Transnistria Energy Crisis

On 31 December 2024, Moldova and its Moscow-backed breakaway region of Transnistria stopped receiving natural gas from Russia via Ukraine after a five-year gas transit contract expired. Since then, both Moldova and Transnistria have been grappling with an energy crisis. The region’s electricity grid relied on an outdated Soviet system and a large power station in Transnistria, which had been receiving free natural gas from Russia’s Gazprom. With no willingness to consider alternative supply routes, Russia’s goal appears to be influencing the upcoming parliamentary elections in Eastern Europe, as Moldova’s pro-European President Maia Sandu, elected in 2024, continues pushing for closer ties with Europe.

The crisis was triggered when Ukraine halted the transit of Russian gas through its territory, despite warning several months in advance. Russia, in response, refused to use alternative routes such as TurkStream or the Trans-Balkan pipeline. Gazprom justified its stance by citing alleged unpaid gas debts of €675 million. Until December 2024, Moldova had received 70-80% of its electricity from a Transnistrian power plant at below-market prices. Moldova disputes this debt, pointing to an international audit that estimates it at €8.2 million—excluding Transnistria’s payment claims, as the region had been supplied with free gas since 2005. This subsidy allowed Transnistria to fund pensions and soldiers’ salaries through energy sales to the EU market, which accounted for 80% of its exports. With free gas supplies cut off, the 360,000 residents of Transnistria were left without heating, hot water, and much of their electricity, bringing public life to a standstill. Meanwhile, Moldova’s capital, Chisinau, also faced political instability, forcing it to import electricity from Romania. This led to soaring prices, daily blackouts, and electricity rationing.

In the lead-up to Moldova’s elections, Russia predictably blamed the pro-European authorities and Ukraine for the crisis, accusing Kyiv of blocking transit to inflict hardship during the winter. Using disinformation campaigns and fake news, Moscow is feeding the narrative that Moldova’s future depends on a close, subordinate partnership with Russia. These efforts play on fears of war and public distrust of state institutions, while shifting responsibility for the crisis to Chisinau. Moldova, which considers Transnistria’s population as its own, offered to buy gas for the region – an offer initially rejected by Transnistria’s capital, Tiraspol. On 31 January, the EU Commission approved €64 million in grant aid to Moldova, including €20 million to alleviate the energy crisis in Transnistria. Without immediate assistance from Moscow, Chisinau began importing 3 million cubic metres of gas per day for Transnistria, restoring heating and allowing a return to gas-fired electricity generation. The EU also proposed €61 million in long-term funding for Tiraspol in exchange for commitments on fundamental freedoms and human rights. However, under pressure from Russia, this offer was rejected. Instead, Transnistria will receive gas through a Swiss-based Hungarian subsidiary, financed by a Russian loan.

This crisis is an opportunity for Moldova and the EU to improve Moldova’s energy security and further reduce Russia’s influence. To this end, the EU has already provided immediate financial assistance to cover gas costs for Moldova and Transnistria. In addition, the EU has already provided Chisinau with €142 million in grants and €220 million in loans between 2021 and 2024, as well as €240 million in direct budget support for its energy system. Although Moldova and Ukraine have been connected to the European electricity grid since March 2022, the infrastructure still faces major challenges. The high-voltage transmission line from Romania, which is essential to improve energy supply, is under construction but won’t be operational until the end of 2025. In the next few years, the EU should encourage Moldova to continue to transform its energy market to reduce dependence on Russian gas. This means investing in sustainable energy and local power plants and increasing electrification. Opening the energy market to foreign investors could improve access to energy and overall security. Equally important is countering Russia’s disinformation efforts, particularly in Transnistria. It’s crucial to show people that Moldova and the EU have viable alternatives, and that Russia caused the current crisis.

The crisis has exposed the fragility of Transnistria and its economy. For too long, both have relied on the Kremlin’s goodwill for free Russian gas. This dependence is not a long-term strategy, as Russia’s use of energy as leverage is a central part of its broader strategy of hybrid warfare. Over the past year, Russia has used this strategy to destabilise Moldova and influence its political landscape, including extensive disinformation campaigns, interference in Moldova’s presidential elections, and attempts to undermine Moldova’s pro-European government. While modernising its energy sector, Moldova needs to rethink its approach to Transnistria by focusing on an energy policy that integrates the region. Chisinau itself can now utilise energy, to gradually reduce Russian influence while working towards a reintegration process of Transnistria. The key steps in shaping Moldova’s geopolitical future are to transform its energy landscape to ensure energy security, while aligning with European standards and deepening regional cooperation.