Tag Archives: Algeria

MENA Update (16 February 2013)

Algeria: Algeria and the US agreed to work together to prevent criminal access to black market nuclear materials, citing fears that supplies from Gaddafi’s stock are within reach of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Officials from both nations discussed security measures including border patrol, strategic trade controls and illicit transfer of conventional weapons, as well as constant monitoring of smuggling threats and trends.

Algerian Colonel Djamel Abdessalem Z’ghida announced that ground border surveillance in the southwest has been strengthened for the fight against trafficking and other criminal networks. Ground forces are supported by daily aerial surveillance.

The agreement between Algeria and the US is an unusual act of cooperation for Algeria, whose government prefers to conduct domestic security affairs unilaterally. US officials hope these efforts increase cooperation on a regional and international scale.

A May 2011 report, distributed immediately following bin Laden’s death, indicated that renewed terror activity could arise from within Algeria’s Al Qaeda franchise. The BP internal newsletter stated, “[Al Qaeda] affiliates and other groups will seek to fill the leadership and motivational void left by OBL.” However a report from January 2012 made no indication of threats to Algeria, rather focusing on other African and Middle Eastern nations, warning of a new brand of Islamic terrorism and “fostered by weak or nonexistent central governments, easily-crossed borders, ready availability of weapons and explosives, and simmering ethnic, religious and economic fissures.”

The militant group which conducted the terrorist storming of the Ain Amenas gas compound are led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a breakaway commander from AQIM. Both AQIM, and Belmokhtar’s group, called “Those Who Sign With Blood” originated in Algeria.

BP’s latest security assessment focuses on a standoff between Iran and the West, suggesting that Iran could use militia’s controlled by Irack to attack Western interests in Iran.

Bahrain: Rioters have blocked roads and clashed with security forces following the death of a teenage boy during the protests for second anniversary of Bahrain’s uprising. The boy is reported to have died from “close range birdshot”. Hundreds of opposition demonstrators threw petrol bombs at police, who responded with tear gas.

On Saturday, police discovered a bomb on the Bahraini end of the King Fahd causeway, a 25km stretch which links Saudi Arabia to the island country. The route is used by thousands of people each day.

The protests occur in the midst of reconciliation talks between the predominantly Sunni government and Shi’ia opposition parties. The opposition wants to put an end to the Bahraini monarchy’s political domination and full power in parliament. The next round of talks is scheduled for Sunday, yet there is no word from either side whether the discussions will continue in the wake of the protests.

Egypt:  On Friday, Egyptian security officials seized two tons of explosives hidden in a truck carrying fruits and vegetables. The explosives were confiscated in the main Suez Canal transport tunnel which connects Sinai to the rest of Egypt. The explosives were packed in 100 plastic bags, and are a type used for demolishing stones in quarries. The driver was been taken in for questioning, and said he was unaware he was transporting explosives. A businessman had asked him to take the goods to Sinai for collection.

Since the 2011, and particularly the Libyan revolution,  Egypt’s Interior Ministry has confiscated hundreds of weapons smuggled from Libya, some of which are meant to be delivered to Gaza. Sinai has increasingly become a haven for Islamist militants who have benefitted from lack of security in the area following the Egyptian Revolution.

The explosives designed for demolishing stones may be an indication that Egyptian attempts to block smuggling tunnels in the Sinai are being met with strong resistance. On Wednesday, Egyptian security forces began flooding smuggling tunnels between Sinai and the Gaza Strip, in an effort to shut them down. The network of tunnels provides an estimated 30% of all goods received into the region, circumventing a blockade imposed by Israel since 2007.

Hamas released a statement Saturday condemning the Egyptian government for the actions. Khalil El-Haya, a senior Hamas official, added that people in Gaza consider Egyptian actions equal to a renewal of the Israeli blockade.

An Iranian envoy to Beirut has connected the killing with the Israeli government, stating that the killing had strengthened Iran’s resolve against Israel.  Ali Shirazi, a representative of Ayatollah Khomenei to the Guards’ elite Quds force, stated, “Our enemies should also know that we will quickly get revenge for (the death of) Haj Hassan (Shateri) from the Israelis, and the enemies cannot shut off the Iranian people with such stupid acts.”

The Israeli government has not commented on the killing; however Israel has considered military action against Tehran if the Iranian government continues with a nuclear program. Iran claims that the nuclear program is peaceful.

