MS Risk Blog

Cabo Delgado: Old insurgent, New tactic

In recent weeks insurgent terror has once again besieged Cabo Delgado, Mozambique’s northernmost province, in what has been a spectacular display of brazen attacks, marking a notable shift in tactics by the shadowy insurgent group.

The group that goes by several monikers which include, Ahlu Sunna Wa-Jamma (ASWJ) and Al-Shabaab; though there is no formal connection to the Somalian regional terror group of the same name, has been responsible for up to 1,000 killings and the displacement of approximately 100, 000 people since October 2017. Since the rise of the insurgency, the violence has mainly been concentrated in the district of Mocimboa da Praia and the surrounding towns and territory within the province of Cabo Delgado, in what would have been described as a brutal low-intensity conflict. The operational tactics that marked this conflict had previously favoured the targeting of civilians with a penchant for widespread human rights abuses, relegating its modus operandi to a fairly unsophisticated and opportunist execution. The insurgents most recent activities point to a more pronounced ambition for territorial acquisition and infamy parallel to established terror groups like ISIS. The feasibility for ASWJ to achieve such a feat within the next 6 months to a year is unlikely. However, ASWJ’s demonstrated ability to widen its tactics and range of targets is indicative of a growing confidence and with the growing confidence is the increased likelihood for further brazen attacks against the state or other symbolic targets that help reinforce their newly stated ambitions for Sharia Law in Mozambique.

The 23 and 26 March pre-dawn attacks on Mocimboa da Praia and Quissanga respectively, were notable for a variety of reasons; first, they were the most daring assaults ASWJ had ever mounted since the beginning of their campaign of terror in October 2017.  In an audacious attack, the group struck Mocimboa da Praia by land and sea, hoisting its flag over police headquarters and exercising control over the area for one day. ASWJ launched a similar attack on the district capital of Quissanga. The violence which resulted in the death of about 20- 30 members of Mozambique’s security forces and the occupation of Mocimboa da Praia for a day, was largely focused on targeting government forces and property. There was a visible effort not to harm civilians and instead win their hearts and minds by redistributing stolen food, medicine and fuel to ‘loyal’ residents. The exercise seems to have been less of a violent escapade, but more of a coordinated PR stunt to demonstrate strength in taking on government forces and garner potential sympathy from the community which is likely to lead to success in recruiting more members. The timing of the attacks from a cynical standpoint could not have come at a more opportune moment; the amalgamation of a variety of factors, not necessarily connected to ASWJ, have enabled the group to stage their attacks and further their aim with relative impunity.

There have been a series of security issues that have competed for the Mozambican government’s priority leading to a lack of sustained focus in any one area, namely the COVID-19 pandemic which has resulted in the confirmation of at least 28 positive cases, with 14 cases in Cabo Delgado. The economy of Mozambique, much like others in Southern Africa, has not fared well in the wake of the virus outbreak, particularly the delayed launch of major Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) projects by oil companies like ExxonMobil and Total which is estimated to be worth $60 billion, is potentially a major setback to the economy. The practicality of lockdown in the country has not translated well with the local population where demographics, social structures and behaviours, and set-up of the economy mean more problems are being created rather than solved. Cabo Delgado is historically an economically challenged province and the uncertainty that the coronavirus breeds has distracted the government’s ability to focus wholeheartedly on the growing ASWJ crisis. Other factors that have resulted in a competing set of priorities for the government have been the two major Cyclones in 2019, that have left tens of thousands of people still in need of aid, one of the worst hit areas from Cyclone Kenneth in April 2019 was Cabo Delgado. The slow government response in addressing the matter of rebuilding the affected communities is likely to engender local support for ASWJ, as people seek to vent frustrations and garner quick solutions for their woes. The hearts and minds operation between 23 and 26 March stands as an example of ASWJ attempts to garner fealty from disenfranchised communities.  Furthermore, despite the government managing to broker a peace deal in August 2019 with the formerly hostile opposition party Renamo, its breakaway militant group, Renamo Military Junta, has sustained its own campaign of violence which has also been escalating in recent weeks and days. None of these secondary factors that the Mozambican government has to contend with are the result of any concerted effort in strategic sabotage or ambush by ASWJ, rather it appears as though this is another serendipitous set of circumstances that have enabled ASWJ  the opportunity to cause maximum damage as efficiently as possible in order to further their cause.

