Suicide Attack in Northwestern Afghanistan

A suicide attack has torn through a crowded market place in Faryab, a province in northwestern Afghanistan, killing more than two dozen people and injuring many more. Initial reports of the attack, which took place in the Almar district, have so far been unable to pinpoint the precise number of casualties, with various Afghan officials placing the number of fatalities between 15 and 25 and the number of injured between 32 and 38. At the moment of going to press it is believed that all of the casualties were civilians except for one soldier and two police officers.

According to Naqibullah Fayeq, a provincial parliamentarian, the bomber – who was riding a motorcycle at the time – detonated his explosive when security forces stationed in the market stopped him to check his identity papers. The attack occurred at 11am local time on a weekly shopping day when the market was crowded with people. Deputy provincial police chief Baryalai Basharyar said that the “target of the attacker was military forces that were present in the area but the majority of the victims were innocent civilians.” So devastating was the explosion that Faryab’s one small provincial hospital and two clinics were rapidly overwhelmed, necessitating the transfer of many victims to hospitals in Balkh and other nearby provinces.

While previous years have seen the Taliban mount annual attacks on provinces to the south and east of the country, the militant group has in recent weeks launched a series of increasingly daring attacks in the north. In late June, Taliban militants captured the Chandara district in the northeast province of Kunduz after a protracted gun battle with Afghan security forces. While security forces were able to regain control of Chardara in a counter-offensive shortly thereafter, reports began to emerge that the militants were planning to push closer to the centre of the province. Also in June, Taliban militants snatched control of Yamgan district in Badakhshan Province away from Afghan security forces. These strategic victories have caught the Afghan government off guard and it has responded by re-arming militia groups to assist the regular soldiers defend threatened geographies.

So far, this and other initiatives have not succeeded in substantially reducing the Taliban’s capacity for insurgency. They continue to be active throughout Faryab where they control many important transport corridors to neighbouring provinces. In the weeks to come, Afghan vice president Abdul Rashid Dostum – who has been overseeing military operations in the area from his home province of Jowzjan – is set to lead a high-ranking delegation to Faryab in an attempt to resolve some of the issues that have contributed to the deteriorating security situation in the north. Should this prove successful, the Taliban’s territorial ambitions in the north might be thwarted long enough for the Afghan military to regroup and launch a counter-offensive, reclaiming territory lost during the spring/summer fighting season.

Afghanistan Claims IS Leader Killed in Drone Strike

Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), has issued a statement claiming that the leader of the Islamic State (IS) terror group in Afghanistan and Pakistan was killed in a drone strike in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar on Friday. Hafiz Saeed – a former Pakistani Taliban commander who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in January – is believed to be among at least thirty other IS militants killed during the attack. Two IS commanders, formerly members of the Taliban, were present when the drone struck and have since confirmed Saeed’s death. A US military spokesperson in Afghanistan has also confirmed that a strike was carried out in Nangarhar but has declined to give any further details.

However, an audio recording of an individual believed to be Hafiz Saeed has since been posted on the Islamic State’s Arabic website. Speaking in the local Pashto language, the as-yet unidentified individual talks about the Islamic State’s desire to implement sharia law in Afghanistan. He also comments on the recent battles between IS militants and members of the Taliban in Nangarhar and the Pakistani security service’s influence over certain members of the latter group. While the authenticity of the audio recording has not been independently verified, it does cast doubt over whether or not Saeed was in fact killed during the Nangarhar drone strike. While this is not the first time that Saeed has been reported killed, his death could represent a major blow to the Islamic State’s ambitions in Khorasan, a geopolitical entity that encompasses both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

While Saeed is the most high profile IS commander to have been targeted recently he is by no means the only one. Earlier in the week, two senior Pakistani militants were also killed in a drone strike in Nangarhar. Security officials reporting on the incident have confirmed that one of the men, Gul Zaman, was Saeed’s deputy in Afghanistan, while the other, Shahidullah Shahid, was the Pakistani Taliban’s principal spokesperson until he defected to join the IS last year. Both men were killed in a US drone strike on a leadership council meeting of the Islamic State in Khorasan. A spokesperson for the Afghan NDS confirmed the strike in a public statement. However, the death toll remains unclear with reports ranging from 24 to 45 fatalities.