On Friday, the chief UN nuclear inspector announced hopes to reach an agreement with Iran in March which allows them to probe into Iranian nuclear research activities.

Tunisia: Thousands of Tunisians responded to a call by the ruling Islamist Ennahda party and poured into the streets to support the ruling party. Demonstrators denounced Prime Minister Jebaili’s plans for a temporary “technocratic” government and chanted against the secular opposition parties.

The rally was called by Ennahda to denounce Prime Minister Jebali’s suggestion following the assassination of opposition leader Shokri Belaid on 6 February, which resulted in bloody classes between government supporters and opposition.  Jebaili has threatedn to resign if he fails to gain support to form a new government.

Religious and political tensions have risen over several months in what was a “proudly secular” Muslim nation. Talks regarding a new administration have been rescheduled for Monday. A previous deadline for a new administration had been cancelled with no new date scheduled as of yet.

France’s “Mission Accomplished”: Why Peace in Mali is Still Far Away

“Mission Accomplished” – two words made famous by United States President George W. Bush when he proclaimed on 1 May 2003, after just six weeks of fighting, that the U.S. had successfully completed major combat in Iraq.  These two words would over time haunt the Bush administration as “mission accomplished” inevitably transformed into a guerrilla warfare on the streets of Baghdad and throughout the entire country.  Nearly a decade later, French President François Hollande used these exact words when on 2 February 2013, he proclaimed that France’s unilateral military intervention was successful and that French troops would begin to withdrawal from Mali in March.  While the scale of France’s “Operation Serval” is far smaller in comparison to the operations that took place in Iraq, there may be a number of parallels that can create comparisons amongst these two missions.

As the first suicide bomber struck in the town of Gao, and with the Islamist militants believed to be regrouping in Mali’s northern mountainous regions, restoring complete order in a country which for the past ten months has been chaotic, will prove to be a much tougher and complicated mission.  The second phase of France’s campaign, which will primarily focus on restoring territorial integrity throughout Mali, is already proving to be a far more complex challenge than bombing the hideouts of al-Qaeda-linked militants.  In order for this stage to be deemed “mission accomplished,” a more intricate process, composed of political, social and economic aspects, is necessary in order to reintegrate the north and the south and to bridge the cultural divides.

Amongst the issues that are necessary to take into account are the minimal credibilities and discipline within the Malian army, which has already proven to be a factor with the surfacing of allegations of human rights abuses.  In turn, political institutions throughout the country have atrophied, Tuareg separatism continues to pose a threat, there are continuing tensions between the north and south, which includes allegations of acts against human rights, there is a need to tackle a vast uninhibited area, which like in Afghanistan, could create a safe haven for these militants, and there is the rapidly growing refugee crisis that has not only impacted Mali, but its neighbouring countries as well.  Additionally, as France looks towards scaling back its operations within the country, officials in Paris will increasingly look towards the African security forces in order to replace them.  However it is highly unlikely that this new contingent will be fully prepared to take over from the French by March of this year.  Of the estimated 5,000 troops that are set to arrive in Mali, a contingent of only 2,500 soldiers, composed of troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, is currently on the ground.  This contingent is composed of English and French-speaking troops, all of which come from different military cultures and which hold different levels of experience.  This has sparked fears that the force may not have the capabilities that are necessary in order to root out the Islamist militants from their hideaways.  France has already suggested that a United Nations peacekeeping force be deployed to Mali in April, a sign that the French are well aware of the limitations of the African forces.

On a much larger scale, there is a need to tackle the fundamental regional issues that remain to be deep-seated.  A senior national security official within the Obama Administration has stated that “what we’re seeing across North Africa and parts of the Middle East is an extremist threat that is fueled by the reality of porous borders, ungoverned territory, too readily available weapons, increasing collaboration among some of these groups, and, in many cases, a new government that lacks the capacity and sometimes the will to deal with the problem.”  In the case of Mali, all of these points will have to be tackled in order to ensure that such a situation does not occur again.

Over the following weeks and months, French and African Forces will have to deal with what has been called the “vanishing enemy” – the hundreds of Islamist fighters who previously occupied the towns of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu but which have now either disappeared into the vast desert territory or have blended in with either the general populations or the refugees that have been spilling into the neighboring countries.    There have already been  a number of reports that have indicated that some fighters have mixed in with the refugees who have been seeking safety in Mauritania.  In response to such reports, Algeria has reinforced its border security in an attempt to prevent militants from crossing over.  Chadian troops have also begun to withdrawal from Kidal, and have moved towards the mountainous regions which border Algeria, as intelligence reports have indicated that a number of Islamist militants have been regrouping in the region.

