US Consulate Targeted in Turkey
August 11, 2015 in TurkeyOn Monday (10 August), the United States Consulate in Istanbul was targeted by two women, with at least nine people killed in a series of separate attacks, which has raised fears that Ankara’s decision to launch a crackdown on the Islamic State (IS) group as well as Kurdish and far-left militants will trigger more violence on Turkish soil.
At 1AM local time, a car carrying explosives struck a police station in Istanbul’s Sultanbeyli neighbourhood. Officials have reported that three policemen and seven bystanders were wounded in the incident, and that the attacker was killed. Less than six hours later, two gunmen opened fire on the same police station, setting off a gunfight, which resulted in the deaths of two attackers and one police officer. There was no claim of responsibility for either attack and so far, IS has not issued any statements about the police station assaults.
At 7AM on Monday, two women targeted the US Consulate in the Sariyer district. According to Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency, there were no casualties, and one of the two women was captured. The news agency has reported that authorities have identified her as Hatice Asik, 42, of the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C). Turkey’s foreign ministry has condemned the attack, stating that security at US diplomatic missions were being tightened. On the ground sources have reported that police with automatic rifles cordoned off streets around the US consulate. Two years ago, the DHKP-C, which is designated a terrorist group by both Turkey and the US, killed a Turkish security guard and wounded several others in a suicide attack that targeted the US Embassy in Ankara. Monday’s attack came a day after the US sent six F-16 fighter jets and about 300 personnel to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, as part of coalition efforts to fight IS. Late on Monday, the DHKP-C claimed on its website that one of its female militants carried out the attack.
Elsewhere in Turkey on Monday, a roadside bombing in southeastern Sirnak province killed four policemen and wounded another. One soldier was killed when a military helicopter drew fire in the province in an attack that officials have blamed on the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Since launching strikes on IS fighters in Syria and PKK militants in northern Iraq, Turkey, which is a NATO member, has been in a heightened state of alert. Authorities in the country have also rounded up hundreds of suspected militants.
Afghanistan Claims IS Leader Killed in Drone Strike
July 16, 2015 in AfghanistanAfghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), has issued a statement claiming that the leader of the Islamic State (IS) terror group in Afghanistan and Pakistan was killed in a drone strike in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar on Friday. Hafiz Saeed – a former Pakistani Taliban commander who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in January – is believed to be among at least thirty other IS militants killed during the attack. Two IS commanders, formerly members of the Taliban, were present when the drone struck and have since confirmed Saeed’s death. A US military spokesperson in Afghanistan has also confirmed that a strike was carried out in Nangarhar but has declined to give any further details.
However, an audio recording of an individual believed to be Hafiz Saeed has since been posted on the Islamic State’s Arabic website. Speaking in the local Pashto language, the as-yet unidentified individual talks about the Islamic State’s desire to implement sharia law in Afghanistan. He also comments on the recent battles between IS militants and members of the Taliban in Nangarhar and the Pakistani security service’s influence over certain members of the latter group. While the authenticity of the audio recording has not been independently verified, it does cast doubt over whether or not Saeed was in fact killed during the Nangarhar drone strike. While this is not the first time that Saeed has been reported killed, his death could represent a major blow to the Islamic State’s ambitions in Khorasan, a geopolitical entity that encompasses both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
While Saeed is the most high profile IS commander to have been targeted recently he is by no means the only one. Earlier in the week, two senior Pakistani militants were also killed in a drone strike in Nangarhar. Security officials reporting on the incident have confirmed that one of the men, Gul Zaman, was Saeed’s deputy in Afghanistan, while the other, Shahidullah Shahid, was the Pakistani Taliban’s principal spokesperson until he defected to join the IS last year. Both men were killed in a US drone strike on a leadership council meeting of the Islamic State in Khorasan. A spokesperson for the Afghan NDS confirmed the strike in a public statement. However, the death toll remains unclear with reports ranging from 24 to 45 fatalities.
IS Claims Responsibility for Consulate Bombing in Egypt
July 13, 2015 in EgyptThe Islamic State (IS) group has claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack that targeted the Italian consulate in central Cairo on Saturday. The attack has demonstrated a further escalation of violence, which suggests that militants may be opening a new front against foreigners in Egypt.
According to Egypt’s health ministry, at least one person was killed after an explosion that targeted the Italian consulate in the centre of Cairo. Security officials in the area reported Saturday that the force of the blast, which officials have indicated was caused by a car bomb, shook the building in the downtown area of the country’s capital city. A spokesman for the health ministry confirmed that one person was killed and ten others were wounded, including two policemen.
Witnesses near the area reported that the explosion caused widespread damage to the building, with a security source disclosing that preliminary investigations have indicated that the attackers placed a bomb underneath a car and remotely detonated it. While the consulate was closed at the time of the attack, the building is located at one of the busiest intersections in Cairo, a major road that connects Ramsis Square to the heart of the city.
