MS Risk Blog

Moldova’s Upcoming Parliamentary Elections – Regional Implications

Moldovan president for just six months, Maia Sandu has lost no time in taking on the hostile political establishment after winning several key constitutional victories. A parliamentary election on July 11 looks set to offer her a sizeable majority that could finally, three decades after independence, kick start genuine reform of Europe’s poorest country which will be seen by Kremlin as moving towards the EU. Consequently, the Transnistrian situation can’t be overlooked, the frozen conflict has all the ingrediencies to be ignited at the behest of Moscow’s desires.

Ever since she was elected president of Moldova in November last year, Maia Sandu has made little secret of her desire to radically reform Europe’s poorest country. Long portrayed by the international media, in overly simplistic terms, as “pro-European” (as opposed to her predecessor Igor Dodon, who favours closer ties with Russia), since taking office the Harvard-educated Sandu has made not Europe her priority, but fighting corruption, which she believes – not without reason – to be the main cause of the country’s widespread poverty.

So far, she has been held back by a parliament which, as she puts it, “does not truly represent Moldovans”. On July 11 however, the country will vote for a new parliament, and if the latest opinion polls can be believed, Sandu’s party, Action and Solidarity (known by its Romanian acronym, PAS), is set for a landslide victory. An opinion poll published on June 20 suggests that Moldovans are about to hand Sandu’s party not just a majority, but a majority large enough to implement constitutional changes.

The poll puts support for PAS at 38.1 per cent, well ahead of Dodon’s Socialists (who have formed an electoral pact with the Moldovan Communist party of another former president, Vladimir Voronin) on 21.4 per cent. Amongst those who say that they are certain to vote, support for PAS jumps to almost 50 per cent. What’s more, besides PAS and the Socialists, no other party or electoral alliance would enter parliament, meaning that PAS would be redistributed enough to seats to claim its constitutional majority.

Moldova’s ethnic Russian, Ukrainian, and Gagauz minorities — who make up around a quarter of Moldova’s population – get understandably spooked when Romania takes any kind of interest in the country, viewing it as the first step towards the eventual unification of the two countries. Most of present-day Moldova was for part of the 20th century an integral part of Romania, but while talk of reunification was once prominent, few have ever given the idea serious credence: not least because most Moldovans oppose it. Furthermore, except for a few extreme nationalists, such as the Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR; a Romanian parliamentary party which is fielding candidates in Moldova’s election), most Romanian politicians appear to have tacitly accepted that history and politics aside, Romania simply could not afford to absorb Europe’s poorest country.

The general public has little knowledge about the Moldova/Transdniestria conflict, and in general those who do find it “fantastic, incredible” that it might have serious geopolitical implications. Transdniestria has been the most relaxed of the “frozen” conflicts arising from the Soviet Union’s collapse. There has been no credible threat of renewed hostilities. The two sides—Moldova on the right bank of the Dniestr/Nistru River and the separatist region of Transdniestria on the left bank—are in constant contact, negotiation, and cooperation with one another. Thousands regularly cross the river for work, education, family visits, transit, and shopping. In 2021, however, the potential for a new war has been played up since an angry and aggressive statement by Dmitry Peskov, the spokesperson for Russia’s president. There followed a steady drumbeat, not exclusively from Moscow, of concern about a “political crisis” in Moldova amid warnings that Transdniestria may be “the most volatile dispute in this region.”

Moldova inherited significant political divisions from the Second World War. The majority Moldovan, ethnically diverse right bank of the Dniester/Nistru was annexed by Romania in 1918 while the left bank remained within the Soviet Union. The 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gave the right bank to the Soviets, who invaded in 1940. Romania and its Nazi allies invaded in 1941, and the Soviets re-invaded in 1944. Each new invader persecuted, deported, and executed untold thousands suspected of cooperation with the last. The result is a divided population: since independence, a plurality on the right bank—regardless of ethnicity—identifies with its Soviet heritage, fears Romania, and votes for communist or socialist parties. A slightly smaller group identifies with its Romanian heritage, fears Russia, and votes for right or center-right parties. A group in the middle holds the balance.

More significant, however, is how Moldova’s domestic politics fits into Russia’s existential—as it sees it—struggle with Ukraine following the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The Kremlin and its patriots believe that a Ukraine charting its own course separate from Russia would doom Putin’s ambitions throughout the post-Soviet region. In April, Russia escalated its military pressure on Ukraine, massing its military along the border while fighting intensified in Donbas. Since Russia’s troops in Transdniestria must be supplied and replenished through Ukrainian airspace, its war with Ukraine has turned them into hostages to potential Moldovan-Ukrainian cooperation—including military cooperation. Russia’s next actions on the issue mystifies even Transdniestria’s leadership. It is unclear how the upcoming elections will play out. Russia’s attitude and actions towards Moldova will have little to do with Moldova’s internal politics and more to do with the conflict in Ukraine and the regional geopolitical arrangements Russia is pursuing regardless of Maia’s leaderships success.