While progress is being made to rid the country of such militants, it remains to be unknown just how well these groups have prepared for such a rapid retreat.  Specifically, it will be necessary to examine whether or not these groups established other bases and supply lines and whether these locations have been identified and targeted by the forces.  Over the coming weeks, it will be necessary to cut off all the supply lines, which will be helped by Algeria’s reinforcement of its border security.  However there remains to be thousands of miles of unmarked, un-patrolled frontiers across Mali where terrorist groups can retreat and utilize as a means of reorganizing themselves.  Furthermore, while Algeria has the ability to secure its borders, the ability of authorities in Libya and Niger to prevent militants from crossing into their countries is limited at best.  A factor which could also prove to be critical as militants may cross the borders for safety amidst France’s air and ground attacks.  If their are large groups of Islamist terrorists remaining in the unmonitored regions of northern Mali, the next stage of battle will undoubtedly involve asymmetrical warfare, therefore the use of IED’s, assassinations of military and political officials as well as the use of suicide bombings.  Mali’s first suicide bombing may have already provided the French and African troops with a glimpse of the type of warfare that such militant groups are capable of orchestrating.

A second factor will be the gathering of intelligence which may prove to be difficult as northern Mali is an area that is larger than Spain and although a majority of the territory is vast open land, the Adrar de Ifoghas mountains are composed of a network of caves and passes, similar to those found in the Afghan Tora Bora region.  Moktar Bemoktar, whose followers carried out the attack on a gas facility in Ain Amenas, Algeria in January of this year, as well as Iyad Ag Ghali, a Tuareg and leader of Ansar Dine, are known to have an intimate knowledge of this region.  Over the past several years, Belmoktar has used his knowledge of this region in order to smuggle products and kidnapped civilians across the border.  A business which has aided him in funding the purchasing of weapons and the recruitment of his soldiers.  It is also currently believed that seven French hostages are being held in the mountainous region by his group and MUJAO.  While the French military intervention may have disrupted the traditional routes used by these militant groups, regional analysts believe that they will now focus on their remaining routes within the mountainous regions as a source to continue not only smuggling weapons into Mali, but as a mechanism to regroup and begin staging hit and run attacks in their former strongholds.  The US recent agreement with Niger to station surveillance drones may be a sign of the need to monitor the mountainous regions on a more regular basis.

Finally, the grievances amongst the ethnic Tuaregs which led to the division of Mali will have to be addressed and the humanitarian crisis will have to be tackled.  Negotiations with the Tuaregs, which will involve a greater measure of autonomy as well as the long-promised economic aid for the region, are essential in restoring stability in the north.  Although such negotiations will not occur over night, there appears to be a window of opportunity which may aid in speeding up the process.  This opportunity came with the split of Ansar Dine, an Islamist group which was formed in 2011 and which is led by Iyad Ag Ghali.  Although his whereabouts are currently unknown, his deputy, Alghabass Ag Intallah, has formed a splinter group known as the Islamist Movement of Azawad, which is prepared for negotiations.  In recent days, similar movements have been coming from the MNLA, demonstrating that they too are ready for a negotiations to occur.  Before the July 2013 elections, political dialogue amongst the varying groups will have to take place in Mali.

Once Africa’s success story, Mali must now look inwards in an attempt to reunite the north and south, however its future looks uncertain. While at the moment, the military intervention in Mali seems far from being a “mission accomplished,” stability in the country is necessary not only for the region, but for the entire International community.  Although Mali is not a regional powerhouse, it is very large, nearly twice the size of France, and has seven neighbours, whose long, poorly guarded borders can inevitably provide militants with the supply and escape routes that are necessary for their survival.  In turn, many of these border countries have already bared witness to violence, extremism and instability and they are ill-equipped in order to deal with the fallout if Mali was to collapse.  In the past Mauritania has had problems with militants who have been liked to al-Qaeda.  Niger, like Mali, has also seen frequent rebellions by ethnic Tuareg separatists.  Algeria also has many problems with al-Qaeda.  During the 1990’s, an Islamist insurgency claimed at least 100,000 lives.  Furthermore, a number of militant cells are known to be active in the eastern mountains and in the desert that borders with Mali.  In the past, a number of troop convoys have been ambushed.  The recent attacks in Ain Amenas indicates that this militant issue continues to be a problem in Algeria.  Within Mali itself, the vast and inhospitable desert has allowed groups with the local knowledge of the region to gain vast quantities of money through trafficking drugs, people, or other contrabands.  Therefore as the military campaign moves forward, developing events will continue to be closely monitored by capitals throughout West Africa, Europe and the United States.  The collapse of Mali and a possible exportation of the jihadist vision would threaten not only the neighbouring countries but would be a direct security threat to Europe.

