MS Risk Blog

French Hostage Possibly Executed

Unconfirmed reports have indicated that a French hostage has been executed in Mali.  A man claiming to be a spokesman for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has stated in a telephone call to Mauritania’s Agence Nouakchott d’Information (ANI) news agency that Philippe Verdon was “killed on 10 March 2013 in response to the French military intervention in the north of Mali.”  Although the news agency could not confirm whether or not the spokesman is in fact a member of AQIM, ANI did confirm that they had received a phone call from a man who presented himself as Al-Qairawani and who claimed that the “spy” Verdon had been executed.  He further stated that “the French President Hollande is responsible for the lives of the other French hostages.”  In the past, al-Qaeda groups have often used ANI in order to broadcast their claims or statements, which often turn out to be true.

Mr. Verdon was seized on the night of 24 November 2011 along with Serge Lazarevic.  According to their families, the two men had been on a business trip when they were kidnapped from their hotel in Hombori, in northeastern Mali.  The families of the two men have however denied that they were secret service agents.  Shortly after the kidnapping, AQIM claimed responsibility and in August 2012, a video depicting Mr. Verdon describing the “difficult living conditions” was released.

Early Wednesday morning, a French Foreign Office spokesman indicated that they were attempting to verify the reports of the killing.  Currently, no further information has been provided however a spokesman for the French Foreign Office has confirmed that the family of Mr. Verdon has been notified.  If these reports are confirmed to be true, it will be a worrying development for Paris as it will greatly increase the risk of those hostages who are being held in Africa.  There are still some fourteen French nationals who are being held in West Africa, including at least six who are being held in the Sahel by AQIM and its affiliates.  Over the past few weeks, a number of the hostages‘ families have expressed their growing fears for their loved ones in light of the ongoing French intervention in Mali.

Understanding Sinai: Smuggling and Radicalism in the Sinai Peninsula

Since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the Sinai Peninsula has become a hotbed of radicalized activity. Many indigenous Bedouin, who have long been disenchanted by the Egyptian government, have turned to smuggling as a lucrative financial endeavor. The system of tunnels, created to transport illicit goods, have also served as for radicalized individuals and groups to enter the region. The desert terrain, largely uninhabited, provides hidden shelter among road-less paths and desert caves.  This combination results in a prime opportunity for mujahedeen to build bases from which to carry out organized crimes and terrorist activities throughout the Maghreb and into the Sahel regions.

Impact of Bedouin Disenfranchisement

Since ancient times, the Egyptian Sinai has been home to several nomadic Bedouin tribes. During the Six-Day war in 1967, Israel took control of the Sinai Peninsula, providing job opportunities for Bedouin, particularly in the tourist industry.  The Bedouin had become accustomed to a cash economy and material wealth during Israeli occupation. Following the end of the occupation in 1982, the Cairo-based government perceived the Bedouin as collaborators with the Israel to destabilize Egypt. Consequently, the Bedouin have been perceived as second-class citizens, facing human rights hardships and severe economic blows.

Twenty percent of Bedouin in the Sinai are denied Egyptian citizenship. They cannot join the police or military, or study in police or military universities. Bedouin tribesmen cannot hold government positions or form political parties, nor can they own land, for fear they would re-sell it to Israelis. Employment opportunities in the Sinai are preferentially given to non-Bedouin Egyptians, and corporate developments have created boundaries that impact the nomadic tribes’ ability to travel throughout their historic territories. Finally, Bedouin tribesmen are often blamed for violence in the region, held without cause or evidence by Egyptian Police. These factors generate great animosity against the Egyptian government; outcries have been met with meager financial assistance and empty promises.

In order to retain wealth and material goods, members of some tribes have turned smuggling as a lucrative opportunity to generate income. Since the 1990s, smuggling rings have expanded to include items of higher value, including drugs, weapons, cars, and people (kidnap for ransom). Concurrently, Bedouin traffickers have enlarged their networks, with weaponry becoming the new expression of wealth.

