MS Risk Blog

Failed Coup in Guinea-Bissau (2 Feb 2022)

Guinea-Bissau’s President Umaro Sissoco Embalo survived an attempted coup on Tuesday 1 February, though he said that many members of the security forces had been killed repelling an attack on democracy that may have been linked to drug trafficking. Heightened security is likely to persist in Guinea-Bissau through at least mid-February after the foiled coup attempt against President Embalo’s government. Official government sources indicate that at least six people – four attackers and two guards – were killed and several others were injured during gunfire exchanges near the Government Palace in the capital, Bissau.

Earlier in the day, heavy gunfire rang out near a government compound where the president was chairing a meeting. The situation remained unclear for several hours, during which both the African Union (AU) and West African bloc ECOWAS condemned what they called “an attempted coup.” At around 17:20, military forces loyal to the Embalo government reportedly entered the Palace of Government and also deployed to several locations within the nation’s capital. They established a security perimeter around the palace, with troops also stationed near the Palace of Justice.

Appearing on Tuesday evening in a video posted on the presidency’s Facebook page, President Embalo stated that attackers had tried to enter the compound just after the cabinet meeting but had been repelled. He went on to say that “it wasn’t just a coup. It was an attempt to kill the president, the prime minister and all the cabinet,” adding that the attack “was well prepared and organized and could also be related to people involved in drug trafficking,” giving no further details. Guinea-Bissau is viewed by the United Nations as a major waypoint for Latin American cocaine headed for Europe. US and European authorities have long suspected that some in the country’s military are involved in the drug trade. During the video on Tuesday, President Embalo suggested that the army was not involved in the attack, stating, “I can assure you that no camp joined this attempted coup. It was isolated. It is linked to people we have fought against,” without elaborating. He also disclosed that arrests had begun of people involved, tough he did not disclose how many were detained. At around 10:00 on Tuesday morning, President Embalo had begun chairing an extraordinary cabinet meeting, entering the government palace with a heavy security detail, a diplomatic source reported. While he was present in the building, gunfire began outside. The cabinet meeting was being held to prepare for a forthcoming ECOWAS summit on 3 February in response to last week’s military takeover in Burkina Faso.

Advisory

Heightened security is likely to persist in Guinea-Bissau through at least mid-February after the foiled coup attempt against President Embalo’s government. Forces in Bissau are likely to maintain an elevated security posture until the situation stabilizes. Additional clashes between rival forces cannot currently be ruled out. Additional security measures, including checkpoints and random searches of vehicles and pedestrians may be carried out in the coming days. Authorities may also impose an overnight curfew, should the situation destabilize. Anyone currently in Guinea-Bissau should shelter in place, maintain close contact with their diplomatic representation, and adhere to all instructions issued by the local authorities. This includes possible curfew-related restrictions. Government buildings, security installations, large groupings of police and soldiers, and any demonstrations should be avoided.

Possible Coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau (1 Feb 2022)

Reports have emerged of a possible coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau. As of Tuesday 1 February evening, the situation in the country remains tense in the wake of an incident that occurred earlier in the day. This incident has been described by both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as an attempted coup. At around 15:00, shots and explosions were heard near the Government Palace in the capital, Bissau. The incident occurred as President Umaro Embalo was chairing a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Reports indicate that military forces have deployed to several locations of the capital city and have established a security perimeter around the Palace of Government and have stationed troops near the Palace of justice. Reports further indicate that the military may have entered the National Television station building, though these have not been verified. The situation in Guinea-Bissau remains fluid and the current whereabouts of President Embalo and Prime Minister Nuno Gomes Nabiam remain unclear.

Advisory

The situation is rapidly developing and MS Risk is currently closely monitoring events on the ground in Guinea-Bissau. Anyone currently in the country, including the capital city Bissau, is strongly advised to shelter in place, maintain close contact with their diplomatic representations, adhere to all instructions issued by the local authorities, including any possible curfew-related restrictions that could be imposed in the coming hours. Avoid government buildings, security installations, large concentrations of soldiers and police, and any demonstrations that may occur.  It is likely that security across the city will remain extremely tight in the coming hours. It is possible that local authorities could implement movement restrictions, which could potentially include curfews. Telecommunications could be restricted in the coming hours.

Revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: what will happen if diplomatic talks fail?

This report aims to talk about some potential consequences if diplomatic talks to reinstate the Iran Nuclear deal fail and how this could affect relationships between other global powers, mainly the United State and Iran, and the impact behind the likelihood of imposed sanctions upon Iran should talks collapse. Negotiations remain at a stalemate with neither side willing to compromise their national interests, despite countries maintaining that this deal is the best framework to address this situation.