Historic Negotiations with the Taliban

A delegation from the High Peace Council of Afghanistan has travelled to Pakistan to take part in historic negotiations with the Taliban, raising hopes of a breakthrough between the two groups even as the spring/summer fighting season gathers momentum and insurgent violence escalates.

Following a series of informal talks held by the two sides in various countries, the Afghan delegation met with with their Taliban counterparts on 8 July in Muree, a resort near the Pakistani capital Islamabad. Afghanistan and the United States have previously urged Pakistan to host trilateral talks with the Taliban, as they believe that Islamabad’s influence over the militant group might prove useful in expediting the peace process. It is with this in mind that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has sought out ways of improving diplomatic relations with Pakistan, particularly in regards to increased security and intelligence cooperation. While these efforts have been widely criticised in Afghanistan, Islamabad has – by agreeing to host the talks – shown itself to be 1) susceptible to Ghani’s overtures and 2) committed to the restoration of regional stability.

So far, very little information has been revealed about the nature of the talks or the identities of the participants. On the Afghan side, the four-man team is said to include deputy foreign minister Hekmat Karzai, the nephew of former president Hamid Karzai. As the High Peace Council is supposed to operate independently from the government, Karzai’s inclusion in the negotiating team may been seen as an attempt by Ashraf Ghani to placate the former president, who has fiercely criticised Ghani’s attempts to normalise relations with Pakistan. On the Taliban side, Pakistani intelligence officials have confirmed that the negotiating team is made up of three men, whose identities have yet to be disclosed. Finally, acting as observers, are representatives of the Chinese and American governments.

While the talks have been greeted with expressions of cautious optimism, the road ahead lies strewn with obstacles, chief amongst which is the Taliban itself. Riven by disunity and unwilling to take orders from a leadership in exile, the Taliban is no longer a coherent insurgent group. A Taliban spokesperson has recently come forward saying that the individuals contracting the negotiations in Pakistan have not been authorised to do so, as the office in Qatar is the only channel through which such discussions can be held. Evidently, there is an ongoing rivalry between those members of the Taliban who want to fight and those who want to talk.

A further complication, and one which will certainly occupy the minds of those present in Islamabad, is the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) as a rival insurgent group in Afghanistan. Over the past month, IS militants are believed to have seized territory from the Taliban in six of the twenty one Nangarhar districts. Moreover, witnesses claim that many of the IS fighters are former Taliban militants who have become disillusioned with the group’s failure to reestablish its authority in Kabul. Should this state of affairs be allowed to continue indefinitely, the Taliban runs the risk of complete disintegration. While it is impossible to say at this stage what the outcome of of the talks will be, there is no doubt that the prospect of becoming a spent force will be an important – if not deciding – factor in the militants’ decision making process.

Afghan and Pakistani Taliban Links to Islamic State

Reports and rumours of disaffected Afghan and Pakistani Taliban insurgents pledging their allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) terror group have been circulating since late September last year. In southern Zabul and Helmand provinces, Mullah Abdul Rauf, a former Taliban commander recently killed in an air strike, was alleged to have been recruiting fighters on behalf of IS. In Kunar and Farah provinces, jihadi training camps have been established while in Ghazni and Paktika provinces, Afghan government officials have announced that hundreds of IS-affiliated foreign fighters posing as refugees have been fighting under the black flag. Although many of these claims have been hard to verify independently, sufficient evidence has emerged in recent months to support the belief that the IS wish to expand their operations into Southern Asia. It is, however, unclear to what extent they have succeeded in doing so.

In response to tactical losses in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has recently been pursuing a strategy designed to preserve its operational capability from destruction. While its primary objective is to defend the territories currently under its control in Iraq and Syria, forays into Lebanon, Libya and elsewhere have proven that its territorial ambitions are not limited to a small corner of the Middle East but are on a vast, global scale. In January 2015, IS spokesperson Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami outlined the Islamic State’s agenda in Southern Asia. In a press release published by the Islamic State’s media wing, Al-Furqan, al Adnani announced the so-called caliphate’s expansion to Khorasan— a geopolitical entity which includes part of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, India and China. Meanwhile, In a separate press release which also appeared in the middle of January, former Pakistani Taliban member Shahidullah Shahid revealed the names of the individuals who would take command of various parts of Afghanistan, including the name of the chapter’s leader, Hafez Saeed Khan, a former commander in the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). More recently, the Islamic State announced the creation of Khorasan Shura – a leadership council for Pakistan and Afghanistan which is almost entirely made up of former TTP leaders. By establishing this council, the IS demonstrated its desire to establish influence amongst Pakistani and Afghani jihadis.

