MS Risk Blog

Peru Presidential Elections

Peru’s transformation has just started.

Last month’s Peruvian election was hotly contested, but the result was clear. Pedro Castillo, a Catholic rural teacher from Cajamarca in Peru’s far north, narrowly defeated his far-right opponent Keiko Fujimori by 42,000 votes. Nonetheless, the losing candidate, the daughter of ex-dictator Alberto Fujimori, has accused the election of fraud and has filed a judicial challenge to overturn the outcome. Indeed, Fujimori’s political opponents are not used to such losses. After all, this is a nation that has historically been seen as part of the United States’ backyard. Since General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s military dictatorship in the late 1960s and early 1970s, no progressive, left-wing, or left-nationalist government has held power. The outcome on June 6 signalled a significant departure from this conservative heritage. Argentina’s, Bolivia’s, Nicaragua’s, and Venezuela’s presidents have all congratulated Castillo on his election as president-elect. However, even weeks after the election, the Fujimori camp seems eager to take power, perhaps via a procedure similar to Bolivia’s November 2019 coup against Evo Morales.

Soon after the results were published by the country’s official electoral body, the National Jury of Elections (JNE), Fujimori condemned the elections as “fraudulent” and launched a legal fight to shift the tide in her favour. She has sought the annulment of over two hundred thousand votes cast in rural areas, asked for an “international audit,” filed nearly a dozen requests for the election itself to be annulled, and even claimed that her defeat was the result of a worldwide “leftist” plot. Simultaneously, a letter signed by several retired and former military figures calling for “military intervention” to prevent Castillo from forming a government began to circulate on private and social media. Since the first week after the election, a tremendous sense of tension and polarisation has engulfed the country, as Castillo supporters began organising marches to prevent Fujimori from attempting to steal the result, and Fujimori supporters rallied against what they perceived as a fraudulent election and the imminent arrival of “communism” with Castillo’s victory.

Fujimori supporters attacked several members of the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE). Other members of the legal system, such as the head of the anti-corruption prosecutor, José Domingo Pérez, have been subjected to physical assaults and death threats. Pro-Fujimori groups have also attacked peasant and indigenous activists rallying outside the JNE headquarters. Many international commentators have compared Fujimori’s strategy to Trump’s reaction to the 2020 election results and subsequent attempts to overturn the results.

However, almost a month after the election, Fujimori’s legal alternatives have significantly reduced. Almost all observer missions, from the United States to the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the European Union, have declared the election free, fair, and transparent. The most notable instance included the resignation of one of the JNE’s judges, Luis Arce Córdova, in response to what he said was a “lack of openness” inside the judicial organisation. Because the JNE needs a complete quorum of four judges to make a final judgement on election results, his departure was seen as an effort to further delay the process and open the door to a repeat election. If no president is recognised by July 28, a new temporary president chosen by Congress must arrange a fresh election.

Latin America was engulfed in social unrest before the COVID-19 pandemic hit. Now a string of elections that continues into 2022, protests in Colombia and upheaval over Chile’s constitution have investors bracing for a new wave of uncertainty over policy making. On top of that, the coronavirus is still ravaging the region, with Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and Chile recording far more confirmed cases per million people than India.

Faced with the obvious election result, many right-wing and centrist opposition leaders have either distanced themselves from the pro-coup narrative, denounced Fujimori for her actions, or even met with Castillo to explore the prospect of building alliances in Congress. The right-wing National Victory (NV) party’s George Forsyth denounced the JNE issue as an attempted “coup” by Fujimori, while the Purple Party of current temporary president Francisco Sagasti acknowledged Pedro Castillo as president-elect. Because there has been no agreement between the country’s right-wing and liberal political forces, Pedro Castillo has had both time and space to continue organising mass rallies against the slow-motion coup, while also meeting with local and regional authorities across the country in preparation for assuming the presidency.  Many past and present progressive heads of state in Latin America, including Alberto Fernández of Argentina, Luis Arce of Bolivia, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, Fernando Lugo, Lula da Silva, and others, have acknowledged his triumph on the world arena.

However, Fujimori’s inability to prevent Castillo from becoming the president does not imply the threat has gone. He will have to deal with a hostile, but mainly unpopular, legislature, in which his Free Peru party presently has just 37 of the 130 seats. The Left’s total legislative authority is slightly under one-third of Congress, thanks to the five seats held by friends from the “Together for Peru” alliance.

