MS Risk Blog

Mali Announces Transitional Leadership, Partly Meeting Conditions set by ECOWAS

On Monday 21 September, the military junta in power in Mali named the country’s post-coup interim government, though questions have emerged whether the West African ECOWAS bloc will accept the transitional leadership, given that it only partly meets conditions set by the regional bloc.

The National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), which is led by Col. Assimi Goïta, announced Monday on Mali’s state television ORTM that retired Maj. Col. Bah N’Daw, 70, has been named president of the transitional government, which is set to be inaugurated on Friday 25 September. Although technically Bah N’Daw is a civilian, he is both a retired military officer and a former defence minister who served under former President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. He also served as an aide to Mali’s former military dictator, Moussa Traoré, who died last week. On Monday, Goïta also confirmed that he would serve as N’Daw’s vice president, in a move that only partly meets conditions set by ECOWAS and which cement’s the CNSP’s desire to maintain some degree of influence and control over Mali’s transitional period. Both men were appointed by a panel set up by the CNSP.

Since Monday’s announcement of Mali’s transitional government, questions have emerged about what role civil society groups and political leaders had in selecting the interim leadership. Notably this concerns the main opposition group M5-RFP. While Goïta disclosed that members of the movement were involved in choosing N’Daw to lead the transition, one of the M5-RFP’s leaders, Choguel Maïga, has denied that this was the case. Speaking to reporters, Maïga disclosed that “we were not part of the body that determined the president and vice president. We learned about this decision through social media and the press.” The coalition has led demonstrations over the past several months against the Malian government and former President Keïta. It has also indicated its desire in recent weeks to be part of the transitional government. If the M5-RFP rejects the new interim leadership, this could fuel further tensions and unrest in Mali. Meanwhile on the ground in Bamako, opinions also appear to be divided over the nomination, with the local population split between wanting a civilian or military leader.

What is evident is that the new interim government will maintain strong ties to the army. Furthermore, the decision comes after the junta stated last week that it would prefer the military to run the transitional period. On Monday, Goïta disclosed that “each proposal has its advantages and its disadvantages,” referring to the choice between a civilian or military president, adding that the committee had taken “a global context” into account when selecting N’Daw, in what appears to be a reference to pressure from ECOWAS.

So far, N’Daw has not indicated whether or not he will accept the nomination. Furthermore, while ECOWAS has also yet to comment on Monday’s announcement, Goïta’s installation to become vice president is likely to be quickly rejected by the international community, which for weeks now has called on Mali’s junta to restore civilian rule as soon as possible. The 15-nation ECOWAS bloc has also insisted that both the president and vice president of the interim government be civilians. While ECOWAS has previously shown some flexibility, agreeing last week to an 18-month transitional time frame for holding new elections, the regional bloc has stressed that sanctions would only be lifted if a civilian president and vice president were named. ECOWAS has already closed borders to Mali and has imposed sanctions in the wake of the 18 August coup, though it currently remains unclear what additional actions the West African bloc may undertake in the wake of Monday’s announcement. It is however likely that ECOWAS, at a minimum, will show some dissatisfaction with Goïta being named vice president, and at a maximum, maintain its stance on the issue and impose further sanctions on Mali. ECOWAS has already stopped financial and commercial trade with Mali, with the exception for basic necessities, drugs, equipment to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, fuel and electricity. Further sanctions however could severely impact the West African country, which is already dealing with a severe economic downturn coupled with the ongoing jihadist insurgency and persistent inter-ethnic violence.

Cabo Delgado’s insurgency: SADC’s moment to shine?

Cabo Delgado, Mozambique’s northernmost province has been besieged by what was a slow-growing Islamist insurgency since October 2017. In the last nine months, the conflict has evolved from inconsistent largely opportunistic attacks with limited capacity that lacked sophistication, to a noticeable upscale in the frequency of attacks, capacity and sophistication. Approximately 1,495 people have been killed since 2017 and around 250,000 people have been internally displaced. This underpins the situation in Cabo Delgado as a growing security and humanitarian crisis, one that forced President Filipe Nyusi to shift from actively denying that there was a growing insurgency, to reluctantly acknowledging the conflict in May 2020 after soldiers were killed during heavy fighting with the insurgents. The growing momentum of the insurgency is increasing the likelihood of regional overspill, and without regional military support, substantial financial commitments, a coherent counter-terrorism strategy and meaningful structural reform of the Mozambican forces the situation within the next 6 months is likely to escalate.