The 23 and 26 March attacks were significant also because the normally reclusive insurgent group made known  its aims by filming a video in front of the police headquarters in Quissanga where they rejected “the wealth of this world” and called for the fall of the Mozambican government with the implementation of Sharia law in the area. Prior to the ISIS flag hoist on 23 March, ASWJ’s affiliation with ISIS Central Africa Province had remained inconclusive, and apart from openly affiliating itself to ISIS, there is still very little that is known about ASWJ, its ultimate aims or how extensive this newly affirmed connection to ISIS is. It cannot be determined whether the group shares the same largescale territorial acquisition ambitions as ISIS. However, what is highly likely is that ASWJ has its sights set on controlling Cabo Delgado, access to its oil and gas reserves and being perceived as the benevolent alternative to an inattentive government in the local community. The donning of ISIS regalia does not necessarily translate to a complete merger with ISIS’s remaining core, rather more of a means to an end for ASWJ aims that remain largely ambiguous despite their latest public announcement.

The absence of a coherent government-led counterinsurgency strategy against the growing Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado may be the catalyst that is enabling the ASWJ’s growth in confidence.  The need for a restructured Mozambican military and security forces has never been more apparent as they face a complex, multi-layered and asymmetrical conflict. Although President Nyusi has acknowledged a need for foreign assistance, the type that been provided in the form of private contractors like the Russian mercenaries, the Wagner group, has proven ineffective, as they too have underestimated the complexity of the growing insurgency.  While there are no quick wins to solving the threat of increased Islamist insurgent activities in Cabo Delgado, a holistic government -led counterinsurgency strategy will need to be developed, and areas where foreign assistance would be most effective will need to be identified. What is emergent is that ASWJ is taking notes on the current shortcomings of the Mozambican government and using that to its advantage in order to find increasingly innovative and bolder tactics to further its aims.

COVID-19: Cybercriminals are Profiting from the Pandemic

On March 11, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the outbreak of COVID-19, a respiratory disease caused by the novel coronavirus, a global pandemic. On March 13, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom stated that Europe had become the “epicentre” of the outbreak and that, apart from China, Europe had more reported cases and deaths than the rest of the world combined. In response, most countries declared a state of emergency and enacted emergency laws in order to limit the spread. Among other things, measures introduced included closing borders; banning large public gatherings; and giving police powers to fine and arrest those violating these measures.

This biological threat naturally distracts from the prospect of virtual threats. As Europe’s focus is drawn towards containing the spread of COVID-19 infections, cybercriminals take advantage of the distraction to spread online infections and scams to profit from the public’s fear. Europol has received reports of intensifying cyber-attacks in almost all 27 member states. Spokesman Jan Op Gen Oorth said they had seen an increase in malware and ransomware attacks seeking to profit from the global crisis. According to Romanian cybersecurity leader Bitdefender, there was an increase of more than 475 percent in the number of malicious reports related to COVID-19 by March 16, as compared to February. In addition, we have seen an increase in the creation of COVID-related domains. Fitspatrick, director of HPCsec, said that as much as 650 domain names associated with the coronavirus were identified in the small period of March 19-23. The majority were considered very likely to be used in phishing messages.

During the crisis cybercriminals are taking advantage of people’s desire to keep up to date with new developments. Many criminals are therefore impersonating entities such as the WHO, NATO, or UNICEF. Their “phishing” e-mails specifically mention COVID-19 related information to encourage people to click on links or files that download malware. For instance, an e-mail might claim to have a list of pharmacies that distribute protective drugs where anyone opening the attachment has their computer infected with viruses. Some viruses, like spyware, can steal information like usernames and passwords, and even turn on your microphone and camera. Other viruses, like ransomware, can be used to blackmail you by locking down your computer. It encrypts files which render the data they contain inaccessible until a ransom is paid for the decryption key. If you don’t pay you lose all your data.

Over the coming weeks and months, attackers are expected to continue to exploit the pandemic to launch ransomware attacks. Targets range from individuals, to small and medium businesses, to larger organisations. Almost one-third of attacks related to COVID-19 target public authorities and healthcare institutions. Health organisations are especially vulnerable. Because they are under significant time constraints and find themselves pressed at capacity due to COVID-19 they are more likely to pay the required ransoms. This is exactly what the hackers are counting on. In addition, many hospitals lack the necessary cyber security to ward off such attacks.

