Assessing the upcoming Moldovan election

• It is likely that current Moldovan administration would win presidential election and EU referendum on 20 October. It is unlikely Russian interference would make significant change on the result of election.
• It is highly likely that Russia and pro-Russian movement would attempt to destabilize Moldova. It is realistically possible that Russian attempt would lead to indirect military conflict within few months.

Moldova, with a small population of 2.5 million, is located between Romania and Ukraine. Its geopolitical position has historically allowed Russian influence to dominate the country, a situation that persisted even after the dissolution of the USSR, of which Moldova was a part. Moldova remains heavily dependent on Russia economically, and Moscow has consistently demonstrated a clear intention to maintain its control over the country.

The separatist region of Transnistria has been supported by Russia, resembling similar situations in both Georgia and Ukraine. In Ukraine, pro-Russian separatists were instrumental in Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent Donbass War. Similarly, South Ossetian separatists were used to justify Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, leading to South Ossetia’s continued claim as an independent republic within Georgian territory. The lesson for Moldova is clear: Russia has both the intent and the capability to destabilize the country by leveraging the existing pro-Russian population against the current government, a strategy that has been in play ever since Moldova’s pro-Western political parties secured control of the government.

The situation in Transnistria has always posed a security threat to Moldova, but since the onset of the Ukraine war, the separatist region has increasingly served as an entry point for Russia’s hybrid operations. The separatist government has received significant economic and political support from Moscow, which has publicly acknowledged Transnistria as an independent nation. Tensions between the Moldovan administration and Transnistria have escalated in recent months, with the Moldovan government issuing frequent warnings against separatist movements, while Transnistria has expressed its desire to align with Russia. For instance, the Transnistrian parliament recently outlawed the use of the term “Transnistria,” insisting on the use of the Russian name “Pridnestrovie.”

These rising tensions pose a real threat as Moldova approaches its upcoming presidential election and a referendum, both scheduled for October 20, 2024. The referendum will ask Moldovans whether they support constitutional changes that could pave the way for the country’s eventual accession to the European Union. Despite the Moldovan courts banning the activities of pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor, authorities have uncovered attempts to corrupt the election process through the illegal use of millions of euros. Given Russia’s long history of interfering in the democratic processes of foreign nations, it is clear that Moscow is employing its well-established tactics to undermine Moldova’s political future.

Recent polls suggest that 55-65% of the population supports the referendum, and it is likely that President Maia Sandu will win the upcoming election. However, Russia continually presents the possibility of an opposite outcome. Currently, around 1,700 Russian troops are stationed in Transnistria, and the economic disconnection from Russia has severely impacted Moldova’s economy, which was already suffering due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its related inflation. The ongoing war in Ukraine has exacerbated this, causing inflation to rise by 40%, while Gazprom has significantly reduced gas supplies to Moldova. Moldovan authorities have also accused Shor and Moscow of orchestrating a complex “mafia-style” voter-buying scheme, attempting to bribe approximately 130,000 Moldovans to vote against the referendum and in favor of pro-Russian candidates. The political and economic tensions are unfavorable for the current administration and are likely to intensify as the election approaches.

The ongoing war in Ukraine has also heightened fear among the Moldovan population. With Russian missiles frequently crossing or landing on Moldovan territory, the possibility of a Russian invasion seems increasingly realistic. The presence of Russian forces in Transnistria further complicates the situation, as any military interference by Russia would severely undermine Moldova’s fragile government. The deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West suggests that Moscow may find it easier to initiate further aggression against its former Soviet republics.

It is possible that the Moldovan population’s understanding of the situation could affect the current overwhelming support for the referendum. For the Sandu administration, winning both the presidential election and the referendum is crucial to consolidating its fragile policy direction. While it is likely that the election results will align with President Sandu’s goals, it is equally likely that Russia will view this as a threat to its influence in Moldova and attempt to destabilize the current government through various means. In conclusion, the upcoming elections will be a pivotal moment for Moldova’s future and for Russia’s regional strategy.