Smuggling in the Sinai

It is important to note that not all members of tribes have resorted to smuggling, rather, certain members of specific tribes. The dominant tribes involved in smuggling on the Sinai Peninsula are the Sawarka, Tihaya, and Tarabin tribes, which have traditional boundaries bordering Israel and/or the Gaza Strip. Connections also exist between Bedouin Rashaida of Eritrea and Sudan, who predominantly engage in human trafficking, and the Tuareg tribes of Libya, who transfer weaponry throughout the Maghreb. Bedouin tribes do not have a sense of national loyalty—only to tribe— nor do they ascribe to an ideology that prevents them from dealing with particular groups, even if they are deemed dangerous or radical, as long as they can afford the price. Daniel Kurtzer, former US Ambassador to Egypt and Israel wrote, “…terrorists, both from Gaza and reportedly al-Qaeda, have used the territory to smuggle arms and plan operations.”

Heading west, tribes transfer goods and materials through the Maghreb and Sahel Regions, taking advantage of porous borders and lax security. From the south, tribes use a system that goes from Kassala, Sudan to the Egyptian border, then north into Sinai. Toward the east, Bedouin smugglers use an intricate system of tunnels to deliver materials through Gaza and beyond. At Sinai’s eastern border, commonly used routes are the Heth and Philadelphi routes, which go between Gaza from Sinai. Tunnel systems that are known by Egyptian and Israeli law enforcement have been bombed or flooded. However, to keep their trading systems open, tribesmen will pay up to $100,000 for the creation of new tunnels.

In addition to smuggling, some tribesmen charge for extensive knowledge of safe and desolated areas within the Peninsula, where smugglers or radicals entering the region can hide while fleeing from law enforcement.

Hideout for Radicalized Groups

Increased lawlessness in the Sinai results directly from the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Bedouins were among the first to ignore national curfews, and rising vehemently against Egyptian police. In February 2011, the police left the Sinai Peninsula, and returned in August 2011 with limited presence. In that time, Al Qaeda inspired militants penetrated the region, and continue to increase presence. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the militant faction of Hamas, as well as Al Qaeda inspired networks, are known to be operating quasi-military training camps in the Sinai. Due to this threat, the Egyptian Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) received permission to send 3,500 military troops into the demilitarized zone, yet the small number of troops is unable to secure the vast, unfamiliar region.

Increased Radical Activity

This week, Egypt’s interior ministry told police in the Sinai Peninsula to raise a state of emergency, after obtaining intelligence that jihadist fighters might attack their forces. Last August, fifteen Egyptian policemen were killed in an assault on a police station bordering Egypt and Israel. The militants seized two military vehicles and attempted to storm the border.

In early January, Egyptian authorities issued a security alert for the Sinai as intelligence services received information about potential attacks by extremist groups in the Sinai. On 15 February, the authorities announced the seizure of two tons of explosives headed to the Sinai from Cairo, followed by the discovery of a weapons cache in Al-Arish two days later. The seized weapons include 21 anti-aircraft shells, six anti-tank mines and an anti-aircraft gun. The same day, one ton of explosives was found in a car headed from Cairo toward the Sinai. On 27 February, Egyptian security forces confiscated 60 antitank missiles south of Cairo that were being transported in two pickup trucks from Libya. And on 5 March, a cache of weaponry, including antitank mines, was seized in el Arish

Egyptian President Mohamed Mosri has pledged to get a grip on security in Egypt but as he struggles to assert control over an entrenched security establishment, this appears to be another empty promise. Morsi administration and Egyptian security forces are hindered by several factors, including poor resources and coordination, and conflicting views on counter-smuggling and counterterrorism strategies. A failure to cultivate Bedouin allegiance and intelligence will also decrease Egyptian security forces ability to identify lairs of suspected jihadists.

MENA Security Update (10 March 2013)

ALGERIA: Impact of terrorist leaders’ deaths

Recent claims by the Chadian Army regarding the deaths of two high ranking terrorist leaders, have left long term ramifications for the Algerian government and its security forces. Last month, Abdel Hamid Abu Zeid —one of the top three leaders in Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb  (AQIM)—was killed by Chadian forces, and last week, unconfirmed reports claimed that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the mastermind of the In Amenas gas field attacks, was killed. If confirmed, these two deaths are the biggest blow to AQIM since its inception.

However, as leaders are killed, the emir of AQIM will need to identify new leaders. An internal power struggle to replace Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid —who held rival deputy commander positions in the Sahara and Sahel regions— could result in even more violence. Retired Algerian army colonel, Mohamed Chafik Mesbah stated, “There is a risk that the violence will move in a more permanent way across the border — both in the short-term and in the long-term.” Algerians worry that the violence may reach as far north as the Kabilye mountains, the birthplace of the radical Islamist movement that later morphed into AQIM.