The group responsible for this campaign of terror is Ahlu Sunna Wa-Jamma (ASWJ). They have also been referred to by several other names including Al-Shabaab, although there are no formal links with the Somalian regional terror group of the same name. Little is known about the shadowy group, except that they have links to the Islamic State (IS) group and have over the last nine months become more emboldened. Their March 2020 pre-dawn attacks on the towns of Mocimboa da Praia and Quissanga signalled a notable shift in tactics and illustrated a growing confidence with the display of more sophisticated capabilities, after they occupied Mocimboa da Praia for a day. This attack was notable because it was the first time the group hoisted its flag, which signalled formal links to Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). It also made known its ambitions for Sharia Law in Mozambique via a video they filmed during the attack. There have been a number of further attacks that IS has taken credit for, despite this, the degree of affiliation these two groups have with each other remains contested. The scale and scope of ASWJ’s overall aims remain ambiguous, although their repeated attacks in the area, and most recently the capture of the strategic port town of Mocimboa da Praia after over five days of intense fighting with government forces on 12 August, provides a glimpse into the group’s near-term goals. The strategic targeting of Mocimboa da Praia suggests the group is currently focused on consolidating its coastal base instead of expanding the reach of its geographical presence. This latest attack by the insurgents underscores their increased capabilities and operational sophistication and indicates the group has developed adequate supply lines and manpower to sustain operations for an extended period.

Although ASWJ have demonstrated increased capacity and capability that poses a credible threat, the escalation of events should also take into account that since the Covid-19 pandemic took root across sub-Saharan Africa, extremist groups have been leveraging the Covid-19 crisis as an opportunity to intensify attacks and increase civilian support. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) commander Stephen Townsend warned in April 2020 that “al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab and ISIS have announced that they see this crisis as an opportunity to further their terrorist agenda.” The exploitation of Covid-19 by extremists groups in sub-Saharan Africa is of particular importance in the Mozambican context, because it reinforces the reality that although the majority of the physical conflict is currently isolated to Cabo Delgado, the problem itself has regional implications and will require a regional response, most likely from the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The dispensation of regional assistance from SADC, sooner rather than later, is important for a number of reasons. The insurgency as it stands bears the hallmarks of the initially unchecked growth of similar terror groups in sub-Saharan Africa like Boko Haram, where the window of opportunity to contain the group in its infancy  was initially missed due to a lack of a coherent counter-terror strategy, adequate funding of military forces and a coordinated regional approach. Although the evolution of any terror group will bear its own unique markers due to a variety of factors that fuel the conflict, the similarities with the case of Nigeria’s army in the initial stages of fighting the Boko Haram insurgency and Mozambique’s current predicament cannot be ignored by the Mozambican leadership or SADC. There are lessons to be learned from the Nigerian, Mali and Sahel region experiences, where extremists groups were allowed to develop, due to similar issues facing Mozambique.

So far, in order to stave off the advancing insurgency, the Mozambican government has sought help from private military contractors (PMC) such as the Russian Wagner Group and more recently South African based, Dyck Advisory Group (DAG). The utilisation of PMCs  may provide immediate combat support to an escalating situation, however based on the most recent capture of the port of Mocimboa da Praia, this quick remedy is fast becoming little more than an added expense, with a low prospect of remaining a sustainable solution in the face of an increasingly aggressive  and agile insurgency that could soon eclipse the capabilities of Mozambique’s defence forces.

The signing of a Liquid Natural Gas Project with Exxon Mobil and Total, worth an estimated US$50 billion also makes the Afungi Peninsula, which is located just South of Mocimboa da Praia, an increasingly likely target for attacks. This stands to potentially jeopardize the LNG project, because opportunistic attacks on operators, such as the killing of eight workers of a private construction company this June, will likely increase in frequency over the next six months. Further to this, disruptions to supply lines are likely continue as ASWJ targets key infrastructure installations across Cabo Delgado. The fact that part of the signed LNG project deal includes Total providing logistical support to a newly established joint task force to guarantee the protection of its planned onshore liquified natural gas project, strongly indicates that whatever counter-insurgency efforts the Mozambican government had put in, has not been enough and will almost likely require regional support.

