.” The report provided no specific details of how they would enact this threat. However, the Bab-al Mandab, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden is the most likely target.

Since January 2017, the Saudi coalition has been engaged in Operation Golden Spear, an offensive aimed at recapturing Yemen’s western coast from Houthi forces and denying them access to key Red Sea ports. Hodeidah port is the final maritime stronghold for the Houthi rebels, and is critical to both the rebel group and Yemeni government. Hodeidah port receives 80% of Yemen’s imports, including vital food and medical aid necessary to support civilians in what has become the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.

However, reports indicate the Houthis have relied on the port to smuggle in Iranian-made weapons to maintain their offensive against the Yemeni government. The Saudi-led coalition has conducted ground and air campaigns in the areas around the port, but have conducted comparatively few targets against the port itself, relenting to urgent warnings by allies and UN member states.

The UN has been working to bring the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels together for peace negotiations. However, on 4 December, the Houthis assassinated their former ally, Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, causing a shutdown of all negotiation attempts. Saleh, who had aligned with the Houthi rebels throughout the war, had formally broken ties with the group on 2 December, two days before his death. Saleh was believed to be a vital component of resolution to the years-long war; it was believed he could broker a deal between the rebels and the Yemeni government.

Following Saleh’s assassination, the Saudi Coalition closed all land, air and sea ports, resulting in a vacuum of critical food, gas, and medical supplies to the stricken country. Once again at the urging of the UN and allies, the Coalition reopened many ports, with a temporary reopening of Hodeidah port beginning on 20 December and lasting 30 days.

The warning from the Houthis came during a meeting with Deputy UN envoy to Yemen, Maeen Shureim, who travelled to meet with Houthi leaders and set the stage for another round of peace negotiations. On Monday, Houthi Chief al- Samad criticised UN efforts to resolve the war in Yemen. “We’ve come to a stage where we don’t care anymore about the role of the UN in solving the crisis in Yemen,” al-Samad was quoted as saying.

On Tuesday, the United Arab Emirates minister of state for foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, said “The Houthi who decimated crops and seeds, destroyed Yemen, betrayed his ally and partner, is now threatening the international navigation; we are facing a terrorist gang that the end of its existence in Yemen is nigh.”

Implications: Intentions and Capabilities:

The threat to block international navigation in the Red Sea is critical. Although the Red Sea contains chokeholds in the north and south, the Suez Canal, nearly 1700 miles away and heavily guarded by Egyptian security forces, is a logistically unlikely target. It is highly likely that the Houthis would intend to target the Bab al Mandab Strait.

At just 20 miles across at its widest point, the strait is a chokepoint for maritime vessels entering or exiting the waterways. Under an international traffic separation scheme, northbound shipping uses a two-mile wide lane on the Arabian side of the strait, while southbound traffic uses a lane on the African side. The lanes are mainly for use by commercial vessels, but are largely ignored by smaller local ships or fishing boats. More than 60 commercial vessels transit the strait each day, alongside passenger cruise liners. Bab-al-Mandab is also one of the most important trade routes for oil tankers; between four and five million barrels of oil pass through the strait annually, mostly heading to Europe. Together, the area and vitality of this waterway combine to make the strait a valuable—and easy—target, potentially threatening hundreds of vessels.

The Houthis have displayed a means to conduct attacks in the Bab-al-Mandab waterway; in March 2017, a Yemeni coast guard vessel struck a naval mine in the vicinity of Mokha port, killing two soldiers and wounding eight. The attack was the first recorded instance of the use of naval mines since the war began. Security officials believed that the mine was planted by Houthi rebels, and reports circulated that the rebels may have placed naval mines around Mokha port to disrupt Coalition operations. Warnings were also issued that the Houthi rebels could deploy aquatic mines in the waters around Hodeidah port as they prepare to defend their control of the Hodeidah governorate.

The rebels have conducted other attacks near Bab-al-Mandab strait using means apart from naval mines. In October 2016, Houthi rebels claimed an attack which destroyed a UAE catamaran in the Strait. Later that month, LNG gas tanker Galicia Spirit was attacked by unknown assailants near Perim Island, approximately eight miles from the Yemeni Coast, in Bab al-Mandab Strait. In January 2017, Saudi warship Al-Madinah was attacked west of Hodeidah port, leaving two crew members dead. It was later determined that the attack had been conducted via a remotely controlled drone device, launched and controlled from Hodeidah port.

