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Belarus: Migrant Hybrid War

On 9 August, the anniversary of last year’s fraudulent presidential elections in Belarus, the UK, the US, and Canada imposed sectoral sanctions on Belarus, targeting key exports such as potash and crude oil, and the UK closed its financial markets to Belarusian debt and securities. President Aliaksandr Lukashenka responded by saying the UK could ‘choke on your sanctions’ which may seem an empty threat viewed from the safe distance of London but, for Belarus’ closest neighbours Lithuania, Poland and Latvia, the choking could become very real.

When the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions, Lukashenka responded by flying in waves of migrants from the Middle East and delivering them to the border to cross into the EU; a tactic last seen by Russia against Nordic states in 2015. This weaponization of migration is a form of hybrid warfare with the aim of destabilizing EU and NATO eastern borders and stirring up tensions within member states as well as between allies.

News broke last week that Poland had deployed around 900 soldiers to its border with Belarus to prevent an influx of asylum seekers from entering the country. More than 30 asylum seekers remain stranded between the Belarusian and Polish border, which is now under military guard and being reinforced with barbed wire. Poland’s crackdown came after neighbouring Lithuania toughened its own border controls to counter the same problem. Lithuanian officials report that more than 4100 people have crossed into the country illegally this year, the majority of whom arrived in July. But between 5 and 16 August, only 14 people made the crossing from Belarus. Lithuanian border guards are pushing asylum seekers back, and the Lithuanian prime minister is unapologetic.

The prime minister repeated accusations that Belarus is flying asylum-seekers in from dangerous and war-torn countries such as Iraq, and pushing them into the EU in retaliation for sanctions against Alexander Lukashenko’s regime. Footage has emerged showing Belarusian security forces in riot gear entering Lithuanian territory to push asylum seekers forward.

As the exodus from Afghanistan continues, it is expected that the tensions will get worse. It’s also noted that in July Belarus has been negotiating a visa agreement with Pakistan, which is already home to at least 1.3m Afghan refugees. Belarus obviously lacks the capacity to bring hundreds of thousands of people into the EU, but Lukashenko’s strategy has exposed how sharply attitudes have shifted in the past six years. Greece, France, Germany and Austria are on the same page as Lithuania – no repeat of 2015 – leaving asylum seekers vulnerable to becoming weaponised and dehumanised. Furthermore, German and French elections are looming large, and the issue is politically poisonous. Moreover, any new wave of migrants on Europe’s eastern borders may worsen anti–immigrant sentiment. In creating the migrant crisis Belarus is becoming just another tool in Russia’s hybrid warfare against western liberal democracies, and it is unlikely this tactic is being used by Belarus without the approval of Moscow. After the latest sanctions, Lukashenka has hinted he will stop cooperating with the US in combatting the traffic of nuclear materials. The impact of such a step is unclear – but it is easy enough to imagine how Belarus, and potentially Russia, could turn this into another facet of hybrid warfare against Europe.

Mozambique’s Insurgency: Fighting Back

In July, South African and Botswana military teams began to deploy to northern Mozambique to assist Mozambican government forces in combating a developing Islamist insurgency. They joined Rwandan soldiers as well as European and American military training forces in the area. With the foreign military help, Mocímboa da Praia, which has been at the centre of the conflict with the jihadist, has been reclaimed. Yet, It is unknown whether this is the start of the end for the group known as al-Shabab. What is evident is that the operation conducted by the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) represents the internationalisation of a locally embedded insurgency.

Mozambique seemed unable to contain the intensifying violence within its borders. The battle began with an attack on Mocímboa da Praia in 2017 and grew in intensity when young people seized firearms from soldiers and won local support. The insurgents known as ‘al-Shabab’ have no association with the Somalia-based group of the same name. The US has designated them as a terrorist group and named them “ISIS Mozambique.” The radicals took control of major areas of the country’s northern regions in the previous year, securing large towns from Mozambican forces on various occasions, notably Palma in the Cabo Delgado Province. The conflict, according to the United Nations, has displaced around 1 million individuals.

Mozambique’s neighbours, particularly South Africa, the regional leader, have grown increasingly concerned in recent months about the conflict’s potential to expand and impact more parts of the region through forced migration and the propagation of extreme views. Countries thousands of miles away, such as France, are equally concerned. France has significant holdings in Mozambique. Its oil giant – Total – which invested $20 billion in Mozambique’s vast natural gas projects, was forced to shut down all on-shore operations due to the escalation of violence in the area. As a result, the global community stepped in with military help because the Mozambique government appeared incapable of suppressing the rebellion.