For SADC the insurgency in Mozambique is an opportunity for southern African countries to test the effectiveness of their regional strategies against terrorism. Furthermore, under the Chairmanship of Mozambique, SADC has a real chance at putting into practise its August 2020 commitment to support Mozambique in addressing terrorism and violent attacks. The SADC principle of non-interference in the affairs of the states may have presented an issue for previous Chairs of SADC, especially because the only support Mozambique had requested from its neighbours was better border control, in its reluctance to request regional assistance. However, what is increasingly more pertinent is the principle of collective security under which President Nyusi’s chairmanship SADC has the opportunity for a better-coordinated regional response to the Cabo Delgado crisis

SADC, like a number multinational organisation, has sometimes been in the past viewed as an institution that is all bark and no bite due to the competing interplay between the principles of collective security and non-interference. Making a success out of the Cabo Delgado crisis is another opportunity to highlight a positive gain in the area of counterterrorism for Mozambique and the region. More so, because the Covid-19 pandemic puts limitation the amount of international military assistance that could be offered, therefore the Cabo Delgado crisis could be SADC’s moment to shine in the area of regional responses for counterterrorism.

New Mali Deadline Set as ECOWAS’ Frustrations Grow

The crucial 15 September deadline to install a transitional government, including a civilian president, passed with Mali being no closer to having a leadership in place that will usher the way for new elections within 18 months. A day after a mini ECOWAS summit in Ghana, Mali’s junta indicated that it was working to respond to the West African bloc’s renewed demands of installing a civilian leadership. Questions however remain on who will lead the country and there is growing concern of a political standoff and a further terrorist threat to regional security.

Frustrated with a lack of progress, the West African ECOWAS bloc appears to be growing impatient with the military junta, known as the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), currently in power in Mali. After meeting with junta leaders in Accra, Ghana on Tuesday, six leaders from ECOWAS called on the CNSP to nominate a civilian transitional government within days not weeks, setting a new 22 September deadline. ECOWAS officials reiterated that once a civilian leadership has been installed, regional sanctions on Mali would be lifted. The major takeaways from Tuesday’s summit are that ECOWAS leaders have again made it clear that a civilian leadership be in charge of the transitional period. While officials on Tuesday firmly rejected the idea that the transitional government could be led by a military individual, one point that ECOWAS has shifted on has been the timeline of the transitional period. Officials accepted the 18-month transitional period, which is a move away from the 12-month period that it had initially demanded, though it is far off from the junta’s first proposal to hold new elections in 2023. ECOWAS further stipulated that the junta would need to be disbanded once the transitional government is in place.

In response to Tuesday’s summit, the CNSP on Wednesday 16 September confirmed that it was working to respond to ECOWAS’ renewed demands. Col. Major Ismail Wague, spokesman for the junta, told reporters that ECOWAS had given the junta an additional week to meet the requirements, warning that it would face further sanctions if the deadline was missed again. ECOWAS has already halted financial flows to Mali and has closed its borders. Questions however remain whether or not the CNSP will yield to growing regional pressure and install a civilian leadership or whether they will attempt to include some military figures within the transitional government, which will be tasked with organizing a new election within the next 18 months.  

While the CNSP and ECOWAS have agreed on a timeline for the transitional period, they remain divided on who will steer the country for the next 18 months. Over the weekend, the junta had noted that the transitional leader could be either a civilian or a military official. ECOWAS however appears, for the time being, to remain adamant that a civilian lead the government, and it is supported by internal actors and regional partners in its position. During Tuesday’s summit, Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo reiterated that “we need a civilian leadership for the transition.” This position appears to be supported by the M5-RFP opposition coalition with Choguel Maiga, a member, praising the regional pressure for a civilian leadership. Meanwhile the African Union Peace and Security Council, which met via video conference on Thursday 17 September, also reinforced its appeal that the Malian transition be led by a civilian though like ECOWAS, it has accepted the 18-month transitional period.

The question now remains which side will blink first in Mali’s ongoing political struggle. West African leaders appear to have already given in to the military junta’s timeline, backing down from earlier demands that democracy be restored within a year. With the international community all calling for a civilian leader to be installed, it is unlikely that ECOWAS officials will easily reconsider this demand despite the threat that the ongoing political upheaval could set back efforts to contain Mali’s growing terrorist threat. For the CNSP, the prospect of additional sanctions being imposed on Mali could result in the military junta to install a civilian leader with the hopes that it will still have some degree of influence over Mali’s future. Evidently, Tuesday’s new deadline will be closely watched across the West African region and internationally, and it remains a test for the two sides, with both the CNSP and ECOWAS wanting to achieve their own set goals and maintaining a degree of influence and sense of control.