In accordance with the JCPOA, signed by Iran and the P5 + 1, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to lift crippling economic sanctions if Iran agreed to limiting its nuclear activities and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unrestricted access to its factories with regular inspection. It also aimed at reducing much of Iran’s regional influence and moreover, relieve regional tensions between fellow rivals Israel and Saudi Arabia.

In 2018, under the then-Trump administration, the United States had abandoned the deal and reinstated economic sanctions, claiming the deal failed in its aims and so initiated a pressure campaign hoping that Iran would negotiate a deal that would further limit their ballistic capabilities. Following the re-imposition of sanctions Iran has begun stockpiling uranium beyond the levels agreed in the deal, while also developing centrifuges, increasing its acceleration of uranium enrichment.

President Biden expressed his desire to re-join the deal last year; but the US and Iran have since remained in indirect negotiations to revive the JCPOA with talks repeatedly faltering. Tehran remains sceptical of the US’ ability to provide sanctions that would be of viable economic benefit and want a binding treaty, which realistically cannot be guaranteed for the following future administrations nor would be passed in Senate. On the other hand, Washington is questioning whether they can secure the deal’s previous non-proliferation demands, following Iran’s significant nuclear development. Talks are rapidly reaching a decision point as Iran’s continued HEU growth will eventually become unattainable under the JCPOA.

There is a consensus that this deal presents the ideal framework to tackle this issue, but allied countries have since been thinking of alternate plans should talks fail, such as full implementation of sanctions to military operations, which would impair Iran’s nuclear program. These all present drawbacks that are otherwise unfavourable in the long term.

If talks were to fail, it is very likely that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will receive full support to reimplement full sanctions against Iran, despite the US having already done so without UNSC backing. However, the impact of this is arguable as Iran has since continued trading with other countries, such as China and Russia, regardless of the imposed sanctions. China and Iran have also signed an agreement bolstering economic ties between them. The sanctions therefore may not be as effective if such a trade continues. It is not within China and Russia’s interests to have a power with unchecked nuclear capability nor is it clear how willing the countries are to risk their own global trade to ally themselves with Iran. Consequently, relations are being strained over this potentiality.

Regardless of sanctions, it is also unlikely that Iran will be hindered from continuing with their nuclear programs. They have repeatedly insisted that their program is not for weapons applications, but this is impossible to confirm as with the end of the deal, Iran would likely never allow the IAEA to inspect their facilities, thereby providing them the opportunity of plausible deniability. However, it is unlikely that the US or other countries would dismiss the potentiality of Iran gaining a nuclear weapon and is likely to take military action to prevent this.

Regionally, Israel has mentioned and is gearing for a possible military confrontation if talks are unsuccessful. Iran and Israel have maintained a tenuous relationship and remains on shaky ground amidst the possible negotiations; Israel has remained uncompromising in its position that the JCPOA is too lenient and has tried to push away from negotiations, claiming them as fruitless. Tensions continue to rise with military exercises taking place in Iran in a blatant intimidation in response to talks between the US and Israel defence chiefs concerning possible military exercises in a worst-case scenario. Thus, it is likely that there will be an escalation of conflict, which will result in the rest of region being embroiled in conflict.

An ideal outcome for the west would be a return to the JCPOA but this seems unlikely given the harsh sanctions already implemented by the United States; they will not remove them unless Iran concedes. A compromise with both moderate sanction relief and moderate nuclear compromise, otherwise known as a ‘less-for-less’ deal, is the approach that Iran hopes for, but this would receive heavy criticism from the west.

Ethiopia Situation update (27 Jan 2022)

Despite security issues in East Africa centring around common themes and issues, by far the biggest threat to regional peace and stability remains in Ethiopia. This remains true for the end of 2021. There have however been several important shifts in the power dynamic in the ongoing war which has been fought for well over a year.

It is our judgement that several major identifiable factors have contributed to a recent shift in momentum, favouring the Ethiopian National army of the Abiy Ahmed regime (ENDF) in their war with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Abstract

By mid-November 2021, through a combination of protracted bush fighting and guerrilla tactics, the TPLF had taken (amongst others) two key strategic cities in Afar and Amhara regions. Tactically this this likely provided the TPLF with capability to launch an attack on Addis Ababa. The towns of Dessie and Kombolcha sat either side of the A2 highway. The A2 is the main arterial route between north and south Ethiopia and links Ethiopia with Eritrea and Djibouti. It is and remains vital for fuel, food aid and any movement of troops. Whilst in control of these positions, the TPLF refused to return over two hundred food aid trucks which would have been suitable for troop transport. It is our assessment that these factors increased the threat of the Tigrayan leadership mobilising their forces on Addis Ababa. Until early December the ENDF showed no demonstrable indication they were able to provide effective opposition.