Just hours after the attack, IS militants claimed responsibility. In a statement that was carried on a jihadist website, the group indicated “through God’s blessing, Islamic State soldiers were able to detonate a parked car bomb carrying 450 kg of explosive material on the headquarters of the Italian consulate in central Cairo.” The statement further warned “we recommend that Muslims stay clear of these security dens because they are legitimate targets for the mujahedeen’s strikes.”
Until now, IS supporters in Egypt had targeted security forces in the country, however the militant group appears to be expanding its targets. Just last month, it carried out a suicide bombing near the ancient Karnak temple in Luxor. IS’ Egyptian affiliate, which is based in Sinai, remains resilient despite increasing pressure from the country’s military. Recently, militants operating in the Sinai Peninsula have escalated bombing and shooting attacks, targeting soldiers and police officers. Two weeks ago, a car bomb killed Egypt’s top public prosecutor while militants affiliated to IS attacked several military checkpoints in North Sinai, in what was the fiercest fighting in the region in years. At the time, the army reported that seventeen soldiers and more then 100 militants were killed in those clashes. Saturday’s attack on the Italian consulate in Egypt has also highlighted IS’ expanding reach. After the militant group seized large areas of Iraq and Syria last year, they have increasingly begun to expand into Egypt’s neighbour Libya, and more recently have claimed responsibility for high-profile attacks in France, Kuwait and Tunisia.
IS Offensive: A Year Review
June 9, 2015 in Iraq, ISIS, SyriaExactly a year ago, the Islamic State (IS) jihadist group launched its sweeping offensive that resulted in the jihadist group overrunning large areas of territory in Syria and in Iraq and which has led to the death of thousands and displaced millions of people.
With 12 months of bloody conflict, it is likely that the situation will continue before the IS gains can be reversed. Speaking at the end of the G-7 summit in Germany on 8 June, United States President Barack Obama disclosed that when it comes to IS, “we don’t yet have a complete strategy” adding that the reason why there isn’t a complete strategy so far is that “it requires commitments on the part of the Iraqis as well about how recruitment takes place, how that training takes place. The details of that are not yet worked out.” He did note that the Pentagon is currently busy drawing up plans in consultation with the Iraqis, and that once a plan can be signed off on, the details will be made public. This comment is similar to one he made back in August, when he stated, “we don’t have a strategy yet” to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/IS). Since his comments, the US and a coalition of allies have launched more than 4,000 airstrikes in Iraq and neighbouring Syria, however they have been unable to prevent key cities from falling to the jihadists. Furthermore, six months after the US began training Iraqi troops to fight IS militants, Iraq’s forces are often unable to match the jihadists. The US has trained around 7,000 Iraqi soldiers in a series of six-week training camps however none of those 7,000 were deployed in unsuccessful effort to defend Ramadi. President Obama has indicated that the US is “going to have to improve” training for Iraqi forces, leaving open the possibility of deploying additional American military trainers. Currently there are around 3,000 American troops deployed in Iraq.
Some Key events in the Conflict:
2014
June
9: IS-led offensive begins in Iraq’s second largest city Mosul.
10: Mosul falls while the surrounding province of Nineveh follows as multiple Iraqi security forces divisions collapse. Then-premier Nuri al-Maliki, announces that the Iraqi government will arm citizens who volunteer to fight.
11: Tikrit, a major city located north of the capital Baghdad falls to IS.
13: Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, calls on Iraqis to take up arms against the militant group.
IS claims to have executed 1,700 mainly Shiite recruits, releasing photos of the killings.
29: IS declares a cross-border Islamic “caliphate” in Iraq and neighboring Syria, which is headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
August
2: IS launches a renewed northern offensive, which drives Iraqi Kurdish forces back and which targets minority groups with mass killings, rape and enslavement.
Thousands of members of the Yazidi religious minority are besieged on Mount Sinjar. This draws international concern and prompts calls for intervention.
8: The United States begins air strikes in Iraq. An international coalition follows suit.
17: Maliki steps aside and is replaced by Haider al-Abadi
19: IS says it has beheaded US journalist James Foley, releasing a graphic video of the killing which results in international condemnation.
Similar shocking beheadings take the lives of journalists Steven Sotloff, Kenji Goto; aid workers David Haines, Alan Henning and Peter Kassing, and Goto’s friend Haruna Yukawa.
22: Shiite militiamen gun down seventy people in what is an apparent revenge attack at a Sunni mosque in Diyala province.
September
23: The Anti-IS air campaign expands to neighbouring Syria.
October
25: Abadi declares first significant government victory in the Jurf al-Sakhr area, which is located near Baghdad.
29: IS executes dozens of Albu Nimr tribesmen. More mass killings follow.
November
14: Iraq forces recapture the strategic town of Baiji however it is later lost again to IS militants.
2015
January
25: Witnesses and Sunni leaders accuse Shiite militiamen of executing over seventy residents in Diyala province.
26: Staff Lieutenant General Abdulamir al-Zaida announces that Diyala has been “liberated” from IS.
