MS Risk Blog

Moldavia Towards EU and Russia’s Reaction

The newly elected Moldavian President Maia Sandu’s policies, internally and externally, are expected to be challenged by Russia’s interest in the region. Notwithstanding the Russian strategic interest, an opportunity is present, and the Moldavian political landscape has the momentum to exploit it. As the Kremlin seeks reassurances that the country will not accede to re-unite with Romania and implicitly with the EU, Moscow will try to follow a patten consistent with its overall strategy towards the West – focusing on disinformation and bellicose statements. Despite Russia’s military prowess posture, President Putin is facing instability all around from the Caucasus to Belarus. As a result, President Putin might be deterred from venturing into a new armed conflict in Moldova, inadvertently opening the possibility for President Maia to implement pro-EU policies. The COVID-19 pandemic crisis might be just the opening that Moldavia needs to swerve free out of Russia’s sphere of influence. Fuelled by the COVID-19 pandemic, Western sanctions, and a low petrol price, Russia’s 2020 GDP growth is projected to contract by 7 percent, an eleven-year low, with a moderate recovery in 2021-2022. Factoring in also the Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal, where Russia must commit new forces, and with a tensed eye on how the Belarus social unrest is developing, the emergence of a new Moldavian conflict is something that Russia will do everything in its power to avoid. The avoidance policy that Russia will embrace will inadvertently create a space for a compromise.

President Maia Sandu’s latest public statement that Russia should withdraw its peacekeeping force from the self-proclaimed Transnistria republic caught Moscow by surprise. The wake-up call ring, from Moldavia’s pro EU leaderships, betrays the Kremlin’s policymakers lack of interest in the matter. Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin Press Secretary, stated that an abrupt departure of the Russian troops will create the conditions for ethnic violence and argued that dialogue must be resumed, and no sudden movements of personnel were advisable. His remark was not as intransigent as Moldavia expected shaping therefore a positive communication channel. Furthermore it can also be translated in a possibility of a phased orderly departure of the military contingent.

Russian-speakers of Transnistria nominally seceded from Moldova in 1990, one year before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, fearing the country might shortly merge with Romania, whose language and culture it broadly shares. The separatist region fought a brief war with Moldova in 1992 and declared itself an independent state, though it remains unrecognised by any country, including Russia. Some pro-Kremlin hawks still fear that Romania may one day try to absorb Moldova, and that President Sandu’s win will inevitably see Russian influence weaken. Moscow keeps about 1,500 troops in the so-called Operative Group of Russian Troops (OGTR) whose mission is to guard the biggest ammunition depot in Southeast Europe, containing about 20,000 tonnes or ammunition left there since the Soviet times. The military presence of Russia in the region has supported the existence of the secessionist regime in the Transnistria region for more than 28 years. In 1999, Russia agreed to withdraw its troops from the region, but it never did. Besides OGTR soldiers, Russia keeps another 500 peacemakers in Transnistria in a trilateral peacekeeping mission with Moldovan and Transnistrian soldiers and refuses to allow this mission to be replaced by a civilian one acting under an international mandate. Moscow and Chisinau have been conducting a dialogue on this with varying success for all 25 years that have passed since the end of the war on the Transnistria. There are several problem points in this negotiation process. It resumes only when political forces friendly to Moscow are in power in Moldova. This was the case in the early 2000s – the Party of Communists headed by Vladimir Voronin was in power, and in four years almost 50% of weapons, equipment and ammunition were removed or destroyed. Negotiations took place in recent years when the socialist Igor Dodon was president in Chisinau. However, when politicians who are pro-European come to power in Chisinau, or when such parties receive a majority in parliament, they traditionally raise the issue of withdrawing Russian peacekeepers from the region, believing that they pose a threat to the security of Moldova, resulting in the Russian negotiation team moving into a frozen state.

This trend, we assess with certitude, to continue, as it favours the Kremlin local strategy of delaying and maintaining a frozen conflict ready to be ignited on its own terms. Moscow propaganda spins around the ideology that it will never abandon its Russian speaking population in the face of Western expansion, which presumably threatens its traditional orthodox way of life. The military contingent underscores this very ideology. The Russian state leverages through this small military force its capability and commitment for its Russian speaking population who was left outside its borders after the fall of the USSR.