Despite its initial reluctance to seek outside military assistance, Mozambique has now realised that it cannot win the war on its own. Rwandan forces, comprised of 1,000 troops, have already commenced operations in Cabo Delgado. The EU announced the creation of a European Union Training Mission (EUTM), which will most certainly be made up of Portuguese and French troops. The United States military is also assisting with training in counter-insurgency. Additionally, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a regional inter-governmental organisation, will provide troops led by South Africa. It’s uncertain how Rwandans and Mozambicans will collaborate with a SADC force that includes Angolans, Batswana, and Zimbabweans. Despite the fact that Mozambique claims to be in command, the RDF has taken the helm.

Moreover, Mozambique’s slow embrace of outside assistance was notably due to South Africa, its greatest and most militarily competent neighbour. This could be due to fears that South Africa will utilise its military presence for selfish gains. The latest arrests of South African spies working in Cabo Delgado has not eased the neighbours tense relationship. Many would believe that South Africa is southern Africa’s natural provider of security. However, its economy is in crisis, and it has serious domestic security concerns, notably the riots in July that  resulted in over 300 fatalities and the mobilisation of thousands of soldiers. The presence of South African troops has been approved only until October 2021, thus, a lengthy counter-insurgency war in Mozambique could be unsustainable for South Africa, or it could wear out their already fragile welcome in Mozambique.

Nonetheless, foreign military has so far proved to be valuable. Within two weeks of their deployment, Rwandan forces – the first foreign force to confront the terrorists – had retaken a vital road junction controlled by the extremists for the past year and reached the coastal town of Mocímboa da Praia. Mozambican and Rwandan forces then retook this key town from the militants, their last stronghold. The Rwandan Defence Force then tweeted that “The port city of Mocímboa da Praia , a major stronghold of the insurgency for more than two years has been captured by Rwandan and Mozambican security forces.”

Rwandan forces barely arrived in Mozambique, yet they already appear to be influencing the conflict’s trajectory. These forces seem to have done more for Mozambique than its own troops have done since the start of the insurgency. President Filipe Nyusi’s objective, based on the way the operation has developed, appears to be to resurrect the natural gas project as Rwandan troops have reclaimed important towns and secured routes leading to gas infrastructure. After all, Mozambique hopes Total could resume work in Mozambique in 2022.

However, with the efficiency with which Rwandan forces advanced into Mocímboa da Praia, which suggests that rather than fighting, the jihadists retired to the jungle, some believe that there is little reason to be optimistic. Mozambique is coming to resemble other African countries afflicted by insurgencies as a result of the influx of foreign forces.  There are some important lessons to be learned. Problems have arisen due to a lack of coordination between numerous foreign and regional forces combatting militants in Somalia, or the Sahel region. Military triumphs that appear to be substantial can be deceiving. The mere fact that extremists have been pushed out of cities and other critical regions does not imply that they have been crushed. They can fracture into smaller fragments, alter strategies, and shelter among civilians, slowly disappear into the territories they know better than anybody else – ready to emerge when they are stronger or when the foreign powers have departed. This is already happening. The insurgents have already abandoned their positions and dispersed into smaller units, as insurgents do when under duress. Parts of the fighting zone are densely forested, providing excellent cover. Analysts believe the militants plans may evolve now, with the group possibly extending across northern Mozambique and employing guerrilla tactics.

There is also the worry that the heavy emphasis on the gas project may fail to address the conflict’s core causes. Grievances will persist as long as the people of Cabo Delgado see minimal benefits from the development of local natural resources, and as long as they see a state incapable of providing medical care, schooling, job opportunities, and security. Thus, many believe that there is a strong possibility that present regional support for Mozambique will fall short of its goals, necessitating the formation of a broader international military alliance to combat the conflict’s numerous risks and stop the violence. However, civil conflicts rarely culminate with a military victory. Military action alone will not tackle the political and economic marginalisation that fuels the insurgency, and therefore, wider grievances must be resolved as well.

What the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan means to neighbouring countries in the region

Colombia continuous police brutality leads to civil unrest for the long term

Colombian police are still illegally imprisoning, torturing and using deadly weapons against innocent demonstrators since April. Initially against a tax proposal that has since been axed, though they quickly morphed into a nationwide howl of outrage over entrenched economic disparity. Protesters stayed in the streets for nearly two months, with marches taking place almost every day in major cities. Some protesters put up roadblocks, and some private and public property was damaged. The National Police officers allowed armed citizens to attack protesters and human rights campaigners. They have subsequently cooled, but they flared up again on July 20, Colombia’s Independence Day. The National Police and the Mobile Anti-Riot Squad (ESMAD) have been criticised for using excessive force and suppressing peaceful protests. The biggest demonstrations were in Cali, where racism, classism, and the country’s internal armed war have caused chaos. The police reaction was violent, killing 44 demonstrators and injuring 1,650. A recent human rights commission visiting Colombia saw police employing counter-insurgency methods developed in battling leftist rebel groups against demonstrators.