MENA Security Update (13 February 2013)

Algeria Update:

On 8 February, the Algerian army arrested two AQIM would-be suicide bombers in Tinzouatine. The individuals, a Malian and an Algerian, carried explosive belts and automatic weapons. They were arrested in the Tamanrasset province near the Mali border.

This arrest follows an attempt in the previous week by an armed terrorist group to break into military barracks in Jebel Boudoukhane, in the southern province of Khenchela. The incident unfolded as terrorists, dressed in military uniforms, set up a false checkpoint near the target, and intercepted trucks that supplied the military barracks with food. The rebels took the driver hostage and drove to the barracks, carrying machine guns and RPGs. One terrorist was killed and several soldiers were injured; the remaining attackers were hunted down by military reinforcements.

Algerian forces are raising their levels of vigilance, as analysts believe that Algerian and Tunisian radical groups are sharing experiences and will increase attempts to conduct both terrorist activities and smuggling of weapons and drugs.

Libya Update:

Libya will close its borders with Tunisia and Egypt for five days, as a precaution on the two-year anniversary of the removal of Muammar Gaddafi. Prime Minister Ali Zeidan stated, “As of midnight on February 14th until the 18th, no one will be allowed to cross the Libyan borders between Egypt or Tunis as a security precaution.” The government has ruled out official celebrations for the 15^th.

Many Libyans, particularly in the east, are likely to take to the streets to protest the government’s inability to provide reforms, including security measures to disarm militias, or the completion of a new constitution.

Lufthansa and Austrian airlines have suspended services until after 17 February, citing “tensions on the ground”. International organizations, including the UN and Western embassies, will also be on lockdown beginning 14 February. Many foreign nationals have left the country in advance of the anniversary.

Security in Tripoli and Benghazi has been tightened, including an increase in checkpoints. The UK FCO has not changed travel advice, but urges against all travel to the country, particularly in light of anticipated demonstrations between 15 and 17 February.

Tunisia Update:

Tunisia has experienced a deepening political crisis since last week’s killing of Shokri Belaid, a leftist lawyer and outspoken opposition leader. The murder in broad daylight, which has not been seen since Tunisian colonial times, highlighted concerns over a largely unreformed police force and justice system.

Prime Minister Jebali delivered an emergency proposal to completely dissolve government and replace politicians with a non-political caretaker government in order to calm the unrest. The caretaker government would remain in place until elections could be held. The proposal sparked tensions within his own Ennahda party. Jebali has scaled back his proposals, which will be announced this week. If rejected, Jebali intends to resign.

One of the two secular parties in the coalition, Congress for the republic (CPR), is also opposed to Jebali’s proposal, fearing it will allow the return of figures from the former regime. Tunisian President Marzouki, who had also threatened to resign, has decided his CPR will remain involved in the transitional, Islamist-led government for an additional week. This announcement is a reversal on his threats to quit if two Islamist ministers were not replaced. CPR Secretary-General Mohamed Abbou stated, “The party has decided to freeze the resignations of its ministers for a week for more discussions on a coalition government.”

On Friday, tens of thousands of Tunisians took to the street for Belaid’s funeral, accusing the ruling Ennahda party of lax security measures in the face of increasing violence. The next day, thousands attended a pro-government rally in support of the current coalition.

UK FCO has issued no travel advice warnings.

Egypt Update:

In a rare move, hundreds of police officers held a protest on Tuesday, demanding that they not be used as a political tool of oppression by the reigning Muslim Brotherhood Party. Officers in at least 10 Egyptian provinces rallied around security officers, some carrying signs saying “we are innocent of the blood of martyrs.”

This uncommon protest by the police comes on the heels of increased police brutality during the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, which saw “old regime” tactics being used against protesters. On Monday, the second anniversary of the overthrow of Mubarak, police clashed with demonstrators in front of Ettihadiya Palace in Cairo, using water cannons and teargas to repel the protesters. The clashes have been smaller and less violent than in previous weeks.