All things considered we analyse that the next three judgments will shape the future. First, that Russia does not care about Transnistria per se; its support for the separatist republic has been no more than one of many tools by which to achieve its overall objective of maintaining influence in Moldova. Second, that Russian policy has been primarily reactive, responding to events rather than proactively driving them. And third, that despite its apparent position as the dominant regional power, Russia has had a limited ability to influence events on the ground in both Moldova and Transnistria. This is no longer the year 2014, and Transnistria is not Ukraine or Crimea, neither by its geographical position nor by its strategic and political importance. Russia is surrounded by unstable countries and political crises; the last thing President Putin needs is further problems with the international community. His cautious and prudent approach to the Belarus crisis is proof of this.

Saudi Arabia in Yemen

During the month of November, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Houthi rebels have been constantly escalating and the number of assaults remains high. A series of incidents such as the detection and dismantling of five Iranian-type mines on November 24, the strike on a Greek-operated tanker on November 25 and the killing of 8 Saudi soldiers on November 30 have further degraded the relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Recently, on November 23, a fire broke out in the Red Sea port of Jeddah, after a rocket attack on a Saudi oil storage facility, of which Houthi rebels claimed responsibility. Brigadier General Yahya Sarea, military spokesman for the Iran-allied fighters, posted on Twitter that the assault came as retaliation for the continuous and aggressive intervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemen’s civil war. Firefighting teams rallied to the place and extinguished the fire with no significant damages and no casualties. In response, Saudi Arabia mounted air raids, targeting the camps of Houthi rebels in Yemen on November, 27. Drone attacks on Saudi oil fields on August 16 and September 14 proved that modus operandi hasn’t changed significantly, however the violence has increased. The crisis has only deteriorated and is not expected to ease any time soon.

Yemen has been locked in a civil war since late 2014. The impoverished Arab country experienced the Revolution of Dignity in 2011, which forced the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign and hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. When the transition government failed to deal with instability, caused, inter alia, by corruption, unemployment, opposing groups and jihadist attacks, the northern Yemeni-based Houthi movement took over the capital Sanaa in 2014. Over 7,700 Yemenis were killed during 2014 due to armed clashes, according to a study published by a Yemeni NGO. President Hadi eventually fled to Saudi Arabia and called for international intervention. Saudi Arabia stepped up and established a coalition in 2015, made of Arab states, including UAE and Kuwait, aiming to restore Hadi’s government and confine Iran’s influence in the region. The coalition mounted Operation Decisive Storm on March 26 of that year, attacking Houthi targets in Yemen and since then, Yemen has suffered a devastating humanitarian crisis, its infrastructures have been damaged, while more than 130,000 Yemenis have been killed.

It is important to evaluate the nature of Saudi intervention with caution. Houthi rebels are aligned with and supported by Iran, a Shia state, on the basis of the common enemy of Saudi Arabia, a Sunni-state, which supports pro-government forces. Saudis construed the Houthi’s power takeover as an Iranian-controlled puppet regime and therefore, an immediate threat to the Kingdom’s border. Therefore, a seemingly civil war has turned out to be more of a proxy war, within the framework of the longlasting dispute between Shia and Sunni for regional superiority. But things are even more convoluted. In summer 2019, forces aligned with the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), claiming an independent south, seized the city of Aden, base of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s government. This is the case of a civil war within a civil war, where Saudi Arabia and UAE while being allies against Houthi, they were also rivals in the dispute between STC and the internationally recognised Republic of Yemen government (ROYG). Although the two parties signed the power-sharing Riyadh agreement in November 2019, tensions and the clashing of interests keep going, signifying the complexity of this particular conflict in the Arab state.

The Yemen civil war and the Saudi regional intervention has been harshly criticized by the international community. The European Union condemned the Saudi-led military intervention. It adopted a controversial resolution in Strasbourg in July 2015, through which the EU acknowledges the Hadi government as the legitimate one and denounces Houthi’s aggressiveness against civilians, while it condemns the Saudi Arabian-led coalition for air raids in Yemen, violating the international humanitarian law and resulting in thousands of deaths. The EU stressed that military operations would only worsen the on-going crisis, with further unfavorable consequences for the region. The oxymoron is the fact that while the EU condemns both parties, according to the latest report on French arms exports, munitions sales to Saudi Arabia have been registered throughout 2019, accounting for €1.4 billion. Currently, in light of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the escalated tensions in Yemen, United Nations also criticized Saudi Arabia’s indiscriminate bombing, targeting Houthi targets, but causing many civilian deaths. UN condemns these acts as being against international law. On the other hand, Unites States, although a major pillar of UN, provides Saudi Arabia with sensitive intelligence data, which would enable the decision makers to form a more concise picture of the battlefield and the state of play with the Houthi forces. On the contrary, Russia has not been currently involved in the dispute, and in fact, maintains good relations with both sides.