Seven Months Later: The Humanitarian Crisis in Ethiopia’s Tigray

In November 2020, fighting between government troops and Tigrayans erupted in Ethiopia in an operation to oust the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The move was presented by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed as a “law enforcement operation” aimed at rounding up TPLF members, but ensuing fighting has killed thousands and left 5.2 million people in Tigray in need of food aid. Seven months since the start of the conflict, one of the world’s most senior humanitarian figures, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock spoke candidly about the conditions in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region. Ethiopia, where, only four decades ago, the modern world became aware of the scourge of hunger, which spawned charity supergroups, money-raising songs, ‘Band Aid’ concerts, and a slew of assurances that we – the world – would never allow it to happen again. Now, when speaking at the G7 summit, Lowcock states that “There’s famine now in Tigray.” Lowcock placed the responsibility squarely on forces from Eritrea, a neighbouring country.

Drawing on an authoritative assessment of the emergency by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (ICP), the ICP evaluated that around 353,000 people in Tigray are in phase 5 (catastrophe), with another 1.769 million in phase 4 (emergency). While the ICP did not use the word “famine”, by definition, Phase 5 indicates that famine applies to a population. The system has five levels from Phase One (food secure) through to Phase Four (emergency) and Phase Five (catastrophe or famine). Behind these figures is a horrific human tragedy. Hunger-related deaths in large numbers are inevitable. It is, in fact, already taking place. Young children are the first to perish in a famine, accounting for two-thirds of those who perish. According to the most recent data from Tigray, 300,000 children are expected to die. The figures are on the conservative side. Because the survey teams were unable to reach all locations, they had to rely on extrapolation from limited data.

The Ethiopian authorities would almost certainly contest the “famine” warning, citing the technicality that the “catastrophe” circumstances were dispersed across Tigray, with no single place having a proportion of people in phase five above 20%, the normal criterion for declaring famine.

Undoubtedly, the region has long been plagued by issues, having been destroyed by the effects of climate change, drought, and locusts, leaving swaths of the people living on the periphery of pervasive poverty. But unmistakeably, this current crisis that is currently unfolding in Tigray is the result of conflict. This crisis has emerged from the cumulative effects of violence, including population displacements, movement restrictions, limited humanitarian access, loss of harvest and livelihood assets, and dysfunctional or non-existent markets, as evidenced by the IPC system statistics.

Humanitarian services have been affected and the government’s largest emergency response apparatus – the “productive safety net programme,” – was shut down as a result of the war. Forces from the neighbouring Amhara region captured Tigray’s most fertile areas, depriving Tigrayans of their farms and shutting down the most lucrative seasonal labour options. The Eritrean soldiers who joined the fight have also been accused of massive pillage, as well as burning crops, demolishing health facilities, and stopping farmers from ploughing their land, together with the Ethiopian army.

Rape has become widespread – usually perpetrated by soldiers. The United Nations estimated that 22,000 rape survivors will require assistance. Furthermore, fear of sexual abuse keeps women and girls hidden, preventing them from seeking food. However, humanitarian organisations have been delayed in their response, hampered by insecurity as well as several procedural roadblocks erected by Ethiopian officials. According to the United Nations, 2.8 million individuals have received relief. Humanitarian workers privately believe that is way too optimistic. There are also regular reports that troops steal aid offloaded from trucks, with several Tigrayan people reporting that Eritrean forces arrive shortly after relief handouts and seize the food.

Aid workers have also been slain in this conflict, the most recent being on May 28. Aid workers are often stopped by the Ethiopian army as they travel deep into rural areas, alleging that they are aiding the rebels. Specifically, nine aid workers have been killed since the fighting broke out. Samantha Power, chief of USAID, believes that the attacks on humanitarian workers are clearly premeditated, and it is part of a worrying trend of harassment and violence directed against aid workers.