Fujimori’s Popular Force party presently has twenty-four seats, the Alliance for Progress has fifteen, Aliaga’s Popular Renewal has thirteen, and Podemos Per has five, bringing the far right and conservative bloc to a total of fifty-seven seats, which is close to half of the total. Popular Action, We Are Peru, Avanza Paz, and the Purple Party were among the centrist-neoliberal parties that won thirty-one seats. Castillo’s ambitions to transform Peru are likewise under danger. The dogmas of the US-based “School of the Americas” continue to dominate Peruvian military and police, while private media have spent three months attempting to vilify and delegitimise the Left in every manner possible. The Lima-based business elite, as well as constant pressure from the US, are also opposed to antagonism. The fight for Peru had only just started, and it was up to all anti-imperialists across the globe to protect the country’s first left-wing administration in decades.

 The lost children of Canada’s residential schools  

During recent months Canada has had the focus of a large-scale discovery of indigenous children’s remains near many school grounds. The government funded boarding schools of which these bodies were discovered were part of a policy to attempt to assimilate indigenous children to European culture and practices, and to erase the culture they once upheld. With more and more unmarked grave sites being found, it has led to a dramatic response by the Canadian people with mass protesting and the tearing down of prominent British Royal statues.

Around 130 residential schools of forced assimilation were operated in Canada between 1874 and 1996, with 150,000 First Nations, Métis, and Inuit children taken from their families and placed within these schools. Many parents were threatened with charges leading to imprisonment if they were not to comply, and therefore were forced to abandon their native cultures and speak English or French as well as convert to Christianity.

Many of the schools have poor heating and unsanitary facilities as well as a lack of medical staff, leading to the loss of life of many children by disease of neglect. Those were also subject to harsh and severe punishments leading some to run away due to physical and sexual abuse.

The first discovery of remains was back in May, in which the remains of 215 students at Canada’s largest residential school were found. Tk’emlúps te Secwépemc Chief Rosanne Casimir announced that the remains of 215 children had been found near the city of Kamloops in southern British Columbia (BC). Later in June, the Cowessess First Nation in Saskatchewan announced that it had found a further 751 unmarked graves in a similar discovery near the former Marieval Indian Residential School, operated up until 1996 under the Catholic Church.

The public reaction since has been extreme featuring large scale protests and demonstrations across the country. On Canada Day, usually, a day of celebration of Canada’s founding by British colonies, a prominent statue of Queen Victoria was torn down by protesters in Manitoba’s capital Winnipeg on Thursday; as well as a smaller statue of Queen Elizabeth close by. Many called for celebrations to be cancelled as many municipalities across Canada called off their events. As well as this, several Catholic churches have been burned down in indigenous communities in western Canada, with St Ann’s Church and the Copaka Church being burned within an hour of each other in British Columbia.

Since 2015, Prime Minister Trudeau has promised to implement recommendations surrounding the missing children. In 2017 Trudeau asked Pope Frances to apologise for the Churches role in the schools but has so far declined with calls again renewed asking for an apology to be made. Also, in 2019 there were plans to commit C$33.8m over 3 years to develop a school student death register, but the National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation has said it has only received a small amount of the money.

With the unfortunate likelihood that more burial grounds are to be discovered soon, frustration and anger towards these events are yet to dissipate. Indigenous leaders have pressed the government to investigate all 130 former schools to find additional graves. Despite evidence and work being done on this situation for several years, Canadians are now grappling with the recent revelations of something that should have been widely known long ago.

Reigniting the Papua Conflict

On June 25^th Papuan rebels reportedly took hostages and killed four workers after attacking a construction site in the west of Indonesia. The National Liberation Army of West Papua (TPNPB), the military wing of the Papuan independence movement claimed responsibility for the recent events. Tensions between the Indonesian government and Papuan separatists have increased in recent months after an Indonesian officer was killed in April. The Indonesian government responded by dispatching 400 troops to the area, arresting Viktork Yeimo, a leader in the Papuan independence movement and be designating the group responsible as terrorists. The escalations in the last three months have marked a return to violence after a reduction in 2020.