The coalition has been conducting searches aboard vessels entering Yemeni ports and reinforced security on land and at airports, however the Houthis do not show any signs of lacking the arsenal necessary to continue their insurgency in Yemen. The recapture of Mokha port from the Houthi rebels in February 2017 uncovered hidden caches of weapons; it is likely that Houthi rebels have additional stockpiles in other areas across Yemen, and are being supplemented through still unidentified smuggling routes.

In December, UN secretary general Antonio Guterres warned that Iran may be defying a call to halt ballistic missile development, and may have been transferring these weapons to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. In November 2017, a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis into Riyadh, Saudi Arabia had Iranian markings, according to a US Air Force official in the Middle East.

It is believed that naval mines deployed by the Houthi rebels have made their way to Yemen through Iranian arms smuggling networks led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), using extensive maritime smuggling networks. In March 2017, it was found that at least three IRGC front companies were identified in arms smuggling to Yemen, likely using maritime commercial supply chains to deliver weaponry. As access to Yemen ports has been impeded, the companies may be using sea ports outside of Yemen to smuggle weapons, which are then transferred overland to their final destination. This evidence indicates that the Houthis have the capability to disrupt maritime traffic through the waterway, and could likely target Bab-al-Mandab Strait in an effort to protect their hold on Hodeidah port.

Guidance:

While unmanned drone boats may likely target coalition warships, aquatic mines do not distinguish, and can cause harm to any vessel in the vicinity. The guidance issued by UKMTO on 1 February 2017 remains in place. Masters are urged to:

• Increase vigilance
• Maintain the furthest possible distance from the Yemen coast
• Transit the Bab el Mandeb strait during daylight hours
• Use the western Traffic Separation Scheme wherever possible.

In addition, ships are urged to prevent misidentification, transmit AIS, and register and comply with BMP4 guidance.

If a master believes he is in or near a mined area note the following immediate action drills:

• Mount extra watches with binoculars and any other observation aids available
• Watch for foreign objects, flotsam and suspect craft in the vicinity
• Drill muster stations and abandon ship preparations
• High state of readiness maintained at all times
• Review cargo consignment for extra sensitivity or control measures
• Plot friendly warships in proximity for distress options and identify if military minesweepers are active or inbound
• Consider night operations, pilot meeting points, harbour entry/exit very carefully

If a mine strike is unavoidable then masters should issue distress signals on Channel 16 and attempt to strike bow-on to minimise casualties and ensure best chance of crew survival. Stern, glancing or flank strikes will enhance damage and accelerate any crisis.

If sea mines are confirmed in an area, then vessels must deviate from any route that would take them into the danger zone until verifiable clearance has completed.

Ecuador’s Vice-President Sentence to Six Year in Jail in Connection to the Odebrecht Scheme

Ecuador’s Vice-President Jorge Glas has been sentenced to six years in jail in connection to corruption at Brazilian construction company Odebrecht. Prosecutors say Glas received $13.5m (£10.2m) in bribes from the company from 2012-2016 in exchange for contracts.
Glas, who had served as Vice-President since May 2013, was relieved of his duties by President Moreno on the 3^rd August 2017 when corruption allegations against Glas first began, with judicial investigations beginning 3 days after. Moreno was unable to relieve him of his position however as Glas obtained the position of Vice-President through popular vote.

Glas was first detained on 3^rd October 2017 in order to prevent him from fleeing the country, and he remained incarcerated until and throughout his trial. Charges were officially brought against Glas on 8^th November, with the National Court beginning his trial on the 24^th along with 12 others accused in relation to the Odebrecht scheme. On 15^th December, Glas was sentenced to 6 years in jail having been found guilty of accepting bribes from Odebrecht, alongside 6 others including his Uncle who was also found to be guilty. During the trial, prosecutors say Glas received bribe payments via his Uncle, Ricardo Rivera.

Former President Rafael Correa has denounced the sentence, saying the courts have imprisoned “an innocent”, and believes the trial against Glas has been politically motivated. Glas’s defence council, Eduardo Loor, announced after the sentencing that he will be appealing the 6-year sentence, and has called it “barbaric”. Glas continues to protest his innocence.