Many protesters feel that President Muhammed Morsi is reverting to the tactics of force used by the Mubarak regime. Protesters also feel that the ruling party is using religious means to increase their control over the nation.

To underscore this, an Egyptian court banned YouTube in Egypt for one month due to the site’s continued hosting of an Anti-Islamic film which caused deadly protests throughout the Muslim world last September. Because the ban is both delayed and disproportional to the amount of unrest it caused in Egypt, human rights activists perceive it as a religious pretext for imposing restrictions and preventing free expression.

In addition, the nation was stirred last week by religious fatwas issued by hard-line Muslim clerics urging the assassination of opposition members. The ruling party has condemned these actions; Egyptian Interior Minister has issued an order for police to deploy additional security to the homes of opposition members. However, extreme actions such as the decree of a fatwa are unusual in Egypt, and are perceived to be in direct connection with the ruling party. The opposition party has since demanded that Morsi be put on trial over the deaths of 60 anti-government demonstrators in the past weeks; the public prosecutor claims there is no evidence to link Morsi with the deaths.

Understanding Algerian Non-Interference

The hostage crisis at Ain Amenas gas complex in January placed a spotlight on Algerian foreign policy and security measures. Although unilateral Algerian security tactics frustrated international governments, authorities in many nations still believe Algerian support is necessary for security in North Africa. Yet President Bouteflika and the Algerian government are unlikely to provide extensive cooperation beyond their borders; Algerian policy is isolationist at the core.

The Algerian government has long held a “non-interference” foreign policy strategy.  Historically, President Bouteflika has been a vocal opponent of foreign intervention, believing in particular that Western foreign military spending in North Africa allows too much leverage and insight into domestic militaries. The January attacks highlighted the extent to which Algeria is ready to act unilaterally. When Islamic militants took several hostages, including 48 foreign nationals, the Algerian military acted quickly to end the siege. This decision, made without the advice or support of other nations, aggravated world leaders who commonly cooperate in such situations. However, to the Algerians, these dialogs appear time-consuming and intrusive.

Algerian reluctance to invite coalition cooperation within its borders is equally matched by an unwillingness to interfere beyond its borders, as evidenced during the2011 Libyan Revolution. Though the Algerian government did not support the Gaddafi regime, they were reluctant to become involved in NATO-supported operations to remove the dictator. Rather, the Algerian government focused on the potential volatility in Libya, fearing that instability would create pockets of opportunity for increased weapons trafficking and radicalised groups to take hold. The Algerian government fortified its borders, shutting down crossings between the two nations. Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci stated, “We can only say that the relationship between us will improve with the return of stability to Libya.” Further, the Algerian government believes that those who aided in the overthrow of Gaddafi, particularly NATO, are responsible not only for the resulting instability, but are beholden to guide Libya’s new government through course-correction as it makes its way into democratic polity.

The nature of this “fortress-like” philosophy dates back to Algerian independence from France in 1962, when the Algerian government became determined to become a pillar of sovereignty. Decades later, in 1992, Algeria suffered a coup d’etat which led to a decade long civil war between the Algerian military and two Islamic parties; the Islamic Salvation Front, and the considerably more radical Armed Islamic Group (GIA).  The GIA carried out a series of massacres, and Algeria found itself alone in struggling with militant Islamic insurgencies, relatively unaided by Western forces. By the end of the war, insurgencies cost the lives of almost 200,000 people, yet the terrorist threat in the Middle East was not fully acknowledged by Western forces until the attacks in the US on September 11, 2001. As a result, Algeria’s experiences have reinforced the government’s conviction to remain solidly independent in dealing with domestic security issues, and non-intrusive in events beyond its borders.

Complicating matters for Algeria, however, are contentious neighbours along those borders. Algeria is the largest country in Africa (five times the size of France) and has a 2,500 mile land border. Six hundred of those miles are shared with a still-unstable Libya, and a further nine hundred of those miles are shared with Mali, where Islamist militants have taken over the northern region of the country, threatening to impact security along Algerian borders. Still more troublesome, a large section of the nation borders fall deep within the Sahara. In that vast, secluded space, many militant groups have taken residence in the areas bordering Algeria, particularly in northern Mali.

