MS Risk Blog

ISIS Targets Libyan Oil Field

4 February– Gunmen stormed a remote Libyan oil field, and killing twelve people on Tuesday. The extremists attacked the al-Mabrook oil field, nearly 105 miles south of Sirte. Among those killed were eight Libyans, two Filipino and two Ghanaian nationals. The Philippines Foreign Ministry said three Filipinos were among seven foreign nationals who had reportedly been kidnapped in the assault, however conflicting reports suggest that there have been no abductions.

Abdelhakim Maazab, commander of a security force in charge of protecting the oilfield said that most of the victims were “beheaded or killed by gunfire,” but does not report any kidnappings. A French diplomatic source in Paris and another Libyan official said Islamic State militants were behind the attack. In recent months, ISIS has made gains in Libya and has a stronghold in Derna. The group has reportedly set up training camps in the country’s eastern region, taking advantage of the deteriorating security situation in Libya.

France’s Total has a stake in the site, which is currently off-line, but it is contracted to a Libyan company. The Filipinos worked for an Italian company. Al-Mabrook closed following clashes which shut Es Sider in December. It used to pump 40,000 barrels a day. Total said it had already withdrawn staff from the site in 2013 and had no personnel onshore since July 2014. It was not clear whether Libya’s state-run National Oil Corp had employed expatriate staff at the field. Ali al-Hassi, spokesman for an oil guard force, blamed Islamists for the attack. “The field is outside of our control,” he said. “Islamic State is controlling it.”

The attack on the oil field comes a week after a separate attack targeting the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli. The hotel is frequented by government officials and foreign diplomats. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has held functions in the hotel. Militants claiming links to Islamic State took responsibility for the deadly attack on the luxury hotel. However, officials of the government in Tripoli denied the claim, blaming “Gaddafi loyalists” for the assault.

Libya’s turmoil has deepened as two rival governments controlling different areas, compete for primacy, each with their own armies. Rival armed factions have also been fighting for almost two months for control of Libya’s biggest oil ports, Es Sider and Ras Lanuf, on the Mediterranean coast.

The recognized government of Abdullah al-Thinni and elected parliament has had to work out of an eastern rump state since a faction called Libya Dawn seized Tripoli in August, setting up its own administration and reinstating the old assembly. Libya’s neighbours in the region have held meetings to discuss the spread of militants through their borders. The UN is working diligently to develop a peace agreement between the opposing governments, however progress has stalled as the Tripoli government has been unwilling to hold the meeting in Geneva, insisting it be held inside Libya. Talks are expected to resume in coming days.

Attacks Continue in Nigeria as Presidential Elections Approach

Nigeria on Monday claimed to have retaken the town of Gamboru, along with four other towns held by Boko Haram, following a joint weekend offensive carried out by it’s military, civilian vigilantes and forces from neighbouring Chad and Cameroon. Tensions however remain high as the country braces for more attacks ahead of the 14 February presidential elections.

On Monday, national security spokesman Mike Omeri announced “our troops are in control after operations which had the active support of volunteers and our friendly neighbours.” In a separate statement, he indicated that the towns that have been retaken are: Mafa, Mallam Fatori, Abadam, Marte and Gamboru, where Chad has carried out three days of airstrikes. All of the towns are located in the northeastern state of Borno. The statement also indicated that eleven towns in Adamawa state to the south of Borno had been liberated, with the militants still occupying six areas. Boko Haram has also been chased out of Guba and Gulani, located in neighbouring Yobe state. On the ground sources in Fotokol, a town in Cameroon located less than one kilometre from Gamboru, confirmed that aerial bombings in the area were on-going early Monday but that the situation appeared quiet by the evening.