New Guinea is the island that is home to both Papua New Guinea, an independent country, and West Papua and Papua, both parts of Indonesia. When the Dutch withdrew from Indonesia in 1949, they retained half of New Guinea until the early 1960s. When in 1962 they eventually left New Guinea, the island was eventually incorporated into Indonesia after a referendum where people voted to remain part of Indonesia. However, many Papuan people felt, and still feel today, that vote was rigged, and that they have a separate identity and would prefer to govern the island independently. As such they have been waging an insurgency against Indonesia for the last 50 years. Indonesia’s response to the Papuan quest for independence has been labelled a human rights violation for the way they handle the largely Christian population of Papua.

The attack on June 25^th was carried out on people working on the controversial Trans Papua Highway “megaproject”. The road is planned to be around 4,000km long and is nearing completion. Papuan rebels have killed workers on the project before, killing 20 in 2018 in an event dubbed the Nduga Massacre. The road is being built through the country in an attempt to improve road access to areas off the coast of the island that contain oil and gas. There have been many objections to the project for environmental and practical reasons. Specifically, the potential for increased illegal logging the roads will provide and that easier travel may lead to increased inter-tribal violence. However, the Indonesian government suggest the road will provide improved access to healthcare and more availability of goods and services.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s initial response has been to increase military and police presence in the region in an attempt to crackdown on the rebels. After recent attacks on civilians, it is unlikely that the authoritarian leader will want to be seen acceding to any pressure from the rebels. So, it is highly likely that increased numbers of military and police personnel will lead to an increase in violence in the short-term. In the medium to long-term the completion of the Trans Papua Highway is likely to reduce the number of attacks on workers in the area, but it will not solve the Papua conflict.

The Alarmingly Low Voter Turnout of the French Regional Elections

This year’s record low turnout for regional elections produced a heavy blow for Marine Le Pen’s far right party, which failed to win a single regional election in its usual stronghold in the south of France. Depriving her the chance to show her party’s strength ahead of next year’s presidential election. It was also an unsuccessful election night for Marine Le Pen’s rival President Emanuel Macron who severely under preformed in both rounds of the election. The results have raised questions on how successful each will be in the presidential election next year. For some observers, the outcome of the election has raised doubts on whether the 2022 presidential election would come down to the assumed contest between Macron and Le Pen.

Traditionally, the regional elections are not as closely followed as the presidential elections or even the municipal elections. The regional elections are held every six years and their purpose is to elect regional counselors for its 18 regions, including 13 on mainland France and 5 overseas. Regional elections hold importance because the regions do not have legislative autonomy. Instead, they manage sizeable budgets they can invest into healthcare, infrastructure, schools, and economic development. The elections are important in themselves, but many were watching to see how well Marine Le Pen’s and Emmanuel Macron’s parties would do.

The elections are held in two rounds- round one on June 20 and round two of June 27. They were originally set for March but were delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic. The delaying of elections has been seen across western Europe in several countries. Local elections in Austria and Isle of Man were delayed, along with presidential elections in Poland, and municipal elections in Finland- just to name a few. In all of Europe 33.3% of all municipal and subnational elections were postponed between February 2020 and June 2021 due to the ongoing pandemic.

Turnout is usually low for regional elections however this year was a record low voter turnout. Around 68.8% of French voters did not show up to the polls, for either round, compared to the 55.6% in 2015. Much of the blame for the low turnout for round one was placed on the recent lifting on coronavirus restrictions, which has shifted some attention away from the election.

The second round having around the same levels of turnout has been a worrying sign for French politicians and proves the overall weariness French citizens have with politics. The low turnout in the second round can be seen as a reassuring sign for the two big loses, the National Rally Party and La République En Marche, which performed so poorly in the first round. In a brief post-election speech, Le Pen stated that the abstention rate showed “discontentment” among electors that was to be seen as a signal for all political classes and society. Political analysts have blamed the lack of interest in the regional election on France’s heavy focus on the presidential election next year and the legislative elections that follow afterwards. Forty percent of those in the PACA region said they are disillusioned with politics as a whole and no individual candidate represents them.

The results of the election are also receiving lots of attention due to the timing. This year’s regional elections come one year before the presidential elections. Many are viewing it as an important gauge of public opinion and an indication on how people might vote during the presidential election. It is also the last race before the presidential elections, so it is also being seen as a test to determine how popular the politicians are among the public.