The consequences of these attacks can be particularly devastating for the health sector. For instance, these attacks can lock down computers that hold electronic medical records. This leaves doctors and nurses without access to critical information about their patients’ medical histories and dosages of drugs required. One example is the recent cyber-attack launched at the Brno University Hospital, which has one of the largest COVID-19 testing facilities in the Czech Republic. The attack caused an immediate computer shutdown which forced the hospital to cancel surgeries and relocate patients. A week later, the hospital still had no means of storing data which slowed processes and potentially endangered lives. In this way, the attacks do not only have economic consequences but can actually put lives at risk.

The private sector is also at risk. By analysing previous attacks during global epidemics and contemporary phishing campaigns based on COVID-19, security firm RiskIQ predicts that attackers will target large corporations relying on markets and supply chains that originate in coronavirus-affected regions. “Personnel at these organisations have heightened interest in news and developments related to the virus, potentially making them more susceptible to social engineering that tricks them into clicking on malicious links,” the company says. In this way, cybercriminals rely on people to make a mistake. They take advantage of human traits such as curiosity and concern about the ongoing emergency situation.

Some of the best protective measures are therefore to prevent them from getting to you in the first place. Firms like Autostore use antivirus software, which looks for abnormal activity and removes malicious software, and web filter, which can filter out suspicious e-mails. In the event that a phishing e-mail still somehow finds its way into their inbox, employees know what to look for as the firm regularly conducts awareness training. For instance, Autostore has conducted simulated phishing attacks to help employees distinguish these e-mails from authentic ones.

In terms of what to look for, the National Cyber Security Centre recently gave the following examples of phishing e-mail subject lines: “2020 Coronavirus Updates”, “2019-nCov: Coronavirus outbreak in your city (Emergency), “2019-nCov: New confirmed cases in your City”.  Another red flag is poor spelling and grammar. These e-mails will also often imply a sense of urgency to scare a person into downloading a file or clicking the link. For instance, it might say that the attachment has urgent information about the coronavirus. It is also a common tactic to put two very similar looking characters by each other so that you don’t spot the mistake. The link might for example start with https; instead of https:. In addition, if you hover over the link without clicking on it, you’ll be able to see that the real address it leads to is different than what it first appears to be.

Managing the real-life virus is difficult enough without having to worry about cyber “viruses”. Indeed, that is what hackers are counting on. “In the past, cybercriminals have found success using disasters and global epidemics in ransomware and other malware attacks and developed a pattern we expect will continue with the coronavirus,” says Aaron Inness, Protective Intelligence Analyst at RiskIQ. The cost to attackers is low and the gain potentially high. Consequently, the risk of cyber-attacks is now higher than usual. It is therefore important that both individuals and organisations remain vigilant and practice good cyber hygiene throughout the pandemic.

Attrition in Iraq: Explaining Rocket Attacks Against US-led Coalition Forces and US Assets

On March 12^th 2020 eighteen small rockets hit Iraq’s Camp Taji military base situated north of Baghdad hosting United States-led coalition troops fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The rocket attack killed one British and two American soldiers in addition to wounding 12 others. On March 14^th a new wave of attacks targeting Camp Taji for the second time injured three coalition troops and at least two Iraqi soldiers. At least three rockets struck Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone near the American Embassy on the 17^th of March and on the 26^th of March two rockets again hit Baghdad’s Green Zone landing near Baghdad’s Operations Command which coordinates Iraq’s police and military forces. Rocket attacks against US-led coalition forces and US assets are not new.  On the 16^th of February 2020 several rockets landed near the US Embassy striking an Iraqi base hosting coalition forces in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone. Prior to this, on the 13^th of February 2020 a Katyusha rocket hit an Iraqi base hosting US troops in the remote province of Kirkuk. Two separate rocket attacks occurred in January 2020 and in December 27^th 2019 a barrage of 30 rockets targeted the Iraqi base in Kirkuk killing a US contractor. No group has claimed responsibility for these attacks, but the US places the blame on militia groups within the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces such as Kataib Hezbollah and have in the past retaliated against Kataib Hezbollah in particular.