Omeri’s statement came hours after a suspected suicide bomber targeted a presidential campaign rally in northeastern Nigeria. President Goodluck Jonathan, who had been addressing supporters of his ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in Gombe city, had just left the venue when the blast happened in a car park outside. Rescue workers and health officials indicated that two women were killed and eighteen people were wounded. According to a source, the two women are believed to be the suicide bombers behind the attack. The latest attack came a day after two explosions occurred in Gombe city, both of which have been blamed on Boko Haram militants. Sunday’s attacks left at least five people dead in a weekend of deadly violence that also saw the militant group attacking the strategic city of Maiduguri for the second time in a week. While Nigerian troops, aided by civilian vigilantes, repelled the attack, it is believed that Maiduguri will likely be targeted again before the presidential elections. This is due to its symbolism for the group and because control of the city would undermine the 14 February polls.   Boko Haram has effectively surrounded Maiduguri, which is seen as one of the last few places in the state where voting could feasibly still take place. If Boko Haram succeeds in gaining control, voter turnout will likely be affected if large numbers of people, many of whom have been displaced by the six-year insurgency, desert the city, which, along with several other areas in the northeast, is a main opposition stronghold.

The last two strikes on Maiduguri may have been preliminary tests carried out by the militant group in a bid to check the city’s defences. In turn, these two strikes have resulted in additional troops being deployed to Maiduguri, a move that may have been designed by Boko Haram to move troops out of other regions in the northeast where the militant group may now strike. While Boko Haram is strategically in an excellent place to launch a successful strike on Maiduguri, analysts question whether the group will be able to hold on to the key city.

For several months, Boko Haram has been in control of a series of towns along Nigeria’s northeastern border. The militant group has also been responsible for a string of cross-border attacks, particularly inside neighbouring Cameroon. The upsurge in violence coupled with fears that the Nigerian government may soon loose complete control over Borno state prompted calls for the affected countries to mount a joint offensive amidst evidence that Boko Haram was rapidly growing in strength.

While the new multi-lateral offensive may succeed in weakening Boko Haram, there could be severe political consequences for Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, who is seeking to be re-elected in the upcoming presidential elections, due to take place in less than two weeks. The president has already been severely criticized over his government’s failed response to the on-going insurgency. Furthermore, Nigeria’s willingness to allow foreign militants to carry out operations on its own territory, and possibly occupy areas with ground forces, will likely be seen as an embarrassment by some in Africa’s most populous country.

Boko Haram, which has proclaimed a “caliphate” in the areas under its control in northeastern Nigeria, is now threatening neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Since April 2014, Boko Haram violence has been on the rise, and has continued to increase in the weeks leading up to the presidential elections:

2014

• April 14: 276 girls are seized from their school in Chibok, in the remote region of Borno state capital. Fifty-seven of the girls later managed to flee however 219 are still missing.
• April 14: At least 75 people are killed in a bomb blast that goes off in a packed bus station on the outskirts of Nigeria’s capital city Abuja. Boko Haram later claims responsibility for the bombing. Further attacks, which occur in May and June, kill another 40 people.
• May 5: Boko Haram gunmen raze the town of Gamboru Ngala in Borno state. Local sources reported that at least 300 people were killed
• May 20: Twin car bombings in the central Nigerian city of Jos, which are blamed on Boko Haram, kill at least 118 people.
• June 3: Heavily armed gunmen raid four northeastern villages in Borno state. Local leaders put the death toll between 400 – 500.
• November 28: Two suicide bombers blew themselves up and gunmen opened fire during weekly prayers at the mosque of the Emir of Kano, which is one of Nigeria’s top Islamic leaders. At least 120 people are killed and 270 are left injured.
• December 1: More than 150 people are killed after Boko Haram militants raid the northeastern city of Damaturu in Yobe state.
• December 14: Boko Haram kills 32 people and kidnaps at least 185 in an attack on the northeastern village of Gumsuri, which is located south of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state.