For the time being, significant developments are yet to occur. The incident of 23^rd of November simply constitutes another act of hostility that indicates a state of fragmentation in the region of Yemen, which will almost certainly continue to suffer from turmoil during the next months. In fact, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made clear the U.S. is strengthening its ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in view of the two countries longstanding alliance. Should Pompeo stick to his words, and given the resistance Houthi project to any assaults waged by Saudi-Arabia coalition, it is highly unlikely that military disputes in Yemen will halt any time soon. Saudi Arabia will continue to receive munitions supplementation, in order to counter assaults led by Iran-backed Houthi movement. Even during the month of November a series of mutual airstrikes and mining in Saudi and Yemeni soil were reported. The Houthis have suffered several notable casualties, but no shift in their strategic plans is expected. Admittedly, Houthi movement constitutes a very cheap opportunity for Iran to combat its biggest rival in the region, Saudi Arabia. While this is true, Houthis and Iran do not share the same ideology and beliefs, but they rather chase the accomplishment of their individual goals through coordinative practices. That being said, even if Iran withdraws from Yemeni civil war, it is likely that Houthi rebels will continue to fight for their own objectives, which is international recognition, along with the establishment of stability and transparency in the country.

Peru Faces a New Era of Protests

November has been a tumultuous month for Peru. It is not new knowledge that Peru has been rocked with protests due to a political crisis that has shaped the stability of the country for a long time. However, 2020 has been a particular exception due to the current global pandemic, the economic downturn and due to the removal of President Martin Vizcarra on 9 November. President Martin Vizcarra was elected as president in 2018 by the local majority in order to combat corruption within the country. With the decline of the Peruvian economy due to the COVID-19 pandemic, President Vizcarra faced a lot of political pressure from Manuel Merino’s congress. This increased when Vizcarra proposed a referendum to remove parliamentary immunity, which infuriated, even more, the congress proposing to remove immunity from the president. Vizcarra was ultimately removed from power with the alleged acts of corruption and impeached by the congress majority. Following this event, crowds started protesting causing a national coup on 9 November. Protests started spreading across different cities of Peru to show the outrage of the president’s ousting and to reject the inauguration of president Manuel Merino, who had formed a far-right government upon taking office.

These ongoing protests are the largest demonstrations over the past twenty years and have been organised by grassroots groups of you people in Peru helped with the spreading phenomenon of social media. However, protests degenerated and resulted in hundreds of wounded, two killed by authorities and several reported missing. Protesters have marched against Merino’s government to demand his resignation, which only happened after the reports of the two deaths. This also pushed the resignation of multiple government officials. Merino’s government lasted for less than five days and it has been followed by the inauguration on 17 November of the new president Francisco Sagasti. President Sagasti has been elected to cover the presidential role for the next five months before the presidential elections in April 2021. Although Peruvians remain alert and vigilant of the new President’s actions, Sagasti is reaching out to the people in order to placate the ongoing protests by giving public speeches and establishing conciliatory gestures.

Unfortunately, public protests could go on for a longer time, which is concerning due to protest violence and due to the fast-spreading COVID-19 virus. Although protective measures are being taken as people continue to march down the streets, this is undoubtedly risking the current Presidency and government stability. Peruvians have been tired of their political system as they have long been disillusioned with widespread corruption and undemocratic measures taken by their own representatives.

The November 2020 protests in Peru have demonstrated the people’s ability to organise large-scale and persistent mobilisations across the country. Peruvians have raised without centralised leadership. Conversely, they have exploited social media to show their political engagement. The police repression has not been a hindrance but has rather motivated them with a new sort of requirement for police reform and supervision and a new Constitution. These demands are now entering the political debate leading up to the April 2021 presidential election.

The protests also encouraged several initiatives to investigate politicians’ corruption claims and deliver meticulous information on candidates before the election. Now, the decision is up to politicians to stop undervaluing the electorate and meet the citizens’ demands for a better representation.