The Current situation

On the 5^th of December, both Ethiopian news sources and trusted 3^rd party  outlets reported that ENDF had successfully retaken Dessie and Kombolcha from the TPLF. This was later confirmed by the official communication channels of the TPLF, referring to a “strategic repositioning”. In the TPLF retreat several UN food aid depots, local business, dry docks and homes were raided and emptied. These were coupled with widely reported cases of extreme sexual violence and non-judicial executions. After losing these positions, The TPLF were pushed back further into northern territories before losing another key position, the city of Lalibela. The loss of the three positions represented a huge reduction in any pre-established capability of the TPLF following through on their initial plans to capture Adidis Ababa and remove Abiy Ahmed.

As of late January, the TPLF have gone into full retreat and no longer occupy Amhara or Affar regions, with all troops now back inside Tigrayan state borders. The ENDF have been ordered to halt any counter operations and have stopped at the Tigrayan border. It is our best judgement that this provides the first and most significant opportunity for peace talks in a country with millions of people in desperate need of food assistance. Tigrayan Leader Debretsion Gebremicahel has stated his intention to use the change in the power dynamic as a catalyst for diplomatic talks.

Contributing Factors and Key Assessments

Ethiopia has been highly closed off to reporting during the past 14 months, it is however possible to make some assessment as to the nature of the TPLF retreat and defeat. Open Source satellite imagery analysis first reported by Al Jazeera and confirmed by the US state department has shown an airbridge of private charter flights originating in the UAE performing frequent weapons deliveries to Addis Ababa. The jets, which are chartered privately through 3^rdparty nations have been confirmed to be carrying Chinese, Iranian and Turkish UAV equipment and weapons. We judge that the timing of these deliveries in relation to the resurgence of the ENDF is likely too significant to ignore.

Further assessment of the nature of the two belligerents likely indicates the lack in TPLF ability to conduct conventional warfare against a standing state force. With years of guerrilla and bush war experience, their capture of the towns pointed to success in rural conflict zones, but an in ability to hold strategic cities so far from their central command and control structure.

As of the ICOD, neither side has commenced meaningful talks, but hostilities on the ground appear to have cooled off. It should be noted that Tigrayan state media and government communications is still reporting daily government drone activity in Tigray. But at this time, it is not possible to fully confirm the validity of these claims.

Burkina Faso Coup Update (28 Jan 2022)

ECOWAS met virtually on Friday 28 January to discuss the crisis in Burkina Faso in the wake of the 24 January coup. Meanwhile on Thursday evening, Burkina Faso’s new military leader addressed the country  for the first time on since overthrowing democratically elected President Roch Kaboré, stating that the nation will return to constitutional order when conditions are right. Concerning reports have also emerged that a group of Russian military contractors has written to the coup leaders in Burkina Faso, offering their services in the country’s ongoing fight against jihadists.

ECOWAS Meeting

On Friday morning, the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regional bloc held an extraordinary meeting to discuss its response to the coup in Burkina Faso. According to two diplomatic sources, West Africa’s main regional bloc on Friday suspended Burkina Faso from its governing bodies in response to this week’s military coup and decided to send a delegation to the Burkinabé capital Ouagadougou. The sources indicate that for the moment, no further sanctions have been imposed, adding that ECOWAS will hold another summit on 3 February in Accra.

ECOWAS had previously suspended and imposed sanctions on Burkina Faso’s neighbours Mali and Guinea following coups in August 2020 and September 2021, respectively, including asset freezes against junta leaders and their families, border closures and suspensions of financial transactions. Following the coup on Monday in Burkina Faso, ECOWAS issued a statement on 25 January to say that the bloc “firmly condemns” the coup, accusing the military of forcing Kaboré to resign “under threat, intimidation and pressure.” Kaboré, 64, remains in detention, with the United Nations leading calls for his release.