2015

• January 3: Boko Haram attacks the town of Baga, which is located on the banks of Lake Chad. According to Amnesty International, “hundreds” were killed.
• January 25: Boko Haram captures the strategic northeastern town of Monguno and a military base. The town is located about 125 kilometres (80 miles) north of Maiduguri. US Secretary of State John Kerry pledges further US support for the counter-insurgency
• January 30 – 31: During a summit at the Ethiopian capital, the African Union proposes to set up a regional five-nation force of 7,500 troops tasked to fight Boko Haram.
• January 31 – February 1: Chadian aircraft bomb the Nigerian town of Gamboru at the border with Cameroon. A 500-metre bridge from the Cameroonian town of Fotokol, where Cameroonian and Chadian soldiers have gathered over the past several days, separates Gamboru.
• February 1: Boko Haram fighters storm Maiduguri. The Nigerian army indicated that it has repelled the assault with the help of local vigilante groups.

ISIS Sleeper Cells in Turkey

3 February- Information leaked from a Turkish National Police intelligence has divulged a threat of potential attacks conducted by ISIS sleeper cells across the country. The police report gives warning of as many as 3,000 operatives living in Turkey who are directly associated with the terrorist group that has taken large swaths of land in Iraq and Syria. The report details a list of cities in Turkey that are vulnerable to attack, including the administrative and cultural capitals, Ankara, and Istanbul.

Turkey shares a 565 mile border with Syria. During the 2011 Syrian uprising, Turkey opened its border to Syrian rebels in an effort to assist in the overthrow of Syrian president Bashar al Assad. As the popular uprising metastasised into a civil war, fighters were able to travel between the nations’ borders. These included members of al-Qaeda affiliated group al Nusra Front, and the group which came to be known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The open border has provided a transit route for ISIS, which has been used to transport fighters, as well as black market oil and numerous weapons.

In the years since the 2011 uprising, extremists have established networks and infrastructure within Turkey that allows them to facilitate illegal activity. The group has reportedly established logistical bases in Turkey, and built a network of cells.

While the Turkish National Police are only now acknowledging this threat, Turkish and America media have been reporting for months about Islamic State recruitment activity in Turkey. In September 2014, the Turkish daily, Hurriyet, identified Islamic State activities in cities such as Istanbul and Kocaeli in the western portion of the country, and Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, and Diyarbakir to the east. Similarly, a New York Times report also detailed ISIS recruitment in Ankara, a report that was echoed in Newsweek which added that other conservative pockets in Turkey, such as the Dilovasi neighbourhood in Ankara are particularly susceptible for recruitment. Turkish daily newspaper Aydinlik noted that ISIS militants were operating in other towns, such as Konya, which is known for its conservative Islamic culture.

In January, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu acknowledged that there are approximately 700 Turkish nationals fighting for ISIS. Financial inducements may play a role; a New York Times report suggests that ISIS offers $150 a day to Turkish recruits who agree to fight.

Further weakening Turkish security is the idea that Turkey may be home to ISIS sympathisers. Ali Ediboglu, a Turkish opposition deputy, claims that “at least 1,000 Turkish nationals are helping […] foreign fighters sneak into Syria and Iraq to join ISIS.” Videos have emerged of gatherings in Istanbul which proclaim support for fighters in Syria, including ISIS. In October 2014, police arrested three students who clashed with protestors at an anti-ISIS rally. Further, a group of 20 people referring to themselves as “Musluman Gencier” (Muslim Youth) interrupted an anti-ISIS demonstration at Istanbul University wearing black masks and wielding bats. The group has reportedly attacked the campus on more than one occasion.

In the midst of the civil war, Turkey has become home to at least 1.5 million Syrian refugees. There is reason to fear that among those numbers are some that could be susceptible to radicalisation. Intelligence reports have suggested that the ISIS may be targeting young men and boys in refugee camps for recruitment.

