Russian Energy Leverage and Political Influence in the Western Balkans

Key Judgements

• Russia continues to use energy dependency as a low-visibility influence mechanism across the Western Balkans, particularly in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
• Energy pricing incentives and long-term gas agreements provide Moscow with structural political leverage rather than immediate coercive power.
• Messaging around “energy sovereignty” and Western unreliability is increasingly aligned with key political decision points rather than elections.
• This activity is unlikely to trigger short-term instability but contributes to long-term strategic ambiguity and slows Euro-Atlantic integration.

Objective

To assess how Russia is leveraging energy dependence to shape political behaviour and strategic orientation in the Western Balkans, and to evaluate the wider implications for regional security and EU cohesion.

Context

The Western Balkans illustrate persistent energy vulnerability within Europe, shaped by limited diversification and continued dependence on Russian supply infrastructure. Although states in the region have formally committed to European integration, reliance on Russian gas imports, established transit routes, and long-term contracts negotiated under previous political arrangements continues to define their energy landscape.

Following the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s capacity to employ overt energy cut-offs as a coercive instrument has declined. In response, Russia has shifted its strategy towards maintaining price stability, offering selective incentives, and shaping narratives, rather than pursuing direct disruption. This approach enables Moscow to sustain influence in the region while minimising the risk of international repercussions.

In Serbia, preferential gas pricing and extended contracts have reinforced domestic narratives that frame Russia as a stable partner in contrast to the perceived volatility and expense of European energy markets. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the fragmentation of governance and entity-level control over energy policy creates multiple avenues for Russian-linked actors to shape policy outcomes.

Timeline

• Pre-2022
  Russian energy dominance across the Balkans is largely uncontested; energy ties viewed as pragmatic rather than political
• 2022–2023
  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine increases EU pressure for diversification; Moscow reframes itself as a stabilising energy provider amid “Western chaos”
• 2024
  Long-term gas agreements and pricing incentives are highlighted in domestic political discourse as symbols of national sovereignty.
• Early 2025
  Energy narratives increasingly align with EU policy debates and sanctions discussions rather than electoral cycles, indicating strategic conditioning rather than direct interference.

Analysis

Moscow’s use of energy leverage is grounded in structural factors, including infrastructure, contractual obligations, and domestic political narratives. This form of influence is persistent and embedded, contrasting with the more episodic nature of information operations or overt political interference, and makes countering Russian energy leverage costly and politically challenging.

Russian messaging avoids direct criticism of the EU, instead focusing on economic realism, affordability, and national autonomy. This framing is particularly effective in states experiencing economic insecurity and political fragmentation, allowing Moscow to erode public confidence in EU integration without overt demands for political alignment.

This strategy enables Russia to maintain influence without escalation, relying on the possibility of withdrawal rather than actual supply disruptions. While unlikely to reverse the region’s strategic orientation, energy leverage slows momentum, preserves Russian access, and contributes to long-term strategic drift in the Western Balkans.

Without substantial investment in diversification and political reform, Moscow is likely to retain the capacity to indirectly shape strategic behaviour. The result is not overt destabilisation, but rather strategic drift, which ultimately limits Western consolidation in Southeastern Europe and serves Russian interests.