It is the prediction of many that next year’s presidential race will come down between Emanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen, but currently neither party holds a region. With less than a year until the presidential election the regional results could be seen as an indication of what is to come. However, local elections rarely are an accurate indicator of the outcome in a presidential race. It is hard to identify clear interpretations of what the regional election could mean for the presidential election, where the ones who lost most remain the clear presidental frontrunners.

Demonstrators Respond to Opposition’s Calls to March for Better Security in Burkina Faso

With growing insecurity in Burkina Faso, on 3 July 2021 thousands across the country protested, demanding a stronger response from the central government to the growing jihadist threat. The demonstrations come nearly a month after a massacre in the town of Solhan that shocked the nation. Since then, pressure has been mounting on the government of President Roch Kaboré to implement a response to the threat emanating from terrorist organizations, which have been expanding their operations in the West African country since 2015.

On Saturday 3 July, thousands of people took to the streets, calling for a stronger response to the rising bloodshed. Some travelled hundreds of kilometres to attend the demonstration in the capital, Ouagadougou, with protests also being held in Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouahigouya, the capital of Yatenga province. The march, organized by the opposition and civil society groups, is the first to take place since President Kaboré was re-elected last year. While in late June 2021, the Burkinabé leader had called on organizers to postpone the march, the opposition has since welcomed the “huge mobilisation across the country despite government calls for a boycott.”

The large numbers on the streets across the country on Saturday highlight the growing frustrations amongst Burkinabé’s and the sense that the central government has failed in their promises to stabilize and secure the country. Since 2015, armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) group, originally based in neighbouring Mali, have embedded themselves across the northern and eastern regions of Burkina Faso, where they regularly launch attacks on civilians. Anger has been rising in the wake of the 4 June attack on the village of Solhan, which was one of the worst incidents to take place in recent history in Burkina Faso. While the government has reported that the attack killed at least 132 people, with armed men, including “young people aged 12 to 14,” being responsible, local sources report that the toll was around 160, and included many children. In response to the rising frustrations over a lack of response to the growing insecurity, and in a bid to appease opposition leaders, President Kaboré on 30 June carried out a cabinet reshuffle. After dismissing his defence and security ministers, President Kaboré has since taken over as defence minister, though it remains to be seen if the latest reshuffle will push back the growing calls for the resignation of the government.

For years now, Burkina Faso has borne the brunt of the jihadist insurgency in neighbouring Mali, increasingly seeing terrorist activity rise within its own borders and transforming into an epicentre of violence. In many ways, the scenes witnessed across Burkina Faso over this past weekend are reminiscent of those seen in Mali a year ago – a population increasingly becoming frustrated with the central government and its failure to push back the rapidly evolving terrorist threat. While the Burkinabé government had called for the protests to be postponed, the fact that many travelled hundreds of kilometres to reach the capital in a desperate bid to have their voices heard shows the discontent amongst the local populations, who are reaching their limit when it comes to the instability in the West African country. After years of promises to secure the country and numerous government reshuffles to shake things up, it is evident that like the Malian population throughout 2020, Burkinabé’s have lost confidence in their government. In response to this growing pressure, President Kaboré on 30 June dismissed his ministers of defence and security and took over the role of defence minister in what is the latest cabinet reshuffle that aims to stop the wave of terrorist attacks in the country. However it remains to be seen what impact these protests and government reshuffle will have on Burkina Faso’s strategy, though the government appears to be paying close attention. While it is unlikely that the weekend’s demonstrations will destabilize government, it may lead to further changes within it in a bid to appease the opposition and protesters. This time around, however the government will need to carry out concrete steps to show the local populations that it is listening. The protests that occurred throughout last year in Mali led to the eventual downfall of the Keïta government after the Malian army launched a coup d’état in August 2020. A second coup d’état just nine months later in May 2021 further plunged the country into uncertainty, with ongoing concerns as to how this latest political crisis will impact the jihadist threat not only within the country, but in the wider West African region. Burkina Faso experienced its own coup d’état in 2015, though since then, it has experienced relative political stability. Today however, it is increasingly becoming apparent that the ingredients for a new coup d’état are becoming more present, and as the frustrations of the local populations bubbles over, Burkina Faso may be headed down a similar path to that seen in Mali nearly a year ago if radical changes are not implemented. In the long-term, however, Burkina Faso will need to implement a permanent solution to the jihadist threat, including securing the country’s porous borders to stem the flow of terrorists and weapons, and working closely with regional countries.