In aligning itself with former AfPak militant commanders and local jihadist groups, the Islamic State’s purpose has been twofold: first, it wants to establish a network of individuals who possess highly developed local knowledge and are capable of launching independent military operations; second, it hopes to polarise public opinion against the U.S led coalition, thereby preparing the ground for further IS expansion. However, these objectives have met with some resistance from local insurgent groups. After al Adnani announced the Khorasan expansion, he also called on: “all the mujahideed in Khorasan to join the caravan of the khalifah [caliph] and abandon disunity and factionalism.” In issuing this call to arms, Al-Adnani and the Islamic State may have inadvertently entered into a turf war with the Afghani Taliban. First, long-standing ideological conventions may prevent some Taliban loyalists from accepting Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as khalifah  because Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Supreme Leader of the Taliban, holds the position of Amir ul-Momimeen (Commander of the Faithful Believers). Second, the Afghan Taliban is a nationalist insurgent group: its chief goal is to overthrow the current Afghan government. In contrast, the Islamic state is a expansionist organisation determined to establish its caliphate. Third, the IS split from al Qaeda, a Taliban ally, in February 2014, making an IS-Taliban joint venture even less plausible.

While increased cooperation between the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic State seems unlikely, conditions may be more suitable for greater IS penetration in Pakistan. In the first place, Pakistan has a reputation for fostering the growth and expansion of Sunni militant groups and, unlike Afghanistan, is riven by deep, sectarian cleavages that the profoundly anti-Shiite IS may be able to exploit. Furthermore, Pakistani militants have shown themselves to be more susceptible to IS overtures than their Afghani counterparts, a factor which may result in the ultimate dissolution of the TTP if more and more Taliban commanders and fighters defect. Should the TTP disintegrate, one possible outcome is that the Pakistani government, which continues to use terrorist groups to advance its foreign policy, might bestow their patronage on the Islamic State. Another possibility is that an intra-jihadist struggle will emerge between groups trying to retain their influence and autonomy within the region.

Although Afghanistan and Pakistan both face more immediate problems from local insurgent groups, the threat posed by the Islamic State cannot be ignored. Steps must be taken immediately to ensure that the IS cannot gain a foothold in the AfPak region. Otherwise, the expansion of the IS caliphate may continue unabated throughout Eastern Asia.

AQ, ISIS Compete for South Asian Primacy

On 5 September, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released a video announcing the formation of a new South Asian branch of AQ, “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent.” Zawahiri stated the group will “raise the flag of jihad” across the Indian subcontinent, as well as Myanmar and Bangladesh, and called upon Muslims “to wage jihad against its enemies, to liberate its land, to restore its sovereignty and to revive its caliphate.” Zawahiri states that a south Asian wing would benefit Muslims in Myanmar, Bangladesh and in the Indian states of Assam, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, who would be freed from “injustice and oppression.”

In his message, also Zawahiri also announced that Pakistani militant Asim Umar would be the emir of al Qaeda’s South Asian wing, entrusted with reviving the network in the area spanning from Afghanistan to Myanmar. Little is known of Umar: he is believed to be in his mid-forties and is perceived as an ideologist and intellectual rather than a fighter. He is thought have had a crucial role in creating radicalized seminaries and madrassas, and he is known to have strong connections with Islamic seminaries in Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan. It is believed that Umar organised Osama bin Laden’s move to a safe house in Abbottabad, where the 9/11 mastermind he lived for years prior to his capture by U.S. forces.

Zawahiri’s announcement signifies an attempt for AQ resurgence in south Asia, where the group was considerably weakened over a series of targeted attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan by the US and allied forces. While the core group was diminished, affiliates have gained momentum in the Middle East and Africa. The group took advantage of power vacuums created during the 2011 Arab uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa to spread their ideologies. Thus, while AQ central has become weaker, the group’s affiliates have gained strength in several places including Mali, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq. In Africa, AQ has affiliates have gained in Somalia through al-Shabaab, which has spread chaos into Uganda and Kenya, and in Nigeria through Boko Haram, which has affected north-eastern Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger. These affiliates are now considerably stronger than the core AQ group. The announcement of a new AQ wing in South Asia indicates that the group has accepted this new ‘business model’ and seeks to reassert its relevance in the region by opening a new branch.