AQIM’s emir, Abdel Malek Droukdel, who is based in Kabilye Mountains, will be responsible for appointing new leaders, if Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid are in fact dead. Belmokhtar’s rival, Al Hammam, is likely to be promoted. Al Hammam’s brigade is said to be holding French hostages captured in Mali last year.

Algeria, which is famous for its unilateral security policies, is at the centre of a counter-terrorism campaign by the US to minimize the volatility of the Sahel region. American officials have increased pressure on the Algerian government to share intelligence on the transnational militant networks which they perceive as a growing threat. The US believes that the Algerian army, one of the largest and most able Africa, should be used to battle militants or train other armies in the region. In exchange, the US wants to deliver high-tech surveillance technology.

Tunisia: Announcement of new political leadership

Tunisia’s new coalition government was revealed on Friday, after a successful last minute deal to end the political crisis. Independents were given key appointments, a clear concession by the dominant Islamist party, Ennahda. Ennahda is mistrusted by the secular opposition, who accusing them of authoritarian tendencies, and attempting to bring about the Islamisation of Tunisian society.

Premier-designate Ali Larayedh announced the new on state television hours before a midnight deadline. The weeks leading up to the deadline were fraught with tensions in government and on the street. Those tensions and were heightened exponentially following the February 6 murder of leftist politician Chokri Belaid by a suspected radical Muslim.

Larayedh declared that the new team, made up from parties of the outgoing coalition and independents, will step down at the end of the year following legislative and presidential elections. Key appointments were given to independent candidates little known by most Tunisians. These appointments reflect a critical concession by Ennahda to give ministries to non-partisan figures, with parties in the outgoing coalition getting less sensitive posts.

On Twitter, Ennahda said 48 percent of appointments in the new government will be in the hands of independents. Islamists will control 28 percent, compared with 40 percent in the outgoing line-up.

Parliament has three days to endorse or reject the new line. Larayedh was optimistic, but has declined to speculate on when the elections would be held, saying that was a prerogative of the assembly, but suggested they could be in October-November.

Libya: Gunmen storm TV network headquarters

On Thursday, gunmen stormed the headquarters of Al-Assama, a private TV network in Tripoli, destroying and stealing equipment before abducting five journalists and media workers. All were released within 24 hours with no injuries, but the stations owner and former manager were released long after the other journalists.

The attack was likely prompted by protest demonstrations against the station’s perceived support of the National Forces Alliance (NFA), a secular coalition led by Mahmoud Jibril, who served as the interim Prime Minister during the 2011-2012 civil war. The NFA defeated a Muslim Brotherhood-led coalition in last year’s legislative elections.

A day earlier, protesters seized members of the Libyan General National Congress, demanding they pass a bill banning former members of the Qaddafi regime from holding positions of power. If the bill passes, Jibril, along with almost every other major government leader, would be banned from holding office.

Al-Assama TV network is also affiliated with a top political figure who currently leads the largest coalition in parliament. Mahmoud Shammam, who runs another TV network, stated that he tried unsuccessfully to reach government ministers and security officials to get their help.

UN Supports Mission in Libya released a statement just hours before the attack, expressing concern over recent attacks and threats against freedom of expression. Last month, an Al-Assama TV crew was attacked and beaten by security guards outside the General National Congress. The President of the General National Congress

Libya:  Attack on President of GNC

On 7 March, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) condemned an attack against the President of the General National Congress (GNC), calling on citizens to settle political issues peacefully. GNC president Mohammed Magariaf was targeted in a gunfire attack against his vehicle.

UNSMIL head, Tarek Mitri, called on Libyans to safeguard and contribute to building and strengthening the State institutions. The General National Congress, the highest legislative authority in Libya, is currently developing the legal framework for free, fair, and inclusive elections.

UNSMIL has also voiced deep concern at several recent incidents, including attacks on media organizations, threats against journalists, and violence against a Coptic church and other houses of worship.

Libya: Ansar al-Sharia returns

On 3 March, four pickup trucks filled with Ansar al-Sharia militiamen arrived at the European School in Benghazi. The men stormed the school, searching for teaching materials they viewed as contradicting sharia law or the values of Libyan society. The militiamen remained for about two hours. Members of the group claim that the parents of a student at the school complained about a biology book for sixth-grade students, which contained graphic images.