In April 2012, an offshoot group of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kidnapped seven people from an Algerian consulate in northern Mali. The militants executed one hostage and released three in the summer. The three remaining are reportedly still in captivity.  Despite these affronts, the Algerian government has been loath to cooperate in actions against militants in Mali, acutely aware of their direct impact on security within Algerian borders.  Algerian officials fear that military involvement might push the radicals further north into domestic territory. Further still, Algerian actions may cause radicalisation of the nomadic Taureg Bedouins, whose territory resides on the borders of Algeria, Mali, and Niger.

While the Algerian government is adamant that they will not send troops to Mali, it has granted permission for French fighters to use Algerian airspace, and has reinforced military presence along the Malian border. The attackers at Ain Amenas gas complex claimed that the siege was a direct result of Algerian cooperation. Attacking Algeria’s gas complex is a significant step for militant Islamists; the assault was more sophisticated than bombings in public places, and sources confirm that the attack has been planned for some time, with the help of individuals working inside the complex.  AQIM and other radicalised groups have historically profited from ransoming hostages, and a complex with foreign nationals would possibly provide income to spend on achieving goals in northern Mali.  In addition, the attack sends a message. Sonatrach, Algeria’s nationalized oil and gas company, is the tenth largest in the world. The hydrocarbon industry provides the bulk of the nation’s wealth.  An attack within such an infrastructure signals an attempt to cripple the Algerian economy.

However, a large percentage of Algerian revenue supports its defence spending. Algeria has the 16^th largest defence budget in the world (primarily purchasing weaponry from Russia), and a highly proficient military, adept after years of experience, at securing its borders and ensuring safety to its hydrocarbon profit sectors. Algeria will continue to secure and reinforce its borders from within, but are unlikely to provide more than airspace permissions in affairs beyond its borders.

Security Updates for MENA (29 January 2013)

ALGERIA: On Sunday, gunmen attacked and blew up a gas pipeline in northern Algeria, killing two guards and wounding seven before being driven off. The extent of damage to the pipeline is still uncertain.

The militants launched a homemade mortar shells at the Ain Chikh site in the Djebahia, 120 kilometres (75 miles) southwest of Algiers. The area is a stronghold of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but militants rarely carry out attacks in the region.

The pipelines, which are protected by local community guards, carry gas from the Hassi R’Mel field in the Sahara desert to the Mediterranean coast for refining. Algerian army units have searched the area, but there have been no arrests. The incident comes two weeks after Islamist militants attempted to seize control of the Ain Amenas gas complex. The attack left 37 hostages dead. Following the gas complex siege, Algerian military was still searching for attackers who had gone missing during the raid.

Between 2011 and 2012, pipelines in Egypt were blown up more than 15 times by Islamic militants in protest of Egyptian oil being delivered to Israel. Oil and gas reserves are the backbone of Algeria’s economy, supplying large amounts of natural gas to Europe. It is likely that the attack was a display of aggression toward Algeria’s support of French intervention in Mali.

TRAVEL ADVICE:

The UK Foreign and Common Wealth office (FCO) has not changed travel advice for Algeria following the pipeline explosion. The FCO advises against all but essential travel to areas within 450km of the Mali and Niger borders and within 100km of the Mauritania border, and all but essential travel to areas within 100km of the Libya and Tunisia borders, south of Tebessa.

LIBYA:  The British embassy in Tripoli has become aware of reports of a potential threat against it. The threats come days after “specific and imminent threats” picked up by MI6, urging British nationals to leave the eastern city of Benghazi due to a “specific and imminent threat” against Westerners, and a day after a similar threat to British nationals in northern Somalia.

An embassy spokesperson said, “We are aware of reports of a potential threat against the British embassy in Tripoli and we are liaising closely with the Libyan government.”

“There is no change to our travel advice, we still recommend against all but essential travel to Tripoli.”

Libyan officials said they were not aware of such reports. Deputy Interior Minister Omar Al- Khadrawi stated, “The British embassy has not informed us of any threats towards it and there has been no coordination between us.”

Last week’s call for many Western and European nationals to leave Benghazi frustrated Libyans, who are eager to increase foreign investment to rebuild infrastructure.

LIBYAN BORDER SECURITY:

LIBYA- EGYPT: The Libyan government has issued a ban on foreigners crossing the Egyptian-Libyan border at Musaid to enter the country. The ban does not apply to Egyptians. Interior Ministry’s spokesman, Magdi Al-Arafi, said that foreigners would have to enter the country from Egypt by air. The border restrictions are due to constant and highly-organised trafficking of drugs and weapons, as well as humans. Six months ago, border forces went on strike in protest against the intimidation and violence from smugglers.