From a recent study produced by Amnesty International it is possible to analyse three incidents from the demonstrations. The first was on May 3 at Siloé, a Cali favela on a hillside. On May 9, armed citizens assaulted an indigenous protest caravan, injuring 11 protestors. The third was an armed citizen raid on a neighbourhood near the Valle university, allegedly in cooperation with police. There is a sense of disappointment among people who hoped for peace in Colombia after the nation signed a landmark peace agreement with the Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) in 2016.

Many anticipated that the agreement would usher in a new chapter in which Colombians would resolve their disputes with words rather than guns. The agreement has stalled under President Iván Duque, who entered office in 2018 after campaigning against the treaties.

The Colombian administration has defied growing international criticism. Critics argue the improvements are cosmetic rather than functional, including new uniforms and human rights training for riot police. However, they also complained of “fake news” and pointed out that two policemen were murdered and another 35 were shot during the demonstrations. More than 500 individuals, including government officials, human rights advocates, and violence victims, testified in the IACHR study about the state’s reaction to the demonstrations in places including Cali and Bogota. The committee recorded indiscriminate use of weapons by law police against demonstrators and non-protesters, gender-based violence, and violence against journalists and medical personnel. It also urged President Ivan Duque’s government to look into abuses and safeguard protesters. According to Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli, Andes director of the Washington Office on Latin America, the study contradicts Duque and his party’s narrative that protestors are vandals and criminals.

The group made over 40 suggestions to the Colombian government, including separating the police and military. The Colombian police, like the army, are a result of decades of violent warfare. But that structure has led to militarised law enforcement – notably by the riot police, ESMAD – that has been heavily criticised by the Colombian public and international observers. The government already has rejected several the suggestions, while Duque and members of his party criticised the report on Wednesday morning, continuing to decry acts of vandalism and roadblocks that violate the rights of citizens. While protest organisers have temporarily suspended the demonstrations, it is predicted only more protests are on the horizon if significant changes are not made.

The underlying reasons people have for protesting have not been resolved yet: unemployment, inequality, corruption, urban poverty. As there’s no reform for police how police conduct their jobs, how police deal with protests, and that is likely to be a trigger for future unrest.

Haiti’s President killed can things get any worse?

The recent killing of Haiti’s President Jovenel Moïse has raised alarm and further conflict in a country already divided and full of problems. What is still not currently known is why Moïse was murdered or who was responsible, but the effects of his death have already been echoed throughout the nation with further instability.

Controversy has always been surrounded by Moïse’s presidency since being in power in February 2017. With allegations of corruption and widespread demonstrations being prevalent in the capital city Port-au-Prince and other cities around the country in February. The legitimacy of his rule was always questioned by the population as his 5-year term, according to the opposition, should have ended that same month. Moïse responded that he took to office late due to allegations of electoral fraud at the time. This anti-government sentiment stayed however and led to continuous anti-government protests and frustration.

An attempt was previously made on Moïse’s life back in February where at least 23 were arrested including a top judge and senior police officer due to a dispute over when his term had ended.

Another attempt on the Presidents’ life was made and successful. Unidentified gunmen had broken into his private residency at around 01:00 on the 7^th of June according to interim PM Claude Joseph in which Moïse was shot and killed and his wife seriously injured. First Lady Martine Moïse was later flown to Florida for treatment.

Video footage not verified but thought to have been taken by residents shows armed men arriving at Moïse’s residence in several vehicles. A man thought to be a security guard appears to be forced to lie on the ground, the attackers disguising themselves as drug agents to get into the building. Officials had described the property’s grounds as having been littered with gun cartridges, implying many shots were fired that night.

A manhunt has since begun to locate who had killed the President and various groups have been blamed. 28 suspects in total have been identified, including 20 apprehended, 3 killed and another 5 still remain at large. Police are currently saying a group of mercenaries, most of them Colombians were behind the attack. Supposedly 26 Colombians and 2 Haitian Americans made up the group that carried out the killing, they also arrested a Haitian man whom they suspect having played a key role in organising the attack. Controversy around who had carried out the attack is still ongoing however, with Haitian opposition politician Steven Benoit believed that the Columbians were not responsible but instead was conducted by his security agents.

Police chief Léon Charles alleged that Christian Emmanuel Sanon, a Florida doctor, with political plans to gain control of Haiti had hired 26 of the 28 members of the Columbian hit squad to enact the attack through a Miami based company called CTU. Whether is this what actually occurred is yet to be known.

With frequent unrest set to continue, with even protestors and gunfire being frequent at the President’s funeral, it is unlikely that any form of solution will be made within the short term. The new prime minister Ariel Henry was recently sworn in calling for unity and to form a temporary government until September’s elections, which could feature even more issues for an already broken nation.