Ansar al-Sharia (“Partisans of Islamic Law”), who fought with other Libyans to topple the Qaddafi regime, advocates the implementation of strict sharia law across Libya. The group has branches in other countries, including Mali, Tunisia, and Yemen. In Libya, the group has declared itself to be an independent paramilitary body that does not fall under the government’s direct command and control. The group represents a marginal minority that does not characterise the views of the wider Libyan society.

Following the US embassy attacks in September of 2012, 30,000 people in Benghazi took to the streets, demonstrating against terrorism and violence, and forced Ansar al-Sharia out of the city. After their expulsion, Ansar members went underground and hid their weapons, opting instead to make a high-profile effort to carry out charity work, such as cleaning streets, unblocking drains, and distributing food the poor. While some Libyans welcomed these efforts, they questioned the real motives of the group. Finally, to the disappointment of many, the militia returned, claiming they want to help secure the city alongside the police and army.

Ansar al-Sharia’s reappearance appears to be an arrangement with the Libyan Ministry of Defence. In Libya, there is currently a shortage of security personnel. Following the rebellion against Qaddafi, many of the militia groups made off with Qaddafi’s stockpiles of weapons, resulting in under-equipped government troops and security units.

MENA: AQAP releases 10th copy of Inspire

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has released the 10th edition of Inspire, its English language propaganda magazine.

The latest edition focuses on al Qaeda’s view of the Arab Spring. Two articles, written by Adam Gadahn and Yahya Ibrahim, focus on al Qaeda’s ability to capitalize on the Arab Spring. Gadahn advises jihadists in the West to continue “direct engagement at home and abroad with America and its NATO parents, particularly France and Britain,” stating that the enemies economic and military hemorrhage must not stop until the West are forced to choose between the crusade against Muslims or the continuation of viable governments and public services.

Ibrahim’s article highlighted the attacks on the US Consulates in Benghazi, and US embassies in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen in September 2012. Claiming that despite his death, bin Laden continues to “inspire old and new jihadists alike”.

AQAP touted Gadahn’s article as an “exclusive.” Gadahn is believed to be based in Pakistan, and has been known to work with As Sahab, al Qaeda’s primary propaganda production outfit. This article indicates that the group was either able to contact Gadahn, or Gadahn contacted the publishers of Inspire to offer the article, and disproves the assumption that Al Qaeda core leadership is disconnected from its affiliates.

Egypt: Increased Al Qaeda-linked presence in Nile Delta and Sinai

Egyptian officials fear that they are seizing only a fraction of the weaponry entering the Sinai Peninsula from Libya, and that the final destination for many weapons shipments is the Sinai itself, where Salafi jihadists have a growing presence.

“The Egyptians are becoming alarmed that weapons are now being stockpiled by Egyptian Salafi groups. They are starting to uncover arms trafficked from Libya in the [Nile] Delta and believe other weapons are being stored in Sinai. It is making them very nervous,” a European diplomat told Voice of America.

In early January, Egyptian authorities issued a security alert for the Sinai as intelligence services received information about potential attacks by extremist groups in the Sinai. On 15 February, the authorities announced the seizure of two tons of explosives headed to the Sinai from Cairo, followed by the discovery of a weapons cache in Al-Arish two days later. The seized weapons include 21 anti-aircraft shells, six anti-tank mines and an anti-aircraft gun. The same day, one ton of explosives was found in a car headed from Cairo toward the Sinai. On 27 February, Egyptian security forces confiscated 60 antitank missiles south of Cairo that were being transported in two pickup trucks from Libya. And on 5 March, a cache of weaponry, including antitank mines, was seized in el Arish.

Further, US intelligence sources indication that Al-Qaeda linked militants have increased contact with local Salafist groups in the Sinai and Delta regions. In the absence of security in the Sinai Peninsula during the Egyptian revolution, several jihadist groups have appeared region. The groups have conducted attacks against Egyptian security forces, Israel border crossings, international peacekeepers, and have repeatedly attacked a natural gas pipeline which transports gas to Israel and Jordan.

Western officials believe there are at least several hundred militants in the region, some of whom are from Yemen and Somalia, and Egyptian officials fear that militants from Algeria and Libya are now operating in Sinai as well.