Tigray Crisis

The security situation in East Africa has greatly deteriorated in the month of November mainly due to the conflict that has flared up in the unsettled Tigray region in northern Ethiopia. After just over three weeks of fighting, the federal Ethiopian government has claimed to have seized control of the Tigray capital Mekele, thus declaring victory over the Tigray People´s Liberation Front (TPLF) at the end of November. Still, this conflict poses a substantial threat to the unity and stability of Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa region.

During his two and a half years as Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed has faced serious crises which have resulted in him winning a Nobel Peace Prize through striking a peace deal with Eritrea, and has overcome both an assassination and a coup attempt. The month of November presented Abiy with a different challenge; that of a potential civil war in Tigray.

The disputed region had been the only area the TPLF politically ´controlled´ since they lost the election in 2018. This loss came as a shock to the TPLF who had run the country for 27 years, therefore Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been in a struggle with the TPLF since 2018. In a battle of egos and as a result of losing substantial power at the central government, coupled with the postponing of elections until May/June 2021 (exacerbated by COVID-19), the TPLF held their own elections in September in defiance of Abiy´s government and as a way of claiming legitimacy, which in turn Abiy ruled unlawful. Tigray´s rebuttal was that it no longer recognised Abiy’s administration.

The conflict was started when Tigrayan forces allegedly attacked an Ethiopian base in Mekele. Abiy believed this crossed the ´red line´ and forced the Ethiopian troops to confront the TPLF on the 4th of November, with a state of emergency also being declared. From this point, things escalated quickly with the Ethiopian government bombing Mekele and mobilising forces to march towards the capital to unseat the TPLF. The violence has resulted in hundreds killed and injured, and a great number more displaced. Heavy shelling by the government has also come under scrutiny by the international community.

Few analysts were expecting a quick and easy win for the Ethiopian government due to the mountainous terrains surrounding Mekele, as well as the experienced and well armed 250,000 TPLF troops, who three decades prior ousted the military dictatorship. In this conflict the TPLF used the communications blockade to their advantage and were able to run a successful PR campaign where they bluffed about their capabilities. This bluff became apparent as TPLF were not winning any significant battles in this conflict and did not last more than a little over 3 weeks when the Ethiopian government claimed victory. It was a relatively quick conflict, but the consequences will last longer.

There have also been concerns about insurgency after this conflict, but this should be taken with a grain of salt as they have not managed to prove their capacity as an effective fighting force in or out of Tigray yet.

As aforementioned, the crisis has not been contained within Ethiopia. While Eritrea and Ethiopia have had a long and troubled history, Eritrea as shown its support to the Ethiopian government in the fight against the TPLF, with this subsequently fuelling tensions and has resulted in rockets being fired from Tigray into Eritrea´s capital Asmara.

The conflict also caused many to flee the region towards neighbouring Sudan. With Tigray encompassing 6% of Ethiopia´s 100 million population, the United Nations warned that the conflict could displace up to 9 million people. By the end of November, over 40,000 refugees had arrived from Tigray to Sudan, half of these children, and with the state of emergency set to last another six months, the UN expects another 200,000 refugees to arrive in Sudan in this timeframe. While Sudan has agreed to welcome the influx of refugees, it is clear the country is not ready for this with many villages being overcome, and with food and blankets provided for refugees quickly running out. Thus, the situation in Sudan is starting to unfold as a humanitarian crisis, however, only time will tell.

With Ethiopia being the only country in the world that transitioned from an empire to a country without breaking up, it is likely we are just seeing the aftermath now. What seems clear now is that Abiy has secured his re-election through this conflict, and that the TPLF will not be registered as a political party in the 2021 elections. This is the start of a post-TPLF future in Ethiopia. Lastly, the conflict has also illustrated a more repressive side to Abiy and the Prosperity Party, and we can expect more law-and-order campaigns across the country.