February
3: IS video shows Jordanian pilot Maaz al-Kassasbeh being burned alive in a cage after he was captured in Syria in December.
26: IS releases video of militants destroying ancient artefacts in a museum in Mosul.
March
2: Iraq launches massive operation to retake Tikrit from IS>
5: Iraq indicates that IS has begun “bulldozing” the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud. IS later releases a video of militants smashing artefacts before blowing up the site.
31: Abadi announces that Tikrit has been retaken. However the victory is marred by pro-government forces who burned and looted dozens of houses and shops.
April
5: IS releases video of militants destroying artefacts at the ancient city of Hatra, which is a UNESCO world heritage site.
May
17: IS seizes Anbar capital Ramadi, which along with the capture of Palmyra in a Syria a few days later, signal its most significant
Afghan and Pakistani Taliban Links to Islamic State
March 13, 2015 in Afghanistan, PakistanReports and rumours of disaffected Afghan and Pakistani Taliban insurgents pledging their allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) terror group have been circulating since late September last year. In southern Zabul and Helmand provinces, Mullah Abdul Rauf, a former Taliban commander recently killed in an air strike, was alleged to have been recruiting fighters on behalf of IS. In Kunar and Farah provinces, jihadi training camps have been established while in Ghazni and Paktika provinces, Afghan government officials have announced that hundreds of IS-affiliated foreign fighters posing as refugees have been fighting under the black flag. Although many of these claims have been hard to verify independently, sufficient evidence has emerged in recent months to support the belief that the IS wish to expand their operations into Southern Asia. It is, however, unclear to what extent they have succeeded in doing so.
In response to tactical losses in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has recently been pursuing a strategy designed to preserve its operational capability from destruction. While its primary objective is to defend the territories currently under its control in Iraq and Syria, forays into Lebanon, Libya and elsewhere have proven that its territorial ambitions are not limited to a small corner of the Middle East but are on a vast, global scale. In January 2015, IS spokesperson Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami outlined the Islamic State’s agenda in Southern Asia. In a press release published by the Islamic State’s media wing, Al-Furqan, al Adnani announced the so-called caliphate’s expansion to Khorasan— a geopolitical entity which includes part of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, India and China. Meanwhile, In a separate press release which also appeared in the middle of January, former Pakistani Taliban member Shahidullah Shahid revealed the names of the individuals who would take command of various parts of Afghanistan, including the name of the chapter’s leader, Hafez Saeed Khan, a former commander in the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). More recently, the Islamic State announced the creation of Khorasan Shura – a leadership council for Pakistan and Afghanistan which is almost entirely made up of former TTP leaders. By establishing this council, the IS demonstrated its desire to establish influence amongst Pakistani and Afghani jihadis.
In aligning itself with former AfPak militant commanders and local jihadist groups, the Islamic State’s purpose has been twofold: first, it wants to establish a network of individuals who possess highly developed local knowledge and are capable of launching independent military operations; second, it hopes to polarise public opinion against the U.S led coalition, thereby preparing the ground for further IS expansion. However, these objectives have met with some resistance from local insurgent groups. After al Adnani announced the Khorasan expansion, he also called on: “all the mujahideed in Khorasan to join the caravan of the khalifah [caliph] and abandon disunity and factionalism.” In issuing this call to arms, Al-Adnani and the Islamic State may have inadvertently entered into a turf war with the Afghani Taliban. First, long-standing ideological conventions may prevent some Taliban loyalists from accepting Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as khalifah because Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Supreme Leader of the Taliban, holds the position of Amir ul-Momimeen (Commander of the Faithful Believers). Second, the Afghan Taliban is a nationalist insurgent group: its chief goal is to overthrow the current Afghan government. In contrast, the Islamic state is a expansionist organisation determined to establish its caliphate. Third, the IS split from al Qaeda, a Taliban ally, in February 2014, making an IS-Taliban joint venture even less plausible.
While increased cooperation between the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic State seems unlikely, conditions may be more suitable for greater IS penetration in Pakistan. In the first place, Pakistan has a reputation for fostering the growth and expansion of Sunni militant groups and, unlike Afghanistan, is riven by deep, sectarian cleavages that the profoundly anti-Shiite IS may be able to exploit. Furthermore, Pakistani militants have shown themselves to be more susceptible to IS overtures than their Afghani counterparts, a factor which may result in the ultimate dissolution of the TTP if more and more Taliban commanders and fighters defect. Should the TTP disintegrate, one possible outcome is that the Pakistani government, which continues to use terrorist groups to advance its foreign policy, might bestow their patronage on the Islamic State. Another possibility is that an intra-jihadist struggle will emerge between groups trying to retain their influence and autonomy within the region.
Although Afghanistan and Pakistan both face more immediate problems from local insurgent groups, the threat posed by the Islamic State cannot be ignored. Steps must be taken immediately to ensure that the IS cannot gain a foothold in the AfPak region. Otherwise, the expansion of the IS caliphate may continue unabated throughout Eastern Asia.