On the 17^th of December, the President of Ecuador’s National Assembly, Jose Salgado, announced the country would be going forward with impeachment hearings of Glas. Days later, after receiving unanimous backing, Ecuador’s National Courts paved the way to begin proceedings into the dismissal of Glas from his position as despite his sentence he was refusing to step down as Vice-President. On the 27^th, the impeachment of Glas took place, with Glas having 5 days to present written or oral exculpatory evidence to defend himself. The impeachment was, in the end, unnecessary in the removal of Glas from his position. On the 2^nd January 2018 under Ecuador’s Constitution’s Article 146, Glas was stripped of his position after being unable to exercise his office for 90 days due to his incarceration. President Moreno has been given 15 days to put forward the names of three candidates for the position of Vice-President, but it is suspected he will do so well before the 15 days given.

Glas at present is the highest-ranking politician to be convicted in the scandal that has spread across much of Latin America, which is being called one of the biggest corporate corruption cases in history. Widespread protests have occurred across Latin America, with the scheme bringing issues of corruption to the forefront of prosecutors and the Medias agendas. Former CEO Marcelo Odebrecht is currently serving a 19-year jail term which began in 2016, and has since provided information to the authorities regarding others involvement in the scheme, including information that was used in Glas’s trial. Over 70 other Odebrecht executives have been jailed, with many of them offering information in exchange for more lenient sentences. At present, $785.5m worth of bribe payments have been admitted by various Latin American and two African countries, with a further $26.5m suspected.

African Union Warns IS Foreign Fighters Headed to Africa

Reports have emerged that up to 6,000 Africans who fought for the so-called Islamic State (IS) are making their way back to Africa after the group was forced out of territory previously held in Syria and Iraq. The threat posed by IS militants was raised on 11 December 2017 during a meeting on counter-terrorism organized by the African Union (AU) and Algeria. The AU’s top security official called on regional countries to prepare. The report comes as the G5 Sahel is launching operations in the West African region amidst an increase in terrorist activity in the past year.

Smaïl Chergui, the AU’s commissioner for peace and security, told the meeting “there are reports of 6,000 African fighters among the 30,000 foreign elements who joined this terrorist group in the Middle East.”  He warned that African countries will need to work closely with one another to share intelligence in order to counter returning militants.

After IS seized vast swathes of Iraq and Syria in 2014, tens of thousands of foreigners joined the terrorist group. However, in the last year, IS has suffered a string of losses to both its territory and military capabilities. Earlier this month, Iraq declared that the country was had been liberated from IS’ control. In Syria, the terrorist group remains under pressure. The squeeze on IS in Iraq and Syria has sparked concerns that its remaining foreign fighters will return home to spread their ideology or conduct extremist actions.

Africa’s Fragile Security Situation

Africa’s security situation remains fragile as a number of countries are battling insurgencies led by major terrorist groups with links to al-Qaeda and IS. Continued insecurity in Libya and Mali, along with insurgencies in Somalia and Nigeria, have transformed areas of the continent into breeding grounds for jihadi activity – resulting in regional instability. Fighters with weaponry are able to move with relative ease through the porous borders. These regional conflicts have also spilled across borders, and have begun to impact stable nations.

 In Nigeria, Boko Haram’s nine-year insurgency has continued, despite the Nigerian government’s announcements on numerous occasions that the terrorist group has been defeated. Although the number of attacks in the northeastern region of the country has significantly declined in the last year, and Boko Haram no longer controls major areas, suicide bombings continue to target mosques, markets and other soft targets. The Far North region of Cameroon and the southern Diffa region of Niger have been impacted by Boko Haram violence. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has remained active, and in October the group launched their deadliest attack – a truck bombing in the capital Mogadishu that killed over 500 people. The United States has carried out dozens of airstrikes targeting senior al-Shabaab commanders this year, however the central government in Mogadishu has minimal control outside the capital. Al-Shabaab has continued to launch attacks near the border regions with Kenya.

In West Africa, the continued situation in Mali has increasingly impacted security across the region. Fighting has spilled as terror groups launch attacks in Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In 2015, at least 81 incidents of terrorism were reported in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, with most incidents occurring in Mali. In 2016, this figure decreased slightly to 70 incidents, yet regional terrorist groups proved their operational capabilities by launching a major attack in Grand Bassam Ivory Coast in March of that year. In 2017, the number of terrorist incidents has nearly doubled from 2016, with at least 132 attacks reported as of 15 December. Furthermore, the northern Sahel region in Burkina Faso has seen a sharp rise in extremist activity this year, as terrorist groups operating in the area increasingly target local communities.