France’s Struggle to Balance Secularism

After a series of attacks, the French government is once again faced with the challenge of balancing key French principles and the relationship with its Muslim community. In the past two months France has been the subject to many egregious attacks by the hands of Islamic extremist. On September 25, a male with a butcher knife attacked people outside the old Charlie Hebdo magazine headquarters, where four people were wounded, two seriously. This occurred after the magazine had just re-published the magazine cover that incited the more brutal attack in 2015. More recently, Samuel Paty, a middle school teacher was beheaded after having a class on freedom of speech where he showed caricatures of the prophet Mohammad. Thirteen days later, three were killed (one beheaded) in The Basilica of Notre-Dame de Nice. The severity and timing of the crimes have built up a national debate between freedom of expression/speech and national security. The three attacks all share a common thread, they are all related to the French government’s response to the Charlie Hebdo magazine caricature of the prophet Mohammad. The suspect who attacked people outside the old Charlie Hebdo magazine headquarters told authorities that he undertook the attack “in the context of the republication of the cartoons”. Since the attacks occurred, France has needed to juggle the tradition of secularism and insensitivity to the Muslim community.

This is not the first time the issue has surfaced in France and the response to the violence by the French government has activated parts of the Muslim community that few issues have in recent memory. Often the debate is a result of terrorist attacks on French soil and unfortunately, the deadly attacks on French soil are becoming too familiar, which has caused the French government to react with strong overarching policies that appear to criticize Islam in a sweeping manner. France has the largest Muslim community in Europe, but they never integrated successfully. In total, around 5.7 million Muslims call France home and represent more than 8 percent of the population. The emotions about Islam in France has peaked due to terrorist attacks throughout the years. The individuals carrying out the attacks claim to do so in the name of Islam and even though Muslim leaders and French Muslims have repeatedly condemned any violence being done in the name of Islam, tensions remain very high. The attacks at the Charlie Hebdo headquarters that left 12 dead, followed by the targeting of a Jewish supermarket that killed 4, and later the horrific attack at the Bataclan theater and linked attacks that killed 130 people all triggered a number of issues relating to Islam among the French government and people. One after another Islamophobia was fueled revealing deep divisions within French society.

To the more recent attacks Macron’s government has responded with a clear stance: France will not give in to Islamic extremist and will protect key French principles. President Macron has asked the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) to agree to a “charter of republican values” as part of his suppression on radial Islam. The charter states two main principles: Islam is a religion not a political ideology, and the rejection of any foreign interference with Muslim groups. The measures also include a bill that includes restrictions on home-schooling, national identification numbers for all school children, a ban on sharing information of a person that allows them to be located by people who want to harm them, and tougher punishments on individuals who intimidate public officials on religious grounds.

In response, Muslims around the world erupted in protest, with tens of thousands expressing their anger over the French government’s call to “reform” Islam. In Bangladesh’s capital, 20,000 protesters took to the streets carrying signs reading “Freedom of Speech is not Freedom of Abuse” and “Boycott French Products”. The protest seemingly has not caused any drastic difference in the trade of French goods, but it shows that the French government’s response has angered Muslims around the world and not just those currently in France.

The vast majority of France’s Muslims do not support Islamic extremism, but often face unfair stereotypes. There is an audience in France for anti-Muslim rhetoric. In the last presidential election between now-president Macron and Marine Le Pen over 10 million people voted for Le Pen, the anti-immigration candidate who claimed France was being attacked by radical Islam. The popularity of Le Pen pushed fears about Islam into the mainstream, with many controversial laws being introduced after. France’s tradition of secularism may play into decisions by figures in French media and government to criticize Islam in sweeping manners. Things get worse when the government appears to back a particular side. Macron has continually publicly supported Charlie Hebdo’s right to publish whatever it wants. It should not be ignored that a presidential election will be happen in 2022 and Macron’s firmed stance could be perceived as a way to resonate with the 10 million individuals who voted for Le Pen’s harsher policy on radical Islam and the French citizens who are shaken by the terror attacks in recent years.

The discussion of freedom of expression vs the right to offend is highly likely to continue in French society and is a seemingly impossible problem France will continue to face. On one hand, freedom of expression is the bedrock of so many democracies and ensures a society that allows individuals to express their beliefs, thoughts, and ideas without government censorship. On the other hand, when a government stands behind crude expressions of opinions, it risks encouraging bias towards a group of people. If the division between French Muslims and the government are not sealed it is highly likely further division will occur with more Muslims feeling separated from their fellow French citizens. The government is going to have to find a way to stand behind key French values while also supporting the Muslim community against bias and hate. Taking such a strong stance behind one side has made the Macron government come across as bias itself. A society that allows freedom of expression and a Muslim community is not an oxymoron, and both are capable of living and thriving together.