Lowcock has said  “Now, we are at a tipping point,”. While expressing his dissatisfaction with the UN Security Council’s lack of action, he also said “Despite all we have told you of the widespread and systematic scale of the rapes, we continue to receive horrific reports of widespread sexual violence,”. Moving forward, Lowcock emphasised three areas where immediate change is required: humanitarian access, money, and a quickening of relief delivery. The UN has also called for an inquiry into the  war crimes, and the US has halted Ethiopia’s economic and security help and barred anyone implicated in the violence or in blocking humanitarian relief from visiting the US. Similarly, on the 26th of May, in a statement, President Joe Biden said, “The large-scale human rights abuses taking place in Tigray, including widespread sexual violence, are unacceptable and must end.”

As US Special Envoy Jeff Feldman cautions, we “should not wait to count the graves” before proclaiming the crisis in Tigray as it is: a man-made famine. Ethiopia evidently does not want the outside world to know about the unchecked murder, rapes, abduction, and hunger that is taking place, thus journalists are not welcome, and the famine and extensive human rights abuses have mostly gone unnoticed. So, what are the options? Once more, diplomatic pressure must be applied on cruel authorities in order to bring about a cease of hostilities and allow humanitarian agencies urgent and unimpeded access.

China’s Political Encroachment into Hong Kong

Peru and its Political Prospect after Presidential Election

Peru has completed the counting of ballots in a close presidential run-off election, but an official declaration might take several days.

The Peruvian electoral office, ONPE, announced on Thursday evening after all polling station records were processed that left-wing populist candidate Pedro Castillo had received 50.179 percent of the vote. Keiko Fujimori, his right-wing opponent, earned 49.821 percent of the vote. The difference was less than 63,000 votes. Peruvians voted under a period of tremendous political turmoil. It cycled through three presidents, suffered one of the world’s highest coronavirus death rates and watched its economy shrink more than any in the region under the weight of the pandemic. Francisco Sagasti, the current president, is serving on an interim basis. After Congress decided to depose popular former leader Martin Vizcarra and Vizcarra’s successor, Manuel Merino, resigned, he became Peru’s fourth president in less than five years.

Many in the country hoped against the odds that the presidential election would offer a new start. Instead, nearly a week after the votes were cast, Peru is again gripped by uncertainty. The two candidates are in a tight race. One contender is claiming fraud and requesting that up to 200,000 ballots be thrown out, thus disenfranchising many poor and Indigenous voters. The other has called on his followers to go to the streets in order to protect those votes. The tension is straining democracy, increasing the schisms that run across a fundamentally divided nation and increasing concerns about the country’s future.

Castillo, a rural primary school teacher who has never held public office, campaigned on a promise to give states greater control over markets and natural resources as part of a plan to bring the benefits of economic growth to Peru’s poorest, despite warnings that his policies would recede the economy of the country like Venezuela.

Before winning the first round of the election, the primary school teacher was barely known, and she ran on a vow to aid the poor by raising taxes on big mining businesses in this copper-producing country. However, there are concerns that his initiatives could destabilise the country’s economy. Whoever wins will have a difficult challenge in uniting a divided country of 32 million people, whose economy has crumbled as a result of the recession.

On the other hand, Fujimori aimed to persuade voters that Peru’s current economic and political systems need adjusting rather than revamping, and that her administration would not result in further allegations of corruption and human rights abuses that marked her father Alberto Fujimori’s reign from 1990 to 2000.

However, it will likely take more days before a winner is announced. Authorities must continue calculate the results from polling locations whose results have been contested and are being reviewed by special election judges. Once the judges have addressed the issues, the count must be approved by the country’s National Jury of Elections (JNE). According to Peruvian law, a winner may be announced only after the JNE has reviewed all vote counts and settled any concerns from election observers. In Peru’s election system, there is no vote recount. According to the JNE President results might be available this month, but that the large number of nullification demands might postpone the process.

Ms. Fujimori requested that 300,000 ballots be reviewed, and 200,000 others be void. It might be days before a judgement is made on her petitions, as well as prospective appeals and reviews. Only then will the electoral tribunal be able to proclaim a winner.

Since 2018, Fujimori has been the subject of a corruption probe and money laundering. She spent 13 months in jail between 2018 and 2020, when she was released on parole. She has rejected the claims and has not been charged officially.

While ballots were still being tallied, the chief prosecutor in her case requested a court to sentence her to preventative jail. The request, according to Fujimori, was superfluous.

Ms. Fujimori has been accused of running a criminal organization that trafficked in illegal campaign donations and could be sentenced to 30 years in prison. Detained and released three times as the case proceeds, she is now accused by the prosecution of having contact with case witnesses, a violation of her release. If she is elected, she will be immune from prosecution for the duration of her five-year tenure.

The election, and the tensions it has stoked, are widening the schisms in Peruvian society.