The impact of ISIS has already been felt in Turkey. On January 6, a suicide bomber attacked a police station in Istanbul’s historic district of Sultanahmet. The bomber is believed to have had ties to the Islamic State. Continued attacks could cause irreparable damage to Turkey’s vital tourism sector and create alarm throughout the nation. However, ISIS may not benefit from targeting Turkey. The group has become reliant on the relatively open border and illicit oil sales in the nation. South-eastern Turkey has a “rather permissive environment” where “authorities don’t seem terribly alarmed over the presence of extremists”. Further, despite the nation’s proximity to the fighting, the Turkish government has not played an active role in the US-led coalition to eradicate ISIS. Turkey has refused to allow its military bases to be used for coalition operations. However the number of ISIS sympathisers and operatives within Turkish borders puts the country at risk. If Ankara decides to take a harsher stance against ISIS, it is likely that the terrorist group could activate cells within the nation. Turkey will need to tread carefully to take a concerted stance against ISIS while ensuring its national security.

ISIS benefits from Libya’s Upheaval

29 January- Militants have attacked a hotel in the Libyan capital Tripoli, killing at least nine people including five foreigners, officials say. The Corinthia Hotel is often used by foreign diplomats, government officials and foreign companies. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has hosted several workshops at the hotel. Several gunmen stormed the Corinthia Hotel and opened fire in the reception area; a car bomb also exploded nearby. Unconfirmed reports say some of the assailants have blown themselves up. The officials say the dead include one US and one French citizen. The US state department has confirmed the death of a US citizen, US Marine Corp veteran David Berry. The French national is reported to have been working for Libya’s Buraq Air. There are conflicting reports as to the total number of attackers.

A Twitter account linked to ISIS said the group had carried out the attack in revenge for the death of Abu Anas al-Liby, a Libyan fighter who was suspected of involvement in the bombings of two US embassies in East Africa in 1998.  As chaos erupts in Libya, officials in Geneva are rushing to put together a peace plan before ISIS can gain a foothold in the country. The attack on the hotel is the latest sign of ISIS flexing its muscles in a country that has become a failed state, and which could reach levels of chaos currently seen in Syria.

Libya has seen continual fighting since the death of Dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Beginning as small, localised skirmishes, the fighting turned into civil war last summer after national elections ushered in a moderate government, the House of Representatives, which heavily defeated Islamist parties and replaced the Islamist leaning General National Convention. Islamists and their allies, particularly tribal militias, reacted to the defeat by declaring parliament void, forming the Libya Dawn militia alliance and seizing Tripoli. The newly elected parliament fled and moved its administrative seat to Tobruk, in eastern Libya. The two sides, based at opposite ends of the country, have been at war ever since, resulting in thousands of deaths, towns wrecked and more than 400,000 of Libya’s six million population displaced.

In the midst of the chaos, ISIS has taken advantage and formed units across all three of Libya’s provinces. They have declared the eastern coastal town of Derna an Islamic caliphate, with parades of fighters waving black flags and ritual beheadings. ISIS claimed responsibility for the murder of 14 soldiers killed as they slept near the south-western town of Sebha, and earlier this month for the execution of two kidnapped Tunisian journalists, which is as yet unconfirmed. Earlier this month ISIS units attacked the living quarters of Egyptian guest workers in Sirte, separating Christians from Muslims and then taking the Christians away. ISIS later posted pictures of the kidnapped men on social media.

There are fears that the foothold in ISIS presence a threat to Europe, particularly in light of Libya’s proximity. At the Geneva talks, UN special envoy Bernardino Leon is warning that the window to agree a peace deal is closing. “Libya’s running out of time. How much time will Libya have, it’s difficult to say but the general impression is that the country is very close to total chaos.”

The UN is struggling to develop a deal, in large part because only one of the warring parties has turned up for the peace talks. Libya Dawn is refusing to take part. The group pulled out of the discussions after forces loyal to the Tobruk-based government seized the Benghazi branch of the central bank last week. Tobruk in turn said that, as the internationally recognised government, it is entitled to control its own central bank, further poisoning relations between the two sides. Because the Tobruk-based government is internationally recognised, it ostensibly controls oil revenues, and is reluctant to agree to a ceasefire while its expanding army is making gains on the battlefield.

