The ineffectiveness of joint UK/US airstrikes in Yemen

Since October of 2023, the Houthi militants in Yemen have sought to disrupt global shipping by way of missile attacks throughout the Red Sea region. The Houthi’s claim that their motive for this strategy is linked to defending the people of Gaza against Israel, however through some further analysis, the Houthis have been attempting to consolidate regional power against the Yemeni government, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE for nearly a decade, further adding to their motivation to attack maritime shipping in the region. In response to this disruption, the US and the UK, along with support from Western nations such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands, have launched missions named Operation Poseidon Archer and Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure and maintain freedom of navigation in the region for commercial vessels. This operation has since led to joint airstrikes being conducted on Yemeni soil to degrade Houthi capabilities, starting from January 2024. This paper seeks to assess the effectiveness of these joint US/UK airstrikes to understand the best way to confront the Houthi threat and restore freedom of navigation in the region.

From January to May of 2024, the Houthis have reported 452 joint American and British airstrikes against its sites in Yemen, with this number reaching over 500 in recent months. These strikes have resulted in the death of 40, with many more injured, and have mainly been targeting Houthi drone sites, ballistic and cruise missile launchers, radars, airports, and underground facilities where Houthi equipment may be stored. Initial estimates in January after the first strikes were that 20-30% of Houthi offensive capabilities were damaged or destroyed, with Lt. Gen. Douglas Sims, the director of the US military’s Joint Staff, claiming that they had successfully achieved their objective of damaging the Houthis’ capability to launch complex drone and missile attacks. Despite this claim, the Houthis have since gone on to conduct over 70 attacks on commercial and military vessels until July 2024, sinking two, including the Rubymar and the MV Tutor, and damaging many more, such as the 15 July strike on the Chios Lion crude oil tanker with a USV. The Houthis have also extended their threat range from the Red Sea to include the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The result of these attacks has been a 60% reduction in daily traffic in the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb Strait, dropping from about 100 commercial ships per day pre-October 2023 to between 40-50 per day throughout 2024. Additionally insurance costs for commercial shipping have significantly increased in the wake of these attacks.

The result of this ongoing trade of missile strikes between Western forces and the Houthis has been a strategic victory for the Houthis. The objective for Operation’s Poseidon Archer and Prosperity Guardian was to secure and maintain freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, an objective which was entirely not achieved as evidenced by the increase in Houthi attacks. As for the Houthis, their objective has been regional power accumulation over the Yemeni government, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, as well as supporting the Iranian axis of resistance in Lebanon and Gaza, objectives which were certainly achieved. By successfully continuing to attack commercial ships, the Houthis are injecting uncertainty into global trade, strongly impacting those nations which benefit the most from trade, such as the Middle Eastern states trade of oil and liquified natural gas, however also the poorer nations in the region such as Yemen itself. Whilst being immediately successful in their objectives, the longer-term result of their degradation of commercial shipping has the potential to backfire onto the nations that are already suffering most, and which benefit the most from cheaper international trade, such as Somalia and Yemen. With millions of their populations already suffering from lack of clean water, access to food, and lack of health care and sanitation; all due to civil war, there is a likelihood that the Houthis would engage in political discussions to consolidate the advances made so far in their campaign.

As a result, it might be more effective for the Western nations in the region to engage politically and economically with the Houthis, rather than through military intervention. The Houthis are bringing in a constant supply of complex weapons systems via Iran, thus making it unlikely that the US or the UK will be able to indefinitely halt Houthi attacks in the region through military action alone. Through engaging in political discussions with both Iran and the Houthis, Western nations may be able to be more effective at halting the attacks on commercial shipping. This may be attractive to the Houthis due to their desire for regional strength, something which will be lacking if they induce a famine within their own population. Whilst Western nations might decide that a political solution is too risky, and that the Houthis cannot be trusted to negotiate with, it can be assessed with high certainty that the joint US/UK airstrikes in Yemen have been highly ineffective at limiting Houthi aggression in the Red Sea. It is highly likely that the continuation of military strikes by the US and the UK will continue to induce more aggression by the Houthis with further attacks on commercial shipping.