Following the release of Zawahiri’s 55 minute video message, India’s intelligence bureau issued security alerts across several provinces in the county. Zawahiri’s announcement came just hours after several news reports announced that the militant group ISIS was also conducting recruitment operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The news reports indicated that ISIS militants were distributing pamphlets in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region; the pamphlets called for the establishment of a caliphate in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Zawahiri’s speech appeared to emphasise that the formation of the branch was not in direct response to ISIS, but the culmination of a longer process. In his message, he said, “This entity was not established today but is the fruit of a blessed effort of more than two years to gather the mujahedeen in the Indian sub-continent into a single entity.”

ISIS influence in India

Prior to the news reports on 5 September, ISIS was believed to focus its efforts on developing a ‘caliphate’ in areas the group had conquered in Iraq and Syria. In July, the group called for Muslims around the world to join them in establishing their new location. However it appears now that ISIS agents have been widening their efforts to recruit members of India’s Muslim community, the second largest in the world, with over 175 million Muslims.

In a speech on 5 July, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the ‘caliph’ of ISIS, made three specific references to India, first stating that Muslim rights in the nation were “forcibly seized”, then referencing atrocities committed against Muslims in Kashmir. Finally, he included India in a reference that the caliphate had “gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shami, Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghrabi, American, French, German and Australian” recruits. It is known that some Indians have already left their nation to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria. On 25 August, Indian engineering student Arif Ejaz Majeed became the first Indian reported to be killed while fighting for ISIS in Iraq. He and three friends reportedly went missing in May, and made contact with their families in June to notify them that the quartet had travelled to Iraq to join the radical group.

ISIS does not have a physical presence in India, yet through social media, the group is seeking to develop a ‘fringe’ subculture amongst potential followers in the region. Like other extreme groups, ISIS has cultivated a message which exploits the emotions of socially or economically marginalised people while simultaneously issuing a welcome for Muslims into their caliphate. The tactic is intended to attract dissatisfied members of Indian Muslim community and encourage those disenchanted individuals to do the ‘heavy lifting’ to attract others. An example of this effort already taking shape is a group called al-Isabah Media Production. The media production group is under the umbrella of a new group called Ansar ut-Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind (Supporters of Monotheism in the Land of India). This group translates ISIS propaganda into Hindu, Urdu and Tamil, and then delivers the messages through social media. While al-Isabah’s social media profiles on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter were removed after discovery, they still spread information through online chat rooms and other forums. This shows that ISIS does not necessarily need a physical presence in order to gain momentum in the region. This momentum has been most visible in the highly disputed region of Kashmir, where reports emerged that ISIS flags were being raised by young Muslim protestors in Srinagar. During two instances in July, young men in black masks raised the ISIS flag during protests of the Israeli airstrikes in Gaza. The incidents raised concerns in Kashmir, where Sunni and Shi’a Muslims have lived together harmoniously, that the introduction of ISIS ideology could create a sectarian divide. India has a very strong moderate Islamic core which is unlikely to allow space for ISIS or AQ, however, the instances where the militant groups have gained sympathy indicate that there are areas where troubles are significant enough for the groups to exploit by introducing an artificial identity crisis.

Competition or Unity

ISIS, formerly al-Qaeda in Iraq, severed ties with AQ in early 2014. ISIS quickly gained prominence through masterful use of propaganda and their rapid advancement through Iraq and Syria. The divergent groups have since been competing for new recruits, but AQ has been left overshadowed by ISIL’s media savvy. In part, AQ has been consistently overshadowed because its leader, Zawahiri, has remained underground, while ISIS has brazenly announced is movements. It could be this distinction that drove Zawahiri into making his rare appearance last week.

In Zawahiri’s message, he states, “O mujahideen, unite and reject differences and discord, and hold firm to the rope of Allah and be not divided amongst yourselves.” These references to rejecting differences could be a veiled message to encourage the groups to unite. He adds, “This entity, Allah permitting, was established to unite with its mujahideen brothers and the Muslims all over the world, and to crush the artificial borders established by the English occupiers to divide the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent.”

It is possible that Zawahiri is desperate to reunite ISIS and AQ in order to form one organisation rather than competing for a market share of radicalised minds. There is no indication, however, that ISIS intends to reunite with AQ. On the contrary, ISIS has actively urged AQ affiliates to leave their branch and join the newer organization.