For instance, after the March 12^th rocket attacks, the US retaliated on March 13^th with airstrikes targeting five weapons stores used by the militia group including facilities housing arms which were reportedly used in previous attacks. Instead the strikes killed three regular Iraqi soldiers, two police officers and a civilian as well as damaging an unfinished civilian airport in Karbala. Moreover, after the December 27^th attacks in Kirkuk, the US retaliated via airstrikes killing 25 Kataib Hezbollah fighters. There is reason to assume PMF militia groups are behind such attacks. For example, hours before the attack on the 16^th of February, one PMF militia leader from Harakat al-Nujuba announced a countdown for ejecting US forces from Iraq. The PMF are mainly backed by Iran. Iran wields considerable influence in Iraq and is generally hostile to the US. On the 3^rd of January 2020 the US killed top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani and leader of Kataib Hezbollah and PMF leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Furthermore, credible news sources such as Aljazeera and Foreign Policy are also claiming that Iraqi militia groups within the PMF are to blame for the rocket attacks. If elements of the PMF are involved in such attacks, then not claiming responsibility may be advantageous. Given the umbrella group’s ties to Iran it is possible that they are attempting to shield Iran from US political and military retaliation.

The Popular Mobilization Forces, also known as the Popular Mobilization Units or Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic, is a state sponsored umbrella group for approximately forty Iraqi militia groups, the majority of which are backed by Iran. Although predominantly Shia, the PMF includes some Sunni, Christian and Yazidi groups. The PMF has its roots in the war against the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria. At the beginning of the conflict with ISIS in 2014, the powerful Shi’ite cleric Ayatollah Ali Sistani issued  a fatwa, an Islamic ruling on a point of law given by a recognised authority, rallying 100,000 young men to join the organization. The then Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki used these militia groups to combat ISIS and maintain his influence in predominantly Sunni areas. A good number of the PMF militia groups have their roots in older organizations such as the Badr Brigade led by Hadi al-Amiri who fought alongside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s. Due to the war against ISIS,  The PMU’s presence in Iraq ballooned and their influence expanded owning their own warehouses for munitions and allegedly prisons. The turning point for the PMF came in 2017 when  it was officially integrated within Iraq’s security forces. Instead of merging the militia groups with regular forces the PMF was successful in solidifying its status as a distinct force. The militia groups preserved their former ties especially with Iran who backs the PMF. Thus, escalating tensions between the US and Iran meant that tensions would also rise between the US and PMF militia groups.

Although the group or groups responsible for the series of rocket attacks are not making themselves known, the strategy behind such attacks is quite clear; to force the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. This resembles the strategy of attrition, one of five strategies used by groups engaged in terrorism in order to achieve political goals according to Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter in their 2006 paper The Strategies of Terrorism. For Kydd and Walter, terrorism is a rational choice for groups seeking to achieve a political goal through violence and can yield results. They point to various incidents in which groups engaged in terrorism achieved their political goals. For instance, the US withdrew from Lebanon after the 1983 suicide attack against the US marine barracks in Beirut, the US pulled its troops out of Saudi Arabia two years after the 9/11 attacks and the Philippines recalled its forces from Iraq after a kidnapping. Kydd and Walter’s five strategies of terrorism are intimidation, provocation, spoiling, outbidding and attrition. The strategy of attrition is intended to inflict costs in order to persuade the enemy to yield to the demands of the group conducting the attack. Attrition is considered the most important strategy used by groups engaged in terrorism because the greater the costs the organization is able to inflict the more credible its threat to inflict future costs according to Kydd and Walter.

Attrition strategies compels either the government or occupying forces to reconsider its objectives. Continuing their objectives means incurring greater costs in financial, material and human resources. Thus, groups engaged in terrorism seek to inflict the highest costs on life, infrastructure and other resources. Hamas’s late master bombmaker Yahya Ayyash wrote in a letter to the organization’s leadership. He said “we paid a high price when we used only sling shots and stones. We need to exert more pressure, make the costs of the occupation that much more expensive in human lives, that much more unbearable”. The outcome of attrition strategies is dependent on three variables: the state or occupying force’s interest in the disputed matter, constraints regarding the state or occupying force’s ability to retaliate and its sensitivity to the cost of violence. For example, democracies, such as the US, are far more sensitive to the cost of life primarily due the importance of public opinion within democracies.