Despite stable economic growth rates over the last two decades, Peru remains a severely unequal and divided country, with the richer and whiter population in its cities receiving the majority of the advantages of Ms. Fujimori’s father’s neoliberal economic model implemented in the 1990s.

When the pandemic swept across Peru, it widened existing social and economic divides, disproportionately affecting people that could not afford to stop working, lived in tight quarters, or had limited access to health care in a nation with a fragile safety net.

The elections were fought along the same economic, racial, and class lines, with Ms. Fujimori receiving the majority of her support from urban regions and Mr. Castillo from the rural highlands, which are home to many mixed-race and Indigenous Peruvians.

Hundreds of voters on both sides have taken to the streets to protest for their candidate, mostly peacefully and at times with musicians and dancers.

The malfunctioning of Peruvian institutions, on the other hand, has the potential to create new waves of dissatisfaction and upheaval, particularly as the government attempts to distribute COVID-19 vaccinations while still growing the economy. The emergence of polarising and even fringe presidential candidates in Peru may be a foreshadowing of what is to come elsewhere in Latin America, where high inequality, rising unemployment, fractured party systems, fiscal crises, and the worst effects of the pandemic are fuelling disdain for politics as usual.

Western Europe’s Response to the Belarus Flight Diversion

On May 23, Flight FRA4978 was approaching its final destination of Vilnius, Lithuania when it was forced to divert to Minsk, Belarus. The plane was accompanied by a MiG-29 fighter jet that guided the plane into the Belarusian capital. Soon after its arrival, a passenger, Roman Protasevich, was arrested. The 26-year-old journalist was the editor of the opposition channel on the Telegram messaging app called Nexta. He left that position to live in exile in Lithuania, where he covered the events of the 2020 Belarus presidential election, after which he was charged with terrorism and inciting riots. Belarus has said that the plane was diverted because a bomb threat onboard and claims the threat came from Switzerland. However, no bomb was found on the flight and the Swiss foreign ministry says it has no knowledge of a bomb threat issued from Switzerland. The incident has promoted a reaction from several western European governments who responded without delay or hesitation.

The fallout from the diversion has propelled Belarus to the front pages for the first time since the mass protests against President Alexander Lukashenko that took place in 2020 throughout the summer and fall. The EU has responded swiftly, announcing a new package of sanctions targeting state enterprises, those in Lukashenko’s inner circle, and Belarus’ state airline. Most of western Europe’s airlines have also been suspended flights entering Belarusian airspace.

This caused other implications, with Russia- an ally of Belarus, taking several days to grant Air France and Austrian Airlines flights to Moscow the clearance to use Russian airspace to divert around Belarus, resulting in cancelations. Along with the EU, the UK has told flights to avoid Belarusian airspace and UK Transport Secretary Grant Shapps has suspended the operating permit of the Belarus’ state airline, Belavia, effectively banning it from the UK. The current situation is seeing cancelations and delays. If the situation escalates further passengers and airlines could see flight times increased, a rise in fares, higher operation costs, and longer haul, nonstop flights needing to make re-fueling stops along the way. Cases of what can become more likely have already occurred. On the day of the incident, the ban on Belarusian airspace had already taken place when a British Airways flight from London to Islamabad was already in transit, causing it to divert to Moscow to refuel, before continuing.

Normally, this is not an ideal situation for the airline and travel industries but is even more inconvenient as airlines in Europe hope to have a busy summer season following the 15-month significant decrease in travel due to coronavirus restrictions. The events have caused the aviation map of Europe to be adjusted with mild challenges and if the situation increases the challenge of drawing a new map will be tough. One road to avoid Belarus airspace would be to fly over the Ukraine however there are already restrictions on flying over Ukraine, after Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down in 2014. For the UK, an option would be to fly over Crimea, but no British operator has flown over Crimea for quite some time. Belarus has seen an increase in traffic as flights have been going around Ukraine since 2014. Now as flights avoid Belarus, Latavia and Lithuania are likely to see an increase in air travel.

The United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Belgium are just a few of the western European countries that have banned the Belarusian airline, Belavia. The airline has had to cancel flights to 22 destinations until at least the end of the summer. It is unclear when the conflict will lessen but the Belarusian government is standing firm in their actions and the EU is standing firm in their response. Airlines are often forced to adjust operations in response to major geopolitical disruptions. For example, several U.S. airlines canceled flights to and from Israel as conflict with Palestine increased and some airlines needed to add fueling stops after the hacking of a fuel pipeline that serves airports on the East Coast of the United States. The brazen decision by President Lukashenko to force a commercial flight to land in order to arrest a journalist has showed how quickly aviation can become entangled in geopolitics.