Operation Spiderweb: An Assessment

Summary

On 1 June 2025, Ukrainian forces conducted a coordinated FPV-drone strike against five Russian air bases located deep within the country. The targets included strategic long-range bombers – notably the nuclear-capable Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 – as well as A-50 early warning aircraft. The operation demonstrates Ukraine’s growing ability to strike high-value targets far inside enemy territory using commercially available technology. It challenges core assumptions about vulnerability, strategic depth, and deterrence within Russian airspace.

At the same time, the use of off-the-shelf drone systems and covert logistics highlights the rising relevance of asymmetric, technology-driven operations in modern warfare.

Key takeaways

• The perceived security of strategic depth has proven misleading – even distant bases are within reach.
• Asymmetric effectiveness: The operation illustrates the strategic impact of simple, technology-enabled capabilities.
• The loss of 10% of bombers – including nuclear-capable platforms – weighs heavily: low availability amplifies the operational impact, with estimated aircraft losses totaling $7 billion.
• The attack underscores the urgent need for NATO members to strengthen the protection of their own air assets and critical infrastructure against drone swarm threats.

Background

The operation was prepared over 18 months by Ukraine’s intelligence services under strict operational secrecy. A total of 117 FPV drones were covertly transported deep into the Russian hinterland. The targets comprised five strategic air bases – from Murmansk in the north-west to central Russia and the Far East on the Chinese border. The coordinated strike was executed on 1 June. Drones were deployed from mobile units including structures with retractable roofs and panels. They reportedly operated semi-autonomously, using AI-assisted visual navigation, GPS, and adaptive targeting (making them less susceptible to jamming). Ukrainian personnel had been exfiltrated in advance. The attack took place immediately before peace talks in Istanbul.

Analysis

The strike challenges Russia’s reliance on strategic depth and reveals the limited protection afforded by geography alone. The inadequate security of strategic platforms highlights a glaring underestimation of asymmetric threats posed by small, hard-to-detect FPV drones. At the same time, it reveals a structural problem with modern air forces: open airfields, a lack of protective structures and poorly developed defence concepts against swarm attacks also affect Western armies.

The operation shows how technological agility can balance out classic superiority – with minimal resources but maximum effect. The targeted use of commercially available drones, combined with camouflage, AI-supported navigation and precise planning, marks a paradigm shift in strategic warfare.

The loss of several nuclear-capable bombers reduces Russia’s operational flexibility. Due to low availability, the effective loss of capability is greater than the material damage would suggest.

Conclusion and Outlook

Operation Spiderweb does not mark a turning point, but it sends a clear message: even core components of strategic air power can be targeted with simple means. Geographic depth can no longer be relied upon as a protective buffer. For Russia, it represents a tangible capability loss; for Ukraine, it is a demonstrative show of competence; and for Western armed forces, a call to reassess their own vulnerabilities.