The security implications of the use of this strategy by the PMF could be significant. At face value it seems as if attrition is working. None of the 5000 US troops in Iraq have so far left the country but the US has pulled out of three key military bases including al-Qaim and the K1 airbase located in the remote northern province of Kirkuk, the latter base having been targeted previously. The US now plans to consolidate its forces in two locations in Iraq. However, the danger of continuing such attacks is the possibility of a military confrontation between the US and Iran that can lead to a full-scale war. This will mean a greater amount of US presence within Iraq and the Middle East as whole running contrary to PMF and Iranian desires. Moreover, the last military confrontation the US and Iran have had was sparked by the US killing of Qassem Soleimani who led the Quds force of the IRGC responsible for extra-terrestrial clandestine operations which included supporting the PMF militia groups in Iraq. Iran responded by firing missiles at a base in Iraq hosting US troops causing a hundred US soldiers to have brain injuries. It is likely that another confrontation between the two states could occur again if the attacks continue.

Italy’s Fight Against COVID-19 Pandemic: The Reason Behind Italy’s High Fatality

As of 31 March, the confirmed cases of coronavirus in Italy have reached 105,792 cases with 12,428 deaths. Until the end of March, Italy is the country with the largest number of total cases and deaths related to the coronavirus pandemic in Western Europe. Italy’s mortality rate is also the highest throughout Western Europe, with a percentage of 11.7%. Italy detected the first case on 29 January from two Chinese tourists which the government quickly isolated. At the end of January, Italy announced the status of ‘State of Emergency’ throughout the country and became the first country in Western Europe to ban flights from China. However, suddenly the virus re-emerged on 18 February when a 38 years-old man was confirmed to be the first locally transmitted case of coronavirus in Italy. Several towns in Northern Italy, believed to be the ground zero of coronavirus spreading in Italy were placed under a lockdown. However, cases kept rising drastically within national levels and finally the government imposed a nationwide lockdown on 10 March.  Many people are wondering why the impact that Italy suffers from the pandemic is much higher than other countries especially in regards to total deaths and mortality rates after some preventive measures that have been imposed. This could be subjected to the fact that the virus could have been circulated unnoticed in the country.

Scientists have been stating that probably virus in Italy has been spreading since early January. It is possible because the virus incubation period could be as long as 7-14 days. During the incubation period, the person infected will not show any symptoms. However, research has shown that the spreading of virus between humans with no symptoms at all is possible. This means that the virus has been spreading more freely than what it was initially thought and preventive measures taken by the government are considered to be too late. Before late January, the existence of COVID-19 was not very well-acknowledged by most people even doctors and scientists. This is proven by reports emerging throughout media in Italy that suggest many hospitals in Northern Italy observed unusually high numbers of pneumonia cases one month before the outbreak was declared. These pneumonia cases are possibly related to the coronavirus.

Another factor that could affect the impact of coronavirus pandemic in Italy is the age of its population. Italy has the oldest population in Europe and second only to Japan at the world level, with 23% of its population being 65 years old and older. It is also reported that 37% of cases in Italy are filled with people over the age of 70. The virus has known to be more lethal to the elderly and people with past illnesses, which creates another reason why the number of deaths and mortality rates in Italy are higher than in other countries. Italy’s national health institute also stated that the average of patients who have died from the virus is 78. To be concluded, Italy’s high number of deaths and mortality rate are most likely caused by the early unnoticed spreading of the virus and its aging population. It is logical to consider that it was almost impossible to prevent the spread of coronavirus. At this point, governments throughout Europe should focus not only on containment measures but also on measures to cure people who got infected.

Venezuela Spiralling into Humanitarian crisis and Political Turmoil

Venezuela have been caught in a political crisis since January 2019, with opposition leader and the National Assembly leader Juan Guaido declaring himself interim president. Under President Nicolas Maduro the economy of Venezuela collapsed, causing shortages of basic supplies which prompted 4.5 million people to leave. The political crisis needs to be resolved so that the economy and resulting humanitarian crisis can be dealt with.

Two Presidents

President Nicolas Maduro succeeded Hugo Chavez who died while in presidency in 2013 following 14 years as the country’s leader. His socialist party PSUV have governed Venezuela for 20 years. In May 2018 Maduro was re-elected as president, with the opposition widely dismissing the poll as rigged. This was due to many candidates who ran against Maduro being barred from running while others had been jailed or fled the country for fear of being imprisoned. The opposition parties also argued the poll would be neither free nor fair. Under President Maduro, the economy of Venezuela collapsed leading to widespread shortages, resulting in 4.5 million people escaping the country. In December 2016 the opposition parties won a majority in the National Assembly with Juan Guaido being made leader of the Assembly. In response to this President Maduro created the National Constituent Assembly, which was made up exclusively of government supporters whose powers supersede those of the National Assembly. This move has resulted in the two bodies being in continuous dispute over issues. In January 2019 with the political crisis worsening National Assembly leader Juan Guaido declared himself interim president on 23 January opposing President Maduro following his inauguration on January 10, 2019.