In recently disclosed communication between Muhammad Jamal al Kashef, the head of the Nasr City terror cell, and Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri, Jamal said that he had formed “groups for us inside [the] Sinai.” This link indicates that some groups are proclaiming allegiance to Al Qaeda.

Egypt Security Update (9 March 2013)

Mass Riots

On Saturday, violence escalated in Port Said after an Egyptian court upheld death sentences for 21 of 52 defendants relating to a deadly football riot in Port Said in 2011. The ruling has already sparked widespread violence, throughout several Egyptian cities, and threatens to continue spreading unrest. One Port Said resident said the city’s residents are “boiling with rage,” having expected five to ten year sentences. “…The death sentences made us feel like we were the scapegoats for [the government’s] deeds. We want retribution for those who died amongst us.”

On Friday, in anticipation of the verdicts, the Egyptian military took taken over security duties in Port Said, believing the residents more likely to remain calm toward the military than the police, whom they distrust.

In the Suez region, Suez Canal Authority spokesmen Tarek Hassanein stated that the canal has not been affected by protests and that shipping traffic is “completely safe.” This announcement followed attempts earlier in the day to block a ferry’s passage in Port Said’s Mediterranean seaport. Port Said and nearby regions are beginning to calm.

Meanwhile, in Cairo, the Al-Ahly Football Club’s most ardent fans—the Ultras— are discontent with the verdict, believing them too lenient, as five of seven police officers were acquitted and the remaining two were given 15 year sentences. The Al-Ahly fans believe the police were directly responsible for allowing the riots to spin out of control, and the majority of the 74 lives lost were those of Al-Ahly supporters. Many people believe the police stood by in revenge for Al-Ahly fans’ role in the 2011 protests against then President Hosni Mubarak. The Ultras set fire to the Police Club in Gezira, and ransacked Egyptian Football Association building, stealing trophies as they set the building ablaze. Both properties are near the Al Ahly club. An army spokesman stated that helicopters were dispatched to extinguish the fires.

The manager of Al-Ahly football club, in a measure to calm his fans, released a statement, “The court’s verdict was fair for Ahly fans. The club’s management has full confidence in Egypt’s judiciary and we support the prosecutor-general’s decision to appeal the 28 acquittals. We will continue supporting the families of Port Said football victims and will not give up until we obtain justice for their sons.”

Undeterred, the Ultras have issued a warning that if the prosecutor-general does not order the retrial of acquitted security officials by 7pm on Saturday, they will escalate the protests using “illegitimate methods.”

Officer Strikes

On Tuesday, thousands of Egyptian security officers around the country went began a strike to protest pressure from the Morsi administration to crack down on street demonstrations, and counter-pressure from the public to exercise restraint. Weeks ago, police strikes began sporadically, with tens of officers in scattered cities protesting their politicized position. This strike is the largest and longest in memory.

Under former President Mubarak, security forces had little training or oversight, using arbitrary force to control citizens, in particular, any political opposition. Anger over these measures has cost police forces the respect of Egyptian citizens, who are incensed by the continued brutality of the police, as well as President Morsi’s inability to deliver changes to security forces.

On Tuesday, 2,000 riot officers in Ismailia refused to deploy for crowd control in Port Said. By Thursday, security officers had closed down at least 30 police stations around the country, including the cities of Cairo, Giza, Ismailia, Port Said, Minya, Sohag, Al Dakahleya, Al Gharbeya and Alexandria, as well as tens of central security divisions (each of which can hold thousands of soldiers) in the Sinai, the Nile Delta and elsewhere.

At the Qasr al-Nile police station in Cairo, two dozen officers said they had shut down the station because one of their colleagues had been killed in clashes with protesters, something they see as a daily occurrence in Egypt. The officers complained that they are called upon to confront protesters, while simultaneously being demonized when they harm someone.

By Thursday, 10,000 soldiers, including generals, went on strike at a camp near the Nile Delta city of Menoufia, refusing to confront street protesters and demanding the resignation of Egypt’s new interior minister, Mohamed Ibrahim. Some officers have also demanded more weapons and a freer hand to use them to beat back demonstrators.

Morsi supporters argue that he is gradually trying to overhaul the Interior Ministry as promised because he needs an effective security force to maintain order and to protect the presidential palace.  Under Mubarak, who kept Egypt under a 30 year state of emergency, there were almost no major political protests, nor any public criticism of the police.