ECOWAS could impose similar measures to those implemented in Mali and Guinea on Burkina Faso as it faces growing pressure to adequately deal with the string of coups that have been impacted the region in recent years. The coup makers in Mali and Guinea, as well as in Chad where the military took power in April 2021, have all set up transitional governments composed of a mixture of military officers and civilians. The leaders in Mali and Chad agreed to 18-month transitions to democratic elections, with Guinea having yet to provide a timeline. Authorities in Mali however have gone back on their original commitment, and have since proposed delaying elections, which were originally due to take place next month.

Damiba Addresses Nation  

Friday’s extraordinary virtual meeting of ECOWAS members came just hours after Burkina Faso’s new military rule called for international support during his first address to the nation since he led the overthrow of President Roch Kaboré on 24 January. During televised comments late on Thursday, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba disclosed that “Burkina Faso more than ever needs its international partners,” adding, “I call on the international community to support our country so it can exit this crisis as soon as possible.” In his speech from the capital, Ouagadougou, Damiba said that he would convene various sections of Burkina Faso’s society to agree on a roadmap to plan and carry out needed reforms. He added, “when the conditions are right, according to the deadline that our people will define in all sovereignty, I commit to a return to a normal constitutional order.” Damiba further noted that security would be the “main priority” and put the country on war footing, noting, “we must significantly reduce the areas under terrorist influence and the impact of violent extremism by giving security forces the will to fight, and we must go on the offensive.”

Damiba’s address to the nation came after earlier in the day, around twenty trade union leaders met for about half an hour with the junta in power at the presidency in the capital Ouagadougou. According to Marcel Zante, who heads a federation of 130 unions, Burkina Faso’s new military leader Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba “assured us that we will be consulted and included in what will be put in place,” adding, “now we are waiting to see what happens on the ground.”

Meanwhile on Wednesday 26 January, the junta warned ex-ministers not to leave the capital or obstruct its military officers during talks over how to return to democratic elections, according to one of the politicians present. The officers, who call themselves the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), ousted President Kaboré on Monday, blaming him for failing to contain worsening violence by Islamist militants. The MPSR has said that it would propose a calendar for a return to constitutional order “within a reasonable time frame” but has not elaborated on its plans for a transition. The MPSR’s leader, Damiba, met with Kaboré’s government on Wednesday, according to one of the ex-ministers present. The former minister reported that Damiba warned them not to do anything to obstruct the junta or to travel outside the capital, but added that he welcomed any contribution they could offer to the transition.

Russia Looking at Possibly Expanding Influence in Region

A group of Russian military contractors has written to the coup leaders in Burkina Faso, offering to train the country’s army in their fight against jihadists. The group, calling itself “Community of Officers for International Security,” which is based in the Central African republic (CAR), published its offer in a letter that has been seen and verified by the BBC. However it currently remains unclear whether or not the offer will be accepted by the military junta currently in power in Burkina Faso. The offer in the letter is explicit, stating, “if Russian instructors are invited to train the army in Burkina Faso, they can do it effectively.” The letter, which has been verified by a Russian security adviser to the CAR, also critiques the French-led offensive against extremists in the Sahel. The letter says that despite leading the operation for a decade, it alleges they have had “no success,” and adds that the Russian group can help the Burkinabé soldiers to “master the security situation in very little time.”

Advisory

An increased security presence is likely in the coming hours and days across the country, notably in the capital Ouagadougou. Associated localized transport, commercial and telecommunications disruptions are also likely to persist. Further flight disruptions are likely and officials may suspend international travel and or close borders in response to the latest developments. Checkpoints across Ouagadougou may also be set up. Protests either in support or in opposition to the recent developments could also occur in major cities nationwide. Anyone planning to travel to Burkina Faso is advised to avoid all non-essential travel until the situation stabilizes. In the event that travel is necessary, reconfirm transport services, including flights, before departure. Persons currently in the country are advised to shelter in place and to maintain close contact with their diplomatic representation. Individuals should ensure that they have enough supplies for the next several days and should limit travel both within Ouagadougou and outside of the capital. Avoid government buildings, security installations, large concentrations of police and soldiers, or any protests that may materialize. Heed all instructions by the local authorities – remain courteous and cooperative if approached and questioned by security personnel.

With much of the focus now concentrating on the political situation in Burkina Faso, jihadists groups operating in the country may use this period to launch attacks both in major cities across the country and rural areas as a mechanism to instil further fear amongst the local populations. Attacks could be indiscriminate and could affect Burkinabé security forces, religious sites, restaurants, schools, markets and places frequented by foreigners. Anyone currently in Burkina Faso is advised to maintain heightened vigilance at all times.