 2015 – 81 Terrorist Incidents reported; most activity occurring in Mali

 2016 – 70 terrorist incidents reported. While activity slightly declined, groups are becoming bolder, launching major attacks in countries not previously threatened by terrorism, like Ivory Coast 

2017 – 132 incidents reported as of 15 December, with a major expansion of reported incidents in the southern region of Mali, northern area of Burkina Faso, and western Niger.

The African continent is now under increased threat from a battle between IS and al-Qaeda, as both terror groups seek to gain influence in the region. This battle has already begun; IS aims to find new territory after suffering major losses in Iraq and Syria, and al-Qaeda aims to secure its future on the African continent by expanding its operations into countries previously unaffected by terror, and forming alliances in the sub-Saharan region.

IS influence on the African continent has increased in recent years – Boko Haram has split, with one faction continuing under the al-Qaeda banner and another pledging allegiance to IS. Similarly in Somalia, a small group of IS fighters have emerged and launched attacks in the Puntland region, though officials have indicated that their influence remains minimal. Al-Qaeda has also sought to expand their influence, and have used Mali’s continued insecurity to their advantage. New groups have emerged along the southern Malian border with Burkina Faso and Niger. These groups have proven to be deadly as they have launched attacks on the local communities, kidnapping and killing locals as they attempt to spread their ideology.

While the G5 Sahel operation is a sign that West African leaders are aware of the threat posed by terrorist groups operating in the region, its impact remains to be seen as funding issues have impacted the operation.

Piracy in South East Asia

There is no doubt, that South East Asian littoral states are sitting among the busiest maritime routes of recent decades. Half of the Earth’s population lives in the region, stretching from Japan across the busiest straits of Malacca and Singapore to the western ports of India and Pakistan, not to forget the thousands of islands of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines etc. The thousands of ships responsible for the shipping of various raw materials, manufactured goods, or providing living to people by fishing are concomitant to maritime piracy.

The actual number of crimes under the aegis of piracy is unknown, because all the global and regional organisations and regimes like the UN, the International Maritime Organisation or the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia’s (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre (ISC) rely on incidents which have been reported to them. Therefore, many of the small-scale crimes committed mostly against fishing dhows or private vessels remain unreported. According to the annual reports of the ISC, the number of attempted and actual crimes against ships increased until 2015 in the region and totalled in 203 incidents. Mainly, there are two types of attacks depending on the position of the ship, when it is at anchor or berth and when the ship is underway. In 2016 most violent acts of piracy happened in the territorial waters of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, especially around the island of Borneo and the area of the Sulu and Celebes Seas, between the islands of the Philippines and Borneo. The littoral waters of Gujarat province in Western India, the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the southern parts of Vietnam and the Sunda-Strait between the islands of Java and Sumatra in Indonesia are also among the affected areas. Last year, the total crimes topped at less than half of 2015, at 85 incidents. Comparing the first half of the year of 2017 with the same period of previous years shows a decreasing tendency in the number of crimes. Thanks to the efforts of regional states, the reported number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships is the lowest of the last ten years.

Littoral states continue to step up efforts in combatting incidents in the affected areas. Malaysian and Philippine maritime forces killed many militants and pirates in recent years. The Defence Ministers of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia met at the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting in May 2016 and decided to finalise relevant agreements, especially the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on maritime patrol, so all maritime crimes are addressed in a cooperative manner. On 19 June 2017, the Philippine Department of National Defence (DND) announced that Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines launched a trilateral patrol agreement. The agreement addresses the piracy incidents, armed robbery against ships, kidnapping of crew at sea and other maritime transnational crimes along the shared border of these three countries. The launch of the maritime patrol also included the establishment of three Maritime Command Centres located at Bongao in the Philippines, Tawau in Malaysia and Tarakan in Indonesia.

Although number of incidents is decreasing, the ReCAAP ISC reiterates its advice to all the captains and the crews of the ships. Always be alerted and vigilant and in case of an attempt to rob or board a ship, follow procedures, report the incident they were involved in and communicate with the littoral states’ enforcement agencies to assist them the best they can.