Parliamentary Elections

On Wednesday, the Egyptian Administrative court suspended parliamentary elections due the Mursi administration’s failure to provide the Supreme court a final review of the new electoral law before enacting it. While this appears to be a minor technicality, its intention is to display deference to the court system which upholds rule of law. The Morsi administration has acknowledged this error, and will likely correct it quickly.

The National Salvation front, who has decided to boycott parliamentary elections, has announced that all liberal parties will merge under one name—most likely the Wafd Party, which is financially solid, visible throughout Egypt, and historically most closely associated with national struggle. Leaders of individual parties will work to convince their base that this move is the best step.

The group will also launch a new satellite channel in order to reflect the Front’s direction as well as providing political and social alternatives. Misr 25, the only satellite channel that focuses on the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood, has struggled to reach non-Brotherhood members. Currently, members who watch the channel believe it an organizational and ideological duty.

Rumours are circulating that despite boycott, members of the Wafd Party and the National Democratic Party may participate in exchange for gaining seven seats for each party in the cabinet that will be formed following the parliamentary elections.

Further, the National Salvation Front will form a parallel parliament similar to the one for which the Islamists will compete next month. This approach, adopted by pressure groups late in Murbarak’s regime, is a pressure tool for the opposition. During Mubarak’s tenure, upon the enactment of a parallel government, he was quoted as saying, “Let them have fun.” Three months later, the outbreak of the Egyptian revolution began.

Fourth French Soldier Killed in Action (6 March 2013)

French President Francois Hollande announced today that top Islamic extremist leaders, who have been seeking shelter in the northern mountainous region of Mali, have been killed.  Meanwhile France suffers a fourth death in Mali.  The security situation throughout Mali remains to be volatile.  With the recent unconfirmed deaths of Abdelhamid Abou Zeid and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, anyone remaining in the country is highly advised to relocate to the capital city of Bamako as retaliatory attacks throughout the northern region are expected to occur.  Companies whose employees remain within Mali should take additional security precautions around company buildings as well as travel routes taken by employees.  MS Risk advises those who are travelling in the country to use alternate routes and to not travel at night.  Although a number of militants are known to be hiding in the Ifoghas mountains, it is highly likely that a number of rebels are present throughout the northern region and may seek to kidnap westerners as a form of retaliation.

During his visit to Warsaw, Poland for a six-nation European Union defence summit, President Hollande indicated that “the terrorist kingpins have been destroyed” in the Ifoghas mountains.  However he declined to comment if key commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar is amongst those key AQIM leaders that have been killed in recent days.  Hollande meanwhile has indicated that France will begin to pull its troops out of Mali sometime in April.  According to the President, the final phase of the French military intervention “will last through March and from April there will be a decrease in the number of French soldiers in Mali as African forces will take over, supported by the Europeans.”  Although initially France’s Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius had indicated in early February that French troop numbers in Mali, who now number around 4,000, would decrease as of March, if all goes according to plan, the recent sharp increase of suicide attacks in the former Islamist strongholds, coupled with a general unreadiness of full deployment of African forces, has effectively forced officials in France to maintain their army numbers within the country as the security situation remains too fluid to withdrawal.

Meanwhile France suffered another casualty on Wednesday when a French soldier was killed during fighting against Islamist militants in eastern Mali, about 100 kilometers (60 miles) from the northern city of Gao.  Sergeant Wilfried Pingaud (37) is the fourth French soldier to have died in action.  He was a member of the 68th African Artillery Regiment based in Valbonne in southern France.   The French soldier died when a group of Islamist fighters attacked French and Malian troops as they were carrying out operations to secure the area.  During the attack, a dozen militants were killed while four Malian soldiers were wounded.  So far, France has suffered relatively minimal casualties during its operation in Mali which was launched in mid-January.  On Saturday, a paratrooper was killed during an operation that was aimed at removing Islamist militants from the Ifoghas mountains.  A legionnaire with the 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment was killed amidst heavy fighting on February 19 while a helicopter pilot died on the first day of the French military intervention.  Although the intervention initially resulted in a quick ousting of the rebels who had previously controlled the northern region of the country, fighting has intensified over the past week as efforts have focused on hunting down the militants who are believed to be in the mountainous region of the country.