Mali Coup Leaders Transitional Proposal Suffers Setback

Nearly a month after a military coup resulted in the removal of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, Mali continues to struggle to set in place a transitional period, amidst growing international pressure and fears that jihadist groups will profit from a power struggle. Divisions however emerged over the weekend as just hours after the military junta in power announced their agreement to an 18-month transitional government, the country’s opposition declared its objection to the move. With a meeting due to take place between the regional ECOWAS bloc and Malian authorities on 15 September, questions remain about Mali’s political future.

Talks were held late last week between the military junta, known as the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), political leaders and civil society groups, with the aim to forge a path forward. Malian officials are under a 15 September deadline imposed by ECOWAS to name a president and prime minister, with the bloc calling for a 12-month transitional period. ECOWAS has threatened to impose further sanctions on Mali should the deadline pass with no leadership in place. On Saturday 12 September, after three days of discussions, the CNSP agreed to establish an 18-month transitional government until an election could be held. Spokesperson Moussa Camara specified that the interim government would either be led by a military officer or a civilian – a likely sticking point. While ECOWAS, the opposition coalition and the international community have all called for the interim president to be a civilian, the military leadership maintains that a civilian or a soldier can fill the role.  The charter for the transition also includes a vice president and transitional council that will serve as the National Assembly. The charter gives control of the defence, security and re-foundation of the state to the vice president. It also states that an interim legislative body is to be established comprising of the opposition coalition, known as the M5-RFP.  The agreement effectively moves away from the CNSP’s previous proposal of a three-year transition period and that a new constitution should be written first.

While it briefly appeared that Mali’s political crisis was beginning to get back on track, the M5-RFP announced on Sunday 13 September that it has rejected the transition charter. The coalition, which took part in the negotiations and which led mass protests ahead of last month’s coup, stated that the resulting document was an attempt by military leaders to “grab and confiscate power.” It further disclosed that the charter did not take into account what it said was a majority vote for a civilian interim leader, and “did not reflect the views and decisions of the Malian people.” While the military junta and opposition coalition were initially united in wanting the departure of President Keita, the two groups are increasingly appearing to diverge. Any additional divisions between these two groups are likely to create further instability in Mali, and may result in violent demonstrations and protests amongst locals who are increasingly becoming frustrated with the situation.

The ECOWAS bloc is set to hold a mini-summit on the current situation in Mali on Tuesday 15 September in Ghana. Presidents from six countries in the regional bloc will be in attendance. Issues at the top of the agenda will likely include the timeline of the transitional period, and the fact that it remains longer than the year set by ECOWAS; and who will lead Mali’s transition, with regional leaders having already stated that the leader must be a civilian. Mali’s junta will try to convince regional leaders to accept its road map, though it remains unclear whether a solution will be announced after the summit, including if ECOWAS will accept the 18-month transition period and whether a leadership will be announced, or whether Malian authorities will be forced to go back to the drawing board, and what any delays will have on sanctions that the bloc has threatened to impose. What is evident is that a transitional government needs to be put in place quickly, and it needs to be accepted by all parties to avoid any further tensions and violence. Any delays to having a responsible leadership in place will need to be avoided in order to keep the jihadist threat at bay.

Whatever the final decision on a transitional leader and period, it is evident that the military junta will maintain a relative degree of influence over the transitional government. Even if a civilian leader is chosen, it is likely that they will be close to the junta, and the military is also likely to have a strong presence in other positions of power. It is also likely that the M5-RFP will attempt to have some degree of influence, and will want to have civilian participants within the transitional government that have close links to the opposition coalition. Questions have also emerged about the ongoing peace process, and what impact the transitional period will have on it. The Coordination for the Movement of Azawad had previously signed a peace agreement with the Malian government. While representatives had not travelled to Bamako to participate in recent consultations on the transitional period, the junta had intended to travel to Kidal to hold talks last week, though they were prevented by weather conditions. Sidi Brahim Ould Sidat, the president of the Azawad group, has disclosed that “we have men, weapons and we control two thirds of the country and the CNSP is no more legitimate than us,” adding “we have two choices to make now: either we enter the transition process and have made a new constitution of Mali together in which we recognize ourselves, or we wait after the transition and we continue negotiations with the government that will be put in place.” It is evident that militia groups in Mali are waiting to see the outcome of the transitional process, though either way, Mali’s peace process remains at a standstill for the time being.