In Benghazi, army units have bottled up Ansar al Sharia, a militant group, in the port area. Meanwhile the air force, loyal to Tobruk, last month repulsed a Libya Dawn offensive aimed at capturing Es Sider, the largest oil port.

Libya is quickly running out of money. The central bank, a neutral institution, pays soldiers on both sides of the conflict, and its reserves are running low, unable to be replenished as oil production has slowed considerably due to the fighting. The population is almost wholly dependent on cash from foreign reserves, and these are starting to run dry.

In the absence of a peace agreement and with depletion of resources, ISIS may become the beneficiary of the anarchy in the failed state, unless at least temporary terms between the two governments can be reached in haste.

Greek Elections

For the first time since the collapse of the military junta in 1974, Greek people decided to put an end to the domination of the two principal parties, New Democracy and PASOK. Syriza, a radical left wing party, won 36,3 per cent of the votes, surpassing New Democracy’s 27,9 per cent. Syriza, won 149 seats in the parliament, just two short of an overall majority. The new government is a coalition between Syriza and the right-wing populist party Independent Greeks. After the end of the elections, Syriza’s leader, Alexis Tsipras, reconfirmed his party’s intent to reject the TINA argument (There is No Alternative) that previous Greek administrations used to justify the imposed austerity measures. However, Syriza’s win was not the only note-worthy event during the Greek elections. The neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, came third with 6,3 per cent of the votes. The party is politically isolated, with its leadership and many of its members in prison with no access to mainstream media. Golden Dawn’s electoral results follow the general rise of far-right parties across Europe.

The rise of Syriza has been fuelled by the economic crisis. After the 2008 economic crisis, Syriza had a steady rise on the electoral rounds that followed. On the 2009 elections it won 4,6 percent of the vote, and after the two electoral rounds in May and June of 2012, it succeeded in winning 26,8 percent of the votes. It surpassed the governmental party, New Democracy, for the first time during the European elections in May 2014 where it won 26,6 percent of the votes, against New Democracy’s percentage of 22,7 per cent. Syriza’s meteoric rise reflects Greek people’s indignation with the choices of the previous governments and the austerity measures that they imposed. It is quite possible that this win is going to affect Syriza’s relationship with its supporters and change the dynamics between the party. Up to 2012, Syriza was a coalition of left parties and organisations. Its history contains a series of splits and consolidations involving numerous left-wing political formations that, in many ways can trail their origins to the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). In its current formation it is a strategic coalition comprising of a wide spectrum of political platforms that include social democrats, radical socialists and communists, environmentalists, anti-globalisation campaigners and human rights advocates. Its synthesis creates friction between the members and could affect its ability to implement a unanimous policy.

Syriza promised to rescind many of the austerity measures that the previous governments signed with the EU and the IMF. Since 2010, and partly due to the austerity measures, the country has seen its GDP shrink nearly a quarter, its unemployment rate reached a third of the labour force (26%) and almost half of its population fell bellow the poverty line. The national debt instead of decreasing has risen to 175 per cent of the annual GDP. Due to these factors, and despite the governmental change, the political system in Greece remains extremely vulnerable. Syriza’s position differs from the previous governments’ positions in two key factors. First, Syriza believes that the only way of making the European Union treat Greece reasonably and limit the austerity measures is to spearhead an immediate re-think of the Greek bailout program through the suspension of the policies demanded from the Troika and through the threat of using its veto power in the European Council. Secondly, Syriza wants to apply a tough bargaining line with a radical agenda that will entail a deep social change in Greece, including a big swift in the tax base, the re-introduction of a decent minimum wage – currently the minimum wage in Greece is 586 euros – and increase the funding for social security and public health provisions.

