Parliamentary Elections in Moldova 2025: Between Europe and Russia

Summary

On 28 September 2025, the Republic of Moldova will elect a new parliament. The vote is considered decisive for the country’s geopolitical direction. It could either confirm the pro-European course with the goal of EU integration by 2028 or initiate a return to neutrality and closer ties with Russia. For many voters, everyday issues such as the economy, energy prices and corruption are the main concerns. But for the European Union, the election is highly relevant in terms of security policy, not least because of Moldova’s location between Ukraine, Romania and the Black Sea region. Moscow, for its part, regards the Republic of Moldova, including the breakaway region of Transnistria, as a strategic sphere of influence. Massive Russian influence through disinformation, vote buying and support for opposition parties and electoral blocs is therefore to be expected.

Key Takeaways

• The election on 28 September is a decision between EU integration by 2028 and closer ties with Russia.
• External influence is shaping the election campaign: the EU is supporting the government with massive financial and political aid, while Russia is relying on hybrid tactics such as disinformation and vote buying.
• Regional fracture lines (pro-Russian north/south vs. pro-European centre and diaspora) make the election result difficult to predict; an unstable coalition is considered likely.

Context

Moldova is a parliamentary republic with 101 seats. Since 2021, President Maia Sandu’s pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) has governed with an absolute majority (63 out of 101 seats). A renewed absolute majority for the PAS is considered unlikely.

PAS (Party of Action and Solidarity): ruling pro-European party of President Maia Sandu.

Patriotic Bloc: alliance around the Socialists (Igor Dodon) with other pro-Russian forces; calls for neutrality and closer relations with Moscow.

Block Alternativa: led by Ion Ceban, officially pro-European, but focused on ‘neutrality’ and pragmatism, partly close to Moscow.

Our Party (Renato Usatîi): populist, heterogeneous, considered a potential ‘kingmaker’.

Small parties and independents: many new parties, little chance of success, but could fragment coalitions.

Analysis

Three factors determine the outcome of the election: external influence, the government’s domestic political weaknesses and regional fault lines within the country.

The European Union is providing massive support to the ruling PAS. Around €1.9 billion has been pledged for energy, infrastructure and modernisation until 2027, of which around €385 million is in grants and the rest in low-interest loans. Together, this amounts to around 11 per cent of Moldova’s GDP. This is supplemented by high-level visits and information campaigns to reach sceptical groups. The aim is to consolidate the pro-European course and secure EU integration by 2028.

Moscow sees this as interference and thus legitimises its own hybrid tactics: disinformation campaigns on social media, vote buying, financing protests and supporting pro-Russian parties and oligarch networks. The aim is to undermine the pro-European course, divide society and weaken confidence in democratic processes. In the 2024 EU accession referendum, approximately 130,000 voters were paid via Russian channels, with a volume of 35–40 million euros, and something similar is to be expected this year. In addition, the separatist region of Transnistria remains a lever of Russian influence and a permanent factor of instability within Moldova.

Domestic policy is dominated by energy prices, inflation and the fight against corruption. The energy crisis in early 2025 revealed dependencies and a lack of preparation on the part of the government. Progress in the fight against corruption remains limited; by summer 2025, there had been no major convictions against oligarchs or corrupt networks, even though this was a key election promise of the PAS. At the same time, opposition parties accuse the PAS of concentrating power and nepotism. The party also lacks new leaders.

There are clear dividing lines between regions. Pro-Russian parties traditionally dominate in the north and south. In regions such as Gagauzia and Taraclia, pro-Russian oligarch networks rely on local structures to buy votes and thus secure their influence. In Gagauzia, trials against regional leaders led to protests that deepened mistrust of the capital. In the centre around Chişinău, the PAS can rely on its stronghold but is dependent on a high voter turnout. Moldovans living abroad also have a decisive influence, regularly accounting for 10 to 20 per cent of the vote and having voted predominantly pro-European in the past.

Conclusion

The election result will have a decisive impact on Moldova’s foreign policy direction. A renewed majority for the PAS would stabilise the EU integration process, even if economic problems and institutional weaknesses make the course difficult. However, a fragmented coalition is more likely, which would delay reforms and promote instability. A strengthening of pro-Russian forces would fundamentally change the foreign policy course and pose considerable security risks for Ukraine, Romania and the entire Black Sea region. Ultimately, the election will show whether Moldovans remain committed to the European path or turn back towards neutrality and closer ties with Russia.