Meanwhile the situation on the ground has not improved, with jihadist militants advancing their operations and continuing to launch deadly attacks. In the weeks since the 18 August military coup, at least 9 terror-related attacks have been reported, spanning from the northern desert regions to the central parts of Mali. Targets have included French forces, and local troops. In Bamako, rallies have been held in support of the CNSP and M5-RFP. The Mouvement Populaire du 4 September (MP4), a new formation that supports the ruling junta, has called for a rally on Tuesday 15 September at the Monument de l’Independence to express support for Mali’s de facto authority, the CNSP, while the Popular African Youth Movement (MPJA) has called for a sit-in in front of the French Embassy on 17 September to denounce French military forces in the country.

The Belarus Crisis and its Implications for Eastern European Security and Businesses

The recent upheaval in Belarus following the presidential election and its aftermath has gained international attention. On the morning of August 10, Belarus’ electoral commission reported that Lukashenko won 80.3 percent of the vote. Later that night, heavily armed security forces deployed onto the streets of Minsk, using rubber bullets and tear gas, and arresting people voicing their suspicions of electoral fraud. Workers also participated in the protests and a strike was initiated at Belaruskali, a huge potash factory in Soligorsk. However, they were pressured into ending it by agents of Belarus’ State Security Committee and the strike’s organiser was handed a jail sentence. Consequently, organisers of other strikes fled the country. On August 16, the biggest mass protests in the country’s history occurred when over 200 thousand people took to the streets in Minsk to protest Lukashenko’s regime and the election results. The number of people participating in protests throughout August makes the situation unique for Belarus: for the first time, its authorities have experienced opposition from the majority of citizens, not only a minority.

On August 21, Amnesty International said that the human rights crisis in the country “caused by the vicious crackdown on peaceful protesters requires businesses, both foreign and national, to exercise particular diligence when operating in the country and upholding their responsibility to respect human rights.” Businesses have the responsibility under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to respect human rights wherever they operate in the world, and to take pro-active steps to make sure that they neither cause or contribute to human rights violations within their global operations and respond when violations do occur. Amnesty International warned businesses that authorities in Belarus may place demands on them that would lead to human rights violations, and that if this occurs, businesses must make their opposition known to the government and to the public, in addition to pursuing legal options to challenge it.

For instance, it has been alleged that the near-total internet shutdown on August 9-11 throughout Belarus was the result of instructions made by authorities to internet providers. On the morning of August 9, when the polls opened, multiple internet providers in the country lost routing. Journalists present in Belarus confirmed that there were significant disruptions to WIFI, LAN and mobile data networks. Twenty-four hours later, internet users still found it difficult to get online. Belarus’ largest telecom providers, A1; Life; and MTS, apologised and said the reasons for the outages were outside their control. Maksimas Milta, Head of the Communication and Development Unit at European Humanities University, told CyberNews that YouTube and Messenger were the first to stop working. Then, Goals, an election platform designed to register votes and report possible violations in constituencies, and Zubr, a map for reporting electoral law violations in real-time via a Telegram bot, were blocked. “So first the authorities blocked these platforms so that people could not observe news about possible violations in real-time,” said Milta. Later in the afternoon, most of the media outlets became unavailable as the whole mobile internet shut down. Independent media such as Free Radio Europe became inaccessible. Belarus’ two largest independent news platforms, Naviny and Tut., both became inaccessible following the closure of the polls.

The fact that these specific websites became inaccessible raised suspicions. Klimarev, executive director at the Internet Protection Society, told CyberNews that once “they shut down the internet, it was clear they are hiding something. To put it mildly, the elections were not transparent.” He explained further that they “foresaw this would happen. Shutdowns are not rare in the world. We just didn’t know how it would be done in Belarus.” He noted that they did not succeed as some information was still getting through. However, businesses were still hurt as the “ATMs, various services, Github and Google Docs, Slack, and other online services that are vital to business operators were down… If that lasts for a short period, it’s ok, but if it goes on for a week, the consequences for the business will be immense.” Milta said he was sure that if protests continue the disruption of the internet will too. On August 10, over 20 NGOs and human rights defenders voiced their concern about the internet shutdown in an open letter. It said: “During the whole day of 9 August 2020 Internet access in Belarus was wholly or partly limited. Blockings were either total or concerned specific Internet services, web sites, social networks, messaging services, whether local or global. It is alleged that the Belarusian authorities decided to block data transfer protocols which led to the disruption of connectivity of the Belarusian networks. All foreign traffic was directed through one channel only in an attempt to allow for deep-packet inspection making VPN services ineffective.”