The Flynn Charge: Implications and Exposure

At 10.30am on December 1st, Former National Security Advisor Lt. General Mike Flynn pleaded guilty to a single charge of providing false statements to FBI officials (violation U.S.C. 1001) filed by the special counsel, Robert Mueller. Flynn’s guilty plea was part of a specific, public plea agreement entered into with the special counsel, tasked with investigating Russian interference in the 2016 election and the Trump campaign’s possible collusion. The Lieutenant General promised to fully cooperate in all matters of relevance, including turning over “all evidence of crimes about which your client is aware”, “providing sworn written statements” and testifying “before any and all Grand Juries.” For a relatively narrow charge, it was a wide-reaching agreement. It was, moreover, a political and legal bombshell that continues to ricochet within the White House and, quite possibly, the Oval Office. It is best to separate the damage into two distinct categories: exposure to the crime Flynn pleaded guilty to, and those he is possibly relaying to Robert Mueller.

Let’s start with the latter. In the past few days, two main schools of thought have emerged among leading US legal scholars over the significance of Flynn’s plea deal for Mueller’s collusion probe. The first is what we might call the ‘big fish school’, expressed in the analysis of many reputable media and legal commentaries. As stated in Lawfare’s ‘Quick and Dirty Analysis’ of the matter, “if a tenth of the allegations against Flynn are true and provable, he has gotten a very good deal from Mueller” — Flynn was reportedly on the payroll of the Turkish government and companies linked to Russian intelligence, to name a few of the litany of detailed allegations against him. According to this analysis, “prosecutors do not give generous deals in major public integrity cases to big-fish defendants without good reason” and, as such, “for Mueller to give Flynn a deal of this sort, the prosecutor must believe he is building a case against a bigger fish still.” What this case involves would relate to the proffer Flynn made to Mueller: explicit information of crimes of interest that cannot be withdrawn upon entry into the plea agreement. What this information reveals is anyone’s guess.

Preet Bharara, former US attorney for the Southern District of New York and famously fired by Donald Trump, as well as Andrew McCarthy, the conservative former federal prosecutor for the same district, have poured cold water on this view. For these attorneys, Flynn’s plea deal reflects Mueller’s weak hand: how damaging could Flynn’s information be if his plea agreement does not protect him from future prosecution, and would Mueller really wipe a dirty slate clean in exchange for it? Writing in Foreign Policy magazine, Lawfare’s Benjamin Wittes and Susan Hennessey do not dismiss this argument out of hand, arguing instead that it only adds to the “unsolved mystery” of Flynn’s plea agreement. Either Flynn is only minimally exposed in the information he is relaying to Mueller, or there is something not publicly disclosed in the agreement submitted to court. But then again, Flynn testified that there exists no secret side agreement. Hence the mystery.

Turning to Flynn’s actual testimony, his statement of offence makes clear he was not acting as a ‘rogue agent’ during the transition but consulted with a “senior official” over his phone call with Russian Ambassador Kislyak, debriefed “senior members” of the transition team over the nature of that call and was directed by a “very senior member” concerning an additional conversation with the ambassador. The White House’s explanation for Flynn’s firing — that he lied to Vice President Mike Pence (who led the transition team) over the nature of those calls — now looks very precarious, implicating not only the Vice President but all White House staff involved in forming the explanation. Moreover, if a CNN report in November is true — that Mueller interviewed Jared Kushner over whether he possessed information that could exonerate Flynn, Kushner’s exposure is noteworthy, especially in light of US media widely sourcing the “very senior official” as Kushner himself. Given the breadth of Kushner’s reported contacts with Russian officials, it is not unreasonable to suppose Mueller is working his way up the food chain.

Flynn’s statement of offence also appears to expose President Trump in Mueller’s obstruction of justice investigation. By linking Flynn’s crime to senior administration officials, President Trump has additional motive for allegedly telling FBI Director James Comey, “I hope you can see your way to letting this go, to letting Flynn go” (as testified by Comey). President Trump’s response to the Flynn charge also did little to help his cause: by tweeting on 2nd December that he fired Flynn for “lying to the FBI”, he only added credibility to this alleged motive.

This review has separated the implications of Mike Flynn’s plea agreement into those related and unrelated to his charge, but the most significant implication might in fact be in the blurring of the two. Unless one counts the 18th century Logan Act, yet to be prosecuted in a court of law, Flynn’s conversations with the Russian ambassador were arguably not illegal. The questions going forward are likely to be why Flynn, Kushner, Pence and the White House misled their audiences. Could the answer be found in Mike Flynn’s recent cooperation?