Juan Guaido, the youngest person to have been elected to lead the National Assembly, argued in a rousing speech to a crowd of supporters in January 2019, that the 2018 re-election of President Nicolas Maduro was illegitimate, and that the presidency was vacant. He went on to state that with his role of Speaker of the National Assembly he was the only one left to lead the country out of the economic and political crisis. Following his move to declare himself interim president he was quickly recognised as the legitimate leader by the United States, Brazil and Colombia. With the nations siding with him soon growing to more than 50 countries. Guaido had the peoples vote as they believed he would ascend to the presidential palace within months. They also applauded his promise to bring in humanitarian aid to resolve the widespread shortages of basic goods.

Political Conflict Intensifies

Over the last year however, the two leaders of Venezuela have been at continuous loggerheads, with the government of President Maduro using his support from the military to prevent Guaido to carry out promises of aid. On February 23, 2019 Guaido faced his first set back, in his promise to provide the food and medical supplies for the country which had been piling up for days just over the Colombian border, after Maduro barricaded entry points, contending that the shipments are meant to humiliate and undermine him. Guaido along with volunteers, set off to bring the aid to the people of Venezuela however were met with teargas and rubber bullets, and at least three of the trucks caring aid were burned at the border. None of the shipments made it past the border blockades.

With the lack of results from Guaido the support for him began to dwindle and attendance at the rallies called in support of Guaido diminished. On April 30, 2019 Guaido made another attempt to gain more control in Venezuela with an attempt to get the armed forces who are loyal to President Maduro to switch sides. This however failed with only a few dozen soldiers joining him and resulted with the Maduro government labelling this as an attempted coup and cracking down even harder on the opposition.

Whilst the political tensions have been going on, the humanitarian crisis has continued in Venezuela, with thousands of people fleeing the country on foot every day. In April 2019, President Maduro allowed a shipment of emergency supplies in from the Red Cross. Prior to this Maduro had been denying the existence of a humanitarian crises and refused any foreign aid to enter the country with the government claiming the aid shipments are a political ploy by the United States. As well as a lack of basic supplies, the infrastructure in Venezuela has been poorly maintained. Since March 2019, a series of country-wide blackouts have been occurring. The continued political tensions have resulted in increased sanctions from the United States on Maduro, including the targeting of oil. Although the government has received sanctions from the US, the Maduro government has received continued support from Russia and China, with China offering to help rebuild the national power grid.

Renewed Political Tensions

A year after the political tensions began, the situation has escalated with renewed tension. Starting in January 2020, the Maduro government deployed police to prevent Guaido who was the National Assembly leader and opposition lawmakers from entering the National Assembly for the election of a new National Assembly leader, which Guaido was set to win. This move by the Maduro government meant they were able to elect their own candidate, pro-Maduro politician Luis Parra, into the position. In response Guaido and the opposition law makers who made up the majority of the National Assembly held their own election off-site and re-elected Guaido with a larger majority then Luis Parra had. This left Venezuela with two men claiming the presidency but also with two National Assembly leaders.

The key players in this crisis are to be seen as being the security forces, who have so far remained loyal to Maduro. Maduro has rewarded this loyalty with frequent pay increases and high-ranking military men being awarded control of key posts and industries. Talks between the government and opposition have seen no progress and continued US imposed sanctions on Venezuela and the government have not weakened President Maduro enough to see him step down from office. It can be said that the actions of the US have given Maduro a scapegoat to blame for the situation in Venezuela.

Overall Assessment

There are concerns to be heard with the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela escalating and the political situation continuing to deteriorate. The mass fleeing of Venezuelans is expected to continue. Resulting in an increased strain on the Latin American countries being inundated by the people escaping the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela; as well as on aid groups trying to support the refugees and asylum seekers. The political situation in Venezuela needs to be resolved so that the economy can be stabilised, and the humanitarian crisis can be resolved. It is likely that a resolution to the situation will only occur with the intervention of international players, through mitigation talks rather than sanctions which are likely to further escalate the current humanitarian crisis. The United States has already offered to mitigate the situation, however, with the United States supporting Guaido’s claim of presidency and putting continued sanctions on Maduro’s government other international powers may need to oversee the mitigation process.