Meanwhile general director of Beltelekom, Shaybakov, suggested that the internet difficulties resulted from the large volumes of foreign traffic. Furthermore, the National Digital Response Centre claimed that the difficulties can be attributed to a significant amount of DDoS attacks against Belarusian telecom operators’ infrastructure. However, Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said: “Belarusian authorities are interfering with internet access and restricting content online, apparently to demobilize protests and disconnect people in Belarus from information they have the right to get.” Since August 12, we have seen repeated internet disruptions. On August 17, a 15-minute nationwide disruption was recorded and on August 23 mobile internet services were disrupted for over three hours while protesters were moving toward the presidential palace. Ahead of the latter disruptions, privately-owned internet service provider A1 told users that temporary restrictions of their 3G networks would occur because of “requests by the authorities related to ensuring national security.”

Independent media outlets and human rights groups continue to operate in the country. Protesters have used Telegram to update each other on police movements and guide each other to certain areas. This, Katsiaryna Shmatsina, political analyst with the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, said can make it more difficult for security services to quash protesters’ coordination. “If we had one clear leader, especially if this leader was in Belarus, we don’t know how long he or she would have lasted.” However, protesters, media outlets and human rights groups routinely experience harassment from the authorities and the threat of being arrested. Following the election, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, the main opposition candidate, fled to Lithuania due to safety concerns. Furthermore, several opposition politicians have been detained during the last month. Amnesty International and local human rights groups have also collected testimonies from protesters who described being tortured and subjected to other ill-treatment while detained in detention centres. AI says these testimonies, in addition to video footage showing that screams of torture victims were heard from outside, evidences “a campaign of widespread torture and other ill-treatment by the Belarusian authorities who are intent on crushing peaceful protests by any means.”

The protests have provoked newfound international interest in the often-overlooked country. Ukrainian lawmaker Oleksiy Goncharenko recently wrote that the international community must prioritise support for the civic movement as this is vital to defend Europe’s geopolitical interests and prevent Putin from taking advantage of Lukashenko’s weakness to advance his own foreign policy. If Lukashenko is cut off from the rest of the word, he might find himself in a position where he has to accept Putin’s terms. This list of terms, Goncharenko wrote, would likely include Belarus selling its strategic industrial assets to Kremlin-friendly Russian oligarchs and establishing Russian military bases in the country. Complying with these terms “would transform the geopolitical landscape in Eastern Europe, cutting off the Baltic States and bringing the Russian military to Poland’s eastern border in a far more comprehensive manner than the current limited threat posed by Moscow’s Kaliningrad enclave.” Comprehensive outside support to protesters could be key to prevent Lukashenko’s security apparatus from overpowering them and reduce the chances of Putin gaining more power over the former Soviet empire.

While Lukashenko should not be isolated too much from the international community as this may drive him towards Russian support, international leaders must continue to put pressure on Belarus’ government to stop the human rights violations. Steps have been taken here as the EU released a statement on September 8 saying that it will impose sanctions on individuals responsible for violence, repression, and falsification of election results in Belarus. Furthermore, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia imposed travel bans on President Lukashenko and 29 other Belarusian officials. In addition, Anders Åslund, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, says the country “urgently needs credible outside mediation in order to prevent a potentially deadly deterioration from taking place”. Åslund suggests the experience of Ukraine and the 2004 Orange Revolution as a possibly ideal mediation model. The people involved, including EU’s Javier Solana and then ambassador to Kyiv Chernomyrdin, were diplomats who knew Ukraine and its top politicians well. Åslund recommends that the top mediator should be a senior politician who knows Belarus well, but who has not in the past antagonized Lukashenko too much. Recently, OSCE reiterated its offer to mediate, with diplomats Edi Rama of Albania and Ann Linde of Sweden offering to participate. Such actions should be prioritised now as mediation should be initiated as quickly as possible to prevent further escalation of the crisis.

For now, Amnesty International recommends that should the Belarusian government make requests of businesses which would breach international human rights they must make their opposition known both to the authorities and to the public. If the government demands that internet providers cause disruptions, they should oppose them and challenge them legally as such measures adversely impact human rights such as freedom of expression and ability to freely seek, receive and impart information. Furthermore, Amnesty International recommends that should businesses make any agreements with the authorities or comply with government orders, these should be made transparent to the public.