LIBYA-TUNISIA: The Ras Jadir border was reopened Sunday after the two countries reached an agreement on safety control and trade measures. Ras Jadir is a main border crossing for goods and people, and has been closed several times, impacting the movement of freights in both directions, and affecting  border residents who earn their living from trans-border trade.

VISA REQUIREMENT CHANGES: Today, Libyan authorities have announced that all foreign visitors to the country must have a visa. Previously travellers from countries such as Tunisia, Turkey and Jordan were not required to have it. In addition, companies wishing to employ foreign workers need to satisfy the Libyan Interior Ministry.

Libya has been trying to boost security at its oil fields following the deadly attacks in Algeria and the threats on Westerners in the region.

LIBYA TRAVEL ADVICE:

There is no change to UK FCO travel advice. The FCO advises against all but essential travel to Tripoli, Zuwara, Az Zawiya, al Khums, Zlitan and Misrata, and the coastal towns from Ras Lanuf to the Egyptian Border, with the exception of Benghazi. The FCO also advises against all travel to all other areas of Libya, including Benghazi.

EGYPT: Head of Suez Canal Authority, Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish, said that the navigation movement in the Suez Canal is normal and is fully secured, and Canal leadership is determined to keep the Canal fully protected. The Canal waterway is secured by the naval force, the second and third field armies, border guard and the Ministry of Interior. Security measures have been tightened due to tensions in Suez and Port Said.

Protests in Egypt came to a head as the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution coincided with death sentences handed down to 21 football fans involved in deadly riots in Port Said in 2012. President Muhammed Morsi declared emergency law in Suez, Port Said, and Ismalia, but residents ignored the night time curfew and took to the streets, saying they no longer recognize Morsi’s authority. In other Cairo and Alexandria, protesters marched in opposition to Morsi’s authority. In Cairo, protestors captured and set an armoured police vehicle ablaze in Tahrir Square.

Egypt’s Defence Minister, General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, warned that the current crisis could lead to a collapse of the state and threaten future generations. Al-Sisi fears that the economic, political and social challenges facing Egypt represented “a real threat to the security of Egypt and the cohesiveness of the Egyptian state”.

On Monday, The Egyptian cabinet ratified law which allows the president, at-will, to “empower the armed forces to make civilian arrests in safeguarding state institutions and restoring security.” The law would apply until after the next legislative elections. The move will likely anger protesters further as Morsi’s actions are increasingly reminiscent of the Mubarak regime.

EGYPT TRAVEL ADVICE:

The FCO advises against all travel to North Sinai, and all but essential travel to South Sinai, with the exception of the Red Sea Resorts in Sharm el Sheikh, Taba, Nuweiba and Dahab, and road travel and transfers between the resorts and the airports of Taba and Sharm el Sheikh. The FCO warns that demonstrations happen regularly across Egypt, often on Fridays. Some have been violent and resulted in deaths, and police may use tear gas for crowd control. In addition, disturbances in Cairo, Port Said, Suez, Ismalia and Alexandria have been violent. A state of emergency is in force in Port Said, Suez and Ismalia; the curfew is from 21:00 to 06:00, and is expected to remain in place until 26 February 2013.

IRAN: Iranian authorities have arrested fourteen journalists in the past two days, citing links to “anti-revolutionary” media. The coordinated crackdown comes ahead of the June presidential elections. Iran’s clerical leadership is making strides to avoid a repeat of the protests which occurred in 2009.

Meanwhile, On Thursday, Iranian Ambassador Hassan Danaie-Far insisted that Tehran retained the right to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which a third of the world’s traded oil passes, in response to any aggression, military or otherwise, by the United States. The statement came in response to continued pressure by the US over Iran’s nuclear program.

Danaie-Far stated, “The only remaining card on the table is war. Is it to their benefit? Is it to the benefit of the world? Is it to the benefit of the region?”

Washington has warned Tehran that any attempt to close the strait would be viewed as a “red line” and grounds for United States military action.

IRAN TRAVEL ADVICE

The UK FCO has retained the same advice since November 2012 against all travel to Iran. British nationals have been arbitrarily detained in Iran in 2010 and 2011. The FCO believes that the risk of this occurring again following the imposition of further EU sanctions on Iran, is significant.