At the same time, it is quite possible that Syriza’s election is going to be a jolt in European politics. The people from the crisis-plagued countries of the South can identify with the win of a pro-European party that is committed to the European dimension of its country, but also a party that, due to its radical disposition, is ready to pressure the European Council to address the problems they have been ignoring over the past five years. Syriza’s biggest threat is the path of compromise that may be pressured to follow. For Greek people Syriza represents their last hope after a series of betrayals from their governments since the crisis started. Its political battle could reignite other similar anti-austerity movements across European countries that face economic problems, namely Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal. Like Greece, these countries were pressured to implement strict fiscal programs. Even though the measures proved to bring positive results in the macroeconomics sector, the economy’s growth halted and the economic crisis was combined with a big humanitarian crisis. Nevertheless, if Syriza fails in fulfilling its promises against the Greek people and does not improve Greece’s performance both internally and at the international forums, similar European anti-austerity parties that now benefit from Syriza’s political dynamic could be negatively affected. Spain, Ireland and Italy are due to hold elections over the next two years. In Spain, the anti-austerity party Podemos continues to gain popularity as the country moves closer to the December 2015 elections. Spain is battling a 24 per cent unemployment rate, second only to Greece’s 26 per cent. Similarly, in Ireland the Anti-austerity Alliance party has increased its power since the 2009 elections, amid protests against the new austerity measures implemented by the government. Italy faces similar problems that underline the people’s dissatisfaction with the high rates of unemployment, the lack of healthcare and the increase of poverty rates.

Syriza does not promote Greece’s exit from the Eurozone. What it aspires to do is to create breathing room from the imposed fiscal programs to undertake basic restorative policies, and to lay the ground for a more cohesive and long-term economic strategy. Syriza’s leader has explicitly stated that his party does not intend to destroy the euro or to force Greece out of the Eurozone. Nevertheless, he has mentioned that he is not willing to keep Greece in the economic alliance under any cost. If Greece follows that path it will not be voluntary but a choice forced to make. This attitude allows him to appease Greek people internally, and promote the image that he is willing to negotiate with his European partners externally. By generating a campaign that focused on change not only for Greece but for Europe as a total, he succeeded in deflecting the narrative of Greek exceptionalism regarding the sovereign debt. Using the widespread crisis and the struggle of many European countries, he makes the case that the issue of the Greek debt must not be regarded as an isolated problem, but as a variable of a wider issue that has at its core a problematic European economic governance.

Syriza’s win rekindled the ‘’Grexit’’ speculations. However, that does not seem to be the case. The various EU Treaties do not include a clause regarding how a country could leave the euro. Currently there is no treaty provision that legally contains the requirements for a member state to be expelled from the EU or EMU. Even though a withdrawal from the EU is not legally impossible, the exit clause itself is, prima facie, not in harmony with that rationale of the European unification project and can create many legal problems, as an exit from the EMU without simultaneous exit from the EU is legally inconceivable. At the same time, even if a negotiated exit can be achieved and the European economy can limit its losses considerably, which is dubious at best, a member’s exit will provoke a general vulnerability at the core of everything the EU represents. The EU’s existence can come into question, due to the fact that there are going to be no guarantees for countries that face similar problems, such as Spain and Italy, that they will not have to follow Greece’s path.

Despite Syriza’s aspiring announcements, a radical revolution both in Greece and in Europe does not seems to be in the cards. The most possible scenario is that Syriza will succeed in finding a more flexible financial agreement, which is not going to deviate substantially from what the previous government agreed to. An agreement is necessary for the new government to continue receiving financial aid in form of loans from the IMF and European partners, and include Greece in the new program of quantitative easing that the European Central Bank announced recently. Syriza’s win represents the need for change in Europe, especially in the European South. Mostly, it reflects a reality that most European governments do not seem to fully comprehend and be prepared to address effectively. This change is expected to further challenge the European cohesion amid the multiple security, economical and political problems that the EU currently faces.